



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

2013-2014 Winter Season Novice Packet

- Mexico Rural
Assistance Aff
- Mexico Rural
Assistance Neg

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.

Mexico Rural Assistance Affirmative

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Summary

This affirmative argues that the United States should send more aid to small rural farming operations in Mexico in the form of money, equipment and supplies (like fertilizer and tractors), and technical training (like lessons on irrigation) because it will reduce poverty and drug violence. Currently, poverty and drug violence is increasing as rural farmers in Mexico are having a hard time selling their food in North America as United States and Canadian farmers, who run highly efficient, government subsidized, and mechanized farms, can sell the same product a lot cheaper.

First, the affirmative argues that this aide will help farmers produce more food, cheaper. In making their food cheaper, more people will buy their food, which in turn, will help farmers keep their farms and stay out of poverty.

Further if farmers start to go out of business, they will look elsewhere to make money – and the two most profitable options are to start producing drugs like marijuana and cocaine or to start working for drug cartels as drug traffickers or contract killers. The plan would help make legitimate farming profitable again, so people do not have to turn to violence or drugs to make money.

Glossary

Felipe Calderon: The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012.

Enrique Peña Nieto: The current President of Mexico.

NAFTA: The North American Free Trade Agreement was a deal between the US, Mexico and Canada negotiated in the mid-1990's that made it easier for companies to ship goods across borders. Also, it eliminated extra taxes and limits on cheaper food from the United States and Canada that used to make Mexican food comparable in price to US and Canadian food. Without these extra taxes that kept US and Canadian food prices at the same level as Mexican food prices, Mexican farmers have had a tough time competing with cheaper US and Canadian goods. It is often argued that this policy has caused a great deal of harm to small rural farmers.

Mérida Initiative: The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of aid and security assistance to the Mexican government.

DTO: Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and distributes drugs.

Rural Development 1AC (1/5)

First, we will describe the current state of the US' relationship with Mexico:

US Aid for Mexico's war on drugs has failed to help reduce Mexico's problems with drug trafficking, poverty, and inequality.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 11

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, <http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf>)

Calderón's drug war led to the killing and capture of many of the cartels' leaders, but there is no sign that the drug trafficking organizations are ready to surrender. In describing Calderon's offensive, a U.S. Government Accountability Office report stated that it "does not appear to have significantly reduced drug trafficking in Mexico."¶ Analysts have found that the initiative is insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the cartels because it does not address the longterm problems that feed the drug trade: poverty and inequality. The Obama administration's expansion of the initiative to include some attention to poverty is a positive change, but to secure long-term impact, poverty relief and job creation for youth will need to become a core component of the initiative.

Rural Development 1AC (2/5)

Next, we will discuss how the absence of aid for programs that reduce poverty causes drug violence in Mexico.

The root cause of current drug violence in Mexico is the poverty of rural farmers.

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012
(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau_-Human_Security_and_War_on_Drugs.pdf)

As such, **the cultivation of illicit crops** and the salaries of sicarios (cartel hit men) **continue to be very attractive in the face of unemployment and poverty** (Kelly, Maghan, and Serio 2005; Hill 2010). However, as Wells (2006, 57) indicates, “this does not necessarily imply that the US should support these industries . . . [rather,] they should be aware of the extent to which people’s economic security is linked to drug cultivation and . . . the importance of offering them [viable] alternative economic opportunities.” ¶ In this light, **it is clear that drug policies should focus more on economic security by addressing problems of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. By maintaining a narrow perspective on the drug industry as a threat to state security, rather than a problem related to underdevelopment or socioeconomic conditions, the War on Drugs continues to neglect the roots of the drug industry.** Writing about the Mexican context, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2010, 7) supports this reconceptualization of security: “**Addressing the socioeconomic needs of the marginalized areas of both the northern urban belt as well as southern rural areas is critical for reducing the recruitment pool for the DTOs, severing the bonds between marginalized communities and criminal elements, and resurrecting the hope of many Mexican citizens that the Mexican State and legal behavior can best advance their future.**” FelbabBrown also underscores one of the most important factors in Mexico’s strategy: the bulk of the anti-drug activities are taking place in northern Mexico’s troubled states, but little action is being addressed in the southern states or poorer communities of the country. A similar situation occurred in Colombia, where security conditions improved in major cities, but rural communities—particularly in the Puntomayo region—have seen little progress.

Rural Development 1AC (3/5)

And, drug related violence in Mexico is increasing.

Shoichet, reporter for CNN, 2013

(Catherine E., March 28, 2013, A grisly crime surges into spotlight as Mexico shifts drug war strategy, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/world/americas/mexico-violence>)

That cartel has since fractured, but **violence in the region has remained a grisly reality.**¶ The seven corpses found in Uruapan last weekend were among at least 30 killed nationwide -- a high death toll that once again drew attention toward drug-related violence in Mexico, where **more than 60,000 people were killed in drug-related violence from 2006 to 2012,** according to Human Rights Watch.¶ Read more: Rape case in Mexican resort city puts violence back into the spotlight.¶ The violence comes as Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto pushes a new strategy aimed at focusing more on dealing with social and economic issues that fuel the drug trade and less on combating cartels head-on.¶ Uruapan is among the metropolitan areas in Mexico tapped for the president's new program, which aims to prevent violence, school dropouts, addiction and domestic violence, and also to better detect problems in Mexico's education system.¶ **Without jobs and social programs,** Peña Nieto told CNN last year, **millions of Mexicans "have no other option than to dedicate themselves sometimes to criminal activity."**¶ The goal of the government's new strategy, Interior Minister Miguel Angel Osorio Chong said last month, is creating a "culture of peace and respecting the law."¶ Mexico reports more than 26,000 missing.¶ "It is the responsibility of the state to pursue criminals and punish them to preserve peace and harmony," he said, "but we are convinced that fighting and punishment alone do not resolve the problem."¶ Some analysts have praised the new government approach.¶ **The cartels have been able to recruit tens of thousands of killers in part because poor neighborhoods have been systematically abandoned over decades** and lack sufficient schools, community centers and security -- in short they lack opportunity," the International Crisis Group said in a recent report on Mexico's cartel violence. "There are many dedicated Mexican social workers with the experience and ability to reach the vulnerable groups if they are given resources. If they succeed in reducing violence, theirs can become a security model to follow instead of one to fear."

Rural Development 1AC (4/5)

The violence from drug trafficking has several bad effects including human rights abuses and significant harm to communities

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012
(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau_-Human_Security_and_War_on_Drugs.pdf)

The presence of military forces in the drug wars has also intensified tensions between cartels and government officials. **Increasing pressure from the security forces and rival cartels has made DTOs more ruthless, violent, and willing to resort to kidnappings, torture, and terrorism across Mexico**, such as the 2011 bomb attack in Monterrey, in order to create an environment of fear and to gain territorial control. Furthermore, pressures in certain areas of the country have resulted in DTOs invading other, more peaceful areas such as Aguascalientes (Kellner and Pipitone 2010). The military may not be directly responsible for these crimes, but its presence provokes conflict by inviting more frequent and aggressive confrontations with DTOs. In the end, **civilians continue to suffer the burden of the War on Drugs**. Many individuals, including government officials, police officers, farmers and ordinary civilians, tend to face dual pressures in this battle for information and power. As Secombe (1997, 292) writes, they face “the threat of assassination or other violence, coupled with the offer of financial reward for a favourable decision [in favour of cartel demands].” As a result, Colombia and Mexico are left with corrupt, weak, untrusted governments and societies paralyzed by impunity, crime, and associated social problems, all of which compromise the security and well-being of individuals and communities. A growing sense of fear, frustration, and mistrust is felt by Colombians and Mexicans. The inability of the War on Drugs to assuage such feelings results in personal and community insecurity. **The current approach is so focused on military action that it has failed to ensure these forms of security and has actually led to human rights abuses, displacements, and deaths. A human security approach in Colombia and Mexico would prioritize the safety of populations and address socio-economic concerns and violence first.**

Rural Development 1AC (5/5)

Thus we offer the following plan:

The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic development assistance to small farmers in Mexico.

Last, we will discuss how development aid will reduce poverty and drug-related violence.

Development assistance to Mexico is crucial to resolve these harms and should target rural areas with small family farms

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 11

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, <http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf>)

Reducing migration pressures will require development and job creation throughout Mexico, but **poverty and international migration are particularly concentrated in the countryside**. Although about a quarter of all Mexicans live in rural areas, 60 percent of Mexico's extreme poor are rural and 44 percent of all of Mexico's international migration originates in rural communities (see Figure 2). ¶ This means that more than half of rural Mexicans live in poverty and 25 percent live in extreme poverty. 25 As one expert states, "Rural poverty is one ... of the principal "pushfactors" in Mexican migration to the United States" and thus should be the primary focus of development efforts aimed at reducing migration pressures. 26 After decades of declining support among international assistance agencies, 27 **agriculture and rural development is now re-emerging as a vital development focus**. The World Bank's 2008 World Development Report states, "**Agriculture continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable development and poverty reduction**." 28 ¶ **Research has also found that agriculture is one of the best returns on investment in terms of poverty-reduction spending**. 29 For example, **each 1 percent increase in crop productivity in Asia reduces the number of poor people by half a percent**. This correlation also holds for middle-income countries such as Mexico. 30 ¶ Among the options for agricultural development, **support for smallholder farmers is the most promising path for poverty reduction**. TheWorld Bank states, "**Improving the productivity, profitability, and sustainability of smallholder farming is the main pathway out of poverty in using agriculture for development**." **And smallholder farmers in Mexico are especially in need of assistance. After decades of declining support from the Mexican government and increased competition from subsidized U.S. producers under the North American Free Trade Agreement small-Mexican farmers have found it increasingly difficult to make a living**.

Answers to: Mexican Economy Growing

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[] Economic growth in Mexico has left small farmers behind – development aid is key to close the gap.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 11

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, <http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf>)

The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the culmination of the economic liberalization that began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-creation program that would slow immigration. But **NAFTA's policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented producers at the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued to diminish. Between 1991 and 2007 Mexico lost 20 percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs.** The loss of rural jobs and the inability to generate income impacted family farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural family employment declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of these displaced farmers ended up in the United States, sometimes working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers. ¶ After NAFTA, the operation of the Mexican small family farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while youth migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 1990 had left by 2000. Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican government also has done little to slow the exodus. Its leading program for small agricultural producers—PROCAMPO—does not target areas of high migration. ¶ Although the Mexican government is primarily responsible for addressing the country's rural poverty, **the United States can provide critical support for programs that address migration pressures at their source.** Because of its potential for long-term impact, such a strategy requires commensurate, sustained policy attention and resources. Furthermore, **by supporting economic development projects with rural Mexican organizations, Mexican government agencies—particularly at the local and regional levels—can be drawn into development projects that reduce migration pressures. A comprehensive, smallholder-based approach to development would by its very nature generate rural employment. Without support for Mexico's small and medium farmers, the country's rural economy will continue to be increasingly dependent on migration and remittances.** While the link between supporting smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact on migration pressures is less recognized.

Answers to: Aid Won't Solve – Mexican Farmers Can't Compete with US Subsidies

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[] With assistance Mexican farmers can compete against even subsidized, US food

Wise, Director of Policy Research at Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, 2012(Timothy A., Growing Out of the Food Crisis: Mexican Smallholders Key to Food Sovereignty, October 10, 2012, <http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GC50Oct12Wise.pdf>)

Since prices spiked in 2007-8, **policy-makers have rediscovered small-scale farmers**. Where the Washington Consensus treated them as unproductive, an anachronism in the modernizing global economy, suddenly they were once again “stewards of the land.” Raising their productivity, **closing the “yield gap”** – the difference between current and attainable yields using readily available technologies – became one of the pillars of the global response to the new food crisis. In theory, anyway. In our new study, we documented that this **is an attainable goal. We showed that small-scale Mexican corn farmers can close a yield gap estimated at 43% or more, and they can do so relying on existing technologies by investing in good old-fashioned farmer-led extension services**. This would eliminate Mexico's 10 million ton annual deficit, which it now fills with \$4 billion worth of imports from the United States. And it would improve resource use while increasing resilience to climate change. **↑Rising agricultural prices**, combined with growing import dependence, **have driven Mexico's food import bill over \$20 billion per year** and increased its agricultural trade deficit. The current drought in the United States is making this situation worse, with maize prices setting new record highs. Three million producers grow most of the country's white maize, which is used primarily for tortillas, and more than 59 native maize landraces that are basic ingredients of nearly 600 food preparations. Yield gaps are estimated at 43% on rain-fed land, compared to just 10% on the country's larger irrigated farms. **Most of the country's small to medium-scale maize farmers are operating at less than 50% of potential**

Answers to: Aid Won't Solve - High Demand for Drugs

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[] They have it backwards – drug production is extremely prevalent because of widespread rural poverty.

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012
(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau_-Human_Security_and_War_on_Drugs.pdf)

Both Colombia and Mexico bear high levels of poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality. These socio-economic conditions, along with weak political and judicial institutions, foster an environment in which drug cultivation and trafficking are not only possible, but for many have become attractive or necessary options to meet basic needs. It is estimated that over 80,000 Colombian families rely on illicit crop cultivation for their livelihoods (UNODC 2011a). The economic incentive is clear: “[A]s long as the price for coca leaves is ten times as high as that for cocoa, coffee, and rice for Andean farmers, they will continue to cultivate it” (Diego Garcia Savan in Wells 2006, 60). In this sense, drug trafficking effectively provides economic security, simply defined in the UNDP report as “assured basic income” (UNDP 1994, 25). Those without economic security often accept any work they can find, including informal work, badly paid, or unproductive work. Informal employment could be as high as 50 per cent in Colombia and 30 per cent in Mexico (World Bank 2012), which undoubtedly leads to increased economic insecurity and related problems such as criminal activity and migration.

Answers to: Not Enough Water

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[] The plan can make farmers competitive and self-sufficient even with coming water problems

Wise et al., Director of Policy Research at Tufts University's Global Development and Environment Institute, 2012

(Antonio Turrent Fernández, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey, Achieving Mexico's Maize Potential, GDAE Working Paper 12-03, October 2012, <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12-03TurrentMexMaize.pdf>)

Mexico now runs a production deficit of roughly 10 million mt/year and an import bill for maize of more than \$2.5 billion/year. This review has demonstrated that **Mexico has the potential to regain self-sufficiency in maize relatively quickly based on existing technologies** and without relying on controversial transgenic maize varieties. Turrent's surveys remain the most comprehensive guide to Mexico's maize potential, suggesting that within 10-15 years Mexico could increase annual production from current lands to 33 million/mt; irrigation and infrastructure projects in the southern part of the country could add another 24 million mt/year. This would be more than enough to meet Mexico's growing demand for maize, estimated to reach 39 million mt/year by 2025 (FAPRI 2011). Additional research confirms the viability of these estimates. ¶Following the prevailing international consensus, public investment should go where the yield gaps are the greatest, among small-to-medium-scale farmers. This is also where private investment is scarce and where market failures are prevalent. Indeed, **the most promising improvements identified in this review came from the provision of basic farmer-led extension services on rain-fed lands using existing technologies. Such programs** do not rely on the introduction of new improved seeds and they **have been proven to improve resource use and promote conservation**. In fact, **researchers recently published in Nature a study estimating that closing yield gaps through improved nutrient and water management could increase production by 30% while reducing inefficient use of inputs** (Mueller, Gerber et al. 2012).

Answer to: Aid Won't Solve – Interferes with Democracy, which is Key to Long-Term Success

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[] The kind of assistance we provide will make farmers self-sufficient and reduces aid dependency

ActionAid, an international charity for children's education, 2012

(Real Aid: Ending Dependency, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/real_aid_3.pdf)

The kind of aid that helps support dramatic decreases in aid dependence is what ActionAid calls real aid – that's **aid which empowers poor women and men** to realise their rights, **and reduces inequality. It might do this directly, by supporting smallholder farmers,** empowering women or building schools. Or it might do it indirectly, by supporting tax systems, better governance or economic development. It is accountable, transparent from beginning to end, and gets the most out of every dollar spent. **It supports developing countries to make their own decisions.** Substandard aid, however, does not do this – and there's still a lot of it out there.

Mexico Rural Assistance Negative

Mexico Rural Assistance Negative – Table of Contents

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Glossary

Felipe Calderon: The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012.

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Mérida Initiative: The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of aid and security assistance to the Mexican government.

DTO: Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and distributes drugs.

No Harms – Economy Growing Now

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[] The Mexican economy is developing now and jobs are becoming available

Flannery, Latin America focused analyst and writer, 2013

(Nathaniel Parish, 6/24/2013, Investor Insight: Is Mexico's Drug War Doomed To Failure?, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/06/24/investor-insight-is-mexicos-drugwar-doomed-to-failure/2/>)

In spite of the violence, Mexico's economy has continued to move forward, even though foreign investment and GDP growth are both starting to slow. **Every day one million people and more than one billion dollars worth of goods cross the border. Gruesome drugwar violence tends to dominate the public debate on Mexico, but along the U.S.-Mexico border, the most important bonds between the two countries are economics.** In her book Two Nations Indivisible Shannon O'Neil explains that "Integration with Mexico has allowed giants such as General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, and Hewlett Packard to lower costs and compete in global markets where they would otherwise be excluded—creating more exports and jobs for both the United States and Mexico in the process." **Chrysler, GM and Ford have all invested billions of dollars and hired thousands of workers in Mexico**, a fact that helped these companies earn a combined US\$12.7 billion in 2012. Despite the benefits of cross-border cooperation, a number of companies also face serious challenges when it comes to managing their operations in Mexico. Nissan and Pepsi both suffered attacks against their facilities and HSBC has seen its reputation severely damaged as the result of a cartel money laundering scandal.

Status Quo Solves – Mexican Government Increasing Poverty Reduction Efforts

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[] The Mexican government is substantially increasing their poverty alleviation efforts

Fox News 2011

(Mexico's Peña Nieto vows to reduce poverty, Sept 11th,
<http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/09/11/mexico-pena-nieto-vows-to-reduce-poverty/#ixzz2XqGXcKZK>)

President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto said in an address to political and business leaders that he **planned to focus on reducing the poverty that afflicts 52 million Mexicans and to boost gross domestic product growth**, which has averaged 2.4 percent annually over the past three decades.¶ The president-elect told the approximately 300 movers and shakers from the worlds of business and politics who attended the annual Lideres Mexicanos magazine dinner on Monday that he was aiming to produce positive results.¶ The 46-year-old Peña Nieto, who will take office on Dec. 1, said **his administration would aim to create 1 million jobs annually and restore Mexico's status as a world leader**.¶ Existing social assistance programs that only "give money away" will be changed, with new policies being implemented to help families get involved in productive activities, Peña Nieto said.¶ **Tax, energy, labor and security reforms will be implemented to boost economic growth**, the president-elect said.¶ **The economy has tremendous growth opportunities and Mexico is part of the MIST** (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) **group**, which is similar to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group of fast-growing emerging economies, Peña Nieto said, citing analysts.¶ "Mexico has a great opportunity to project itself in the world and gain the confidence of capital to promote its economic growth," Peña Nieto said.

No Harms – Drug Related Violence is Declining in Mexico

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[] Violence in Mexico has been declining

Castañeda, foreign minister of Mexico during the administration of President Vicente Fox, 12
(Jorge, CATO Institute Economic Development Memo, No. 16 • September 24, 2012,
<http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb16.pdf>)

Time for an Alternative to Mexico's Drug War False Premises for Launching the Drug War First false premise: violence in Mexico had been increasing, and something had to be done about it. Absolutely false. **Violence in Mexico had been declining by any indicator, mainly the most important and reliable one: willful homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants. From the early 1990s through 2007, violence in Mexico declined from around 20-odd willful homicides per hundred thousand a year to about 8 per year in 2006 and 2007.** That is still higher than the rate in United States, but **it is one-third the rate in Brazil, one-tenth of what Colombia saw in its worst years**, and one-third of what we have in Mexico today. Violence in Mexico had been declining for 20 years, but then spiked from 2007 onward. The year 2011 saw violence in Mexico reach Brazilian levels.

Aid Won't Solve – Mexican Farmers Can't Compete with US Subsidies

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[] **Farmers can't compete with subsidized American goods – no amount of aid can convince people to remain farmers**

Hesson, MA at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, 2010

(Ted, Oaxaca Trip: NAFTA and Mexico's Small Farmers, January 21,

http://www.longislandwins.com/index.php/blog/post/oaxaca_trip_nafta_and_mexicos_small_farmers/)

Then came **NAFTA** in 1994, which **hit the Mexican agricultural sector hard**. As part of the agreement, **Mexico had to eliminate all tariffs** on agricultural imports by 2008 (from what I understand, there are no longer any tariffs on agricultural goods). **That meant that small Mexican farmers wouldn't be able to compete with subsidized U.S. imports**, including corn. According to a 2002 article in Business Week, the average Mexican farmer then received \$722 in annual subsidies, while U.S. farmers stand to collect \$20,800 per year. From 1990 - 2000, the market price for corn decreased 58.3 percent and and market price for beans decreased 45 percent. Decreased subsidies hurt Mexican agriculture, but there are other NAFTA-related factors that affected this sector of the economy, as well. Support to small farmers from the Mexican government has declined by 31.26 percent since NAFTA came into effect, and the Mexican government has not enforced pre-NAFTA quota rules, which would limit agricultural imports. In a country where 10 million people—a quarter of the workforce—live off the land, the inability to compete has increased poverty and forced more people to consider migrating, either to the U.S. or other parts of Mexico. Since NAFTA was enacted, 2 million people have been displaced from the agricultural sector while the rural poverty rate has climbed to 85 percent. Here's what the Witness for Peace information packet has to say about the change: "Because **[small farmers] can no longer produce food that is cheap enough to compete with U.S. imports, an increasing number of Mexican farmers have been forced to abandon the countryside**. This is disrupting the social and cultural fabric of rural Mexico. **It is not unusual for a small Mexican town to have lost half its population to migration over the past twelve years.**" In the small villages across the state of Oaxaca, **the history of corn cultivation goes back thousands of years. But** with rapidly growing Mexican imports—1/5 of corn consumed by Mexicans is now imported—**those traditions seem headed for extinction.**

Aid Won't Solve – Mexican Farmers Can't Compete with US Subsidies

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[] US subsidies make US food so cheap that small farming is no longer economically viable

Baumann, Director of LCSWorldwide, 2013

(Susana G, 01/11/2013, Mexican Farmers Affected By Agricultural Subsidies From NAFTA, Other International Agreements, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/11/mexican-farmers-agricultural-subsidies_n_2457845.html)

The impact of NAFTA and other international agreements in combination with U.S. agricultural subsidies expel millions of Mexicans and other rural workers from their countries of origin into the United States territory every year.¶ According to Wise, who carried out a comparison of farm product prices in the U.S.-Mexico trade between 1997 and 2005, **Mexico was flooded with agricultural imports exported at prices below production costs.**¶ In his research, **the eight products studied included corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, beef, pork and poultry. All products showed significant increase in exports**—from the lowest 159 percent in soybean to the largest in pork exports at 707 percent.¶ For all products, Mexican producers' prices fell from 44 to 67 percent from early 1990's levels, declining local production and increasing import dependency. Mexican crop production also fell except for corn and meats, which at lower prices, was rapidly adopted for consumption in the Mexican families' diet.¶ **An estimated 2.3 million people have left agriculture in a country desperate for livelihoods,** said Wise. **The study estimated that the cost to Mexican producers was around \$12.8 billion in the nine-year period, more than 10 percent of the U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade value annually.**

Aid Won't Solve – High Demand for Drugs

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[] **Can't decrease drug violence without decreasing use in the US – demand, not under development is the cause**

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009

(Ted Galen, Troubled Neighbor: Mexico's Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 631, February 2, 2009, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa631.pdf>)

Robust Consumer Demand Makes Victory Impossible That sobering reality has ominous implications for the strategy that advocates of a “war on drugs” continue to push. Their strategy has long had two major components. The first is to shut off the flow of drugs coming from drug-source countries, through various methods of drug crop eradication, developmental aid to promote alternative economic opportunities, interdiction of drug shipments, and suppression of money-laundering activities. The second component is to significantly reduce demand in the United States through a combination of criminal sanctions, drug treatment programs, and anti-drug educational campaigns. At best, efforts at domestic demand reduction have achieved only modest results, and the supply-side campaign has been even less effective. Moreover, with global demand continuing to increase, even if drug warriors succeeded in their goal of more substantially reducing consumption in the United States, it would have little adverse impact on trafficking organizations. **There is more than enough demand globally to attract and sustain traffickers who are willing to take the risks to satisfy that demand.** And since **the illegality of the trade creates a huge black market premium** (depending on the drug, 90 percent or more of the retail price), the potential profits to drug trafficking organizations are huge.⁶⁶ Thus, **the supply-side strategy attempts to defy the basic laws of economics, with predictable results. It is a fatally flawed strategy,** and Washington's insistence on continuing it causes serious problems of corruption and violence for a key drug-source and drug-transiting country such as Mexico. Thus, the notion that the solution to the violence in Mexico is to win the war on drugs is as much a chimera as the other two so-called solutions. Given the healthy state of global demand, there is no prospect of ending—or even substantially reducing—the trade in illegal drugs. There is only one policy change that would have a meaningful impact.

Aid Won't Solve – Not Enough Water for Farmers

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[] Droughts and climate change make farming in Mexico unsustainable

Tegel, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America, 2012

(Simon, Mexico's drought turns farms to dust, July,

<http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/-americas/mexico/120716/drought-farms-climate-change>)

The lack of rain is forcing the region's farmers to draw ever more heavily on the aquifers lying below their fields. Yet that is no solution either.¶ The aquifers' sole source of replenishment is the rain itself. And just 3 percent of the precipitation that falls here ever makes it to the aquifers. Most of the rest evaporates.¶As a result, the farmers are having to dig their wells deeper and deeper into the rocky ground.¶ Rafael Armendariz, 65, is president of the community of Benito Juarez, a few miles from Constitucion. He says that wells, which a generation ago produced water from a depth of 250 feet, now have to be excavated, at great cost, to around 800 feet.¶ To make matters worse, CONAGUA, the national water commission, has not done any hydrological studies of the local aquifer. No one in Benito Juarez knows how close they are to the aquifer running dry.¶ "We don't know what else to do," says Armendariz, as he predicts that the current generation could be the last in Benito Juarez to work the land. "Farming is the only thing we have ever done. That is why we keep at it."¶ And the costs of deeper wells go beyond their excavation. Alejandro Rodriguez, 46, uses three wells to irrigate his 338-acre peach and apple farm on the outskirts of Chihuahua city.¶ His monthly electricity bill for pumping that water from an aquifer 350 feet down can reach almost \$10,000. As the wells go deeper, the electricity required increases exponentially.¶ The regional government talks about climate change but has done little, says Martin Bustamente, of the Chihuahua branch of El Barzon.¶ **"We have never learned to live in the desert and now that climate change has arrived, we are finally going to have to catch up or face disaster,"** he warns.¶ He is calling for government support for farmers to acquire more efficient, state-of-the-art irrigation systems and for no aquifer to be used unsustainably. He is also pushing for a way to have thirsty urban areas pay the region's farmers, who, effectively, manage the natural watersheds that supply the cities' water.¶ Above all, he wants existing laws to be enforced so that the amount of water actually withdrawn from aquifers does not exceed the concessions authorized by CONAGUA.¶ Outside observers may think northern Mexican governments are overburdened trying to contain drug war violence.¶ But for residents like Armendariz, water is the real security issue.¶ **"Violence? If the rains don't come, it will only get worse because more people will be out of work. You cannot fix that problem if you don't secure the water."**

Aid Won't Solve – Interferes with Democracy, which is Key to Long-Term Success

Aid Won't Solve – Aid from outside organizations undermines democratic decision making and thus never allows a people to solve their own problems; this kind of democracy is key to change the rules of engagement, aka, the status quo.

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap-/swap404.pdf)

This study analyzes the political economy of aid dependence. **Large amounts of aid** delivered over long periods, create incentives for governments and donors that have the potential to **undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions**. These incentives are not always acted on, but when they are, large amounts of **aid may reduce local ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, while fragmenting budgets and lowering tax effort**. Large amounts of aid, delivered to countries with weak institutions create some of the institutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness. In aid dependent countries, **donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the critical functions of governance**: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or decaying public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation and maintenance is neither planned for nor affordable. In these countries, aid has been part of the problem. And longterm **dependence on aid creates disincentives for both donors and governments to change the rules of their engagement.**