### Mexico Rural Development Affirmative

### Mexico Rural Development Affirmative – Table of Contents

Summary 2

Glossary 3

Mexico Rural Development 1AC 4-9

**Advantages**

Add-Ons:

Deforestation Add-On Adv 10-11

US Drug Consumption Add-On 12

US Economy Add-On 13-14

Drug Violence Advantage

Impact Extension: Latin American Instability 15

Answers to: Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere 16

Answers to: Demand for Drugs Makes Trafficking Inevitable 17

Poverty Advantage

Answers to: Mexican Economy Growing 18

Answers to: Drug Production Profitable 19

Answers to: Corporate Competition Hurts Farmers 20

**Solvency**

Solvency – Rural Assistance Solves Drug Production and Poverty 21

Solvency Extension – Aid Reduces Drug Violence 22

Solvency Extension – Aid Helps Farmers 23

Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete 24-25

Answers to: Not Enough Water 26

Answers to: Aid Dependence Turn 27-28

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Violent Backlash in Mexico 29

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Cartels Splintering into Small Groups & Arrests Fail 30

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Price Spikes Benefit Cartels 31

Answers to: War on Drugs Good – Prohibition Empirically Not Feasible 32

Answers to: Colombia Proves Effectiveness 33

### Summary

#### This affirmative argues that the United States should send more aid to small rural farmers in Mexico in the form of money, equipment and supplies, and technical training. This is because rural farmers in Mexico have fallen behind under the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has dumped lots of cheap American agriculture, like corn, in the Mexican market.

#### There are several advantages to this policy:

#### First and foremost is drug violence. As farmers start to go out of business, they look elsewhere to make money – and the two most profitable options are to start producing drugs like marijuana and cocaine or to start working for drug cartels as drug traffickers or contract killers. The plan would help make legitimate farming profitable again, undermining the presence of drugs that has created a wave of violence in Mexico.

#### Second is poverty. As farmers go out of business, they can no longer afford food or living expenses. The plan would help them make enough money to get by - an ethically worthwhile goal.

#### Third is deforestation. Many of the poor rural farmers in Mexico have a hard time farming because they live on rocky or low-nutrient soil. To find arable land, they often slash-and-burn forests to make new plots for the farming operations, which puts a strain on the earth’s ecological integrity. With additional technical training and the right equipment and supplies this could be prevented through better farming practices.

### Glossary

**DTO:** Drug Trafficking Organization or drug cartel; a large and sophisticated gang that produces and distributes drugs.

**Enrique Peña Nieto:** The current President of Mexico.

**Felipe Calderon:** The former President of Mexico who completed his term in November 2012.

**Mérida Initiative**: The program through which the US is currently providing a substantial amount of aid and security assistance to the Mexican government.

**NAFTA:** The North American Free Trade Agreement was a deal between the US, Mexico and Canada negotiated in the mid-1990’s that made is easier for companies to ship goods across the borders but also had a variety of negative effects on average people.

**War On Drugs:** A policy by the United States Federal Government that gives foreign military aid to foreign countries in aims to identify and fight drug cartel/organizations to destroy the illegal drug trade.

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (1/6)

#### Contention 1 is Inherency:

#### The United States has gutted development aid to Mexico and instead sends billions to Mexico’s military to fight the War on Drugs.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 2011

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf)

But the U.S. government’s foreign policy response to the causes of immigration matches its domestic policy: an overwhelming focus on security and law enforcement.14 Within the U.S. government’s Latin America assistance portfolio, Mexico has traditionally been a low-priority country because of its status as a middle-income nation. Until 2008, Mexico and Central America received 16.2 percent of foreign assistance funds directed toward Latin America. This typically amounted to $60-70 million per year for Mexico, with more than half of that directed to assist Mexico’s fight against international drug trafficking. Mexico received about $27 million per year in foreign assistance for all nonsecurity programs prior to 2008.15 In an effort to combat Mexico’s narcotic trafficking organizations, U.S. assistance was dramatically increased in 2008 through the Mérida Initiative, a multi-year $1.8 billion program focused on law enforcement assistance to Mexican (and, to a lesser extent, Central American) security agencies. Through this program, U.S. assistance to Mexico increased from $65 million in fiscal year 2007 to almost $406 million in fiscal year 2008.16 In 2009, total State Department assistance to Mexico was $786.8 million. Of this total assistance package, $753.8 million—96 percent of U.S. funds to Mexico—was directed toward military and drug enforcement assistance. Although it’s dwarfed by the $10 billion annual border enforcement budget, the Mérida Initiative dominates U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico.17 In 2009, U.S. development assistance that could be directed toward job-creation projects that reduce migration pressures totaled $11.2 million, or .01 percent of total U.S. assistance (see Table 1 on next page). The Mérida Initiative increased total U.S. assistance to Mexico but decreased the importance of economic development in the overall Mexican foreign assistance agenda.18 There are U.S. government agencies other than the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department that focus on poverty reduction and rural development in Latin America, but within the entirety of U.S. foreign assistance to Mexico, poverty reduction and economic development remain a low priority.19 USAID’s lack of emphasis on supporting rural Mexico—where poverty and migration are concentrated— is part of a global foreign assistance trend beginning in the 1980s that de-emphasized agricultural development.20 In spite of the growing interest, discussion among U.S. policymakers and practitioners on migration and development has largely been theoretical.

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (2/6)

#### Contention 2 is Drug Violence:

#### The War on Drugs has strengthened drug trafficking organizations in Mexico – violent measures have increased rural poverty, forcing poor farmers to produce illegal crops or join ranks with cartels to survive.

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012

(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau\_-Human\_Security\_and\_War\_on\_Drugs.pdf)

In its effort to eradicate drug trafficking, the War on Drugs threatens the economic security of thousands of individuals in Colombia and Mexico who depend on the illegal but profitable drug industry for their livelihoods. As Peterson (2002, 437) explains, attempts to implement crop substitution programs through alternative development initiatives in Colombia have been met with numerous geographical, ecological, and climate-related obstacles. Many villages are too far removed from market access points, a situation made worse by the mountainous topography, making it difficult to sell alternative crops, and there are few profitable types of legal crops that can grow in the rocky soil of the Andes. Conversely, coca plants can grow very easily—they become productive within two years—and the expertly established drug trafficking channels allow products to move very quickly (ibid., 428, 437). Plan Colombia failed to take these factors into account in its crop eradication campaigns and many drug-producing regions in Mexico continue to lack sufficient funding for alternative development initiatives. As such, the cultivation of illicit crops and the salaries of sicarios (cartel hit men) continue to be very attractive in the face of unemployment and poverty (Kelly, Maghan, and Serio 2005; Hill 2010). However, as Wells (2006, 57) indicates, “this does not necessarily imply that the US should support these industries . . . [rather,] they should be aware of the extent to which people’s economic security is linked to drug cultivation and . . . the importance of offering them [viable] alternative economic opportunities.” In this light, it is clear that drug policies should focus more on economic security by addressing problems of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. By maintaining a narrow perspective on the drug industry as a threat to state security, rather than a problem related to underdevelopment or socioeconomic conditions, the War on Drugs continues to neglect the roots of the drug industry. Writing about the Mexican context, Vanda Felbab-Brown (2010, 7) supports this reconceptualization of security: “Addressing the socioeconomic needs of the marginalized areas of both the northern urban belt as well as southern rural areas is critical for reducing the recruitment pool for the DTOs, severing the bonds between marginalized communities and criminal elements, and resurrecting the hope of many Mexican citizens that the Mexican State and legal behavior can best advance their future.” FelbabBrown also underscores one of the most important factors in Mexico’s strategy: the bulk of the anti-drug activities are taking place in northern Mexico’s troubled states, but little action is being addressed in the southern states or poorer communities of the country. A similar situation occurred in Colombia, where security conditions improved in major cities, but rural communities— particularly in the Puntomayo region—have seen little progress.

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (3/6)

If no action is taken, the presence of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico will result in more violence and spread across the region.

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans‐Border Institute, 2011

(David A., The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011)

Third, Mexican stability serves as an important anchor for the region. With networks stretching into Central America, the Carib- bean, and the Andean countries, Mexican DTOs undermine the security and reliability of other U.S. partners in the hemisphere, corrupting high-level officials, military operatives, and law enforcement personnel; undermining due process and human rights; reducing public sup- port for counter-drug efforts; and even provoking hostility toward the United States. Given the fragility of some Central American and Caribbean states, expansion of DTO operations and violence into the region would have a gravely destabilizing effec**t.** Fourth, the unchecked power and violence of these Mexican DTOs present a substantial humanitarian concern and have contributed to forced migration and numerous U.S. asylum requests. If the situation were to worsen, a humanitarian emergency might lead to an unmanage- able flow of people into the United States. It would also adversely affect the many U.S. citizens living in Mexico.

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (4/6)

#### Contention 3 is Poverty:

#### Mexican farms have been stretched to the breaking point by free trade and the War on Drugs – forcing millions of people into poverty and starvation.

Watt, Lecturer in Hispanic Studies at the University of Sheffield, 2010

(Peter, “NAFTA 15 Years on: The Strange Fruits of Neoliberalism”, State of Nature, http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6369#sthash.7JzbMAGf.dpuf, Winter)

Thus, if corn, bean or coffee farmers can no longer scrape together a living as a result of a policy into which they never had any input, that’s not free-trade’s problem. There being no alternative – at least in the orthodox thought of what Herman dubs ‘Marketspeak’ – GATT, the WTO and NAFTA were introduced to the world as solutions to poverty, rather than its exacerbators. ‘Future historians’, Mark Weisbrot observes, will certainly marvel at how trade, originally a means to obtain what could not be produced locally, became an end in itself. In our age it has become a measure of economic and social progress more important even than the well-being of the people who produce or consume the traded goods. [8] As free-market ideology contrasted with peoples’ lived experience, only a constant barrage of information and commentary on the wonders of the new socio-economic model would ensure that those with stakes in maintaining it would be immune to challenge. For journalist and author Carlos Monsiváis, the role of the Mexican media is to ‘persuade and dissuade Public Opinion, to neutralise “unorthodox inclinations”, to parody expressions of free thought and to convince of the inexistence of alternatives’. [9] Trade agreements such as NAFTA were pushed through by underlining a sense of inevitability, ‘the inexistence of alternatives’ and although the public had no say, free-trade was soon to become a reality whether Mexicans wished it or not. If businesses and farmers failed or ran into debts as a result, this was explained as their failure to modernise, to adapt to the new realities of the global market. Countering this sense of inevitability is a major challenge, because it is this sense that allows for the unthinkable to become acceptable, or at least tolerable. On this, journalist John Gibler comments that, Ideology serves to normalise horrid social relations. With the magic of a well-placed word or two, duly impregnated with ideology, the most absurd and unacceptable of situations are made to seem natural. Ideology tells us that when the Mexican police routinely kill and torture, well, it is part of the rule of law; if twenty million Mexicans live in hunger, their children dying of diarrhoea, well, that is the sad reality of poverty; as nearly half a million Mexicans cross the border into the United States every year seeking their own labour exploitation just to keep their families alive, they are looking for a better life, hence they migrate; if Mexico’s twelve million indigenous people live on the margin of the state, constantly subject to massacres, everyday racism, and the ravage of hunger, well, the indigenous were always like that, even before the Spanish came, that’s the indigenous past. [10]

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (5/6)

Poverty kills millions of people a year – it is a moral travesty that must be rejected.

Gilligan, Director of the Center for the Study of Violence, 1996

(James, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes.. P. 191-196)

The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously, rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. \*Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acts; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. \*Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. The finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had come closes to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards, and the lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed to the “structural violence” to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past decade, the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide—or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear [war], or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

### Mexico Rural Development 1AC (6/6)

Thus we offer the following plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic development assistance to small farmers in Mexico.

#### Contention 4 is Solvency:

#### United States aid to Mexican small farmers can address the rural poverty that fuels drug violence - the plan represents a radical shift in the status quo framework of engagement toward Mexico.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 2011

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf)

Mexico’s countryside is one of the most promising environments to invest in rural development to reduce migration pressures. Mexico has the 14th largest economy in the world, but it is also extraordinarily unequal.22 Depending on the measure, between one third and half of Mexicans are considered poor and up to 18 percent live in extreme poverty, unable to meet their basic food needs.23 Reducing migration pressures will require development and job creation throughout Mexico, but poverty and international migration are particularly concentrated in the countryside. Although about a quarter of all Mexicans live in rural areas, 60 percent of Mexico’s extreme poor are rural and 44 percent of all of Mexico’s international migration originates in rural communities (see Figure 2).24 This means that more than half of rural Mexicans live in poverty and 25 percent live in extreme poverty.25 As one expert states, “Rural poverty is one … of the principal “pushfactors” in Mexican migration to the United States” and thus should be the primary focus of development efforts aimed at reducing migration pressures.26 After decades of declining support among international assistance agencies,27 agriculture and rural development is now re-emerging as a vital development focus. The World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report states, “Agriculture continues to be a fundamental instrument for sustainable development and poverty reduction.”28 Research has also found that agriculture is one of the best returns on investment in terms of poverty-reduction spending.29 For example, each 1 percent increase in crop productivity in Asia reduces the number of poor people by half a percent. This correlation also holds for middle-income countries such as Mexico.30 Among the options for agricultural development, support for smallholder farmers is the most promising path for poverty reduction. The World Bank states, “Improving the productivity, profitability, and sustainability of smallholder farming is the main pathway out of poverty in using agriculture for development.”31 And smallholder farmers in Mexico are especially in need of assistance. After decades of declining support from the Mexican government and increased competition from subsidized U.S. producers under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), small-Mexican farmers have found it increasingly difficult to make a living.

### Deforestation Add-On Adv

[ ] Rural underdevelopment combined with drug demand is a primary cause for deforestation

Woodgate, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Sociology at the Institute for the Study of the Americas, University of London, 2011

(Graham, Climate Change, Forests and Rural Development in Highland Mexico, May 23, http://www.intercambioclimatico.com/en/2011/05/23/climate-change-forests-and-rural-development-in-highland-mexico/#sthash.6hKUBJcD.dpuf)

The struggle for survival in the countryside leads people to engage in illegal logging, with individual trees fetching US$ 100 and more. The clandestine nature of this activity means, that in order to avoid detection, people come into the forest for short periods, cutting just a few of the larger trees, often with no more than hand tools. Along with a warming climate, illegal logging might also contribute to the increasing numbers of insect pests, such as pine bark beetles, which are attracted by chemicals released when trees are injured. In particular, Mexico is seeing a significant loss of forest cover due to infestation by Dentroctonus spp. – the ‘tree killers’. These beetles bore in through the bark to excavate egg galleries. An early sign of infestation are the resin tubes that form on the bark at the entrance to the beetle’s tunnels. When the eggs hatch the larvae begin to devour the living tissue, destroying the trees’ ability to transport water and nutrients, ultimately resulting in premature death. In addition to illegal logging and beetle infestation, the Nevado’s forests are also being degraded by the activities of livestock farmers. At the end of each dry season farmers burn off the dead vegetation beneath the forest canopy in order to encourage earlier and more nutritious grass growth for their sheep and cattle. Although many species of pine growing at high altitude require periodic fires to release seed from cones for the regeneration of the forest, this burning destroys any young seedlings that may have been established during the previous spring and summer. In concert, illegal logging, beetle infestation and forest fires all add up to a very alarming rate of forest degradation and have almost certainly caused the forests of the Nevado Toluca to shift from being net carbon sinks to net emitters, providing further positive feedback into the climate change equation. It must also be recognised that illegal logging and forest fires are ultimately a result of poor people’s struggles to make ends meet. Thus, if policies such as the [UNFCCC’s](http://unfccc.int/methods_science/redd/items/4531.php) REDD+ strategy are to achieve the desired results, close attention must be focused on mechanisms that can provide realistic and reliable alternative incomes for otherwise marginalised rural people.

### Deforestation Add-On Adv

[ ] Deforestation is a serious threat to humanity

Watson, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 2006

(Captain Paul Watson,. 9/17/06, ìThe Politics of Extinction.î http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)

The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction.

### US Drug Consumption Add-On

#### [ ] Drug use in the US costs the economy billions of dollars and hurts people’s health – it is essential to stop drugs at the source to prevent a spiral into addiction.

US Department of Justice, 2011

(“Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use on American Society,” Online: <http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44731/44731p.pdf>)

Taken together, these costs total $193,096,930, with the majority share attributable to lost productivity. The findings are consistent with prior work that has been done in this area using a generally comparable methodology (Harwood et al., 1984, 1998; ONDCP, 2001, 2004). It is important to note that there is no double-counting among the cost components identified above. In cases where a component involves incapacitation (as with drug-induced incarceration, specialty treatment, and hospitalization), society essentially pays twice: once to deal with the problem behavior of an individual and again because after the behavior has been dealt with, the individual becomes nonproductive. (b) Incarceration and homicide components of Productivity included in Crime. As noted above, some elements of productivity costs may be viewed as crime costs. In column (b) lost productivity attributable to illicit-drug-induced incarceration and illicitdrug-induced homicide are treated as crime costs. This causes crime costs to increase from $61,376,694 to $113,277,616 and productivity costs to decrease from $120,304,004 to $68,403,082. The total remains unchanged. Comparison of Drug Coststo Other Societal Costs The estimates presented above place illicit drug use on par with other serious chronic health problems in the United States. A recent study conducted by the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (2008) estimated that diabetes costs the United States more than $174 billion each year. As was the case here, that study included both direct costs (medical care and services) and indirect costs (short-term and permanent disability as well as premature death). Finkelstein et al. (2009) report that medical costs associated with obesity totaled more than $147 billion in 2008. This is driven largely by the fact that obese Americans spend approximately 40 percent more on medical services (an average of $1,429 per year) than those whose weight is in the healthy range. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report that between 1995 and 1999, smoking caused an estimated 440,000 premature deaths each year and was responsible for at least $157 billion annually in health-related economic costs (CDC, 2002). The approach taken by the CDC authors was similar to the approach taken here and was based upon estimates of annual smokingattributable mortality, years of potential life lost, smoking-attributable medical expenditures for adults and infants, and lost productivity for adults. Heart disease exacts perhaps the highest toll. During 2010 alone, it cost the United States an estimated $316 billion. This includes the costs of health care services, medications, and lost productivity (CDC, 2010). Illicit drug use is not like other health problems in that its consequences may include criminal sanctions. Since it is well known that illicit drug use sometimes progresses from experimentation to recreational use and eventually to abuse or dependence, it is relatively easy to draw inferences from the findings presented above. It is important that illicit drugs be made as difficult and costly to obtain as possible. This points to the value of law enforcement efforts. It is best if illicit drug use not be initiated at all.

### US Economy Add-On (1/2)

[ ] Further drug related violence in Mexico would significantly harm the US economy

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans-Border Institute, 2011

(David A., The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011)

The United States has much to gain by helping strengthen its south- ern neighbor and even more to lose if it does not. The cumulative effects of an embattled Mexican state harm the United States and a further reduction of Mexican state capacity is both unacceptable and a clear motivation for U.S. preventive action. First, the weaker the Mexican state, the greater difficulty the United States will have in controlling the nearly two-thousand-mile border. Spillover violence, in which DTOs bring their fight to U.S. soil, is a remote worst-case scenario.3 Even so, lawlessness south of the border directly affects the United States. A weak Mexican government increases the flow of both illegal immigrants and contraband (such as drugs, money, and weapons) into the United States. As the dominant wholesale distributors of illegal drugs to U.S. consumers, Mexican traffickers are also the single greatest domestic organized crime threat within the United States, operating in every state and hundreds of cities, selling uncontrolled substances that directly endanger the health and safety of millions of ordinary citizens. Second, economically, Mexico is an important market for the United States. As a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is one of only seventeen states with which the United States has a free trade pact, outside the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The United States has placed nearly $100 billion of foreign direct investment in Mexico. Mexico is also the United States’ third-largest trade partner, the third-largest source of U.S. imports, and the second-largest exporter of U.S. goods and services—with potential for further market growth as the country develops. Trade with Mexico benefits the U.S. economy, and the market collapse that would likely accompany a deteriorated security situation could hamper U.S. economic recovery.

### US Economy Add-On (2/2)

#### [ ] US economic decline undermines our ability to maintain global peace – it would force US military withdrawal.

Duncan, Chief Economist at Blackhorse Asset Management and analyst for Bloomberg, 2012

 (Richard, The New Depression, pg. 129)

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nuclear-armed submarines. The country spends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. economy collapses into a New Great Depression, the United States could not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper. Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned.

### Impact Extension: Latin American Instability

[ ] Latin American instability would spawn a host of global dangers.

Manwaring, Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, 2005

(Max G., venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conﬂict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee ﬂows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafﬁcking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More speciﬁcally, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafﬁcking in women and body parts, trafﬁcking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconﬁned and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conﬂict. 62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century. 63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real. But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

### Answers to: Drug Production Shifting Elsewhere

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Mexico is the lynchpin – drug use and trafficking have almost doubled.

Villagran, correspondent for Christian Science Monitor, 2013

(Laura, Jan 25, 2013, “As Mexico's traffickers ship drugs north, they leave addicts in their wake” http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0125/As-Mexico-s-traffickers-ship-drugs-north-they-leave-addicts-in-their-wake)

Exponential growth in the trafficking of drugs through Mexico – destined for the large consumer market to the north – is leaving a growing number of addicts in its wake. Heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamines were once unheard of in Mexico, but today rehabilitation centers are filled with addicts. Being the top supplier of illegal drugs to the US has made Mexico a consumer nation, too, as cartels have sought to expand the local market over the past decade. Illegal drug use in Mexico – still well below levels in the United States – rose 87 percent between 2002 and 2011, according to the latest national survey of addictions. In the survey, 1.5 percent of respondents reported having consumed illegal substances in the previous year, compared with 0.8 percent in 2002. And drug rehabilitation professionals caution that higher levels of use may exist, given that the data is self-reported. They also note that an alarming increase in drug use among women and adolescents between 2002 and 2008 has persisted, although the survey suggests overall illegal drug use has plateaued since 2008. “The reality is that … in the organizations and institutions that work directly with this population, we see that [addiction] is on the rise, and that the adolescents who come here are younger and younger,” says Blanca Ferreyra, who coordinates addiction treatments at the Love Life Foundation, a Mexico City nonprofit. “By 14 years old, they’ve got a two- or three-year-old addiction.”

### Answers to: Demand for Drugs Makes Trafficking Inevitable

**[ ]**

[ ] They have it backwards – drug production is extremely prevalent because of widespread rural poverty.

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012

(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau\_-Human\_Security\_and\_War\_on\_Drugs.pdf)

Both Colombia and Mexico bear high levels of poverty, unemployment, and economic inequality. These socio-economic conditions, along with weak political and judicial institutions, foster an environment in which drug cultivation and trafficking are not only possible, but for many have become attractive or necessary options to meet basic needs. It is estimated that over 80,000 Colombian families rely on illicit crop cultivation for their livelihoods (UNODC 2011a). The economic incentive is clear: “[A]s long as the price for coca leaves is ten times as high as that for cocoa, coffee, and rice for Andean farmers, they will continue to cultivate it” (Diego Garcia Savan in Wells 2006, 60). In this sense, drug trafficking effectively provides economic security, simply defined in the UNDP report as “assured basic income” (UNDP 1994, 25). Those without economic security often accept any work they can find, including informal work, badly paid, or unproductive work. Informal employment could be as high as 50 per cent in Colombia and 30 per cent in Mexico (World Bank 2012), which undoubtedly leads to increased economic insecurity and related problems such as criminal activity and migration.

###  Answers to: Mexican Economy Growing

**[ ]**

[ ] Economic growth in Mexico has left small farmers behind – development aid is key to close the gap.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 11

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf)

The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the culmination of the economic liberalization that began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-cre ation program that would slow immigration. But NAFTA’s policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented producers at the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued to diminish. Between 1991 and 2007 Mexico lost 20 percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs. The loss of rural jobs and the inability to generate income impacted family farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural family employment declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of these displaced farmers ended up in the United States, sometimes working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers. After NAFTA, the operation of the Mexican small family farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while youth migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 1990 had left by 2000. Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican government also has done little to slow the exodus. Its leading program for small agricultural producers—PROCAMPO—does not target areas of high migration. Although the Mexican government is primarily responsible for addressing the country’s rural poverty, the United States can provide critical support for programs that address migration pressures at their source. Because of its potential for long-term impact, such a strategy requires commensurate, sustained policy attention and resources. Furthermore, by supporting economic development projects with rural Mexican organizations, Mexican government agencies—particularly at the local and regional levels—can be drawn into development projects that reduce migration pressures. A comprehensive, smallholder-based approach to development would by its very nature generate rural employment. Without support for Mexico’s small and medium farmers, the country’s rural economy will continue to be increasingly dependent on migration and remittances. While the link between supporting smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact on migration pressures is less recognized.

### Answers to: Drug Production Profitable

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Poverty is still prevalent – even if some farmers succeed by producing drugs, others deserve a chance to succeed with US aid.

Wainer, immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute, 2011

(Andrew, Development and Migration In Rural Mexico, Bread For The World Institute, Briefing Paper, Number 11, http://www.bread.org/institute/papers/briefing-paper-11.pdf)

The 1980s saw falling wages, a decline in living standards, job displacement, and lowered prospects for economic mobility The impact on small farmers was particularly harmful. In addition to a reduction in state support, small and mediumsized producers faced the cumulative impact of long-term drought, multiple economic crises, increased competition from U.S. producers, falling agricultural commodity prices and increases in the price of agricultural inputs, and reduced access to credit. Mexico’s rural population decreased from 58 percent in 1950 to 25 percent in 2005. While many of the rural poor migrated to Mexico’s overcrowded cities, others opted for the United States.33 The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the culmination of the economic liberalization that began in the 1980s. NAFTA was touted as a Mexican job-creation program that would slow immigration. But NAFTA’s policies reinforced support for large, export-oriented producers at the cost of small farmers, and rural employment continued to diminish. Between 1991 and 2007 Mexico lost 20 percent (2.1 million) of its agricultural jobs. The loss of rural jobs and the inability to generate income impacted family farms in particular: non-salaried agricultural family employment declined 58 percent between 1991 and 2007. Many of these displaced farmers ended up in the United States, sometimes working in U.S. agriculture as field laborers.34 After NAFTA, the operation of the Mexican small family farm became the vocation of older Mexicans, while youth migrated to the cities or the United States. Almost a quarter of rural Mexicans ages 15-24 in 1990 had left by 2000. Throughout 30 years of increasing emigration, the Mexican government also has done little to slow the exodus. Its leading program for small agricultural producers—PROCAMPO— does not target areas of high migration.35 Although the Mexican government is primarily responsible for addressing the country’s rural poverty, the United States can provide critical support for programs that address migration pressures at their source. Because of its potential for long-term impact, such a strategy requires commensurate, sustained policy attention and resources. Furthermore, by supporting economic development projects with rural Mexican organizations, Mexican government agencies—particularly at the local and regional levels—can be drawn into development projects that reduce migration pressures. A comprehensive, smallholder-based approach to development would by its very nature generate rural employment. Without support for Mexico’s small and medium farmers, the country’s rural economy will continue to be increasingly dependent on migration and remittances. While the link between supporting smallholder farmers and poverty reduction is proven, the next logical step with respect to its impact on migration pressures is less recognized.36

### Answers to: Corporate Competition Hurts Farmers

**[ ]**

[ ] With assistance Mexican farmers can compete even against low US food prices

Wise, Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute, 2012

(Timothy A., Growing Out of the Food Crisis: Mexican Smallholders Key to Food Sovereignty, October 10, 2012, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GC50Oct12Wise.pdf)

Since prices spiked in 2007-8, policy-makers have rediscovered small-scale farmers. Where the Washington Consensus treated them as unproductive, an anachronism in the modernizing global economy, suddenly they were once again “stewards of the land.” Raising their productivity, closing the “yield gap” – the difference between current and attainable yields using readily available technologies – became one of the pillars of the global response to the new food crisis. In theory, anyway. In our new study, we documented that this is an attainable goal. We showed that small-scale Mexican corn farmers can close a yield gap estimated at 43% or more, and they can do so relying on existing technologies by investing in good old-fashioned farmer-led extension services. This would eliminate Mexico’s 10 million ton annual deficit, which it now fills with $4 billion worth of imports from the United States. And it would improve resource use while increasing resilience to climate change. Rising agricultural prices, combined with growing import dependence, have driven Mexico’s food import bill over $20 billion per year and increased its agricultural trade deficit. The current drought in the United States is making this situation worse, with maize prices setting new record highs. Three million producers grow most of the country’s white maize, which is used primarily for tortillas, and more than 59 native maize landraces that are basic ingredients of nearly 600 food preparations. Yield gaps are estimated at 43% on rain-fed land, compared to just 10% on the country’s larger irrigated farms. Most of the country’s small to medium-scale maize farmers are operating at less than 50% of potential

### Solvency – Rural Assistance Solves Drug Production and Poverty

**[ ]**

[ ] Rural development assistance is key to solve the incentive for drug production and shift towards a focus on poverty alleviation

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012

(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau\_-Human\_Security\_and\_War\_on\_Drugs.pdf)

To effectively combat drug crime within their borders, Colombia and Mexico also need to broaden and diversify their national strategies. Given the success in reducing crime in Colombian cities, a continuation of multifaceted action, including the establishment of a national research, analysis, and strategic bodies, such as the Government of Colombia’s Dirección de Justicia, Seguridad y Gobierno, to better understand DTOs and the drug trade, could contribute to safer cities in Mexico and be replicated in different settings in Latin America. To avoid the balloon effect, whereby drug production and violence are merely displaced to other territories, military efforts must be matched with national socio-economic policies along the lines of improvements in education, economic productivity, small-scale agriculture, and employment opportunities, all well-known concerns in Mexican society. By addressing issues of economic and food security and improving standards of living and capacity building in rural communities, there will be fewer incentives to be or get involved in criminal activities, and personal and community security will improve. For instance, investments in crop substitution, smallscale farming, and the elimination of aerial spraying campaigns could help prevent the future growth of the drug trade. Moreover, the Colombian and Mexican governments need to continue their efforts to combat corruption and better address problems of impunity and human rights violations by adopting a human security approach to drug policies. The establishment of effective judicial reforms 11 to bring crimes to justice create a stronger sense of confidence, trust, and security across those countries.

### Solvency Extension – Aid Reduces Drug Violence

#### [ ] Rural development will help alleviate several causes of rural poverty – drastically undercutting the basis for drug trafficking and violence.

Gautreau, School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa, 2012

(Ginette Léa, To Rid the World of the Drug Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico, Paterson Review of International Affairs (2012) 12: 61–83, http://diplomatonline.com/mag/pdf/Gautreau\_-Human\_Security\_and\_War\_on\_Drugs.pdf)

Furthermore, accessing markets to sell crops is complicated by distance and inadequate infrastructure, such as a lack of communications technology and poor road conditions. Rather than investing in crop eradication, the government should increase investment in infrastructure development that facilitates access to markets and health care, as well as increase investment in social safety nets, alternative development programs, and local agriculture that together enhance economic, environmental, health, and food security. By threatening environmental, health, and food security, the War on Drugs threatens livelihoods and exacerbates problems of poor market access, poverty, and internal displacement. Therefore, crop eradication as promoted by the War on Drugs cannot be divorced from economic security. By stopping crop eradication policies, particularly with toxic herbicides such as glyphosate, governments can support these essential forms of security and ensure a healthier environment for various communities. By prioritizing these forms of human security over the unsustainable destruction of illicit crops, governments can focus on developing real, long-term alternatives based on licit crop cultivation and better market access. By improving livelihoods, countries would have fewer families relying on or turning to the drug trade for subsistence, thus abating the intensity of the drug conflicts. To this day, the state security approach has failed to generate such results.

### Solvency Extension – Aid Helps Farmers

#### [ ] US aid can help small farmers by supporting irrigation projects and providing essential technologies.

Broughton, Green party candidate and Director of Canada’s Wilderness Committee, 2013

(Robert, “How the US can help Mexico,” *DailyKOS*, June 10, Online: <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/06/10/1215167/-How-the-US-can-help-Mexico>)

The effect of this on Mexico's economy has been devastating. (It's been even more devastating for Guatemala, a much poorer country that is also dependent on corn imports.) This isn't in the best interest of either the US or Mexico. When rural Mexicans can't feed themselves, they move to cities, and often on to the US. Draining Mexico's rural areas of people makes these areas more vulnerable to the narco-terrorists. Cultivation of corn began in Mexico, and corn has a cultural value as well as a food value. There are 60 varieties of corn grown in Mexico, and the genetically-altered versions from Monsanto are a solution looking for a problem. So, why can't Mexico grow enough corn to feed its population, and what can the US do to help? One problem is infrastructure. Rural farmers have problems getting their products to markets. However, Mexico has been doing a better job than the US has of improving infrastructure over the past few years, so the US can be of no help on this one. The Mexican government initiated a program called MasAgro in 2011. It is an agricultural extension service, and intends to assist small farmers in Mexico to test and use better maize and wheat varieties, and to promote conservation agriculture cropping practices and other technologies that raise their yields and incomes while reducing costs, risks, and environmental impacts. The Mexican government also initiated another extension service, the Strategic Project for High-Yield Maize (PROEMAR), in 2008. It features basic soil analysis and precision fertilizer application. It has demonstrated dramatic results when implemented in conjunction with a strong, accountable farmer organization. Mexico can also increase crop yields by improving and increasing irrigation. Mexico was actually promised public investment in irrigation in the run-up to the NAFTA agreement. This promise wasn't kept. There is less irrigated corn-growing land now than there was prior to NAFTA. So, the Obama administration could start by revisiting the irrigation issue, and provide resources that the US Department of Agriculture already has. As for MasAgro and PROEMAR, the Department of Agriculture and land-grant universities in every state know a few things about agricultural extension. In addition, the Peace Corps has a long history of recruiting agricultural extension volunteers. So, the US has the resources to do some good here, and improve its image in Latin America. All that's needed is a commitment; put those land-grant university graduates to work.

### Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete

#### [ ]

[ ] Mexico can close the trade gap with technical assistance

Wise et al., Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute, 2012

(Antonio Turrent Fernández, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey, Achieving Mexico’s Maize Potential, GDAE Working Paper 12-03, October 2012, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy\_research/MexMaize.html)

To what extent could Mexico close this yield gap, using proven technologies widely employed in the country, to regain its lost self-sufficiency in maize? Based on a close examination of productivity gains and potential in Mexico’s diverse maize-producing sectors – irrigated and rain-fed, industrial scale and small scale, using hybrid seeds and native varieties – authors Antonio Turrent, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey find that Mexico has the potential to regain self-sufficiency in maize relatively quickly based on existing technologies and without relying on controversial transgenic maize varieties. Specifically: Evidence suggests that within 10-15 years Mexico could increase annual production on current lands from 23 to 33 million tons, meeting the current deficit of 10 million tons. Irrigation and infrastructure projects in the southern part of the country could add another 24 million mt/year. This would be more than enough to meet Mexico’s growing demand for maize, estimated to reach 39 million mt/year by 2025. Such investments in new water resources, combined with public investments in more efficient water-use in irrigation systems in the semi-arid northern parts of Mexico, are urgently needed as climate change threatens to make water more scarce, undermining agricultural production. Mexico’s current push to expand the use of transgenic maize is unnecessary and ill-considered. Its yield potential is limited, particularly for smaller scale producers, and its risks are high for a country with Mexico’s rich diversity of native maize varieties. Mexico’s highly touted MasAgro Program, with its focus on smallholders and resource conservation, has laudable goals, but the program has too small a budget and focuses on strategies – improved seeds and “no till” practices – that are poorly suited to small-scale farms and marginal lands. A pilot program in farmer-led extension services has proven the most promising, raising yields 55-70% in a project carried out in several states by a farmer organization. The project promoted precision application of inputs on both high-quality and marginal lands, improving conservation without relying on new hybrids nor transgenic seeds. Such programs build on Mexico’s rich maize diversity, an asset that will become increasingly valuable as climate change challenges existing growing conditions. Such findings are consistent with the prevailing international consensus around the “sustainable intensification” of small-scale production. Public investment should go where the yield gaps are the greatest, among small-to-medium-scale farmers.

### Answers to: Mexican Farmers Can’t Compete

**[ ]**

[ ] Farmers can’t compete because of technology and development practices which the plan can fix

Melendez, Journalist at The Monterey County Herald, 2008

(CLAUDIA, Mexican farmers struggle to survive, 12/10/08, http://www.montereyherald.com/ci\_7616170)

"In our country we still find farmers who use oxen to pull carts to farm," said Congresswoman Susana Monreal Avila, who represents one of the largest agricultural states in Mexico. "This is what they use because they don't have the access to other tools and that places (them) at a disadvantage." Speaking to a group of U.S. activists and students touring Mexico with Food First, a Berkeley-based advocacy group that promotes policies to eradicate hunger, Monreal Avila said she's heading a group lobbying to renegotiate the agricultural provisions of NAFTA, which she blames for the deterioration of Mexico's agrarian industry. Former Mexican President Vicente Fox defends NAFTA as a program that has brought progress to the country and increased agricultural trade with the United States. "We are now exporting more than ever," Fox told The Herald during a recent visit to Monterey County. "Maybe those who didn't modernize couldn't compete.

### Answers to: Not Enough Water

**[ ]**

[ ] The plan can make farmers competitive and self-sufficient even with coming water problems

Wise et al., Director of Policy Research at Tufts University’s Global Development and Environment Institute, 2012

(Antonio Turrent Fernández, Timothy A. Wise, and Elise Garvey, Achieving Mexico’s Maize Potential, GDAE Working Paper 12-03, October 2012, http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/12-03TurrentMexMaize.pdf)

Mexico now runs a production deficit of roughly 10 million mt/year and an import bill for maize of more than $2.5 billion/year. This review has demonstrated that Mexico has the potential to regain self-sufficiency in maize relatively quickly based on existing technologies and without relying on controversial transgenic maize varieties. Turrent’s surveys remain the most comprehensive guide to Mexico’s maize potential, suggesting that within 10-15 years Mexico could increase annual production from current lands to 33 million/mt; irrigation and infrastructure projects in the southern part of the country could add another 24 million mt/year. This would be more than enough to meet Mexico’s growing demand for maize, estimated to reach 39 million mt/year by 2025 (FAPRI 2011). Additional research confirms the viability of these estimates. Following the prevailing international consensus, public investment should go where the yield gaps are the greatest, among small-to-medium-scale farmers. This is also where private investment is scarce and where market failures are prevalent. Indeed, the most promising improvements identified in this review came from the provision of basic farmer-led extension services on rain-fed lands using existing technologies. Such programs do not rely on the introduction of new improved seeds and they have been proven to improve resource use and promote conservation. In fact, researchers recently published in Nature a study estimating that closing yield gaps through improved nutrient and water management could increase production by 30% while reducing inefficient use of inputs (Mueller, Gerber et al. 2012).

### Aid Makes Farmers Self-Sufficient

**[ ]**

[ ] There is no link to their turn – the kind of assistance we provide will make farmers self-sufficient and reduces aid dependency

ActionAid, an international charity for children’s education, 2012

(Real Aid: Ending Dependency, https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc\_lib/real\_aid\_3.pdf)

The kind of aid that helps support dramatic decreases in aid dependence is what ActionAid calls real aid – that’s aid which empowers poor women and men to realise their rights, and reduces inequality. It might do this directly, by supporting smallholder farmers, empowering women or building schools. Or it might do it indirectly, by supporting tax systems, better governance or economic development. It is accountable, transparent from beginning to end, and gets the most out of every dollar spent. It supports developing countries to make their own decisions. Substandard aid, however, does not do this – and there’s still a lot of it out there.

### Aid Makes Farmers Self-Sufficient

**[ ]**

[ ] And we reduce dependence on remittances, money sent home by people forced to go to other countries for work

Cohen, Professor of Anthropology at Pennsylvania State University, 2001

(Jeffrey H., Transnational Migration in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico: Dependency, Development, and the Household, American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 103, No. 4 (Dec., 2001))

Two models (dependency and development) have dominated the debate over the outcomes of migration and remittance use (Brettell 2000:104). Dependency models focus on the socioeconomic costs of migration, while de- velopment models point toward the economic growth that can come from the careful use of remittances. Dependency models argue that migration exacerbates local socioeco- nomic inequalities, increases economic dependency, and drives unproductive consumption within peasant house- holds while creating pools of cheap labor waiting to be ex- ploited (Reichert 1981). In this scheme, rural communities become little more than nurseries for the young (future mi-grants) and "homes" for the elderly (those no longer able to migrate). The outcome of this process is the social disintegration of sending communities as the able-bodied are siphoned away by the pull of job opportunities and the dis- ruption of local practices as remittances are wasted (see Brana-Shute and Brana-Shute 1982; Didiz Briquets 1991; Guidi 1993; Martin 1991; Papademetriou 1991; Ruben- stein 1992).

### War on Drugs Failed – Violent Backlash in Mexico

#### [ ]

#### [ ] The War on Drugs has failed in Mexico – military force causes cartel backlash, cartels are resilient, government corruption, and police desertion rates.

**Colonel Chase, director of strategy research on the Southern Border, 2012**

(David, “Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border,” December 3, Online: <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA561048>)

These efforts by the Mexican government have met with some success especially with the targeting, capturing and killing of DTO leadership. However, there are fears that little real positive effect has been achieved and some belief that Mexico’s war on drugs is proving to be futile altogether. Critics claim that any attempts at progress has been slowed and hampered by several problems. First, the strong response from the Mexican government is one factor in the increased violence as DTOs fight back in response. Second, even as DTO leadership has been arrested or killed the organizations themselves have proven very resilient by becoming more adaptive, less vertical in organizational structure and by becoming multi-nodal. Other problems cited include the fact that the Police are generally viewed as corrupt, brutal and susceptible to bribes despite purges of senior police leadership and intensive retraining efforts. As recently as August 2010 a purge of the federal police force was conducted and resulted in more than 3,000 officers being fired for being corrupt. Even the Mexican military is facing problems. Ever since becoming involved in the crackdown on DTOs the Mexican Army has been continually charged with human rights violations to include rape, killings, disappearances and torture. As recently as 2010 there were over 1,200 human rights complaints against the Army.28 Another problem that the Army faces is a very high desertion rate, particularly among soldiers sent to fight the DTOs. 29 Exacerbating the problems with the security forces is the lack of effective rule of law highlighted by a judicial system that is ineffective and corrupt itself. A recent study has found that of all the numerous cases brought before Mexican courts the conviction rate is only around one percent with known criminals routinely being released.

### War on Drugs Failed – Cartels Splintering into Small Groups & Arrests Fail

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Cartels have fractured into over 300 trafficking groups, arresting the head of the Zetas achieves nothing more than good publicity.

Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009

(Ted, “Troubled Neighbor: Mexico’s Drug Violence Poses a Threat to the United States” *Cato Institute,* Online: <http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/troubled-neighbor-mexicos-drug-violence-poses-threat-united-states>)

Since Calderón took office in 2006, the Mexican government has for the first time given the military a lead role in combating the traffickers. Approximately 36,000 troops are now involved in that effort, in addition to several thousand federal police officers. The principal outcome of that strategy, however, has been an even greater level of violence, with military personnel increasingly becoming targets. The military also has now been exposed to the temptation of financial corruption that had previously compromised Mexico’s local and federal police forces so thoroughly. Decapitation Strategies Don’t Work The belief that neutralizing Mexican drug kingpins will achieve a lasting reduction in drug trafficking is the same assumption that U.S. officials made with respect to the crackdown on the Medellín and Cali cartels in Colombia during the 1990s. Subsequent developments have shown that assumption to be erroneous. Indeed, an October 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office found that while opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Colombia had declined since the start of Plan Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production (the country’s principal drug export) had actually increased by 15 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 51 The elimination of the Medellín and Cali cartels merely decentralized the Colombian drug trade. Instead of two large organizations controlling the trade, today some 300 smaller, loosely organized groups do so. More to the point, the arrests and killings of numerous top drug lords in both Colombia and Mexico over the years have not had a meaningful impact on the quantity of drugs entering the United States. Cutting off one head of the drug-smuggling Hydra merely results in more heads taking its place. Indeed, one might wonder how serious Mexico’s anti-drug campaign will be in the long run. U.S. leaders held out hopes that Calderón’s predecessor, Vicente Fox, would disrupt the trade. Similar hopes were invested in earlier Mexican administrations, but a noticeable pattern emerged in all of those cases. Early on, new Mexican presidents typically went out of their way to impress on U.S. policymakers that they were serious about cooperating with Washington and taking on the drug lords. Then, within a few years, the efforts dwindled into futility marked by official corruption.

### War on Drugs Failed – Price Spikes Benefit Cartels

#### [ ]

#### [ ] The War on Drugs increases cartel profits - they can justify jacking up prices to compensate for risk of punishment.

Becker, professor of economics and sociology at the University of Chicago, 2013

(Gary and Kevin M. Murphy, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, “Have We Lost the War on Drugs?,” *Wall Street Journal*, Jan 4, Online: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578217682305605070.html>)

Prices of illegal drugs are pushed up whenever many drug traffickers are caught and punished harshly. The higher prices they get for drugs help compensate traffickers for the risks of being apprehended. Higher prices can discourage the demand for drugs, but they also enable some traffickers to make a lot of money if they avoid being caught, if they operate on a large enough scale, and if they can reduce competition from other traffickers. This explains why large-scale drug gangs and cartels are so profitable in the U.S., Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and other countries.

### War on Drugs Failed – Prohibition Empirically Not Feasible

#### [ ]

#### [ ] Boosting drug prices just increases black market profits --- no serious reduction in demand.

Williams, columnist for Psychology Today, 2011

(Ray, “Why ‘The War on Drugs’ Has Failed,” *Psychology Today*, June 6, Online: <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/wired-success/201106/why-the-war-drugs-has-failed>)

At least 500 economists, including Nobel prize winners Milton Friedman, George Akerlof and Vernon Smith have concluded that reducing the supply of marijuana though interdiction without reducing the public demand, causes the price and therefore the profits of drug cartels to rise. Despite over $7 billion spent annually towards arresting and prosecuting nearly 800,000 people for marijuana offenses in the U.S. in 2005, according to the FBI, the federally-funded Monitoring the Future Study reported that 85% of high school seniors found marijuana "easy to obtain." Numerous experts have criticized The War on Drugs as the wrong approach to deal with the problem. They argue that by favoring domestic law endorsement in instead of treatment, the government has focused on enforcement instead of dealing with treatment as a social problem. In addition, by making drugs illegal rather than regulating them, The War on Drugs creates a highly profitable black market, and increasing levels of violent crime. Prohibitionist policies based on eradication, interdiction and criminalization of consumption simply have not worked. Violence and the organized crime associated with the drug trade are getting worse, not better, despite the current policies. The alarming power of the drug cartels leads to a criminalization of politics and a politicization of crime. And the corruption of the judicial and political system is undermining the foundations of democracy in several Latin American countries.

### Answers to: Colombia Proves Effectiveness

[ ]

#### [ ] They’re misconstruing the facts – the War on Drugs was effective, but only because the US gave aid to Colombian farmers. Our aff is an essential piece of the puzzle.

Shirk, Prof of Political Science at the University of San Diego and Director of the Trans‐Border Institute, 2011

(David A., The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat, Council Special Report No. 60, March 2011)

Despite the major differences between Mexico and Colombia, U.S. efforts to support Mexico can draw some lessons from its efforts in Colombia. U.S. antidrug assistance through Plan Colombia greatly bolstered the capacity of the Colombian state to combat DTOs and make long-term gains in citizen security. Although Plan Colombia exhibited many flaws—including human rights violations and unresolved prob- lems of violence and internal displacement—intense binational coop- eration, intelligence sharing, and joint tactical operations provided a decisive advantage against both DTOs and insurgent threats. Military and law enforcement assistance was only part of the equation. Robust economic assistance, averaging $200 million a year over the past five years, has consolidated security gains in Colombia. Furthermore, this aid facilitated the transformation of Colombia’s urban slums into resil- ient communities and helped decrease unemployment from 15 percent to 11 percent.