### Mexico Rural Development Negative

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### Summary

#### This negative contains several answers to the fundamental arguments of the rural assistance affirmative. Here you can find arguments to answer the affirmative’s advantages like:

#### Drug violence is declining now, which means the status quo is sufficient to solve the problem

#### Mexico’s economy is growing – so farmers aren’t as poor as they used to be

#### Deforestation is declining now

#### You can also find more substantial arguments against the rural assistance affirmative like:

#### The War on Drugs policy has been successful and should continue – this is a defense of the status quo that proves the affirmative is an unnecessary step to combat drug violence.

#### Foreign aid creates cycles of dependence – this argument states that governments that receive aid are more likely to become corrupt and reliant on aid to function.

### Glossary

**DTO:** Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and distributes drugs.

**Enrique Peña Nieto:** The current President of Mexico.

**Felipe Calderon:** The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012.

**Mérida Initiative**: The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of aid and security assistance to the Mexican government.

**NAFTA:** The North American Free Trade Agreement was a deal between the US, Mexico and Canada negotiated in the mid-1990’s that made is easier for companies to ship goods across the borders but also had a variety of negative effects on average people.

**War On Drugs:** A policy by the United States Federal Government that gives foreign military aid to foreign countries in aims to identify and fight drug cartel/organizations to destroy the illegal drug trade.

### No Harms – Violence Declining

**[ ]**

[ ] Violence in Mexico has been declining

Castañeda, foreign minister of Mexico during the administration of President Vicente Fox, 12

(Jorge, CATO Institute Economic Development Memo, No. 16 • September 24, 2012, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb16.pdf)

Time for an Alternative to Mexico’s Drug War False Premises for Launching the Drug War First false premise: violence in Mexico had been increasing, and something had to be done about it. Absolutely false. Violence in Mexico had been declining by any indicator, mainly the most important and reliable one: willful homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants. From the early 1990s through 2007, violence in Mexico declined from around 20-odd willful homicides per hundred thousand a year to about 8 per year in 2006 and 2007. That is still higher than the rate in United States, but it is one-third the rate in Brazil, one-tenth of what Colombia saw in its worst years, and one-third of what we have in Mexico today. Violence in Mexico had been declining for 20 years, but then spiked from 2007 onward. The year 2011 saw violence in Mexico reach Brazilian levels.

### Answers to: US Drug Consumption Add-On

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Legal prescription medicine is just as harmful in terms of addiction and lost economic output – reducing drug trafficking won’t get rid of drug abuse.

Renick, writer from Bloomberg News, 2011

(Oliver, “Prescription Drugs Cause More Overdoses in U.S. Than Heroin and Cocaine” Jul 7, 2011 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-07/prescription-drugs-cause-more-overdoses-in-u-s-than-heroin-and-cocaine.html>)

Accidental drug overdoses from prescription pills have more than doubled in the past decade as deaths from illegal drugs decreased, a Florida study found.¶ Prescription medications were implicated in 76 percent of all overdose deaths in Florida between 2003 and 2009, while illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin were present in 34 percent of deaths, according to data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Ten percent of overdoses came from a mix of both illegal and prescription drugs.¶ Unintentional poisoning is the second leading cause of injury death in the U.S. after automobile accidents, accounting for 29,846 deaths nationwide in 2007, the CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, said. In 2007, the U.S. government began the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, a $9 million program that provides state funding for recording and monitoring prescription drug use.¶ “By 2009, the number of deaths involving prescription drugs was four times the number involving illicit drugs,” the report said. “These findings indicate the need to strengthen interventions aimed at reducing overdose deaths from prescription drugs.”¶ The number of annual deaths from lethal concentrations of prescription medicines increased 84 percent from 2003 to 2009, while deadly overdoses of illegal drugs fell 21 percent. Deaths from the narcotic painkiller oxycodone and anxiety medicine alprazolam, sold under the brand name Xanax, more than tripled.¶ Availability¶ “The sense is that the widespread availability of prescription drugs is causing people to switch from illicit drugs like cocaine and heroin,” Leonard Paulozzi, a medical epidemiologist at CDC’s Injury Center, said in a phone interview.¶ Paulozzi said most prescription overdoses were in men between the ages of 45 and 54.¶ Heroin death rates dropped 62 percent in the period. Cocaine overdoses increased until 2007, and declined in 2008 and 2009, researchers found. Methadone rates rose 79 percent, the study said.¶ The federal government spent $15.1 billion on the so-called War on Drugs in 2010, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Efforts to combat illegal drug use included prevention, treatment, law enforcement and interdiction.

### Answers to: Drugs Hurt the US Economy

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Economic decline decreases the risk of international aggression and war.

#### 

Tir, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, 2010

(Jaroslav, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, *The Journal of Politics*, Volume 72: 413-425, Project MUSE)

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise.

No Harms – Economy Growing Now

**[ ]**

[ ] The Mexican economy is developing now and jobs are becoming available

Flannery, Latin America focused analyst and writer, 2013

(Nathaniel Parish, 6/24/2013, Investor Insight: Is Mexico's Drug War Doomed To Failure?, http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/06/24/investor-insight-is-mexicos-drugwar-doomed-to-failure/2/)

In spite of the violence, Mexico’s economy has continued to move forward, even though foreign investment and GDP growth are both starting to slow. Every day one million people and more than one billion dollars worth of goods cross the border. Gruesome drugwar violence tends to dominate the public debate on Mexico, but along the U.S.-Mexico border, the most important bonds between the two countries are economics. In her book Two Nations Indivisible [Shannon O’Neil](https://twitter.com/shannonkoneil)explains that “Integration with Mexico has allowed giants such as General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, General Electric, and Hewlett Packard to lower costs and compete in global markets where they would otherwise be excluded—creating more exports and jobs for both the United States and Mexico in the process.” Chrysler, GM and Ford have all invested billions of dollars and hired thousands of workers in Mexico, a fact that helped these companies earn a combined US$12.7 billion in 2012. Despite the benefits of cross-border cooperation, a number of companies also face serious challenges when in comes to managing their operations in Mexico.[Nissan](http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/03/fighting-continues-in-ciudad-victoria.html)and [Pepsi](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2151369/Sabritas-factories-owned-Pepsi-attacked-firebombs-Mexican-drug-cartel.html) both suffered attacks against their facilities and [HSBC](http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2012/09/30/could-hsbc-face-the-worlds-first-billion-dollar-money-laundering-settlement/) has seen its reputation severely damaged as the result of a cartel money laundering scandal.

### Status Quo Solves – Mexican Government Increasing Poverty Reduction Efforts

**[ ]**

[ ] The Mexican government is substantially increasing their poverty alleviation efforts

Fox News 2011

(Mexico's Peña Nieto vows to reduce poverty, Sept 11th, <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/09/11/mexico-pena-nieto-vows-to-reduce-poverty/#ixzz2XqGXcKZK>)

President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto said in an address to political and business leaders that he planned to focus on reducing the poverty that afflicts 52 million Mexicans and to boost gross domestic product growth, which has averaged 2.4 percent annually over the past three decades.¶ The president-elect told the approximately 300 movers and shakers from the worlds of business and politics who attended the annual Lideres Mexicanos magazine dinner on Monday that he was aiming to produce positive results.¶ The 46-year-old Peña Nieto, who will take office on Dec. 1, said his administration would aim to create 1 million jobs annually and restore Mexico's status as a world leader.¶ Existing social assistance programs that only "give money away" will be changed, with new policies being implemented to help families get involved in productive activities, Peña Nieto said.¶ Tax, energy, labor and security reforms will be implemented to boost economic growth, the president-elect said.¶ The economy has tremendous growth opportunities and Mexico is part of the MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) group, which is similar to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group of fast-growing emerging economies, Peña Nieto said, citing analysts.¶ "Mexico has a great opportunity to project itself in the world and gain the confidence of capital to promote its economic growth," Peña Nieto said.

### Status Quo Solves – Drug Production Profitable

#### [ ] Drug trade solves widespread poverty --- small farmers who cultivate drugs stay afloat.

Keefer and Loazya, research economists at the World Bank, 2008

(Philip and Norman, The World Bank, “The Development Impact of the Illegality of Drug Trade,” *The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper*, March, WPS4543)

Repression of the drug trade naturally reduces the wealth of agriculture workers in poor countries that grow poppy seeds (Afghanistan) and coca leaves (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru). Their welfare losses are usually considered insignificant relevant to evaluations of prohibition, precisely because their farming activity is either criminal in and of itself, or contributes to criminal activity in other countries. There are four reasons to take these welfare losses more seriously. First, the cultivation of poppy seeds and coca has not been historically criminalized, nor is it everywhere criminalized; these farmers are therefore not criminals in the usual sense nor in their own perception. Second, they are poor and the welfare losses caused by economic setbacks are proportionally greater. Third, the benefits of prohibition seem to be scant, such that even the lightly-weighted welfare losses that prohibition imposes on cultivators may be relatively large. The fourth reason is perhaps the most important: the losses that farmers incur may arise in part because criminalization leads to a transfer of rents from them to drug traffickers.

### Turn - Aid Hurts Small Farmers

#### [ ] Aid introduces farmers to the international food market – they’ll get crushed by corporations and driven off their land.

Ewelukwa, Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 2005

(Uche U. " Centuries of Globalization; Centuries of Exclusion: African Women, Human Rights, and the "New" International Trade Regime" *Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice* 20 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 75)

Ultimately, the unregulated influx of cheaper goods from the North could significantly displace local production, lead to the loss of traditional market domain of small farmers, and threaten the livelihood of millions. While data is not currently available to demonstrate the effect of dumping on farmers in rural communities in Africa, the problem in Mexico is replicated in many communities around the globe. As the IATP report rightly notes, the displacement of farmers as a result of agricultural dumping "is happening around the world, in places as far apart as Jamaica, Burkina Faso and the Philippines." 337¶ A second problem with dumping is that Third World farmers who venture to sell their product to exporters "find their global market share undermined by the lower-cost competition." 338 Additionally, dumping has important implications for a nation's food security. 339¶ Trade liberalization also triggers changes in the supply and distribution of produce that privilege large-scale producers and suppliers. Trade liberalization in services opens doors for foreign investors to establish large grocery stores in place of the traditional open-air markets that are prevalent in Africa. As large grocery stores spring up, the tendency would be for the stores to turn to agro-businesses for their supply of produce because local farmers lack the capital and the know-how to meet the quality standards the grocery stores demand. In Africa, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations ("FAO") reports that small farmers risk being swept out of agriculture by a wave of supermarket expansion. 340 The FAO reports that the wave of supermarket expansion is not limited to major cities but has spread to rural towns. FAO's Kostas Stamoulis predicts that "the onslaught of supermarkets will improve the quality and safety of food sold locally as farmers strive to meet supermarket's quality standards for the domestic market," 341 and argues that supermarkets [\*130] could provide "a stable, dependable market for farmers' produce and may boost employment in cities and surrounding areas by providing jobs in transport and distribution." 342 The impact on small farmers is likely to be catastrophic. For example, giant corporations could institute new quality and safety standards in order to wipe out local competition.

### No Harms – Deforestation Rates Declining

**[ ]**

#### [ ] Deforestation is slowing

REUTERS in 06

(Reuters 18/10/06. “Brazil declares Amazon not for sale” Carbon Offset Projects > Brazil reforestation >Project-related news. <http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=448> Thursday, 19 October 2006)

The Brazilian government says it wants foreign help to preserve the Amazon but rejected any sell off of what it described as the heritage of the Brazilian people. Environment minister said the Amazon was “not for sale” and the country had its own plan for Amazon conservation which it would table at the annual UN climate convention conference in Nairobi next month.¶ It’s believed the government wants an international loan fund set up that is tied specifically to action to prevent native forests being cut down.¶ Silva added that Al Gore would be asked to support the Brazil plan. The climate campaigner and global warming film-maker and author is in Brazil promoting his book, based on the film An Inconvenient Truth.¶ The rate of Amazon rainforest loss has slowed in recent years but large areas continue to disappear each year to make way for agriculture. Between July 2004 and August 2005, 18,900 square kilometres of forest were destroyed, an area almost half the size of Switzerland.

### No Harms – Trends Show RE-forestation is Occuring

**[ ]**

#### [ ] Reforestation is actually occurring globally.

Beef Myths.org, 2007

(Beef Myths, 2007, “Amazon Rainforest Deforestation and U.S. Beef Consumption” http://www.beefmyths.org/beefmyths/amazonrainforestdeforestation/)

To understand the issue of tropical rainforests and destruction we have to look at the big picture, i.e. total forest destruction. According to current estimates, on an annual basis, 0.38 percent of the world’s forests were converted to other land uses during the 1990s. To partially offset this loss, large areas reverted to forest during this same time leaving a net deficit of 0.22 percent per year.[1] The world’s temperate-zone forests are actually expanding due to reforestation by affluent countries and reduced losses caused from fires and pests. The rate of tropical forest loss was 0.8 percent, with the greatest losses occurring in Africa and South America, though the greatest rate of loss occurred in Asia.[1] Since 1990 the rate of loss has been decreasing. America had its own surge of tree-clearing in the late 19th century. We cut huge tracts of Eastern forest to fuel small pig-iron smelters. After the advent of coal-fired steel furnaces, virtually all of the forest was allowed to regrow. According to 1996 government statistics, we actually have 14 million more acres of forest land than we did in 1920.[2]

Status Quo Solves – Mexico Receives Aid to Reduce Deforestation

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Mexico is already receiving a significant amount of aid targeted directly at deforestation

Latino Daily News 2012

(Mexico To Fight Deforestation With $15 Million Loan, November, http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/mexico-to-fight-deforestation-with-15-million-loan/19938/)

Mexico will receive $15 million in financial and technical assistance to support climate change mitigation efforts. The program will create a dedicated financing line, accessible by communities and ejidos or their members, for identified low carbon projects in forest landscapes in five of the states with the highest levels of net forest loss: Oaxaca, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Jalisco and Campeche.¶ The program is sponsored by the Forest Investment Program (FIP) under the Strategic Climate Fund, which supports governments in their efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, promote sustainable forest management and enhance forest carbon stocks. [Mexico’s Investment Plan under the FIP](http://beforeitsnews.com/r2/?url=http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=ME-L1120) was approved in October, 2011.¶ The program includes a $10 million loan for financing projects that must reconcile economic profit for the communities and generate environmental benefits through reducing the pressure on forests and promoting enhancement of carbon stocks. Through the dedicated financing line, the program will attend one of the underlying economic causes of deforestation and forest degradation by removing the obstacles that limit access to credit by offering the financial terms and conditions required for these projects.¶ A $5 million grant will provide additional financial and technical assistance to support the viability of the individual projects. The grant will strengthen the technical, financial and management skills at the ejido and community level for conducting low carbon strategies.¶ The program is a pilot project that will permit obtaining lessons for its replication in other key geographic areas in Mexico, demonstrating a viable business models that promotes reduction of deforestation and degradation while increasing economic returns, and the corresponding financial structures that are required.

Status Quo Solves – Mexican Laws have Reduced Deforestation

#### [ ]

[ ] Mexico is making substantial progress against deforestation now

Gardiner and Pichardo, vice president of the Global Legislators Organization and president of GLOBE Mexico and a former deputy in the Mexican Parliament, 2012

(Barry and Ignacio, Mexico sets global benchmark on tackling deforestation, Daily Times, http://www.illegal-logging.info/item\_single.php?it\_id=6607&it=news&printer=1)

Below the global radar, a major victory was secured in Mexico on Tuesday, April 24, in the worldwide battle to prevent deforestation and forest degradation, which are collectively the world’s second largest sources of greenhouse emissions. A set of legal amendments was approved by the Mexican Parliament that sets a powerful global precedent for empowering local communities to address deforestation. In so doing, the vote also positions Mexico as the first country in the world to legislate in support of efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (the so-called REDD+ agenda). This is a crucial development, and is of global importance for several reasons. Up until now, debate on REDD+ has predominantly been within the UN climate convention and the executive branch of governments across the world. However, approval of these legal amendments by a domestic legislature (the Mexican Congress) highlights an important transition towards engraining the approach within national legal frameworks. In addition to this shift in focus, this Mexican package of legal reforms takes a critical step towards ensuring that local communities who sustainably manage their forests receive the economic benefits derived from any future carbon payment scheme. By enshrining this in national legislation, the Mexican Congress is building a groundbreaking, forward-looking legal framework that supports the concept that forests should be worth more alive than dead. As important as the Mexican precedent is, however, this argument now needs to be won across a critical mass of other countries if global deforestation is to be truly addressed – and its contribution to global warming arrested. Although Brazil has made headlines in recent years for reducing its deforestation rates, a report published by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in late 2011 showed that the global net loss of forests between 1990 and 2005 was 72.9 million hectares. This is unsustainably large, even though the net rate of loss is slowing.

### No Solvency – Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Mexico is no longer the global hotspot for drugs – it’s shifting to Honduras and Central America.

Tico Times, 2012

(“Central America replaces Mexico as front line for drug trafficking, UN says” http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/Central-America-replaces-Mexico-as-front-line-for-drug-trafficking-UN-says\_Sunday-September-30-2012 Tico Times)

Central America is replacing Mexico as the top front for drug trafficking from South America to the United States. The change is inciting an increase in regional violence, according to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.¶ "The implementation of the Mexican security strategy (beginning in 2006) increased the importance of Central American links (with the traffickers) that had begun many years ago," said the study released last week. The study cites an increase of direct major drug shipments from Central¶ America to the United States and a decrease in shipments from Mexico to the United States.¶ Drug trafficking has undoubtedly contributed to the increase of violence in Central America, which has reached "extreme" levels, the study said.¶ However it notes that gangs or "maras" remain a major cause of violent deaths in urban parts of the region.¶ Honduras maintains the highest homicide rate in the world with 92 killed per 100,000 in 2011. El Salvador has a homicide rate of 69 per 100,000 citizens and Guatemala has a rate of 39 murders per 100,000. Costa Rica has the lowest homicide rate on the isthmus with 10.3 murders per 100,000. For comparison, the United States homicide rate was 4.2 per 100,000 in 2010, according to the most recent statistics.¶ According to the UNODC, Central American countries play a key role in the transit of cocaine from South America, but "Honduras is now the most popular entry point for cocaine."¶ "Approximately 65 of the 80 tons transported by air toward the United States lands in Honduras," where authorities found 62 secret airstrips between February and March 2012.¶ The activity of drug trafficking in that country increased "dramatically" after the 2009 coup against former President Manuel Zelaya, as "law enforcement fell into disarray, resources were diverted to maintaining order, and counternarcotics assistance from the United States was suspended," the report adds.¶ The Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas has expanded its presence into Guatemala, by operating in local cells made up of ex-members of elite military corps.¶ "It is said that Los Zetas traveled to Guatemala and created a local faction around 2008. Since then, the group has played a prominent role in the violence in that country," the UNODC report said.¶ In 2010, 330 tons of cocaine entered Guatemala for the United States, according to official U.S. figures cited in the report.¶ As for El Salvador, authorities say minimal cocaine passes through the country, which is confirmed by "radar data suggesting very few shipments go directly from South America to El Salvador."¶ However, the official figures could be underestimating the size of the cocaine flow, the report added.¶ Drug trafficking from Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama, while still minor compared to Honduras or Guatemala, also has increased "significantly" in the past years, the document said.

### No Solvency – Drug Demand Makes Production Inevitable

**[ ]**

[ ] Production of drugs is inevitable because of US demand – drug trade remains too profitable.

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009

(Ted Galen, Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 631, February 2, 2009, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs-/pdf/pa631.pdf)

Robust Consumer Demand Makes Victory Impossible That sobering reality has ominous implications for the strategy that advocates of a “war on drugs” continue to push. Their strategy has long had two major components. The first is to shut off the flow of drugs coming from drug-source countries, through various methods of drug crop eradication, developmental aid to promote alternative economic opportunities, interdiction of drug shipments, and suppression of money-laundering activities. The second component is to significantly reduce demand in the United Statesthrough a combination of criminalsanctions, drug treatment programs, and anti-drug educational campaigns. At best, efforts at domestic demand reduc- tion have achieved only modest results, and the supply-side campaign has been even less effective. Moreover, with global demand continuing to increase, even if drug warriors succeeded in their goal of more substantially reducing consumption in the United States, it would have little adverse impact on trafficking organizations. There is more than enough demand globally to attract and sustain traffickers who are willing to take the risks to satisfy thatdemand. And since the illegality of the trade creates a huge black market premium (depending on the drug, 90 percent ormore of the retail price), the potential profits to drug trafficking organizations are huge. 66 Thus, the supply-side strategy attempts to defy the basic laws of economics, with predictable results. It is a fatally flawed strategy, and Washington’s insistence on continuing it causes serious problems of corruption and violence for a key drug-source and drug-transiting country such as Mexico. Thus, the notion that the solution to the violence in Mexico is to win the war on drugs is asmuch a chimera asthe othertwo so-called solutions. Given the healthy state of global demand, there is no prospect of ending—or even substantially reducing—the trade in illegal drugs. There is only one policy change that would have a meaningful impact.

No Solvency – Farmers Can’t Compete

#### [ ]

[ ] Farmers can’t compete with subsidized American goods – no amount of aid can incentivize people to remain farmers

Hesson, MA at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, 2010

(Ted, Oaxaca Trip: NAFTA and Mexico’s Small Farmers, January 21, http://www.longislandwins.com/index.php/blog/post/oaxaca\_trip\_nafta\_and\_mexicos\_small\_farmers/)

Then came NAFTA in 1994, which hit the Mexican agricultural sector hard. As part of the agreement, Mexico had to eliminate all tariffs on agricultural imports by 2008 (from what I understand, there are no longer any tariffs on agricultural goods). That meant that small Mexican farmers wouldn’t be able to compete with subsidized U.S. imports, including corn. According to a 2002 article in Business Week, the average Mexican farmer then received $722 in annual subsidies, while U.S. farmers stand to collect $20,800 per year. From 1990 - 2000, the market price for corn decreased 58.3 percent and and market price for beans decreased 45 percent. Decreased subsidies hurt Mexican agriculture, but there are other NAFTA-related factors that affected this sector of the economy, as well. Support to small farmers from the Mexican government has declined by 31.26 percent since NAFTA came into effect, and the Mexican government has not enforced pre-NAFTA quota rules, which would limit agricultural imports. In a country where 10 million people—a quarter of the workforce—live off the land, the inability to compete has increased poverty and forced more people to consider migrating, either to the U.S. or other parts of Mexico. Since NAFTA was enacted, 2 million people have been displaced from the agricultural sector while the rural poverty rate has climbed to 85 percent. Here’s what the Witness for Peace information packet has to say about the change: “Because [small farmers] can no longer produce food that is cheap enough to compete with U.S. imports, an increasing number of Mexican farmers have been forced to abandon the countryside. This is disrupting the social and cultural fabric of rural Mexico. It is not unusual for a small Mexican town to have lost half its population to migration over the past twelve years.” In the small villages across the state of Oaxaca, the history of corn cultivation goes back thousands of years. But with rapidly growing Mexican imports—1/5 of corn consumed by Mexicans is now imported—those traditions seem headed for extinction.

No Solvency – Farmers Can’t Compete

#### [ ]

[ ] There is not profit in farming – everyone is shifting to other types of work

Paley, an editor-member of the Media Co-op, 2013

(Dawn, March 11th, Corn on the Border – NAFTA & Food in Mexico, http://dawnpaley.ca/2013/03/11/corn-on-the-border-nafta-food-in-mexico/)

“NAFTA created a disloyal competition, because the United States and Canada continued to subsidize agricultural producers, and we pulled the subsidies,” said Herrera, who has worked in Mexico’s agricultural sector for over 30 years. “It became impossible for small and medium producers to compete with producers from Canada and United States.”¶ Agricultural subsidies in Mexico chalk in much lower than they do in Canada, which according to a 2005 estimate provided $3.7 billion to farmers, and the US, which paid out $19.1 billion in the same year. Mexican farmers, the majority of whom farm plots smaller than five hectares, receive between $78 and $102 per hectare per harvest cycle in government support, according to Herrera. “The peasants are often so poor that what they receive from [PROCAMPO, the federal assistance program for farmers], they use to satisfy their basic consumption needs,” he said.¶ A 2011 study showed that for small farmers in Mexico to produce a kilogram of corn it cost $3.72, compared to $1.67 per kilo in commercial farms. Both groups sell their product at a loss and rely on state support and other income to survive. “I have a hectare that’s maybe a quarter planted, and it gives me a ton (of corn per harvest),” said Pedro Viafuerte, who has land in Mexico State, but who works as a custodian in Mexico City in order to earn an income. “We use it for our personal consumption… and to fatten our livestock, because it doesn’t fetch the price it should.”¶ Because it is so difficult to turn a profit growing traditional foods, according to a report published by the Agriculture, Society and Development journal last year, most Mexican peasants no longer grow corn and beans as a means of economic survival. Instead, “most of the production that peasants obtain from their land plots (maize, beans, kidney beans, etc.) is for self-consumption … the greater part of monetary income is obtained from other activities linked to the land (fruit, flower or vegetable production) or of another type (commerce, paid work in factories or construction in Mexico or the USA).”

### No Solvency – Insufficient Water

#### [ ]

[ ] Droughts and climate change make farming in Mexico unsustainable

Tegel, GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America, 2012

(Simon, Mexico’s drought turns farms to dust, July, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/-americas/mexico/120716/drought-farms-climate-change)

The lack of rain is forcing the region’s farmers to draw ever more heavily on the aquifers lying below their fields. Yet that is no solution either.¶ The aquifers’ sole source of replenishment is the rain itself. And just 3 percent of the precipitation that falls here ever makes it to the aquifers. Most of the rest evaporates.¶ As a result, the farmers are having to dig their wells deeper and deeper into the rocky ground.¶ Rafael Armendariz, 65, is president of the community of Benito Juarez, a few miles from Constitucion. He says that wells, which a generation ago produced water from a depth of 250 feet, now have to be excavated, at great cost, to around 800 feet.¶ To make matters worse, CONAGUA, the national water commission, has not done any hydrological studies of the local aquifer. No one in Benito Juarez knows how close they are to the aquifer running dry.¶ “We don’t know what else to do,” says Armendariz, as he predicts that the current generation could be the last in Benito Juarez to work the land. “Farming is the only thing we have ever done. That is why we keep at it.”¶ And the costs of deeper wells go beyond their excavation. Alejandro Rodriguez, 46, uses three wells to irrigate his 338-acre peach and apple farm on the outskirts of Chihuahua city.¶ His monthly electricity bill for pumping that water from an aquifer 350 feet down can reach almost $10,000. As the wells go deeper, the electricity required increases exponentially.¶ The regional government talks about climate change but has done little, says Martin Bustamente, of the Chihuahua branch of El Barzon.¶ “We have never learned to live in the desert and now that climate change has arrived, we are finally going to have to catch up or face disaster,” he warns.¶ He is calling for government support for farmers to acquire more efficient, state-of-the-art irrigation systems and for no aquifer to be used unsustainably. He is also pushing for a way to have thirsty urban areas pay the region’s farmers, who, effectively, manage the natural watersheds that supply the cities’ water.¶ Above all, he wants existing laws to be enforced so that the amount of water actually withdrawn from aquifers does not exceed the concessions authorized by CONAGUA.¶ Outside observers may think northern Mexican governments are overburdened trying to contain [drug war](http://www.globalpost.com/internal/section-config/mexico) violence.¶ But for residents like Armendariz, water is the real security issue.¶ “Violence? If the rains don’t come, it will only get worse because more people will be out of work. You cannot fix that problem if you don’t secure the water**.”**

### Answers to: Aid Trains Farmers to Deal with Water Shortages

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[ ] Increasing droughts will doom farming efforts.

Rush, writer for the Executive Intelligence Review, 2013

(Cynthia R., Mexico's Drought Demands, 'NAWAPA-Plus' Infrastructure Projects, June 2013 http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2013/4024mex\_nawapa\_plus.html)

"Our country is now suffering the consequences of desertification, at the same time that drought and water scarcity are affecting worrisome [land] extensions due to over-exploitation of aquifers," Conafor said in a late-May statement. "The North of the Country Is Dying of Thirst," read a May 21 Televisa headline.¶ According to Arturo Osornio Sánchez, Undersecretary of Rural Development at Mexico's Agriculture Ministry, 18 of Mexico's 32 states are "collapsed" due to both drought and frosts. The National Meteorological Service had forecast that rainfall for May would be only half the average rainfall as measured for that month over the past 40 years.¶ Looming food shortages pose a national security threat, warned Benjamín Grayeb, president of the National Agricultural Council on May 3. Agricultural production could drop by as much as 20% this year, he added, with a particularly dangerous decline in grain production.

### No Solvency – Assistance Will Fail

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[ ] Assistance to farmers won’t reduce violence and may even make things worse

Felbab-Brown, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2011

(Vanda, Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies, September 2011)

It is important that social interventions are designed as comprehensive rural development or comprehensive urban planning efforts, not simply limited social handouts or economic buyoffs. The latter approaches have failed – whether they were conducted in Medellín as a part of the demobilization process of the former paramilitaries (many of whom have returned as bandas criminales)15 or in Rio de Janeiro‟s favelas.16 ¶ The handout and buyoff shortcuts paradoxically can even strengthen criminal and belligerent entities. Such buyoff approach can set up difficult-to-break perverse social equilibria where criminal entities continue to control marginalized segments of society while striking a let-live bargain with the State, under which criminal actors even control territories and limit State access.

Dependency Turn 1NC

#### [ ] The plan creates a dependency on US assistance which makes development problems worse and undermines the government

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user\_upload/Pdfs/swap-/swap404.pdf)

This study analyzes the political economy of aid dependence. Large amounts of aid delivered over long periods, create incentives for governments and donors that have the potential to undermine good governance and the quality of state institutions. These incentives are not always acted on, but when they are, large amounts of aid may reduce local ownership, accountability and democratic decision-making, while fragmenting budgets and lowering tax effort. Large amounts of aid, delivered to countries with weak institutions create some of the institutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness. In aid dependent countries, donor agencies and foreign experts often take over many of the critical functions of governance: substituting their own goals for an absent leadership vision, using foreign experts and project management units in place of weak or decaying public institutions, and providing finance for investments whose operation and maintenance is neither planned for nor affordable. In these countries, aid has been part of the problem. And longterm dependence on aid creates disincentives for both donors and governments to change the rules of their engagement.

Impact – Aid Doesn’t Go to Farmers

#### [ ] Aid creates a large bureaucracy that destroy the effectiveness of the plan even before it gets to the farmers and actually reduces development

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user\_upload/Pdfs/swap-/swap404.pdf)

The goal of governance reforms is primarily to increase the quality of public institutions and to reduce corruption. Yet large amounts of aid and technical assistance enable bureaucracies to continue functioning without at the same time creating any incentive for them to cooperate with efforts to increase meritocratic appointments, reduce corruption in procurement and provision of services, or cut back on unsustainable numbers of public employees. In addition, aid dependence means that countries are deeply exposed to some of the most criticized practices in the aid system: by-passing instead of building capacity, poaching talented staff from government offices, providing unnecessary and unwelcome technical assistance. This directly affects the institutional context within which bureaucracies operate, and has created some significant barriers to the development of more effective states. Finally, high levels of aid tend to lessen pressures that might push the development of bureaucratic accountability. In aid dependent countries, accountability for the funding is valued most highly by those who provide the bulk of the funds: the donors. Many aid dependent countries have not developed the capacity to carry out extensive audits. Instead, donors substitute their own accountants and reporting, creating an enclave of accountability that rarely grows beyond its borders.

Impact – Elites Maintain Problems to Get More Aid

#### [ ] And this turns the case – political elites will prevent success because they want to keep getting money from the US

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user\_upload/Pdfs/swap-/swap404.pdf)

Political elites also have little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid provide exceptional resources for patronage, and many fringe benefits (vehicles, study tours, etc.) that would not otherwise be available to officials in low-income countries. A senior planning officer in Mauritius, a country that has never been aid dependent by our measure, once described his “thankless” task as “asking the nasty questions,” about proposed projects, questions that ensured that he and his colleagues “will not win any popularity contest…with [our] political overlords” (Bheenick, 1986: 53). With aid given outside of budget constraints, planning officers and political overlords alike are spared the need to justify their aid requests.

#### [ ] And this leads to bad practices in the government which makes underdevelopment worse

Bräutigam, Professor in the School of International Service at American University, 2000

(Deborah, Aid Dependence and Governance, http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user\_upload/Pdfs/swap-/swap404.pdf)

Budgets in many aid dependent countries have collapsed under the weight of many hundreds of projects and policy conditions. Yet aid dependence itself inhibits the budget restructuring required by economic crisis. Aid dependence tends to exacerbate problems of budget fragmentation, repetitive budgeting, and cash flow management. Budgets that are essentially aggregates of donor projects are divorced from planning and policy objectives. Continued provision of large amounts of aid over long periods of time removes the hard budget constraint from government calculations of what is affordable and sustainable in policy choices, and genuinely hard budget constraints are essential for keeping government commitments at sustainable levels. Finally, countries that are heavily dependent on aid tend to have lower levels of tax effort, suggesting that large amounts of aid may serve to reinforce inadequate revenue collection efforts.

### War on Drugs Solves – Specifically in Mexico

#### [ ] The War on Drugs is succeeding – criminalization has weakened cartels and aid has strengthened Mexico’s military.

Poiré, director general at the Center for Intelligence and National Security, 2011

(Alejandro, “Can Mexico win the war against drugs?,” *Americas Quarterly*, Vol. 5 No. 4, Fall 2011, ProQuest)

Addressing this escalation of crime and insecurity required not only a plan for domestic action, but also recognition of the transnational dimension of the problem. That recognition has been the key to our comprehensive, multifaceted approach. The National Security Strategy, launched in 2006, rests on three main tenets: severely weakening criminal organizations; massively and effectively reconstructing law enforcement institutions and the legal system; and repairing the social fabric through, among other things, enhancing crime prevention policies. To date, there have been significant achievements. Our enhanced intelligence capabilities and close collaboration with U.S. agencies have allowed us to arrest or kill 21 of the 37 most-wanted leaders of major criminal organizations. Moreover, Mexican authorities have seized over 9,500 tons of drugs that will never reach U.S. or Mexican children, and captured more than 122,000 weapons since 2006-most of which were bought in the United States. At the same time, the professional caliber of Mexico's Federal Police force has improved significantly through strict recruitment, vetting and extensive training-even as the force has grown nearly sixfold to 35,000 federal policemen. But it is not just a question of numbers; police intelligence capabilities have been reinforced by the recruitment of an additional 7,000 federal law enforcement intelligence personnel from top-level universities. A new judicial framework is in place, thanks to the introduction of legal reforms designed to strengthen due process guarantees, provide fuller protection to victims and increase the efficiency and transparency of trials. Much of this has been the result of the introduction of oral procedures in the federal court system, which is expected to be fully implemented in 2016. We have also achieved significant success in dismantling criminal financial networks. Authorities have confiscated a record amount of cash from the drug cartels-although more can still be done-and special investigative units are spearheading a national effort to combat money laundering. Currently, Congress is working on passing a bill aimed at increasing the capacity of the federal government to investigate and prosecute money launderers. To improve Mexico's social fabric, we have focused on the economic and social roots of crime and addiction since Calderón took office. We consider drug addiction to be a public health problem. Accordingly, national legislation has decriminalized personal consumption of drugs, while directing drug users to proper medical help. Also, public spending devoted to addiction/prevention programs has more than doubled during the first five years of Calderón's administration.

### War on Drugs Solves – Proven in Colombia

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#### [ ] The War on Drugs is essential to dismantling trafficking organizations and reducing violence – it worked in Colombia.

Walser, Senior Policy Analyst on Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 2009

(Ray, “U.S. Drug Policy in Latin America,” *Testimony before the Committee on the Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, of the United States House of Representatives*, December 7, Online)

The vast majority of Colombia's paramilitaries have been demobilized and the FARC has suffered serious reverses. Heartening news indicates that coca production has finally begun to decline in Colombia, realizing one of the most significant long-term benchmarks for success in Plan Colombia. These are not the signs of a failed war on drugs, but indicators that a capable Colombia is increasingly able to meet the internal challenges posed by the drug trade. The Obama Administration has demonstrated its confidence in Colombia and the government of President Alvaro Uribe by moving forward to deepen its strategic ties under a new Defense Cooperation Agreement that will utilize facilities in Colombia in order to monitor trafficking over land and at sea and gather valuable intelligence needed to advance the fight against traffickers. Colombia and the U.S. are pressing forward with this agreement despite the distorted misrepresentations and threats issued against Colombia by Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and his allies. Likewise another indication of strong cooperation was the August 2009 renewal of the Air Bridge Denial On the other hand, the picture elsewhere is not as rosy. Coca production appears to be on the rise in Bolivia and Peru. Earlier this year, Washington was deluged with anxious expressions of concern regarding the threat Mexico drug cartels posed to the stability of our closest neighbor. The names of dreaded and emboldened drug organizations -- the Gulf and Sinaloa Cartels, La Familia Michoacana, and the lethal drug soldiers Los Zetas have become far too familiar to the public in the U.S. Ciudad Juarez, across from El Paso, has become the epicenter for Mexico's narco-carnage. Again, the Obama Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, recognizes the gravity of the situation and is continuing to deliver promised assistance under the Merida Initiative. It has regularly expressed its readiness to back Mexico's President Calderón in the drug fight. Professionals throughout the U.S. government recognize the urgency of their mission in cooperating with Mexico and the importance of delivering swift and targeted help. Congress can also help by streamlining the disbursal of assistance, cutting down on red tape, and by following through with the provision of the $450 million requested in the FY2010 State Department budget in order to demonstrate sustained legislative support for this critical program. Likewise, the new Administration, with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice in the lead, has added additional teeth and stronger missions through the updating of its National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy and with the assignment of additional law enforcement personnel to the border. It is moving ahead to block the southward movements of arms and bulk cash into Mexico, using the ample authority already granted by existing gun legislation. Vigilance and security on the U.S.-Mexican border along with active cooperation with Mexico's law enforcement are the watchwords for success in defeating Mexico's dangerous cartels.

### War on Drugs Solves – Increased Cost of Drugs Deters Buyers

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#### [ ] The War on Drugs drives up drug prices by adding risk to trafficking and production – these costs deter consumers.

Calukins and Lee, 2012

(Jonathan - Professor of Operations Research at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College and a consultant with RAND's Drug Policy Research Center, and Michael - drug-policy researcher at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College, “The Drug-Policy Roulette,” *National Affairs*, Number 12, Summer, Online: <http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-drug-policy-roulette>)

What makes illegal drugs so expensive is precisely the fact that their production is prohibited, and that this prohibition is often strictly enforced. One factor is what economists call "compensating wage differentials," or compensation for taking risks. Suppliers of illegal drugs court real dangers, including arrest, imprisonment, physical injury, even death. Thus, in addition to seeking wages that compensate for their time and allow for normal profits, people employed in drug distribution also seek compensation for assuming these risks — much as coal miners and deep-sea divers typically earn higher wages than people performing similar jobs under less hazardous circumstances. Another factor is the inefficiency that stems from having to operate covertly. The precautions required to evade detection make the production of drugs very labor intensive. Grocery-store cashiers, for instance, are more than 100 times as productive as retail drug sellers in terms of items sold per labor hour. Similarly, hired hands working for crack dealers can fill about 100 vials per hour, whereas even older-model sugar-packing machines can fill between 500 and 1,000 sugar packets per minute. This labor intensity of drug production, combined with the high wages demanded for that labor, are what drive up the costs of drugs; by comparison, materials and supplies — glassine bags, gram balances, and even guns — are relatively cheap. How would these dynamics — and, with them, drug prices — be altered if drugs were legalized? To begin, legalization would cut production costs in source countries. Cultivators and preparers would no longer fear crop eradication; the need to employ only manual labor would disappear. Production could expand and mechanize, becoming more efficient and therefore less expensive.

### War on Drugs Solves – Key Arrests Made Recently

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#### [ ] Mexican marines have arrested the leader of the Zetas, one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico – this is the first step in a new War on Drugs operation that will crack down on cartels.

Associated Press, 2013

(“US federal official: Top leader of Mexico’s brutal Zetas drug cartel captured” Associated Press, Monday, July 15 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-federal-official-leader-of-mexicos-zetas-drug-cartel-captured/2013/07/15/85376a4c-edab-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_story.html>)

MEXICO CITY — Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, the notoriously brutal leader of the feared Zetas drug cartel, has been captured in the first major blow against an organized crime leader by a Mexican administration struggling to drive down persistently high levels of violence, a U.S. federal official confirmed.¶ Trevino Morales, known as “Z-40,” was captured by Mexican Marines in Nuevo Laredo, the Mexican media reported. The U.S. official who confirmed the media reports was not authorized to speak to the press and asked not to be identified.¶ Trevino’s capture removes the leader of a corps of special forces defectors who splintered off into their own cartel and spread across Mexico, expanding from drug dealing into extortion and human trafficking.¶ Along the way, the Zetas authored some of the worst atrocities of Mexico’s drug war, slaughtering dozens, leaving their bodies on display and gaining a reputation as perhaps the most terrifying of the country’s numerous ruthless cartels.¶ The capture of Trevino Morales is a public-relations victory for President Enrique Pena Nieto, who came into office promising to drive down levels of homicide, extortion and kidnapping but has struggled to make a credible dent in crime figures.

### Answers to: Cartels Splintering/Price Increases Fund Cartels

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#### [ ] The existing War on Drugs approach is the only way to beat cartels – if you take away drugs, they’ll resort to other black market activities. They have to be dismantled – and the US successfully destroyed 612 trafficking organizations last year.

Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2012

(Gil, “Drug Policy in the Americas,” CSIS, Online)

This Administration condemns the gruesome drug-related violence and is committed to partnering with the Mexican government to disrupt the cartels that commit such brutality. These organizations pose a significant challenge—they don’t just prey on citizens through drug distribution, but diversify their operations through human trafficking, contraband smuggling, financial fraud, and extortion, spreading violence, corruption and terror wherever they operate. These groups are in business for money and power and there is no limit to the schemes they will employ to extract illegal proceeds from our societies. In an interview with PBS in May, Alejandro Junco, the head of Grupo Reforma, put it well: “Once the dominating cartel establishes territorial control, it turns the most profitable part of its business—selling protection. Kidnappings, extortion, piracy, contraband, sale of organs, prostitution—cartels will turn to anything illegal that makes money. The profitability of drugs is actually quite low compared to the profitability of these other areas.” The United States takes our responsibility to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking groups operating within our borders very seriously. Last year, U.S. law enforcement agencies disrupted or dismantled 612 drug trafficking organizations on the Attorney General’s Target list, which focuses on the major drug trafficking and violent criminal organizations operating within the United States. We have interagency task forces operating in every part of our country to identify and disrupt major drug distribution networks within the United States. We welcome a dialogue on the best tactics to address the threat posed by transnational criminal organizations. We recognize that it is appropriate to examine what works best. But we also recognize that transnational criminal networks would not disappear if drugs were made legal. Transnational criminal organizations don’t derive all their revenue from drugs, as I just mentioned. They would not simply disband if drugs were legalized. They are diversified businesses, profiting from human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, intellectual property theft, and other crime. Institutions like CSIS play an important role in helping develop a rational, balanced approach to the international drug issue. Too often, we face a polarized debate—legalization at one end of the spectrum and a “war on drugs” at the other. The Obama Administration is committed to a third way forward. Legalization is not our policy, nor is locking every offender up. Our approach focuses on the public health challenge of drug consumption and science of addiction and tackling the international security challenge posed by transnational criminal organizations. There are no simple answers to the global drug issue. It is complex and threatens the health and security of people everywhere, regardless of citizenship. I’m grateful for the opportunity to provide some insight into the global policy landscape and this Administration’s approach. Thank you.

### Answers to: Cartels Backlash Against Enforcement

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#### [ ] The War on Drugs is key – it’s the only approach that punishes crime, which creates a disincentive to participate in cartels.

Rios, fellow in inequality and criminal justice at Harvard’s school of government, 2013

(Viridiana, “How to win the Mexican drug war,” *Huffington Post*, April 12, Online: [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-12/opinions/38492205\_1\_cartels-drug-violence-trafficking)](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-12/opinions/38492205_1_cartels-drug-violence-trafficking)/BI)

Because trafficking is a business and fighting is a business strategy, drug cartels choose to fight whenever war brings more benefits than costs. And the cost that governments can more efficiently impose on a criminal entrepreneur is prison. Cartels have chosen to fight in certain areas of Mexico because it makes business sense. South of the U.S. border, only 6 percent of all homicides produce a trial and judgment. As such, killing trafficking enemies to take over their territory, and potentially increase illegal earnings, is profitable. In short, war pays in Mexico. So the right way to fight a drug war in Mexico is not to aim at eliminating criminal organizations, as many have assumed, but rather to create conditions in which war does not pay. This will not be achieved with the strategy Washington has embraced. Even if all criminal organizations were eliminated, new ones would emerge as long as profits could be made from cocaine. A war against drug organizations is an endless war. Mexican President Enrique Peña ­Nieto plans to hold a national forum Tuesday with academics, laypeople and others to discuss how the country can best achieve peace. Now is the time for Mexico to choose the right direction. Mexico must craft a system of incentives, using arrests, sentencing and imprisonment, so that criminal organizations cannot find it profitable to kill. Rather than help Mexico fight an unwinnable war against criminal organizations, the United States must help its neighbor battle impunity. Ours must be a war to make sure those who kill face consequences; a war to improve Mexico’s justice system, because only 31 percent of the population believes it would be punished after committing a crime; a war against the sort of outbreaks where, in one day, more than 130 prisoners escape a jail near the Texas border. The goal must be to make violent crime a risky endeavor, rather than a discretionary choice made by criminal businessmen. A war against impunity can be won. A war against drugs cannot.

### Answers to: Prohibition Fails

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[ ] Prohibition is a necessary first step - plan cannot succeed without first having security from violence.

Felbab-Brown, senior fellow at The Brookings Institution, 2011

(Vanda, Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies, September 2011)

Counterinsurgency or anti-organized crime policies that focus on directly defeating the belligerents and protecting the population tend to be more effective than policies that seek to do so indirectly by suppressing illicit economies as a way to defeat belligerents. Efforts to limit the belligerents‟ resources are better served by a focus on mechanisms that do not harm the wider population directly, even though such discriminate efforts are difficult to undertake effectively because of their resource intensiveness. ¶ In sum, counternarcotics policies have to be weighed very carefully, with a clear eye as to their impact on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. Seemingly quick fixes, such as blanket eradication in the absence of alternative livelihoods, will only strengthen the insurgency and compromise state-building, and ultimately the counternarcotics efforts themselves. ¶ Effectiveness in suppressing illicit economies is critically predicated on security. Without constant and intensive State presence and security, neither the suppression of illicit economies nor alternative livelihoods programs have been effective.