



# BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

## 2010-2011 Varsity Packet Tournament Three

- Japan Affirmative Set
- Japan Negative Set
- Turkey Affirmative Set
- Turkey Negative Set
- START DA Set
- START DA Aff Set
- Japan Counterplan
- Japan Counterplan Aff
- Turkey Counterplan
- Turkey Counterplan Aff
- Topicality File

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# **Japan Aff (Set)**

## Explanation

In 1960, the United States and Japan signed a historic treaty, which committed the United States to help defend Japan if Japan came under attack, and it provided bases and ports for U.S. armed forces in Japan. This agreement has lasted now for 50 years, enduring events such as the Vietnam War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea and the rise of China. Today, the United States operates 85 military facilities in Japan, housing 44,850 U.S. military personnel and 44,000 of their dependents.

Close to 75 percent of those personnel are based on the island of Okinawa. Our troop presence there is strongly disliked by the island's population. In 1995, two U.S. marines raped a 12-year-old Japanese girl, creating an enormous anti-American backlash. The U.S. swiftly made plans to reduce the presence of American troops in Okinawa. In 2006, the U.S. agreed to move the Futenma base to a less populated part of Okinawa while also shifting some troops and their families to Guam.

The landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPC) last August, after over 50 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), raises substantial questions about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Yukio Hatoyama was named Japan's new Prime Minister from the DPC. He had campaigned opposing any new basing in Okinawa, including the abrogation of the 2006 agreement. After substantial pressure from the Obama administration, Hatoyama reversed positions, and agreed to the new U.S. base. He was then forced to resign as a result of going back on his campaign promise. New DPC Prime Minister Naoto Kan has announced that he will abide by the 2006 agreement.

The U.S. military's footprint in Japan is almost surely going to be a huge sticking point in the months and years ahead. Meanwhile, the bases there continue to be viewed by American military leaders as vital our defense efforts throughout Asia.

### **Summary of the Japan Affirmative:**

The evidence in this file is would allow you to read an affirmative that claimed that the US should withdraw its military presence from Japan. The inherency evidence discusses the current plans for the U.S. military in Japan and the politics of American military bases in the country. Despite widespread public opposition to the bases in Japan and a failed plan to relocate the major US base on Okinawa, no action is being taken right now and the military presence seems stable.

The harms can be divided into two advantages. The first is US-Japan relations. The bases in Japan are a major source of friction between the US and Japan. Because the bases are so unpopular domestically in Japan, there is significant pressure to remove them, or worse, break off security cooperation between the US and Japan altogether. If this were to happen, neither the US nor Japan would be able to effectively maintain security in East Asia, especially deterring China and North Korea. Countries like China might take advantage of the bad relations and make a move towards regional hegemony. This would ultimately lead to a war in the region that would go nuclear. It is also possible that as a result of the US withdrawal that Japan might begin to build up its military (this is called rearmament, because they were banned from having a military after World War II). There is evidence about why this would increase stability, as it would allow Japan to take charge of the region and deter China.

The second advantage centers around the environment surrounding Japan, specifically the ocean. The US military is a notorious polluter, and its training exercises in Japan are polluting the ocean around it. The military is dropping spent uranium shells into the ocean, which are a source of radiation.

Specifically, the military's activities are destroying coral reefs and the Dugong, a seal-like species that is on the brink of extinction. The affirmative would argue that these coral reefs are an important source of biodiversity, which is necessary to keep the ecosystem, and humanity, alive.

The solvency contention would argue that withdrawing troops from Japan would cause a realignment in the US-Japan security alliance. The new relationship would be more equal, instead of the US dictating terms. This would be more sustainable and allow the two countries to work together to maintain security in East Asia.

## Glossary:

DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan

Okinawa: Island of Japan where the US military presence is concentrated.

Futenma: The name and location of the US military base on Okinawa.

Yukio Hatoyama: Served as Prime Minister of Japan from 2009-2010. He resigned in 2010 because he broke a promise that he made during his election that he would close the U.S. military base on Okinawa, which made him very unpopular with voters.

Naoto Kan: Current Prime Minister of Japan.

Multipolar: Refers to a situation in world politics when there are several powerful countries, but no one clear leader. Some argue that the world is becoming multipolar, with Europe, India, and China rising up to be on equal terms with the United States.

Hegemon: The most powerful country in the world, the country most able to influence world events in its favor. The U.S. is almost universally considered the hegemon in world politics today.

## Inherency Evidence

### **John Feffer, Foreign Policy in Focus, May 13, 2010**

[[http://www.fpiif.org/blog/okinawa\\_and\\_obamas\\_base-based\\_addiction](http://www.fpiif.org/blog/okinawa_and_obamas_base-based_addiction)]

Nearly 100,000 Okinawans protested the original base plan back on April 25. They are planning to form a human chain around the Futenma base on May 16. Organizers expect 30,000 people to form the 13-kilometer chain. Latest polls show that 90 percent of Okinawans oppose relocation of Futenma within the prefecture. So, what's the likely outcome? The United States, which has pledged not to go forward with basing without local consent, will not get a new base any time soon. Hatoyama may well lose his position. And the Okinawans will have to put up with the dangerous Futenma base in the meantime. Of course, the Obama administration could just decide that, with the Cold War over for 20 years, it can close one of its 90 military facilities in Japan. But alas, it seems that like most of his recent predecessors in the office, Obama has an incorrigible addiction to bases.

### **Michael Werbowksi, World Press Review, June 11, 2010**

[<http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3567.cfm>]

Hatoyama's campaign promise to Okinawans was surely a big vote-getter and assisted in the DPJ's victory, but it may have deeply displeased Washington. As far as the United States is concerned, from the onset the electoral promise was not meant to be honored. The United States had essentially already locked Tokyo in to an inflexible situation (previously negotiated with the former, more pro-American Liberal Democratic Party-led government) by which certain parts of the base would be expanded, by means of a 2006 bilateral agreement, to another location in Cape Henoko. As part of this deal the United States was to build an additional runway at this strategic facility. Hence, more military activity, not less, on Okinawa.

### **New York Times May 23, 2010**

[<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/24/world/asia/24japan.html>]

Reneging on a prominent campaign promise, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama told outraged residents of Okinawa on Sunday that an American air base would be moved only to the north side of the island rather than off the island. The announcement, a victory for the Obama administration and a humiliating setback for Mr. Hatoyama, confirmed what the Japanese media had been reporting for weeks: that he would accept Washington's demands to honor a 2006 agreement to move the United States Marine Air Station Futenma to the island's less populated north.

## Inherency Evidence

**Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, May 12, 2010**

[[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11804](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804)]

World War II ended 65 years ago. The Cold War disappeared 21 years ago. Yet America's military deployments have little changed. Nowhere is that more evident than on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Okinawans are tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since. The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units.

**Michael J. Green, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the CSIS and Associate Professor of IR at Georgetown, 2010**

“Japan’s Confused Revolution” The Washington Quarterly

[http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan\\_Green.pdf](http://www.twq.com/10january/docs/10jan_Green.pdf)

The DPJ also finds itself in a bind about pledges made to create a “more equal alliance” with the United States, including among other things: withdrawing its ships from the multinational coalition in the Indian Ocean, renegotiating bilateral agreements to move U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam as well as to build a new Marine helicopter base back in Okinawa, revising the Status of Forces Agreement governing U.S. forces in Japan, and declassifying secret documents related to U.S. nuclear weapons policy in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. Recognizing the broad public support for the alliance, the DPJ shifted the language on these demands in the policy manifesto it produced just before the election, promising only to “work towards” satisfaction in each area. The party’s difficulty in building internal consensus, however, was reflected in a parallel index it produced for internal purposes that used the original language promising to fulfill all of their demands in the alliance.

FYI: DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan

## Inherency Evidence

**Linda Sieg and Yoko Kubota, staff writers for Reuters, 6/22/2010,**  
[http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M0TS20100623,](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M0TS20100623)

Kan took over earlier this month from Yukio Hatoyama, who quit after sparking public outrage for breaking a promise to move a U.S. airbase off the southern island, reluctant host to about half the 49,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan. The dispute over where to relocate the U.S. Marines' Futenma airbase has distracted Washington and Tokyo as the close allies try to cope with an unpredictable North Korea and a rising China. It has also hurt the popularity of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with voters ahead of a July 12 upper house election, which it needs to win for smooth policymaking, including efforts to rein in huge public debt. "I want to express my gratitude for the fact that this burden contributes to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region," Kan said at ceremony to mark the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa at the end of World War Two, in which about 150,000 Okinawan men, women and children were killed. "I promise to seriously try all the more to reduce Okinawa's burden related to the U.S. bases and eliminate the associated dangers." Kan, visiting Okinawa for the first time as prime minister, spoke at a memorial park where rows of black stones are engraved with names of those who died in the 82-day battle -- civilians and soldiers on both sides. Kan has made fiscal reform a top priority ahead of the election, but opposition parties have used the base dispute to blast the DPJ's diplomatic policies since the party took power for the first time last year.

WRANGLING After months of wrangling, Japan and the United States reached an agreement shortly before Hatoyama quit for the two sides to go ahead with a 2006 deal to shift the Futenma airbase to a less crowded part of Okinawa. Kan has said he will stick to the agreement, but keeping the base on the island, strategically located close to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, faces strong resistance from residents who complain of noise, pollution and crime associated with bases.

## Harms Evidence

**Subhash Kapila, Royal British Army Staff College, and A PhD in Strategic Studies, 6/7/10,**  
Japan's Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html>

The latest issue in Japan-US Security Relationship to rock Japanese politics and bring down outgoing Prime Minister Hatoyama was the relocation of the US Marine Air Base, Futenma. It is not the intention to go into the merits or demerits of the Futenma issue. The aim is to focus on the larger issue as to why earlier Prime ministers strongly aligned to US security interests had long and stable tenures and why presently Japanese Prime ministers are increasingly becoming vulnerable to strong Japanese domestic opinion on US-Japan security related issues. This significant change can be attributed to two strategic factors, both pertaining to the United States. In the past United States reigned supreme strategically in East Asia. That strategic strength provided Japan with a sheet anchor for its security. Today, United States strategic power is on the decline and China is rising strategically strong in East Asia. Japanese insecurities therefore are raised. More seriously, Japanese insecurities are magnified further when Japan perceives that United States policy formulations in East Asia exhibit ambiguities about Japan's strategic sensitivities. Under the present US Administration, even though the US President and US Secretary of State visited Japan first in East Asia, but in their pronouncements in Tokyo they seemed to indicate that the United States intends to adopt China as a partner in the security management of East Asia. With such US attitudinal adoptions, it becomes logical for Japanese public to question the very premises of US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Japan's financial underwriting of US forward military presence in Asia and the sizeable US Marines presence on Okinawa Island.

**Subhash Kapila, Royal British Army Staff College, and A PhD in Strategic Studies, 6/7/10,**  
"Japan's Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact"

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html>

One gets a feeling from media features in Japanese press that strong resentment is surfacing in Japan on these issues. More importantly the arrogance of US officials in dealings with Japan's security matters is being resented. No wonder outgoing Japanese PM Hatoyama made pointed public references during President Obama's visit to Tokyo that United States needs to manage relations with Japan on a more "equitable basis". He was airing widespread Japanese sentiments on the issue. The United States security architecture in East Asia could collapse without Japan's participation. The United States would need to address Japan's sensibilities on security issues on a more imaginative and equitable basis. US obliviousness to this aspect could generate more political instability in Japan endangering US security interests.

## Harms Evidence

**Michael O' Hanlon**, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, March-April 2001

“Come Partly Home, America: How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad”. *Foreign Affairs*. Volume 80, No. 2. JSTOR)

In addition, the marines on Okinawa are not so much forward-deployed as they are marooned. Okinawa itself is not at risk, and Japanese forces have the capacity to defend it even if it were. Furthermore, the three amphibious ships based in Japan can transport only the 2,000 marines of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which patrols the region, to areas of actual threat elsewhere in the Pacific. The other 15,000 marines on Okinawa could not quickly deploy elsewhere with their equipment. In the event of a war, these troops could be flown to Korea without their heavy weaponry to help in noncombatant evacuations or similar missions. But they would have no advantage over infantry soldiers airlifted from the United States or local South Korean infantry troops. Keeping so many marines on Okinawa also places a major strain on U.S.-Japan relations, as George Washington University Professor Mike Mochizuki has argued and as an increasingly broad swath of the U.S. defense community now recognizes. In terms of acreage, three-quarters of U.S. bases in Japan are on Okinawa, taking up almost 20 percent of the land of an island that is small and, as home to more than a million people, densely populated even by Japanese standards. Changes to the base structure agreed to in the 1990s will reduce the acreage of the U.S. bases on Okinawa by only about a fifth, even if they are carried out in full. (Local resistance to moving the marines' Futenma air base has stymied efforts to enact much of the plan.) Mean while, marine flights continue in and out of Futenma-located right in the middle of Ginowan City-with the associated risks of accidents. Polls in recent years showed that more than 80 percent of all Japanese consider the Okinawa arrangement undesirable and unfair to local citizens. By trying to hold on to all of its bases in Japan, the United States risks causing a backlash and ultimately losing everything, including those facilities with the greatest military benefit for crises in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, or elsewhere-notably, the Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa and U.S. Navy and Air Force facilities on Japan's main islands.

**Christopher A. Preble, independent defense analyst, 3/14/91**

“U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: Adjusting to change” CATO institute  
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-007.html>

The Persian Gulf crisis provides a catalyst for a critical break in precedent and a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy and policy. America's leaders must be alert to the forces at work in Japan and recognize the likelihood of change. Failure to do so threatens to perpetuate an increasingly untenable U.S. strategy based on fostering Japan's security dependence on the United States. Given the hostility already demonstrated by Congress and the American people toward Japan's limited military "burden sharing," refusal to adjust U.S. policy could lead to an acrimonious confrontation. No one should be so naive as to think that the use of Japanese power will forever be dictated by American wishes or American fears. Japan is unlikely to remain a pliant U.S. protectorate indefinitely. U.S. leaders should not allow irrational fears of a long-since dead adversary to hamper sound, rational foreign policy. With America struggling economically to meet military commitments abroad, and with Japan beginning to struggle for military autonomy, a continued unwillingness on the part of American policymakers to accept, indeed to encourage, changes in the current defense arrangement may lead to an abrupt popular rejection of the status quo in both countries, with all the attendant bitterness and mutual recriminations.(13) American and Japanese leaders must appreciate the growing domestic pressures in their respective countries and respond with a new policy that not only more equitably distributes security burdens but restructures the entire Japanese-American security relationship.

## Harms Evidence

**Michael Auslin, Director Japan studies, AEI, Wall Street Journal June 16, 2010**

[[online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575307471399789704.html](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575307471399789704.html)]

Japanese military officials worry that this year's protests in Okinawa could have spillover effects, inspiring protesters around Atsugi to demand a reduced American presence, and possibly even agitating against the government plan to move Japanese planes there. Moreover, Iwakuni's mayor might reject the new burden of potentially hosting the George Washington's air wing. That, in turn, would embolden antinuclear protesters in Yokosuka, the U.S. Navy's main base, to step up their ongoing pressure to move the nuclear-powered George Washington, the Navy's only permanently forward deployed aircraft carrier, out of Japanese waters. This worst-case scenario would be a series of simultaneous, grassroots movements against the U.S. military presence in Japan that could potentially put fatal stress on the bilateral security alliance and effectively isolate Japan militarily in the western Pacific. Given Mr. Hatoyama's fate when he botched this issue, politicians now are more likely to respond to public demands or they will be replaced by those who do.

**Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 2010**

[<http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201005210397.html>]

The political situation in Okinawa Prefecture has changed dramatically in recent months. Okinawans have become more vocal before in demanding that the Futenma airfield be moved out of their prefecture, preferably out of the country. For the first time, voters in Nago have elected a mayor clearly opposed to the plan to build a new facility to take over Futenma functions in the city. Even Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, who has shown conditional support to the relocation of the base to Henoko, now finds it hard to agree to the plan being considered by the central government. If the Hatoyama administration forges ahead with the Futenma relocation to Henoko in accordance with a new bilateral agreement, serious problems will inevitably occur. It's a fair bet that the 2014 deadline for the relocation under the current plan will become impossible to meet. That would be an undesirable development for the United States as well.

**Chalmers Johnson, Prof. Emeritus, Univ. of CA – San Diego, Los Angeles Times May 6, 2010**

[<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/06/opinion/la-oe-johnson-20100506>]

The United States is on the verge of permanently damaging its alliance with Japan in a dispute over a military base in Okinawa. This island prefecture hosts three-quarters of all U.S. military facilities in Japan. Washington wants to build one more base there, in an ecologically sensitive area. The Okinawans vehemently oppose it, and tens of thousands gathered last month to protest the base. Tokyo is caught in the middle, and it looks as if Japan's prime minister has just caved in to the U.S. demands.

## Harms Evidence

**Subhash Kapila, Royal British Army Staff College, and A PhD in Strategic Studies, 6/7/10,**  
 “Japan’s Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact”  
<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html>

Apolitically unstable Japan could create a strategic vacuum in East Asia in which China could assertively step in to fill the vacuum to the strategic discomfiture of the United States. North East Asia comprises the region China-Taiwan- Japan-Korean Peninsula, Russia and USA. This region today is overwhelmed by a number of strategic crises endangering regional stability and peace. The crises today are focused more on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its military provocative adventurism e.g. sinking of South Korea. Navy ship by a North Korea Navy submarine. Over-arching over all this is the US-China rivalry, this US-Russia rivalry the Japan- China regional rivalry and Japan’s territorial disputes with all its neighbors. Each one of these issues are potential flash points in North East Asia. Japan gets drawn into all these strategic flash points in one way or the other. Japan’s capacity to manage crises and crisis-response maneuverability gets seriously impaired if it is plagued by domestic political instability Japan's crisis management capacities get further impaired when political instability emerges from Japan-US Security Relationship which so far has provided Japan and USA a combined strategic weight to handle regional crises. More than a healthy and stable Japan-China relationship, there is a greater strategic imperative and a call on the United States that American approaches to China and overbearing American approaches to contentious Japan-US security issues does not render Japan vulnerable to China's strategic and political coercion.

**Subhash Kapila, Royal British Army Staff College, and A PhD in Strategic Studies, 6/7/10,**  
 “Japan’s Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact”  
<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html>

Japan is no ordinary nation in Asia. It has a unique historical past in strategic terms. It also has a unique strategic future both in terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and also should it adopt an independent strategic posture based on its innate national strengths. In terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (50th Anniversary this year). Japan is the pivot of the United States security architecture in East Asia even now despite significant changes in US-China relations and the overall power-balance in North-East Asia more specifically. In global terms, Japan counts more politically and economically than strategically. Its global significance arises from the fact that it is ‘global funder’ of many economic and social reconstruction projects. Here also Japan figures significantly in the United States calculus as additionally Japan virtually underwrites the United States forward military presence in East-Asia and contributes financially to United States military operations to offset her Constitutional limitations of not contributing troops e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Indian Ocean maritime security etc. With such strategic, political and economic salience, when political instability hits Japan, the strategic impact of such instability becomes a matter of serious concern both in regional and global terms. It should be a graver concern for the United States.

## Harms Evidence

**Subhash Kapila, Royal British Army Staff College, and A PhD in Strategic Studies, 6/7/10,**  
 “Japan’s Political Instability and Its Strategic Impact”

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers39/paper3848.html>

North East Asia comprises the region China-Taiwan- Japan-Korean Peninsula, Russia and USA. This region today is overwhelmed by a number of strategic crises endangering regional stability and peace. The crises today are focused more on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and its military provocative adventurism e.g. sinking of South Korea. Navy ship by a North Korea Navy submarine. Over-arching over all this is the US-China rivalry, this US-Russia rivalry the Japan- China regional rivalry and Japan’s territorial disputes with all its neighbors. Each one of these issues are potential flash points in North East Asia. Japan gets drawn into all these strategic flash points in one way or the other. Japan’s capacity to manage crises and crisis-response maneuverability gets seriously impaired if it is plagued by domestic political instability Japan’s crisis management capacities get further impaired when political instability emerges from Japan-US Security Relationship which so far has provided Japan and USA a combined strategic weight to handle regional crises.

**Joseph Nye, Director of Harvard Kennedy School of Govt, and Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, 2/17/07**

“The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020.” CSIS 2-17-07. Pg 16  
[http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216\\_asia2020.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf)

With the goal of “getting Asia right,” there is the question of where the U.S.- Japan alliance fits within this strategy. Some argue that if we rely too much on the U.S.-Japan alliance, we and Japan will be isolated in Asia. They point to the immediate tensions between Japan and China and between Japan and Korea over historical issues and advocate a shift in our long-term strategy to China. We believe this construct would needlessly weaken our greatest strategic asset in the region—the close U.S.-Japan alliance. The alliance can and should remain at the core of the United States’ Asia strategy. The key to the success of this strategy is for the alliance itself to continue to evolve from an exclusive alliance based on a common threat toward a more open, inclusive alliance based on common interests and values. One thing is certain about 2020: the United States and Japan will still be the world’s two largest economies with democratic systems and shared values. That is why the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to shape Asia’s future as it has its past—and be a critical factor in the global equation. Consider Japan’s role today. Japan upholds international institutions as the second-largest donor to the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank. Polls in 2006 of countries around the world demonstrate that, with the exception of China and Korea, Japan is the world’s most respected contributor of public goods. Japan upholds the balance of power in Asia through its own measured self-defense capabilities and support for U.S. presence. Japan provides relief in cases like the 2004 tsunami, with over \$500 million in grants and the dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces. Japan has become a positive model for economic development, democratic principles, and global cooperation. The ability of the Japanese economy to sustain such high levels of financial support for the international system will likely decrease in relative terms by 2020, but after 50 years of passivity, Japan’s new leaders are arguing for a more proactive security and diplomatic role that will keep Japan’s weight in the international system high. The United States needs a Japan that is confident and engaged in that way. Turning away from the U.S.-Japan alliance or lowering our expectations of Japan would likely have a negative impact on regional stability and its role in the region. Instead of a Japan that underpins the international system in 2020, it may become comfortable as a “middle power” at best, and recalcitrant, prickly, and nationalistic at worst. Not to encourage Japan to play a more active role in support of international stability and security is to deny the international community Japan’s full potential. But if U.S. strategy continues to have high expectations for Japan that meld with Japanese national sentiment, Japan will stand as a powerful model for the region of what leadership based on democratic values means.

## Harms Evidence

**Thi Lam, General in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 10/27/95**

“Why a Remilitarized Japan is Crucial for Asia-Pacific Stability”

<http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/columns/pacific-pulse/951027-japan.html>)

If there is any single factor goading Japan to finally assume its global responsibilities it is China's growing military power. Only a remilitarized Japan can offer a strategic counter-weight to help stabilize the economically booming region. But the new rearmament of Japan is not intended as a show of hostility towards Beijing. Rather, the aim is to bring about a cooperation between the two East Asian giants. The model is the cooperation between France and Germany that became the foundation for a peaceful and prosperous European community. For any long-term Sino-Japanese alliance to work, China -- now undergoing a delicate transition to a post-Deng era -- must also move towards democratization. As the last two centuries have shown, democratic states do not make war on one another; dictatorial regimes do. Indeed, the much celebrated Franco-German cooperation would not have occurred until a twice defeated Germany finally turned democratic. The West can help this process along through continuing its policy of "constructive engagement ". But a "remilitarized Japan no longer clinging to America's skirt," in the words of one political analyst, is also imperative to add firmness to the West's flexibility.

**Ted Galen Carpenter, director of foreign policy studies at Cato, 11/1/95**

“Paternalism And Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship”

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-244.html>)

Moreover, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan can probably protect its security interests without a massive rearmament effort. A modest increase in military spending, say to 1.5 percent of GDP, might well be sufficient--and only the most paranoid would be alarmed by a buildup of that magnitude.(39) Such an increase would produce decidedly more potent air and naval capabilities sufficient for a more credible, wide-ranging Japanese security role. But it would hardly be enough for a new wave of imperialism--especially if Japan was careful not to greatly expand its ground forces. Without a potential army of occupation, Tokyo would clearly lack the ability to subjugate its neighbors, and the existing ground Self-Defense Force, some 150,000 active duty personnel, is obviously far from being such a force.

## Harms Evidence

### **Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy at Cato, 2006**

“Japan’s Growing Confidence Should Be Welcomed”,  
[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=6398](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6398))

A Japanese military, operating independently of the US but still constrained by the cautious (even pacifist) impulses of the public, could be an important factor for regional stability. It could, for example, provide a credible deterrent to offensive actions by North Korea against Japan, and might inhibit Pyongyang from acting aggressively against other countries. Overall, east Asian countries should welcome the emergence of a regional power capable of providing a strategic counterweight to a rising China. Japan is the one regional power best suited to play this role. Even if the Japanese revise their constitution, they will retain their skepticism about the use of military force and an equally strong determination to maintain firm civilian control over the military. Recent controversies over Mr. Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine for Japan's war dead and a separate but related row over textbooks that play down Japanese wartime abuses should not be seen as evidence of resurgent Japanese nationalism. Although there may be a nationalist fringe within Japan pining for a return to martial glory, such individuals remain on the margins of Japanese society.

### **Doug Bandow senior fellow at Cato Institute, 6/18/10**

[“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at  
<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>,

Some Japanese see little danger and correspondingly little need for much defense. Others are not so certain. It’s a decision for the Japanese people. North Korea’s military abilities remain uncertain and its aggressive intentions remain unpredictable. Prime Minister Hatoyama cited “the current situation in the Korean peninsula” as a reason to maintain the base on Okinawa. Moreover, China’s power is growing. So far Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive, but increasingly seems willing to contest islands claimed by both nations. The best way to keep the competition peaceful is for Tokyo to be able to protect itself. Of course, several of Japan’s neighbors, along with some Americans, remain nervous about any Japanese military activity given the Tokyo’s wartime depredations. However, the Japanese people do not have a double dose of original sin. Everyone who planned and most everyone who carried out those aggressions are dead. A country, which goes through political convulsions before it will send unarmed peacekeepers abroad is not likely to engage in a new round of conquest. Anyway, the best way to assuage regional concerns is to construct cooperative agreements and structures between Japan and its neighbors. Democratic countries from South Korea to Australia to India have an interest in working with Tokyo to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains peaceful and prosperous. Japan has much at stake and could contribute much. Tokyo could still choose to do little. But it shouldn’t expect America to fill any defense gap.

## Harms Evidence

**Jonathon Landy, National Security and International Correspondent, 3/10/06**

Knight Rider, <http://www.pioneerplanet.com/seven-days/3/news/docs/025201.htm>]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stake could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

**C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007,**

Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very active American intervention in Eastern Eurasia and creating the underlying conditions for a massive, and probably nuclear, great power war. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

## Harms Evidence

### **Straits Times, 2000**

(“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” June 25<sup>th</sup>, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis)

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book *The Korean War*, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

## Harms Evidence

### **Gary Mackey, Former Marine in Japan, 6/13/08,**

“CAMP BUTLER, OKINAWA, JAPAN DESTROYED Whistleblower's Career, LIED to Office of the Special Counsel, Covered Up Environmental Violations, Health and Safety of citizens placed at risk FPO AP Nationwide”

These were not just run-of-the-mill performance problems. These were serious environmental issues, such as the deliberate dumping of diesel fuel into a ditch which went off-base into the Japanese living area, a serious chemical fire at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma which released toxic fumes, almost losing a waste oil disposal contract which would have cost the Marine Corps over \$700,000 in additional disposal charges and mismanagement and gross negligence in not setting up an efficient program for reacting to spills of petroleum-oil-lubricants and hazardous substances. These issues went to the very core of protecting the environment as well as protecting the health and safety of U.S. personnel and the Japanese public at large. This is a very serious issue on Okinawa where the government there and the Japanese public want the U.S. bases removed.

### **Genuine Security, 2007**

[“Okinawa: Effects of long-term US Military presence” Okinawa: Effects of long-term US Military presence, <http://www.genuinesecurity.org/partners/report/Okinawa.pdf>, pg. 5]

Regular training exercises using live ammunition have caused forest fires, soil erosion, earth tremors, and accidents. In 1996, U.S. Marines fired depleted uranium shells into the ocean. The U.S. military defines this as a conventional weapon, but, officially, they are not allowed to fire depleted uranium in Japan. White Beach, a docking area in Okinawa for U.S. nuclear submarines, is an area where regional health statistics show comparatively high rates of leukemia in children and cancers in adults. In 1998, for example, two women from the White Beach area who had been in the habit of gathering shellfish and seaweed there died of liver cancer. Also local people are affected, sometimes killed, in traffic accidents caused by U.S. troops. In October 1998, for example, a U.S. Marine killed a young woman in a hit-and-run accident. Under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA, Article 4), the U.S. is not responsible for environmental clean-up of land or water. As in Korea and the Philippines, host communities do not have adequate information on the extent of military contamination. The Japanese government does not release information about it. After the incident with the depleted uranium shells mentioned above, the U.S. government must inform local officials about military operations, but Okinawan people doubt that this is really working.

## Harms Evidence

### **Center for Biological Diversity, et al. 2010**

[ Center for Biological Diversity, Earthjustice, American Friends Service Committee, Animal Welfare Institute, Big Wildlife, Endangered Species Coalition (on behalf of more than 400 organizations, <http://cop10.org/issues/military/106-henokodugongs>)]

The island of Okinawa has been called the “Galápagos of the East” because of the incredible variety of marine and terrestrial life it supports. Unfortunately, a joint military project proposed by the U.S. and Japanese governments threatens to destroy one of the last healthy coral-reef ecosystems in Okinawa, pushing many magnificent species to the brink of extinction. You have the power to protect these unique and priceless creatures. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate the contentious U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab and Henoko Bay. This shortsighted plan does not take into consideration that the relocation will destroy a valued ecosystem, including the nearly 400 types of coral that form Okinawa’s reefs and support more than 1,000 species of fish. It will also hurt imperiled sea turtles and marine mammals. Current plans call for construction of the new military base near Henoko and Oura bays in Okinawa. But the habitat this project would destroy supports numerous endangered species — animals protected by American, Japanese, and international law for their biological and cultural importance. These species include: Okinawa dugong: The critically endangered and culturally treasured dugong, a manatee-like creature, relies on this habitat for its very survival in Okinawa. Japan’s Mammalogical Society placed the dugong on its “Red List of Mammals,” estimating the population in Okinawa to be critically endangered. The U.S. government’s Marine Mammal Commission and the United Nations Environmental Program fear the project would pose a serious threat to this mammal’s survival. The World Conservation Union’s dugong specialists have expressed similar concerns and have placed the dugong on its Red List of threatened species. The Okinawa dugong is also a federally listed endangered species under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. The Okinawa dugong has extreme cultural significance to the Okinawan people, and only about 50 dugongs are thought to remain in these waters. The base construction will crush the last remaining critical habitat for the Okinawa dugong, destroying feeding trails and seagrass beds essential for dugong survival.

## Harms Evidence

**Peter Galvin, Center for Biological Diversity, 11/3/09**

[[http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press\\_releases/2009/dugong-12-03-2009.html](http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2009/dugong-12-03-2009.html)]

Representatives of conservation, animal protection, and peace and justice groups representing more than 10 million Americans hand-delivered a letter today to the White House and State Department urging President Barack Obama to cancel plans to expand a U.S. military base near Henoko in Okinawa, Japan. The base expansion would destroy the prime feeding ground of the few manatee-like Okinawa dugong remaining in the world (believed to number about 50). The plan to expand the base – Camp Schwab, in northeast Okinawa – calls for filling in parts of Oura Bay and the surrounding area. The 1.5-mile-long airbase would also permanently disrupt one of the most biologically diverse areas in the Pacific. Okinawa has been called the “Galápagos of the East” because of its rich and unique biological diversity. The Henoko area provides important habitat for numerous rare wildlife species in addition to the dugong – an endangered marine mammal related to the manatee and a cultural icon in Japan – and three species of endangered sea turtles.

**Peter Galvin, Center for Biological Diversity, 4/23/10,**

“Sign on Letter calling for halting of military operations in Okinawa Dugong Habitat”

[http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/Okinawa\\_dugong/sign-on\\_letter.html](http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/Okinawa_dugong/sign-on_letter.html)

If the proposal to relocate the military operations of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab and Henoko Bay moves forward as planned, it will destroy one of the last healthy coral-reef ecosystems in Okinawa and push several nationally and internationally protected species to the brink of extinction. Under a 2006 bilateral agreement, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate the contentious Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab and Henoko Bay. However, this shortsighted plan did not take into consideration that the relocation would destroy a valued ecosystem, including nearly 400 types of coral and habitat for more than 1,000 species of fish. It would also hurt imperiled sea turtles and the iconic Okinawa dugong. The critically endangered and culturally treasured dugong, a manatee-like creature, relies on the pristine conditions of Henoko Bay. Japan’s Mammalogical Society placed the dugong on its Red List of Mammals, estimating the population in Okinawa to be critically endangered. The Okinawa dugong has considerable cultural significance for the Okinawan people, and only about 50 dugongs are thought to remain in these waters. The base construction would imperil the last remaining critical habitat for the Okinawa dugong, destroying feeding trails and seagrass beds essential for dugong survival.

## Harms Evidence

### **Red Orbit, 2010**

(Staff Writer March 26 2010 Coral Reef Extinction Could Have Catastrophic Effect)

[http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1842159/coral\\_reef\\_extinction\\_could\\_have\\_catastrophic\\_effect/index.html](http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/1842159/coral_reef_extinction_could_have_catastrophic_effect/index.html)

Were that to occur, the results could be catastrophic. Coral reefs are eaten or inhabited by many of the oceanic fish population, which in turn provide a food or income source for an estimated one-billion people around the world. In addition to hunger and poverty, some predict that severe political unrest could also result, should the coral reef actually become extinct. "You could argue that a complete collapse of the marine ecosystem would be one of the consequences of losing corals," Carpenter told Brian Skoloff of the AP on Thursday. "You're going to have a tremendous cascade effect for all life in the oceans." "Whole nations will be threatened in terms of their existence," added Carl Gustaf Lundin of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. According to Skoloff, "Experts say cutting back on carbon emissions to arrest rising sea temperatures and acidification of the water, declaring some reefs off limits to fishing and diving, and controlling coastal development and pollution could help reverse, or at least stall, the tide." Such measures have met with resistance, however. Earlier this week, in fact, a proposed set of restrictions on the trade of coral species was rejected by the member nations of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Failing to establish such regulations, however, could create a chain effect that could wipe out other seagoing species, such as grouper, snapper, oysters, and clams, and destroy a fishing industry that directly employs at least 38 million individuals worldwide.

### **Robin Kundis Craig, , Associate Professor of Law – Indiana University, 2003**

"Taking Steps Toward Marine Wildlife Protection?") Lexis Nexis

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, " ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life.

## Harms Evidence

### **Science Daily, 2/20/09**

(Japanese Coral changes sex on the sea floor, February 20th 2009)  
<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/02/090219202833.htm>

Trees do it. Bees do it. Even environmentally stressed fish do it. But Prof. Yossi Loya from Tel Aviv University's Department of Zoology is the first in the world to discover that Japanese sea corals engage in "sex switching" too. His research may provide the key to the survival of fragile sea corals -- essential to all life in the ocean -- currently threatened by global warming. In times of stress like extreme hot spells, the female mushroom coral (known as a fungiid coral) switches its sex so that most of the population becomes male. The advantage of doing so, says the world-renowned coral reef researcher, is that male corals can more readily cope with stress when resources are limited. Apparently, when times get tough, nature sends in the boys. "We believe, as with orchids and some trees, sex change in corals increases their overall fitness, reinforcing the important role of reproductive plasticity in determining their evolutionary success," says Prof. Loya, whose findings recently appeared in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society B. The Will to Fight and Survive* "One of the evolutionary strategies that some corals use to survive seems to be their ability to change from female to male," says Prof. Loya. "As males, they can pass through the bad years, then, when circumstances become more favorable, change back to overt females. Being a female takes more energy. And having the ability to change gender periodically enables a species to maximize its reproductive effort." Corals, though a part of the animal kingdom, can act like plants. Both are sedentary life forms, unable to move when times get tough. In stressful environmental conditions, male corals can "ride out the storm," so to speak, says Prof. Loya. "Males are less expensive -- in the evolutionary sense -- to maintain. They are cheaper in terms of their gonads and the energy needed to maintain their bodies," he adds. He also notes that this theory probably doesn't apply to humans, even those who have opted for a sex change. While admired for their beauty by divers, coral reefs provide an essential habitat for thousands of species of underwater creatures. Without the reefs, much of the underwater wildlife in reef habitats would perish. And for millions of people in the tropical regions, coral reef sea life is a major source of daily protein.

## Harms Evidence

### **Irish Times 02 (7/27, LN)**

Such pleasure is probably the least important reason why biodiversity is a good thing: human survival is more to the point. Conservationists insist that biodiversity is basic to the Earth's life-support system and that the progressive loss of species - as in the current destruction of natural forest - could help destabilize the very processes by which the planet services our presence and wellbeing. Most ecologists, probably, go along with the idea that every species matters. Like rivets in an aeroplane, each has its own, small importance: let too many pop and things start to fly apart. But some are now arguing that since so many species seem to do much the same job, mere "species richness" may not be essential: so long as "keystone species" are identified and cared for, their ecosystems will probably still function.

### **Jim Chen, Prof. of Law "Globalization and Its Losers" 9Minn. J. Global Trade 157), 2000**

The value of endangered species and the biodiversity they embody is "literally ... incalculable." What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preservation. Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record. To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo-Christian "myth and legend," we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history." The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity. If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descendants [will] most regret" the "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government." Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens - in ten million years, perhaps a hundred million

## Solvency Evidence

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, 8/31/09,**  
 “Tokyo Drift,” [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10496](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10496)

Over the last half century Japan has changed far more than has the alliance. It is time to adjust the U.S.-Japan relationship accordingly. Some on the Right point out that Tokyo cannot demand equality unless it does more. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation observed: "Neither country is well served by endlessly repeated bromides of the strength of the alliance as it becomes increasingly apparent that Japan will not fulfill the security role required to address increasing global security threats." However, the real problem is not that Tokyo does too little, but the United States does too much. Japan's security dependence is not in America's interest. Why preserve a military relationship created in a very different world? Klingner contended that "the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives," since "The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary."

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, 8/31/09,**  
 “Tokyo Drift,” [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10496](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10496)

Yet South Korea, with forty times the GDP, twice the population, and far greater military spending than Pyongyang, should be the one deterring threats from the North. America should not demonstrate resolve in defending allies — Japan as well as South Korea — which should be defending themselves. And Tokyo is unlikely to allow the United States to use facilities in Japan for American purposes — especially to initiate war against China over Taiwan or to otherwise maintain U.S. primacy. In fact, America's aggressive foreign policy and force structure, oriented to offense rather than defense, is why the United States spends so much on the military — roughly half of the global total. Washington has eleven carrier groups in order to attack other nations, such as Iran, North Korea and China, not to prevent them from attacking America. Even more so, the role of U.S. bases and forces abroad is offensive, to intervene. Protecting war-torn allied states in the aftermath of the greatest conflict of human history made sense. Doing the same today, when allied states have prospered and the most serious hegemonic threat has disappeared, does not make sense. Washington should return to Japan responsibility for its defense. Even today, Tokyo, though spending just one percent of GDP (\$47 billion last year) on the military, is on par with the leading European states. But with the world's second largest economy (third based on purchasing power parity), Japan could do much more. Doubling its defense effort — which would still be half of America's burden — would match Chinese military spending. Whether Japan needs to do so is, of course, up to Japan. The more persuasive Beijing's so-called peaceful rise, the less pressure on Tokyo to act militarily. The more provocative North Korea in developing and testing both missiles and nuclear weapons, the greater the need for Japan to augment its forces. Whatever the Japanese people wish to do, they should pay the cost of and take responsibility for doing so.

## Solvency Evidence

### **Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, 6/18/10**

[“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>, accessed June 28, 2010//Thur]

Some Japanese see little danger and correspondingly little need for much defense. Others are not so certain. It's a decision for the Japanese people. North Korea's military abilities remain uncertain and its aggressive intentions remain unpredictable. Prime Minister Hatoyama cited “the current situation in the Korean peninsula” as a reason to maintain the base on Okinawa. Moreover, China's power is growing. So far Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive, but increasingly seems willing to contest islands claimed by both nations. The best way to keep the competition peaceful is for Tokyo to be able to protect itself. Of course, several of Japan's neighbors, along with some Americans, remain nervous about any Japanese military activity given the Tokyo's wartime depredations. However, the Japanese people do not have a double dose of original sin. Everyone who planned and most everyone who carried out those aggressions are dead. A country, which goes through political convulsions before it will send unarmed peacekeepers abroad is not likely to engage in a new round of conquest. Anyway, the best way to assuage regional concerns is to construct cooperative agreements and structures between Japan and its neighbors. Democratic countries from South Korea to Australia to India have an interest in working with Tokyo to ensure that the Asia-Pacific remains peaceful and prosperous. Japan has much at stake and could contribute much. Tokyo could still choose to do little. But it shouldn't expect America to fill any defense gap.

## Solvency Evidence

### **Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, 6/18/10**

["Get Out of Japan", National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>, accessed June 28, 2010//Thur]

Do U.S. bases in Okinawa help dampen regional arms spending? That's another point more often asserted than proven. Even if so, however, that isn't necessarily to Washington's benefit. The best way to ensure a responsible Chinese foreign and military policy is for Beijing's neighbors to be well-armed and willing to cooperate among themselves. Then local or regional conflicts would be much less likely to end up in Washington. None of this means that the Japanese and American peoples should not be linked economically and culturally, or that the two governments should not cooperate on security issues. But there no longer is any reason for America to guarantee Japan's security or permanently station forces on Japanese soil. The Obama administration's foreign policy looks an awful lot like the Bush administration's foreign policy. The U.S. insists on dominating the globe and imposing its will on its allies. This approach is likely to prove self-defeating in the long-term. U.S. arrogance will only advance the point when increasingly wealthy and influential friends insist on taking policy into their own hands. Before that, however, Washington's insistence on defending prosperous and populous allies risks bankrupting America. Washington must begin scaling back foreign commitments and deployments. Japan would be a good place to start.

### **Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 2010**

"Japan can Defend Itself", [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11804](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804))

Who should protect Japan? Japan. Tokyo's neighbors remain uneasy in varying degrees about the prospect of a more active Japan, but World War II is over. A revived Japanese empire is about as likely as a revived Mongol empire. Both Japan and India could play a much larger role in preserving regional security. Many Japanese citizens are equally opposed to a larger Japanese military and more expansive foreign policy. Their feelings are understandable, given the horrors of World War II. However, the most fundamental duty of any national government is defense. If the Japanese people want a minimal (or no) military, that is their right. But they should not expect other nations to fill the defense gap. Moreover, with an expected \$1.6 trillion deficit this year alone, the United States can no longer afford to protect countries which are able to protect themselves. Washington has more than enough on its military plate elsewhere in the world. Raymond Greene, America's consul general in Okinawa, says: "Asia is going through a period of historic strategic change in the balance of power." True enough, which is why East Asian security and stability require greater national efforts from Japan and its neighbors. Regional defense also warrants improved multilateral cooperation — something which should minimize concerns over an increased Japanese role.

## Solvency Evidence

**Mark Beeson, Department of Politics, University of York, UK, 2006**

“American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific, Geopolitics”, EBSCOHOST)

Elsewhere in the region American policy generally and the ‘war on terror’ in particular have eroded popular support for the US even more dramatically. 83 That enthusiasm for the US in Islamic Indonesia might plummet as a consequence of the US’s increasingly unilateral, for-us-or-against-us policy stance in the ‘war on terror’ is perhaps predictable enough. What is more surprising is that the US’s frequently heavy-handed, uncompromising approach, when combined with a frequently unsophisticated understanding of, or apparent disregard for, Southeast Asia’s particular difficulties, may actually be encouraging further opposition to its policies.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, there is a good deal of skepticism about American policy in the region, even amongst supporters of the war on terror, as US policy appears to be equally preoccupied with countering Chinese influence in Southeast Asia – a concern that is not widely shared in the region.<sup>85</sup> The other issue that may be effectively creating a divide, or at least a growing sense of difference, between the East Asian and North American sides of the Asia-Pacific is the growing realization that, while the hub and spokes architecture that the US continues to dominate may further American grand strategy,<sup>86</sup> it is not necessarily helpful in resolving specific East Asian problems or promoting greater regional cooperation. As Muthiah Alagappa points out, it is striking that ‘the development of international society has made the greatest progress in a subregion – Southeast Asia – after American disengagement and has made much less progress in a subregion – Northeast Asia – where the United States has continued to be engaged most heavily’.<sup>87</sup> Not only has Southeast Asia been able to foster a sense of regional identity in the absence of direct American engagement – with no obvious loss of security or stability – but American policy has made little progress in resolving the East Asian region’s most intractable and dangerous confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Alagappa argues that American troop deployments across Northeast Asia may actually be making the resolution of stand-offs in North Korea, and between Taiwan and China, more difficult to resolve. Like Kang, Alagappa concludes that ‘the consequences of American disengagement may not be as disastrous as posited’.<sup>88</sup> Such a possibility is still quite unimaginable for many policy makers and commentators around the region. Yet it is becoming increasingly less controversial to suggest that China’s rise will inevitably draw Southeast and Northeast Asia into ‘a single East Asia regional security dynamic’.<sup>89</sup> If the ‘Korean problem’ can be resolved satisfactorily, if the status quo prevails in relation to Taiwan, if Japan and the rest of the region remain comfortable with the inevitability of a more powerful China and do not seek to ‘balance’ its ascendancy in the manner much Western scholarship predicts – all clearly big ‘ifs’ – then it is not obvious what justification or support there would be for continued American troop deployments across the region, or even a security architecture that continues to revolve around Washington rather than Beijing. In such circumstances the Asia-Pacific would become the emptiest of signifiers, and the US would be deprived of a potentially important institutionalized link to the countries of East Asia.

## Solvency Evidence

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan, 8/31/09,**  
 “Tokyo Drift,” [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10496](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10496)

With the rise of prosperous and/or populous allied states (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and several ASEAN nations) as well as friendly powers (India and Indonesia, most notably), Washington is in the position to act as an off-shore balancer, prepared to act against an aggressive hegemonic power should one arise, but not entangled in daily geopolitical controversies. America's overwhelming power and geographic isolation give Washington greater flexibility in defending its own security. Expecting Tokyo to protect itself doesn't mean severing bilateral security relationships. The United States and Japan should cooperate on issues ranging from intelligence sharing to emergency base access. Nye also writes of "a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming." None of these, however, compares to the importance of preserving the nation from attack. And none are relevant to a military alliance. In fact, today's emphasis on military issues may inhibit bilateral cooperation elsewhere. The DPJ intends to change Tokyo's relationship with the United States. In what direction will the new government move? Washington should take the lead, turning defense responsibilities over to Japan, which would benefit both countries.

**Michael Vaughan Assistant Professor in School of Social Work at St. Louis University, 3/23/10**  
 (“Japan’s New Government – Finding or Losing Its Way?”  
<http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:200332>)

For its part, the US military has largely treated Okinawa as its own fiefdom since 1945. Some 12,500 Americans died and 37,000 were wounded in the battle for the island. Until it officially reverted to Japan in 1972, the US military ran the place with a free hand, often defying the wishes of both the Japanese Government and the US State Department. In one incident, in 1966, the US military secretly transported nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Honshu, Japan’s main island, in flagrant violation of the 1960 Security Agreement. The US military also resisted Okinawa’s reversion to Japanese rule and it continues to have a proprietary attitude about what takes place there. The US Government should respect Japan’s desire to reduce the US military presence on its sovereign territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea and the Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of US troops in Japan, which to some is redolent of 19th Century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the course of the alliance.<sup>13</sup>

## Solvency Evidence

### **Doug Bandow senior fellow at Cato Institute, 6/18/10**

[“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, June 18th, 2010, available online at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>,

The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do. The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units. Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops—insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?’”

### **John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, 3/6/2010**

“Okinawa and the New Domino Effect”, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html>

Yet the actual strategic value of Futenma is, at best, questionable. The South Koreans are more than capable of dealing with any contingency on the peninsula. And the United States frankly has plenty of firepower by air (Kadena) and sea (Yokosuka) within hailing distance of China. A couple thousand Marines won't make much of a difference (though the leathernecks strenuously disagree). However, in a political environment in which the Pentagon is finding itself making tough choices between funding counterinsurgency wars and old Cold War weapons systems, the "China threat" lobby doesn't want to give an inch. Failure to relocate the Futenma base within Okinawa might be the first step down a slippery slope that could potentially put at risk billions of dollars in Cold War weapons still in the production line. It's hard to justify buying all the fancy toys without a place to play with them. And that's one reason the Obama administration has gone to the mat to pressure Tokyo to adhere to the 2006 agreement. It even dispatched Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Japanese capital last October in advance of president Obama's own Asian tour. Like an impatient father admonishing an obstreperous teenager, Gates lectured the Japanese "to move on" and abide by the agreement - to the irritation of both the new government and the public. (See Gates gets grumpy in Tokyo, October 28, 2009)

## Solvency Evidence

### **Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow CATO Institute, March 25, 2010**

[<http://closethebase.org/2010/03/25/okinawa-and-the-problem-of-empire/>]

If Washington is going to both defend Japan and use Japanese territory as a launch pad for intervention elsewhere, troops must be stationed somewhere, and Okinawa is centrally located. In fact, there's no reason for the U.S. to do either. Allies are a means to an end; the defense of America, not allies, is America's vital interest. Sometimes protecting other nations is necessary for U.S. security, as during the Cold War. But that world disappeared long ago. Enemy threats are far fewer and allied capabilities are far greater. True, politicians and analysts alike routinely term America's alliances "cornerstones" and "linchpins" of U.S. security, regional stability, and world peace. In reality, today's alliance are unnecessary at best and dangerous transmission belts of conflict and war at worst.

### **Gavan McCormack, professor, Australian National University, March 5, 2010**

[[http://www.fpipf.org/articles/the\\_travails\\_of\\_a\\_client\\_state](http://www.fpipf.org/articles/the_travails_of_a_client_state)]

At Honolulu in January 2010, Hillary Clinton insisted that the Ampo base system was indispensable for East Asian, especially Japan's, security and prosperity. It was essentially Joseph Nye's 1995 point. But is it true? The idea that the peace and security of East Asia depends on the presence of the Marines in Okinawa (the "deterrence" function) is tendentious. There is today almost zero possibility of an attack on Japan by some armed force such as was imagined during the Cold War, and in any case the Marines are an expeditionary "attack" force, held in readiness to be launched as a ground force into enemy territory, not a force for the defense of Okinawa or Japan as stipulated under Article 4 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Since 1990, they have flown repeatedly from bases in Japan for participation in the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars.

### **Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute, May 12, 2010**

[[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11804](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804)]

Checking China is next on the potential Okinawa mission list. However, no one expects the United States to launch a ground invasion of the People's Republic of China irrespective of the future course of events. Thus, the 3d Marine Expeditionary Force wouldn't be very useful in any conflict. In any case, a stronger Japanese military — which already possesses potent capabilities — would be a far better mechanism for encouraging responsible Chinese development.

## Topicality Evidence

### **US Forces Japan, 2008,**

“US Forces in Japan”, <http://www.usfj.mil/>

U.S. military strength in Japan is about 36,000 ashore and 11,000 afloat, and U.S. forces are dispersed among 85 facilities located on Honshu, Kyushu, and Okinawa. Total acreage of U.S. bases is approximately 77,000 acres. USFJ bases and facilities range in size from a several thousand acre training area to a single antenna site.

### **US Forces Japan, 2008,**

“US Forces in Japan”, <http://www.usfj.mil/>

On mainland Japan, there are seven different bases/posts. Yokota and Misawa, representing the Air Force; Camp Zama, representing the Army; Iwakuni; the Marine Corps; and Yokosuka, Atsugi, and Sasebo, the Navy. The closest of these is Camp Zama, which is approximately 20 miles from Yokota. The drive time, due to the traffic congestion in Japan, can be anywhere between one to two hours. The next largest facility on the island is Yokosuka, which is 70 kilometers away and can take two to three hours by car.

### **Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 3/31/10,**

“Japan”, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm>

Japan provides bases and financial and material support to U.S. forward-deployed forces, which are essential for maintaining stability in the region. Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, the 5th Air Force, and elements of the Army's I Corps. The United States currently maintains approximately 50,000 troops in Japan, about half of whom are stationed in Okinawa.

## Allied Proliferation DA Answers

**Muthiah Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, 2008,**  
“The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia, Ed., p. 26)

In exploring the implications of national nuclear strategies and more broadly nuclear weapons for national and regional security, this study advances three propositions. First it posits that nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers and have a modifying effect on structure and its consequences. However, they do not fundamentally alter the distribution of power to make a difference in system structure or the pattern of security interaction. Nuclear weapons have not substantially altered the security dynamics in Asia. Certain nuclear strategies such as compellence, counterforce, and limited war could and have intensified existing threat perceptions and lines of enmity. However, they have not created new ones. Other strategies such as existential, minimum, and extended deterrence, and a posture of general deterrence have not exacerbated security situations. In fact, they have had an ameliorating effect. By contributing to greater self-reliance in deterrence, nuclear weapons reduce the salience of external balancing as a rationale for alliance among nuclear weapon states. However, alliances and alignments among them still make sense for other reasons. For nonnuclear weapon states that perceive a nuclear threat, alliance with a nuclear weapon state that can extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal provides an incentive for alliance formation and sustenance. On conflict resolution, nuclear weapons do not advance or obstruct settlement of disputes. When they are relevant, nuclear weapons contribute to a situation of no war and no peace. The logic of the enormous destruction power of nuclear weapons argues against conflict resolution through the physical use of violence. However, nuclear weapons are not a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution. The grave risks associated with escalation to nuclear war in certain cases have induced parties to explore a diplomatic settlement. Dispute settlement, however, hinges on the willingness or unwillingness of conflicting parties to negotiate and compromise on political differences that underlie the dispute. Second, the study posits that nuclear weapons have contributed to the security of states and reinforced stability in the Asian security region that is underpinned by several pillars. Although there could be some destabilizing consequences, thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined stability in Asia. In fact, they have contributed to stability by assuaging national security concerns, preventing the outbreak of major wars, strengthening the status quo, increasing deterrence dominance, and reinforcing the trend in the region toward a reduction in the salience of force in international politics. For a number of reasons (acceptance of the political and territorial status quo; increase in the political, diplomatic, and economic cost of using force in a situation of complex interdependence; and the impracticability of resolving conflicts through the use of force) the offensive roles of force have been on the decline in Asia. Nuclear weapons reinforce this trend by enhancing deterrence dominance and making the cost of war among nuclear weapon states catastrophic and prohibitive, especially in a situation of complex interdependence.

## Allied Proliferation DA Answers

**Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, Research Fellow and resident expert on Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and PhD – Fletcher School and Senior Research Associate – UGA Center for International Trade, 2009**

Naval War College Review, “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option”, 62:3, Summer, Ebsco)

In any event, Japan's "nuclear allergy" persists to the present day. Mataka Kamiya explains Tokyo's self-imposed injunction against bomb making in terms of the general pacifism codified in Japan's peace constitution, lingering memories of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and antimilitary sentiments dating from the interwar years. (11) As a result, concludes Kamiya, opposition to nuclear weapons "is deeply embedded in postwar Japanese culture and society.... [I]t is still far stronger, even today, than those who warn of impending Japanese nuclear armament realize." (12) The vast majority of observers in Japan and in the West are inclined to agree with Kamiya, if for different reasons. Indeed, very few scholars have lent credence to rationales for a nuclear buildup. (13) Tetsuya Endo, a former vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, argues that while Japan possesses the technical capabilities to stage a nuclear breakout, the material costs combined with the prospects of international isolation would deter Tokyo from pursuing such an option. (14) Brad Glosserman cautions that Japan likely would not survive intact as a nation-state following a nuclear exchange--even a limited one--owing to its lack of strategic depth and the extremely high population density throughout the Japanese Archipelago. (15) Llewelyn Hughes identifies a series of domestic institutional constraints, ranging from constitutional to informal, that have anchored Tokyo securely to the U.S. nuclear guarantee. (16) Others believe that Japan is actively pursuing other strategic options, including strengthening its own conventional military capabilities and deepening its alliance ties to the United States, as substitutes for an independent nuclear deterrent. (17) In sum, normative, material, geographic, institutional, and strategic considerations militate against going nuclear.

## Readiness DA Answers

### **Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, 6/18/2010**

“Get Out of Japan”, National Interest Online, , available online at <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23592>

The claim is oft-made that the presence of American forces also help promote regional stability beyond Japan. How never seems to be explained. Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends: “the Marines on Okinawa are an indispensable and irreplaceable element of any U.S. response to an Asian crisis.” But the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), while packing a potent military punch, actually has little to do. The MEF isn’t necessary to support manpower-rich South Korea, which is capable of deterring a North Korean attack. The Marines wouldn’t be useful in a war against China, unless the Pentagon is planning a surprise landing in Tiananmen Square to seize Mao Zedong’s mausoleum. If conflict breaks out over Taiwan or various contested islands, America would rely on air and naval units. Where real instability might arise on the ground, only a fool would introduce U.S. troops—insurgency in Indonesia, civil strife in the Solomon Islands or Fiji, border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma or Cambodia. General Ronald Fogleman, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, argued that the Marines “serve no military function. They don’t need to be in Okinawa to meet any time line in any war plan. I’d bring them back to California. The reason they don’t want to bring them back to California is that everyone would look at them and say, ‘Why do you need these twenty thousand?’”

### **Emma Chanlett-Avery; Specialist in Asian Affairs; and; Weston S. Konishi; Analyst in Asian Affairs; July 23, 2009;**

Congressional Resource Service; The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests; Reduce the U.S. Military Presence in Japan

Some analysts argue that the Cold War formula for the U.S.-Japan alliance is outdated and that the forward presence of 53,000 U.S. troops is an unnecessary burden to the U.S. military. They assert that Japan has the resources to develop into a more autonomous defense force and could cooperate with the U.S. military in areas of mutual concern on a more limited, “normal” country- to-country basis. Further, advocates argue that the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japanese soil could cement a more durable strategic partnership than the current configuration.<sup>31</sup> Opponents of this strategy argue that the large-scale U.S. military presence is necessary in a region with simmering tension and the rise of China, a power that may challenge U.S. hegemony in Asia. Some military experts argue that reducing the number of Marines stationed in Japan, while maintaining air and sea assets, could reduce some of the burden on local communities and still maintain a strong U.S. deterrence in the region.

## START DA Answers

### **Daily Yomiuri, 11/8/2009**

[“U.S. Senate move threat to realignment;

Attempt to slash budget seen by some as warning to Hatoyama over Futenma,” November 8, <http://archive.wn.com/2009/11/08/1400/japanpolitical/>]

A U.S. Senate move concerning the fiscal 2010 budget could jeopardize the realignment of U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture. A Senate committee has voted for a budget bill that slashes 211 million dollars, or about 70 percent, from the 300 million dollars (27.2 billion yen) sought by the U.S. administration for the planned relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam. Senators are now discussing the bill in a plenary session. The move apparently reflects the Senate's mistrust of the Japanese government concerning its reluctance to make a final decision on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan. Such a huge budget cut for the plan to realign U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture could threaten the entire proposal. The White House has submitted to the U.S. Congress a document in which it objects to the proposed budget reduction, saying such a move would hurt the Japan-U.S. agreement reached in February on the relocation of U.S. marines to Guam. It was from this document that the intended budget reduction came to light.

### **Rasmussen Reports, Independent and highly respected polling service, 11/15/2009**

[http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public\\_content/politics/general\\_politics/november\\_2009/26\\_favor\\_pulling\\_all\\_u\\_s\\_troops\\_out\\_of\\_japan](http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/november_2009/26_favor_pulling_all_u_s_troops_out_of_japan)]

Twenty-six percent (26%) of Americans say the United States should remove all its military troops from Japan, a central issue in President Obama's trip to that country Friday and Saturday. A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 49% disagree and oppose the removal of all U.S. troops from Japan. Twenty-five percent (25%) are not sure. The United States still has 47,000 troops based in Japan, many on the island of Okinawa, and friction between Americans and local residents have been growing in recent years. But the president in his visit to Tokyo held firm to a previously negotiated plan to maintain the troops there, saying the two countries have a shared commitment to "the defense of Japan with minimal intrusion on the lives of the people who share this space."



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Japan-Neg (Set)

## Inherency Answers Evidence

**Yukio Kubota, for Reuters, 8/3/2010,**

“U.S. base row adds to Japan PM Kan's headaches”, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-50593120100803>

Senior Japanese and U.S. government officials on Tuesday discussed held talks that included the tricky issue of relocating a U.S. airbase in Futenma on the southern island of Okinawa. The issue helped trigger the resignation of Japan's previous prime minister in June, and is adding to current Prime Minister Naoto Kan's headaches after an upper house election loss in July. It also threatens to undermine the 50-year-old U.S.-Japan alliance. Following are some questions and answers about the issue: IS THIS JUST ABOUT THE FUTENMA AIRBASE? No. The issue is much broader. Washington and Tokyo agreed in 2006 on a "road map" to transform their decades-old alliance, the pillar of Japan's post-World War Two security policies. It reflects part of a U.S. effort to make its military more flexible globally and attempts by the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party to shed the constraints of Japan's pacifist constitution and assume a higher security profile. Central to the pact was a plan to reorganize U.S. troops in Japan, including a shift of up to 8,000 Marines by 2014 to the U.S. territory of Guam from Okinawa. The shift is on track for 2014 despite concerns Guam lacks infrastructure to meet the target, a U.S. official told Reuters this week. [ID:nSGE67106I] A final decision on the move is due in September.

**Agence France Presse, 6/29/2010,**

“Japan wants US Marines to move to Guam”

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jHCgMpgERSBWZI3zVOJCYj5z84Hw>

Japan's government said Wednesday it had no plan to delay transferring some 8,000 US marines based on the southern island of Okinawa to the US Pacific territory of Guam by 2014. In Washington on Tuesday, Jackalyn Pfannenstiel, an assistant US secretary of the Navy, told Congress that the lack of infrastructure in Guam could cause delays. But Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito Sengoku told a news conference: "I have not confirmed that debate. We think we want to go ahead firmly as promised." According to Saturday's Daily Yomiuri, the US Navy told the Guam government last week that the island's infrastructure could not handle a fast enough construction schedule to allow for the Marines to transfer there by 2014. The US government has effectively given up on its target of completing the transfer in 2014 and also informed Tokyo of the delay, the daily said without giving a source. The transfer plan, also involving the relocation of some 9,000 military family members, is part of a 2006 agreement between Tokyo and Washington aimed at reducing the heavy US military presence on Okinawa.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Elena Atanassova, Catholic University of Leuven and University of Antwerp Belgium, 4/1/10**  
“Political and Security Dynamics of Japan-China Relations: Strategic Mistrust, Fragile Stability, and the US Factor”, [http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/30\\_467.pdf](http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/30_467.pdf)

America’s military presence in East Asia and role as a provider for regional stability has been a crucial determinant of Japanese and Chinese respective security policies. For Tokyo, its alliance with the US is the bedrock of Japan’s national security; for Beijing, the US (and its strengthened security partnership with Japan) poses the greatest potential threat to Beijing’s internal stability and leadership ambitions in East Asia. Despite the criticism of Japan’s alleged remilitarization, most Chinese elite and observers do not seem to worry that, at least in the foreseeable future, Japan might become an independent (of the US) security actor in East Asia or turn into a national security threat to the PRC. China continues to recognize the US security umbrella as putting a cap on Japan’s rearmament. What mostly concerns Beijing is the perceived US hegemony in East Asia, of which Tokyo is seen as a main pillar, and its impact on the Taiwan issue (Roy, 2006). Especially during Koizumi’s term, Beijing regarded Japan’s normalization being channeled through a strengthened US-Japan alliance and encouraged by Washington, hence came to view Tokyo as a major tool in America’s strategy of balancing the PRC’s rising power and maintaining the US regional security dominance (Wu, 2005).

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **Joseph Nye, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 1995**

“East Asia Security: The Case for Deep Engagement”,

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51210/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-for-deep-engagement>)

It has become fashionable to say that the world after the Cold War has moved beyond the age of power politics to the age of geoeconomics. Such clichés reflect narrow analysis. Politics and economics are connected. International economic systems rest upon international political order. Consider East Asia 20 years ago. The United States was withdrawing from Vietnam, and many observers predicted that widespread instability would follow a broader American withdrawal from the region. Compare those gloomy predictions with the stable and prosperous East Asia of today. There are a number of reasons for East Asian prosperity, including high savings rates and successful macroeconomic policies. But among the important and often neglected reasons for East Asia's success are American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces. Our national interests demand our deep engagement in the region. We back up that engagement with our steadfast commitment to sustain a forward military presence of about 100,000 American troops in East Asia, of whom 36,000 stand by our ally the Republic of Korea, while 47,000 demonstrate our commitment to regional security and the defense of Japan. The U.S. presence is a force for stability, reducing the need for arms buildups and deterring the rise of hegemonic forces. Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is necessary. Analysts who ignore the importance of this political order are like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. Security is like oxygen--you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about. East Asia is currently the world's most dynamic economic region. Asia and the Pacific (excluding the United States) are expected to account for about one-third of the world's economic activity at the start of the next century. Instead of looking back 20 years to 1975, we should look forward 20 years. Will there be a political order and security framework that will sustain this impressive economic growth, or will the stable expectations of entrepreneurs and investors be subverted first by costly arms races and then by armed conflicts?

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Wu Xinbo, IR Professor at the Center for American Studies, Winter 2006,**  
 “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance” Washington Quarterly, Vol 29 No 1, p 119-130)

POLARIZING THE REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE Chinese analysts believe that it has been a key U.S. policy objective to maintain primacy in regional security since the Cold War years. To that end, Washington not only retains a strong forward deployment but also a vibrant “hub-and-spoke” alliance system, of which the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the core. In the post-Cold War era, Japan has become an even more valuable piece of the U.S. regional security strategy: it helps consolidate U.S. preponderance and balance China’s growing power. As Japan becomes more actively involved in the U.S. regional security strategy, enhanced U.S.-Japanese security ties will contribute to the primary U.S. strategic position in East Asia and the western Pacific region, amplifying U.S. clout on regional political, economic, and security affairs. As the alliance also intends to serve as the backbone of a regional security structure, the emphasis placed on it reflects an attempt to enhance the U.S.-Japanese condominium of regional security, a development that will both undermine China’s influence in the region and run the risk of returning the region to a bipolar structure characterized by strategic competition, antagonism, and even confrontation. A bi-polar regional order would be a nightmare scenario, at least for China and presumably for the entire region, including the United States and Japan.

**Andrew Nathan And Robert Ross Professors of Political Science Columbia And Boston College, respectively, 6/17/1998,**  
 “The Great Wall And The Empty Fortress”, Page 99

Any uncertainty in U.S. policy would be highly destabilizing. Chinese perceive the U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific, the pan alliance, and U.S. troops in South Korea as positive factors in the East Asian balance of power. They understand that the American presence reassures Japanese leaders that they do not have to take unilateral military measures to achieve security. Current U.S. policy contributes to Chinese and Japanese security simultaneously. If America's ability as an Asian power were to diminish, Japan would be likely to expand its military power in order to protect its interests throughout Asia. This would prompt China to augment its military power, contributing to a Sino-Japanese arms race. This scenario could be triggered by American hesitation during a crisis on the Korean peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. military withdrawal following the unification of Korea by South Korea could create perception that the United States was making a strategic retrenchment Northeast Asia. A crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations, arising from politicized economic conflicts or popular resentment in either country at the costs of cooperation, could be the catalyst leading to American military withdrawal from Japan. A significant decline in the U.S. defense budget in its naval presence in the western Pacific would call into question America's commitment to the regional balance of power. All of these developments would cast doubt on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and thus affect foreign policies throughout Asia.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Lary Nicsch, Asian Affairs Specialist for the Congressional Research Service, 5/25/2000,**  
“Ignored Issue in the Taiwan Debate”, Washington Times

The limitations of the debate will not be altered so long as it pays no attention to the issue of the adequacy of the U.S. force structure in the Western Pacific to influence the situation in the Taiwan Strait. No future decisions on arms sales to Taiwan will replace two fundamental roles that only U.S. forces in the Western Pacific can play. Only U.S. forces would have the capabilities to respond immediately to a Chinese attack by striking at bases and missiles launch sites that would be the sources of the attack, thus limiting the damage to Taiwan. Equally, and perhaps most important, only U.S. forces would constitute an effective deterrence against a Chinese decision to use military force. If China continues to escalate its threats and military buildup, Beijing will examine closely the indicators of U.S. intent and military capabilities. Chinese analysts and policy-makers increasingly will link U.S. intent with U.S. military capabilities in the region, especially if, as expected, the United States continues its policy of maintaining ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan's defense.

**Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, 2003**

“Incomplete Hegemony”, chapter in the book “Asian Security Order”, Page 153-154

One important contribution of the U.S. position in Asia has been to keep potential power rivals at bay. Japan and China are major powers, each with the capacity to become a great military power. They share geographic proximity and an unfortunate history of conflict and mutual recrimination. Events such as the recent conference in Japan reconsidering the 1937 massacre at Nanking, ongoing disputes over the veracity of Japanese textbooks, and recent remarks by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to the effect that Japan must be prepared to put down Korean or Chinese "uprisings" reopen old wounds and keep hostilities alive." The Japanese-Chinese relationship has the makings of a classic security dilemma, one reinforced by bad memories and ethnic conflict. As Tom Christensen noted recently: "Although Chinese analysts presently fear U.S. power much more than Japanese power, in terms of national intentions, Chinese analysts view Japan with much less trust and, in many cases, with a loathing rarely found in their attitudes about the United States" (1999: 52). Chinese attitudes and suspicions obviously factor into Japan's own anxieties about the rising power and intentions of its large neighbor. In this circumstance, U.S. hegemony plays a critical role in keeping the negative aspects of the relationship from spiraling in a dangerous direction. Through its alliance and commitment to defend Japan, the United States makes it possible for Japan to avoid confronting China directly. A direct Japanese approach to China would only confirm Chinese fears of a revanchist Japan. Although Chinese officials are reluctant to admit it, they recognize that the U.S.-Japan alliance constrains as well as protects Japan. This alliance, combined with the U.S. cooperative approach to China, helps to reassure China that it need not confront Japan directly. The diplomatic game U.S. officials must play is a delicate one: too strong an alliance with Japan arouses Chinese fears of containment; too strong a partnership with China arouses Japanese fears of abandonment. The difficulty of the diplomatic task reinforces the likelihood that in the absence of a U.S. hegemonic role, Japanese-Chinese geopolitical competition would increase substantially.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, 4/11/09**

Ivan, “China’s Threat to the US is Exaggerated”,

<http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2009/04/10/chinas-threat-to-the-us-is-exaggerated/>

Furthermore, the U.S. military deploys far forward around China; China’s general military forces do not deploy in the Western Hemisphere and do not threaten the United States. The most important finding in the Pentagon’s report was that China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far away from its borders before 2015. The report continued that China would not be able to deploy and sustain large units in combat far away from China until well into the decade after that. Instead, the Pentagon concluded that China is modernizing its military for short conflicts around its borders. In other words, China’s capability to project conventional power is and will remain pathetic far into the future — thus making most of China’s neighbors relatively safe, and the faraway U.S. very safe, against a Chinese attack. But what about Taiwan? Right now it is doubtful that China could conduct a successful amphibious invasion against Taiwan, which is an island. Island nations are easier to defend than other countries, because amphibious landings are one of the most difficult military operations to undertake. In Taiwan’s case, it has a very good air force that could probably sink any Chinese amphibious force, because Chinese ships are deficient in good air defenses. The greatest threat to Taiwan would be Chinese intimidation or actual attack with a growing number of short-range ballistic missiles.

**Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1998,**

“Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival, vol. 40. No. 4,

[http://people.exeter.ac.uk/sjenkins/Pages/undergrads/2036acro/mendelbaum\\_majorwar.pdf](http://people.exeter.ac.uk/sjenkins/Pages/undergrads/2036acro/mendelbaum_majorwar.pdf)

Is major war now obsolete? Surely no question is more important. The threat and the fact of organized violence on the largest possible scale have dominated the twentieth century. There has hardly been a moment between 1914 and 1998 when major war – or the anticipation of it or planning for it – was not a powerfully influential fact of international life. There was scarcely a political development of any consequence that was unaffected by major war, actual or prospective. This question has an answer. The answer is ‘yes’: major war is obsolete, if this statement’s two adjectives are properly defined. It is *major* war, not war in general – collective killing for some purpose – that is obsolete, as the contents of any daily newspaper make clear. War has not been abolished. What is increasingly unlikely is a war fought by the most powerful members of the international system, drawing on all of their resources and using every weapon at their command, over a period of years, leading to an outcome with revolutionary geopolitical consequences including the birth and death of regimes, the redrawing of borders and the reordering of the hierarchy of sovereign states. There have been four such wars in the last two centuries: the wars of the French Revolution (1792-1815); the First World War (1914-1918); the Second World War (1939-1945); and the Cold War (late 1940s-early 1990s). It is the numerically small but historically monumental class of wars to which these four conflicts all belong that is obsolete.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Francesco Sisci, Asia Editor of La Stampa, 6/3/2010**

“Flaws in pulling plug on North Korea,” Online Asia Times,  
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LF03Ad01.html>, 6/28/2010

Or what about the future regional balance of power? Thousands of American troops, [are] now stationed in the region to avert a North Korean threat, would have to pull out or find a new *raison d’etre*. In both cases it would be very complicated. Without an American presence, Japan would start to re-arm to defend itself against China and China would do the same, leading to a dangerous arms race. Keeping American troops would not do the trick either, as this would pose the irksome question of whether their presence would be against a possible Chinese threat, or for what?

**Suvendrini Kakuchi, writer with IPS news, 6/2/2010,**

“Japan-U.S. Pact Crucial to Balance of Power in East Asia”  
<http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51681>

Other issues creating tense regional relations include Chinese military activities in Japanese waters that have, for the moment, been smoothed in an agreement forged on Monday to pursue further talks between Chinese premier Wen Jiabao and Hatoyama during the former’s visit to Tokyo this week. Inoguchi said it is difficult to predict what will happen next. An unfortunate confluence of factors, namely, "Japan’s weak leadership," the anticipated victory of the opposition in South Korea’s local elections on Wednesday, and Chinese reports of local labor and rural unrest turning into a headache for Beijing, "can only mean a more explosive East Asia," he said. Last week Hatoyama fired cabinet minister Mizuho Fukushima, leader of a small leftist party, after she refused to sign a document approving the relocation of the Futenma U.S. military air base to a less crowded part of Okinawa, citing it was against the party’s campaign pledge. Professor Masao Okonogi, an expert on the Korean peninsula, said the ongoing political crisis has turned the spotlight once again on the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which has long been a thorny issue on the domestic front and a relentless quagmire for Japanese governments. "Any attempt to change the bilateral military alliance, which the Japanese public thinks is unfair, signals a treacherous path for governments as you can see from what is happening now," he said. The Japan-U.S. military alliance allows Japan to defend itself from foreign invasion but prevents it from participating in an attack. In addition, Japan is host to the largest number of U.S. military and naval bases in Asia, where they are heavily involved in U.S.-led wars in the region. Japan’s defense policy views the Treaty as crucial to efforts to forestall threats posed by North Korea and China, which are seen as potential dangers to Japan’s national security. But China and North Korea view the military pact between Japan and the United States as a throwback to Cold War diplomacy. Analysts say any hopes the Japanese public may have had to push for a more equal military alliance with Washington have been dashed as tensions grow and the lack of leadership on the domestic front leaves little room for meaningful negotiation. Professor Akira Kato, an international politics expert at Obirin University, said an equal alliance with the United States would mean allowing Japan to rearm itself.

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **Stratfor, globally respected intelligence think tank, 5/28/2001**

“Will Japan Re-Arm?,” [http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/1698/analysis/will\\_japan\\_re\\_arm](http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/1698/analysis/will_japan_re_arm),

Ironically, the resurrection of a regional military power in Tokyo raises the prospect of more, not less, confrontation in the region. The increasing reach of Japanese forces extends to China, its historic rival in Asia. China, as well as South Korea, the Philippines and others in the region who remember Japanese occupation, will view a growing Japanese military deterrent warily. In the short term, the United States will support and even help finance Japan’s evolution because it achieves the near-term goal of neutralizing a growing Chinese military threat. Over the long term, however, as Japan becomes increasingly involved in security affairs and fields a more aggressive navy, the United States may find itself contending with Japan over competing security interests. “What is really worrisome is not simply Japan’s current military capability,” the Rand report said. “Japan has both the financial and technical means to transform its military into powerful strategic forces in a relatively short period of time. Absent a U.S. presence, Japan may very well attempt to fill the power vacuum by becoming a major hegemonic contestant in the region.”

### **Van Jackson, Founder and Executive Editor of Asia Chronicle, 7/6/09**

DC Asia Policy Examiner, “Obama's nuclear plan could prevent Asian arms race”

<http://www.examiner.com/x-16317-DC-Asia-Policy-Examiner~y2009m7d6-Obamas-nuclear-plan-could-prevent-Asian-arms-race>)

One of the myriad fears associated with North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is the potential for it to spark a nuclear arms race in Asia. The doomsday scenario plays out rather intuitively: 1) North Korea confirms unequivocally that it will be keeping its existing nuclear weapons or possibly adding to its stockpile; 2) Japan, which has repeatedly mentioned its belief that a nuclear North Korea is a threat to Japanese security, dramatically builds up its defensive and offensive military capability, possibly developing its own nuclear program while it pushes for greater involvement in transnational security issues such as terrorism; 3) China, continuing to see Japan as the only near-peer realistically capable of challenging its regional leadership, is threatened by Japan’s remilitarization and responds by increasing its own military spending; 4) Partly in response to China’s increased military expenditures and partly in response to nagging historically based concerns over Japan’s remilitarization, both South Korea and Taiwan build up their own conventional armaments, potentially engaging in secret nuclear programs as well. Under such circumstances, political risk indicators would shoot through the roof and foreign direct investment inflows of capital would quickly dry up as multinational corporations seek a safer, more stable region in which to do business. The region’s resulting economic contraction would place increasing pressure on national governments to pander to xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments, as has been done many times before, thus stoking the fire of conflict. The region, in sum, would become a powder keg.

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **Dr. Robinson Lecturer at Edith Cowan University (Australia), 3/29/2010**

“Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion” Journal of Asia Pacific Studies  
<http://www.japss.org/upload/10.robinson.pdf>.

Japan’s Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force, and Japan’s previous decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons have been, “on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism” [Bukh, 2010, pp7-8]. As Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, the possibility remains that Japan could become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficiently provoked by regional competitors like North Korea [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has argued that Asia’s security environment will eventually compel Japan to nuclearize [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China and Japan are each dominant in the others’ strategic thinking regarding economic, political and military issues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence China’s own strategic vision [Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain “convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by an invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface” [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very least Japan’s new foreign policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japan and South Korea to nuclearize. Issues like control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, and Chinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around which conflict might develop [Matthews, 2003, p81].

### **Joshua Kurlantzick, Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program, July-August, 2002,**

“Axis of good: the case for remilitarizing Japan”,  
[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1316/is\\_2002\\_July-August/ai\\_90114011/](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_2002_July-August/ai_90114011/)

All these things could happen--if Japan's neighbors could tolerate the idea of a more assertive Japanese military, and if Japan's own people could accept the same prospect. The obstacles to normalized relations in Asia are immense. China, South Korea, and other nations once colonized by Emperor Hirohito's legions remain extremely wary of Japan developing into a true military power. Last fall, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had to cancel a trip to the South Korean parliament after lawmakers in Seoul, angry that Japan's role in the war on terror could mean more militarism in general, threatened to physically bar him from the chamber. Meanwhile, China's press frequently runs articles reminding the public of wartime atrocities and warning that China will react strongly to Japanese military normalization. It is hard to tell how many of these expressed fears are sincere, and how many are clever attempts to "mau-mau" the Japanese on their point of greatest vulnerability. Either way, they are frequently heard.

### **Toshimura Ogura, Economics Professor at Toyama University, April 1997,**

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...\\_19693242/pg\\_8](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m..._19693242/pg_8)

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region - nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Environmental Protection Agency, climate change, November 30th, 2007,**  
<http://www.epa.gov/bioiweb1/aquatic/climate.html>

Global climate change poses a serious threat to many aquatic ecosystems. Over the last century, increased global temperatures have caused sea levels to rise approximately 15-20 cm (6-8 inches) worldwide, and is expected to continue to rise at an average rate of 1-2mm/year. This rise in sea level is due primarily to the melting of mountain glaciers, the expansion of ocean water due to warmer ocean temperatures, the pumping of ground water, and the melting of the polar ice sheets. On average, for every foot of sea level rise, the ocean moves inland 50-100 feet. At this rate, low lying areas and coastal aquatic ecosystems such as estuaries, marshes, and mangrove forests are being threatened. Higher salinities caused by increased evaporation, greater levels of tidal inundation, increased occurrences of flooding, and increased shoreline erosion are significantly altering the composition of these ecosystems, affecting both the plants and animals living in these habitats. If measures are not taken to help prevent further global warming, aquatic biodiversity could be greatly affected. Not only could the composition of species within specific ecosystems be greatly altered, but species extinction could also occur.

**ABC, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7/1/2005,**  
"Ocean species at risk," <http://www.climateark.org/articles/reader.asp?linkid=43653>

Thousands of marine species are at risk from global warming because of acidification of the world's oceans, scientists said. Britain's Royal Society said in a report that the seas were currently absorbing one tonne of carbon dioxide - the prime greenhouse gas, per person per year and were simply running out of capacity to absorb it. It called on next week's summit of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations to take action. "Our world leaders meeting at next week's G8 summit must commit to taking decisive and significant action to cut carbon dioxide emissions," society oceanic expert John Raven said. "Failure to do so may mean that there is no place in the oceans of the future for many species and ecosystems that we know today," he said. The Royal Society said the carbon sink-holes of the oceans were being overtaxed by the rising output of carbon dioxide from power stations burning fossil fuels, raising their acidity and with it the threat to life. "Basic chemistry leaves us in little doubt that our burning of fossil fuels is changing the acidity of our oceans," he said. "The rate of change we are seeing to the ocean's chemistry is a hundred times faster than has happened for millions for years."

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Louis A. Helfrich, Richard J. Neves, and James Parkhurst, Professor of fisheries at Virginia Tech, October 2003,**

“Sustaining America's Aquatic Biodiversity: Why Is Aquatic Biodiversity Declining”

<http://www.ext.vt.edu/pubs/fisheries/420-521/420-521.html>

Aquatic habitats are the areas where water plants and animals live and obtain shelter, water, nutrients, and food for survival. Loss of habitat is the major reason why aquatic biodiversity is declining. Many of our native aquatic habitats were lost as early pioneers cleared the land, drained and filled wetlands, and cleared streamside forests. Our natural biodiversity is lost through many careless human activities including: the large-scale cutting of streamside forests, the overharvest of native plants and animals, the indiscriminate use of pesticides, draining and filling of wetlands, mining, stream gravel dredging, water pollution, flood control, dams, irrigation and water diversions, road construction, and the conversion of wetlands to agricultural and city development. Preventing habitat loss is the first important step to take in protecting our native species, and restoring important degraded habitat is the second step. By protecting critical habitats and restoring degraded ones, by insisting on smart development and restricting urban sprawl, especially in sensitive riparian (streamside) areas, river corridors, and wetlands, we assure our native aquatic biodiversity will be sustained.

**The Daily Yomiuri, Japanese Newspaper, 2/7/2009,**

“Transplanted coral growing fast in lagoon off Okinawa coast”

<http://www.physorg.com/news153241426.html>

Baby coral transplanted in the Sekisei coral-reef lagoon in Okinawa Prefecture under a coral-reef regeneration program are growing steadily, according to the Environment Ministry and Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology. The Sekisei Lagoon, which extends between Ishigakijima and Iriomotejima islands, is located about 450 kilometers west of the prefecture's main Okinawa island and is the country's largest coral reef. The lagoon area also includes the smaller islands of Taketomijima and Kuroshima. Researchers working on the joint project first implant fertilized coral eggs into ceramic beds. Once the eggs have grown into larvae 1 centimeter to 2 centimeters in diameter, they take the ceramic beds to the lagoon and attach them to rocks in the seabed. Since the project began in fiscal 2004, about 7,500 baby coral have been transplanted. In some areas, scientists have found staghorn coral of about 10 centimeters in height where they planted baby coral last year. Recent mass generation of Acanthaster starfish and coral bleaching in the area have caused catastrophic damage to the lagoon. Because of the damage, the reef has diminished to about 20 percent of its largest recorded size

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Amy Mathews Amos, independent environmental consultant advising conservation groups and others on marine conservation issues, 7/16/2010,**

“Killing Nemo and his Coral Home”, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/30778/>, accessed: 7-16-10

But it's not just fish populations that get destroyed. Coral reefs are structures produced by living organisms in oceans. The primary organisms typically are stony corals that secrete an exoskeleton of calcium carbonate, creating a reef that supports the corals and a huge variety of other animal and plant life. Divers often squirt cyanide into reefs to stun fish, making them easier to catch. Cyanide typically doesn't kill the fish outright, but it does kill corals and other life on the reef. Divers also often pry corals apart to find fish hiding in crevices, destroying a reef structure that took decades or centuries to build. All of this comes at a time when corals can least afford it. Pollution and overfishing for food are major problems on these reefs. And corals are notoriously vulnerable to increases in water temperature and other effects of climate change. According to Tissot, the net effect of removing reef fish in such large numbers is that we are making coral reefs less able to handle stresses like global climate change. “Our best defense against climate change is a stable reef with an intact ecosystem. A reef that retains its own natural complexity will be more resilient to these changes.” The good news and the bad is that this destruction is driven largely by demand in the United States and Europe. Because we created most of the demand, we can also change it. According to Dr. Eric Borneman, a coral biologist at the University of Houston and an author on the aquarium hobby, “Just reducing the mortality rate would make a huge, huge difference.” He urges hobbyists to buy fish only from reputable businesses that source from responsible exporters that can trace their fish to its source. These businesses sell healthy fish that clearly have been handled well throughout their journey. Although they may be more expensive initially, the higher survival rates of these fish make them less costly because they don't need to be replaced—and therefore don't fuel demand for overfishing on coral reefs. He also urges hobbyists to learn “which fish are almost impossible to kill and which are almost impossible to keep alive” in captivity. Those that won't survive in a tank should never be removed from a reef. Brian Plankis, president of the nonprofit Reef Stewardship Foundation, maintains, “Everyone can take action to help coral reefs, not just hobbyists.” He recommends reducing your personal carbon footprint by driving a more fuel-efficient vehicle, taking public transportation, and purchasing electricity from renewable sources. Ultimately, changes need to happen on the water in source countries to eliminate overfishing and cyanide use. But changing demand in the United States can help: without a market, there's nothing to sell. Changes to U.S. import laws are needed to prevent unregulated or poorly managed fish from entering the country. Stricter shipping requirements to reduce the number of fish that die en route may also be necessary. In the meantime, keep rooting for Nemo. The future of the world's coral reefs may depend on it.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Michael L. Rosenzweig, Department of Ecology & Evolutionary Biology, University of Arizona, 2001,**

PNAS, Volume 98, No. 10, May 8, p. 5404)

Human pressure may greatly accelerate the relaxation process by increasing accidental extinction rates. Various human activities suggest this. We increasingly commingle evolutionarily separate provincial biotas, creating the New Pangaea and introducing native species to predatory and competitive threats from exotics (47). We rapidly transport novel diseases and parasites around the world. We simplify biotic temporal regimes (for example by limiting disturbances such as fire). And we are warming the globe. The National Research Council (44) implicates exotic species or lack of adequate disturbance as the root cause in endangering a significant proportion of threatened U.S. species. But global warming may constitute the worst threat of all: by altering the basic abiotic conditions of reserves, it can destroy their ability to do much of their job. When the earth was covered with contiguous tracts of natural habitat, species could track such changes, moving to keep up with the shifts in location of their favored habitats and so avoiding extinction (48-50). But today, with natural habitats restricted to patches of reserves, this is not possible. Meanwhile, we show little sign of abandoning the destruction of habitat that brings deterministic extinction to species.

**Roger A Sedjo, Sr. Fellow, Resources for the Future, 2000,**

Conserving Nature's Biodiversity: insights from biology, ethics and economics, eds. Van Kooten, Bulte and Sinclair, p. 114

As a critical input into the existence of humans and of life on earth, biodiversity obviously has a very high value (at least to humans). But, as with other resource questions, including public goods, biodiversity is not an either/or question, but rather a question of "how much." Thus, we may argue as to how much biodiversity is desirable or is required for human life (threshold) and how much is desirable (insurance) and at what price, just as societies argue over the appropriate amount and cost of national defense. As discussed by Simpson, the value of water is small even though it is essential to human life, while diamonds are inessential but valuable to humans. The reason has to do with relative abundance and scarcity, with market value pertaining to the marginal unit. This water-diamond paradox can be applied to biodiversity. Although biological diversity is essential, a single species has only limited value, since the global system will continue to function without that species. Similarly, the value of a piece of biodiversity (e.g., 10 ha of tropical forest) is small to negligible since its contribution to the functioning of the global biodiversity is negligible. The global ecosystem can function with "somewhat more" or "somewhat less" biodiversity, since there have been larger amounts in times past and some losses in recent times. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to indicate that small habitat losses threaten the functioning of the global life support system, the value of these marginal habitats is negligible. The "value question" is that of how valuable to the life support function are species at the margin. While this, in principle, is an empirical question, in practice it is probably unknowable. However, thus far, biodiversity losses appear to have had little or no effect on the functioning of the earth's life support system, presumably due to the resiliency of the system, which perhaps is due to the redundancy found in the system. Through most of its existence, earth has had far less biological diversity. Thus, as in the water-diamond paradox, the value of the marginal unit of biodiversity appears to be very small.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

**Chisa Fujioka, article for Reuters, 6/23/2010,**  
 “Japan PM Seeks to Quell Okinawan Anger over U.S. Base,”  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65M0TS20100623>

After months of wrangling, Japan and the United States reached an agreement shortly before Hatoyama quit for the two sides to go ahead with a 2006 deal to shift the Futenma airbase to a less crowded part of Okinawa. Kan has said he will stick to the agreement, but keeping the base on the island, strategically located close to Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, faces strong resistance from residents who complain of noise, pollution and crime associated with bases. "I hope that in this milestone year, Okinawa's excess base burden will be alleviated in a way that the people of Okinawa can see with their own eyes," Okinawa governor Hirokazu Nakaima said at the ceremony. Nakaima later told Kan in a meeting that it would be difficult to keep the airbase on Okinawa, Kyodo news agency reported. Kan, who has said U.S.-Japan ties are the core of Tokyo's diplomacy, is expected to touch on the issue when he meets President Barack Obama on the sidelines of a summit of G8 and G20 leaders this weekend in Canada. Hatoyama had raised the hopes of Okinawa residents before the DPJ's landslide election win last year that Futenma could be moved off the island, but he failed to find a replacement site elsewhere in Japan or outside the country. Washington and Tokyo have agreed to work out by the end of August a detailed plan, including a relocation site, but Japan's defense minister has already expressed doubts over how smoothly the deal can be implemented. An election for the governor of Okinawa is due in November and the result could also affect the airbase deal, coming near the time when Obama is expected to visit Japan for an Asia-Pacific leaders' summit.

**Timothy Stone, Lieutenant Commander, Office of Military Commissions Chief Prosecutor,**  
**2006** “US-Japan SOFA: A Necessary Document Worth Preserving” Naval Law Review, 53 Naval L. Rev. 229,

[\*229] I. Introduction The principles enshrined in Chapter II, Article 9 of Japan's post-war Constitution places its self-defense forces in a secondary role behind the United States military when it comes to security issues, both in Japan and the East Asian region. n1 Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Japan has steadfastly supported the U.S. in the Global War on Terror n2 and has re-affirmed its security alliance with the U.S. n3 The U.S.-Japan alliance is at the forefront of the U.S. defense strategy in Asia, and critical to regional stability and the national security of both nations. n4 "The alliance is dedicated to preserving the status quo in the Far East, that is, deterring the use of force as a means of altering political borders." n5 The foundation of the alliance is the forward basing of American [\*230] military personnel in Japan. "The governments share the understanding that Japan's provision of bases to the United States, allowing those forces to implement the United States' strategic plan in the region, balances the U.S. commitment to defend Japan." n6 "That exchange is the core of the agreement, and neither side considers the arrangement unfair." n7

## Solvency Answers Evidence

**Dominic Lieven, Professor of Russian Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 4/13/03**

Will Baghdad be 1st Domino to Fall to "Democratic Imperialism"? Daily Yomiuri.

I think the main difference between the Japanese and the Europeans is that the Europeans can afford to go their own way in security terms. Partly because of the European Union and the whole way international relations have developed in Europe since 1945 and partly because its very hard to conceive of genuine strategic geopolitical threats to Europe, at least ones that have a military side to them. The situation in East Asia is rather different. The Japanese are not members of something like the European Union. They are almost by definition much more isolated. Nobody can know what is going to happen in China and I think the chances are that China will seek to integrate itself peacefully into the contemporary global order, but its not going to be easy for the Chinese and some of the tensions involved could result in all sorts of unexpected developments. And in any event China is by nature the hegemon of East Asia. Faced with all of those challenges, the Japanese are in a difficult position. I think it is hard to imagine that in the short run there is any alternative but dependence on the United States unless the Japanese are really prepared to go full-tilt toward rearmament, which would include having nuclear weapons. That is hard to imagine at the moment, though it would be conceivable if American policy were to become so dangerous in Japanese eyes that it was safer to go one's own way.

**Daizo Sakurada, Associate Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Integrated Arts & Sciences of the University of Tokushima in Japan, July 1997**

“For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective”

[http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working\\_Papers/WP07.pdf](http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Working_Papers/WP07.pdf)’

The withdrawal of the US military forces from Japan would represent a fundamental disengagement of US military commitments in East Asia; it would signify the end of American trustworthiness. Fearing Japan’s remilitarization, no state in the Asia-Pacific region, except perhaps North Korea, seeks the termination of the Treaty. Once the Treaty is abolished, Japan would be forced to consider options that Washington would currently regard as unpalatable. Japan may decide to take on a more independent strategic role in the region. The SDF could be developed to a greater potential, and could be used directly in support of its foreign policy goals. Strategic links with China and Russia could be reconsidered. Moreover, Japan might have to seriously consider a nuclear option. At the extreme both Japan and the US could grow to regard each other as hostile entities.<sup>44</sup> The Treaty provides a mechanism to avoid this strategic rivalry and to deepen the cooperative strategic relationship between Japan and the United States.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

**Tze M. Loo, assistant professor of East Asian history at the University of Richmond, Virginia, 6/10/2010**

[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-edloo.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-edloo.html?_r=1)

Was Hatoyama doomed to fail from the beginning? Maybe. The Futenma base issue is only the most visible tip of a much larger configuration of issues relating to the foundations of the postwar Japanese state and U.S.-Japan relations. It was naïve to think that Hatoyama could singlehandedly undo a situation that has been more than 60 years in the making. But there are many ways to fail, and Hatoyama failed particularly badly. He reached an agreement with the United States on May 28 about Futenma's relocation despite the strong, vocal and frequent expressions of opposition from Okinawans. The anger at Hatoyama's betrayal shut down channels of communication between Okinawa and the central government and aggravated local mistrust of the center. It has also exacerbated the sense among Okinawans that "mainland Japan" is perfectly willing to continue its discriminatory treatment of Okinawa by leaving the island to carry the burden of the U.S.-Japan security relationship from which all Japan benefits. But this is not only about Okinawa. Any serious attempt to address the question of bases on Okinawa cannot avoid the inextricably linked question of the entire U.S.-Japan security arrangement. In mishandling the Futenma issue, Hatoyama squandered the opportunity to start a frank discussion — and perhaps even a rethinking — of what Japan's role in that relationship is, and what it wants from it. This is crucial for Japan as a whole because a conversation about the country's future direction (including its existing security relationships) within a rapidly changing East Asia is becoming increasingly necessary. Hatoyama cast his resignation as taking responsibility for failure on the Futenma issue, but this too, looks likely to hurt the situation. Since his resignation, Japanese media and popular attention to the Futenma issue has collapsed, and Okinawa's base issue faces the very real risk of getting lost in the transition to the new government. Indeed, the new prime minister, Naoto Kan, has made the Japanese economy his primary focus. Regarding Futenma, he reaffirmed the government's commitment to the May 28 agreement with the U.S. while promising (vaguely) to give attention to reducing Okinawa's base burdens.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# **Turkey Aff (Set)**

## Explanation

A strong security partnership with Turkey has been an important element of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East since the early 1950s. However, in the last few years, especially since 2003, relations between Turkey and the United States have fallen off significantly. The main reason for that is the fallout from the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, which Turkey did not support.

Incirlik Air Base remains an important base in NATO's southern region. Incirlik serves as a regional storage center for war reserve materials that would be used in combat operations. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the U.S. military presence in Turkey has declined from 15,000 in the late 1980s to around 2,000 personnel today.

For more than 40 years, Turkey has housed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Tactical means that their range is relatively short, only up to 500 miles, which stands in comparison to ICBMs that fly thousands of miles. The TNW initially were placed in Turkey to serve as a rapid strike force against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It is believed that Turkey now hosts 90 gravity bombs (they drop from airplanes) however no permanent U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik Air Base. Therefore, one could reasonably conclude that NATO no longer relies on TNW for its defense.

### **Summary of the Turkey Affirmative:**

The cards in this file are set up so that you should be able to read an affirmative about withdrawing the U.S.' tactical nuclear weapons from turkey. The inherency arguments will focus on how the U.S. maintains 90 gravity bombs at one air force base in Turkey, even though they lack the capacity to use them. Some evidence may talk about how the need for these weapons has disappeared with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War twenty years ago, which the missiles were originally set up to deter.

The harms can be separated into two distinct advantages. The first is a nuclear terrorism advantage. The nuclear weapons stored at the base are not very well protected, as Turkey lacks the funding and refuses to commit the resources necessary to their safety. In fact, recent attempts have been made to break into the base, proving the danger of a nuclear theft. Because these are relatively small weapons, they would be relatively easy to steal for a group dedicated enough. The advantage would say that a nuclear attack by terrorists would be a catastrophe, as a stolen weapon would likely be used against the United States.

The second advantage is based off of Iran and Turkey's role in promoting stability in the Middle East. The advantage claims that Turkey and Iran have a special connection, and that Turkey could greatly aid in the negotiations between the US and Iran in order to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, in order for Turkey to leverage its relationship with Iran, it would have to be nuclear free state, in order to encourage Iran to follow its example. More broadly, the advantage claims that Turkey without nuclear weapons would be a model for the rest of the Middle East, which would maintain stability and prevent proliferation.

The solvency evidence talks about how the US has successfully removed weapons from Turkey before in much more tense situations, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, without event. The evidence also talks about how this would improve the stability and safety of the Middle East. Some other cards included refute the claim that the nuclear weapons are a crucial part of the United States' deterrent in the region, arguing that they are outdated and not needed in order to deter Russia or to keep NATO secure.

## Glossary

Incirlik: The air force base in Turkey where the nuclear weapons are housed

DHKP: Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, a Marxist terrorist Group in Turkey

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nuclear Weapons)

FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization

TNW: Tactical Nuclear Weapons

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Created during the Cold War to deter Russia. Turkey is a member, which is why US nuclear weapons are stationed there.

B61: Refers to the sort of plane that would be used to drop the bombs in Turkey.

## Inherency Evidence

**Lale Kemal, staff writer, 4/4/10.**

[Today's Zaman, Washington's atomic weapons on Turkish soil to come to the agenda, p. <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/mobile.do?load=wapDetay&link=206338>]

An agreement reached between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on March 26 on the terms of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is expected to bring to the agenda US Cold War-era atomic weapons located at Turkey's Incirlik Air Base as well as in some other European countries. START was first signed in 1991 and has been renewed by Russia and the United States with increasingly stringent limitations on several occasions since. The treaty will reduce arms by only half as much as the 2002 Treaty of Moscow signed by former President George W. Bush and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. The new START agreement is scheduled to be signed by the two countries in Prague on April 8. Both sides will be required within seven years to reduce their arsenals of long-range nuclear warheads to 1,550, about one-third below current levels and nearly three-quarters below the level agreed in the first START that was signed in 1991. The White House said on March 26 that the deal contained "no constraints" on the construction of a missile defense shield, which had been a key sticking point between the two powers. NATO member Turkey, bordering Iran, is expected to be a site for the US's missile defense program. Withdrawal or reduction of US atomic weapons on Turkish soil together with some other European countries will come to the agenda once the US and Russia sign the new START, recalled Western diplomatic sources. "But it is not expected that the US will take any action concerning the withdrawal of those weapons from Turkish soil without consulting Turkey," said the same sources. On the other hand, the US would not like to withdraw its weapons from Turkish soil due to this NATO ally's proximity to Iran, engaged in a bitter row with the West over its nuclear program.

**Alexandra Bell, Fellow Truman National Security Program, GOOD Blog, August 25, 2009**

["Turkey's Nuclear Crossroads", <http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/>]

There are approximately 23,335 nuclear weapons held between nine nations: the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Less widely known are the five other states that hold nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, NATO deployed nonstrategic or "tactical" nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Today these aging weapons are more of a liability than an asset—their size and portability makes them attractive to terrorists.

**Richard Weitz, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Turkey Analyst, April 12, 2010**

["The Future of NATO's Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil", <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html>]

Today, Turkey remains one of five European members of NATO that hosts U.S. nuclear weapons within the framework of the alliance's nuclear-sharing arrangement. The NATO nuclear arsenal in Turkey is unique in several respects. First, thanks to major reductions in other countries, Turkey has more U.S. nuclear weapons than any other alliance member outside the United States. Of the 200 or so B-61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe, Turkey hosts approximately 90 at Incirlik Air Base.

## Inherency Evidence

**Richard Weitz, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Turkey Analyst, April 12, 2010**

[“The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil”,  
<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html>]

As part of the current NATO deliberation, there have been proposals to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey as part of an alliance-wide consolidation of NATO’s TNW arsenal. Some proponents of retaining NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements favor removing them from those European countries that no longer want them on their soil and relocating them into those countries that do, which might only include Turkey and perhaps Italy. If NATO withdrew U.S. TNW from all other European countries, the Turkish government could find it uncomfortable remaining the only NATO nuclear-hosting state, and might request their removal from its territory as well. But then Turkey might proceed to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in any case for the reasons described above.

**Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Truman National Security Fellow, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 11/23/09**

“The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,” <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly PDF assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed.

## Harms Evidence

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, assistant professor in the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University in Ankara, Dec 2005,**

“Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?,”

<http://mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Kibaroglu-EuropeanSecurity-USnukesTurkey-December2005.pdf>

Dramatic changes have taken place in the international security environment over the last decade. These changes, however, are being assessed differently among officials and experts regarding the role of nuclear weapons. The viability as well as the credibility of the nuclear posture of NATO, including the implicit ‘first use’ strategy of the Alliance, is still of utmost importance for Turkish officials.<sup>23</sup> However, the very nature of the emerging threats, especially since the 9/11 attacks, requires a thorough revision of the ways and means of dealing with them. Admittedly, nuclear weapons have become inappropriate in the face of the new threats posed to the free world by terrorist organizations. Retaining them simply increases the probability of theft and the use by terrorists of some crude radiological devices or even nuclear weapons. Therefore, in addition to taking tighter measures to safeguard nuclear and radiological material in places where they are stored, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to ultimately get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down the US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries overseas including Turkey. Nevertheless, the official view is diametrically opposed to their withdrawal. Below is an account of why this is the case.

**Aslıhan Tümer, disarmament campaigner for Greenpeace Turkey, 6-8-2006**

[International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, NATO’s Nuclear Sharing and Incirlik, [http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap\\_old/bulletin26/art11.htm](http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap_old/bulletin26/art11.htm)]

In recent months there were news reports on possible attacks on the Incirlik Air Base by Iran’s Sahab-3 missiles, and newspapers ran a story on plans by Al-Qaeda to attack the base. This fed long-standing discussions on potential dangers NATO nuclear weapons might pose to Turkey. The current deployment of NATO nuclear weapons in European countries reflects a Cold War view and mentality. But the Soviet Union ceased to exist and is therefore no longer a threat, if indeed it ever was. The NATO-Russia Council brings the countries together as equal partners and gives the opportunity to identify and pursue joint actions.

## Harms Evidence

### **Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010**

[http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey\\_rep.pdf](http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf)

Of the two FTOs in Turkey, it is easy to see that the DHKP/C is the primary threat in the nuclear terrorism threat to national security. Their extensive espionage network and anti-Western society attitude would make them a very dangerous non-state actor if they were to acquire nuclear explosive devices (or WMDs of any kind). There are several places that one of these groups could acquire nuclear materials in Turkey. The most likely scenario would be to acquire material from one of the four research reactors. None of these reactors run on anything more highly enriched than 20% however, so any material stolen would be useless as fuel for a weapon, unless plutonium or another isotope could be extracted. Turkey does have the capability to reprocess spent fuel and enrich uranium, but it is unknown how often this is done or what quantities of the material might be available. The other source of material is the nuclear weapons already prepositioned in Turkey. These are assembled and ready for use, but the undoubtedly tight security surrounding these weapons makes them an exceedingly poor choice. In addition, even if a group were to succeed in acquiring one of these weapons, the permissive action links on the weapon would prevent it from being used without permission.

**FTO** = Foreign Terrorist Organizations

**DHKP** = Revolutionary People's Liberation Party, a Marxist terrorist Group in Turkey

### **William C Potter, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000**

“Tactical Nuclear weapons: Options for control, Volume 119” United Nations Publications, p.42-43

Some TNWs are quite small. They can be carried by one or two soldiers. They are thus much more susceptible to theft than more sizeable and heavy warheads. In addition, older TNWs do not have the sophisticated electronic locks-permissive action links- that were designed to prevent unauthorized use in more modern designs. In other words, certain types of TNW present a greater risk of unauthorized or even terrorist use. Finally, TNWs may present, again, on a general level, the most visible proof that the NWSs are not willing to proceed with nuclear disarmament. TNWs are meant for fighting nuclear war. They betray a willingness to consider the use of nuclear weapons to gain military advantage. This willingness is completely incompatible with a serious commitment to reduce nuclear weapons to zero, even over an extended period of time. Since the complete elimination of TNWs assumes a major change in existing doctrines and Alliance arrangements, they may face too much opposition in the short term. NATO may be loathe to renounce the embedded flexibility allowed by TNWs altogether, France may not wish to forego the pre-strategic options provided by its air-launched stand-off missiles, and Russia may feel that the weakness of its conventional forces would make the disappearance of shorter-range nuclear weapons a risk to national security. If these objections obtain, an upper limit for TNW holding could be a more realistic option. Such a limit might even be concluded on a bilateral basis. The question then is where this limit should be set. As a rule, fewer would be better, since the fewer TNWs are around, the fewer storage areas are maintained, the lesser the risk of theft or unauthorized use.

## Harms Evidence

**Jeff King, Chris Lindborg, and Phillip Maxon, writers and analysts for the British American Security Information Council, 2008**

“NATO Nuclear Sharing: Opportunity for Change?” BASIC Getting to Zero Papers Number 9,

Second, when compared to strategic weapons, the usual pre-delegation of authority over tactical nuclear weapons to lower members of the chain of command, and the weapons’ smaller size, may make the weapons more vulnerable to illicit acquisition and use.<sup>7</sup> Recent revelations about the inadequate security surrounding bomb sites in the nuclear sharing countries, clearly adds to these concerns. According to a government ‘blue-ribbon’ report obtained by security expert Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, most sites require “significant additional resources to meet DOD \*U.S. Defense Department security requirements.”<sup>8</sup> Difficulties, including the short training regimen for nuclear security teams (in some cases as little as nine months) and the inability to perform no-notice security checks as a result of host nation/NATO requirements, create a hazardous situation in which weapons designed to defend NATO may become targets of theft to be used against the Alliance. There seems an awareness in NATO circles that public support for the continued presence of tactical nuclear weapons in their respective European countries is low. General James Jones, NATO’s former Supreme Allied Commander, noted back in 2004 in an address to the Senate in Belgium (where there has been considerable opposition to the bombs) that “good news is on the way” and that the United States would reduce its nuclear weapons in Europe.<sup>9</sup> In recent years, the United States appears to have followed through on this reassurance, withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from Ramstein Airbase in Germany in 2005 and from Lakenheath in the United Kingdom in 2008.<sup>10</sup> Explanations for the low-key way in which the United States has withdrawn the B-61s have been speculated upon elsewhere. A critical aspect in understanding this process is NATO’s virtual admission that these weapons have taken on a sensitive political symbolism of their own. By not playing up their withdrawal, or using them as bargaining chips for the retraction of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, there is a sense that these weapons have simply lost their utility and are no longer worth maintaining at European sites. To have them become bargaining chips with Russia may have led some Alliance

**Hans Kristensen, director, Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, 5/10/10**

(Speaking at the NPT-Review Conference, Speaking at the NPT-Review Conference, <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/05/speaking-at-the-npt-review-conference.php>)

Then there is the issue of safety. This is more significant than people generally think. The 200 weapons are scattered in 87 aircraft shelters at six bases in five countries. Ten years ago, the U.S. Air Force discovered that weapons maintenance procedures at the shelters under specific conditions could lead to accidents with a nuclear yield. Two years ago, the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review determined that security at the host country bases did not meet U.S. security standards. And just a few months ago, peace activists at Kleine Brogel demonstrated loudly and clearly that despite extensive security arrangements unauthorized people can get deep into a nuclear base and very close to the weapons. The widespread deployment was designed to survive a Soviet attack, but in today’s world widespread deployment is out of sync with nuclear weapons storage in the age of extreme terrorism.

## Harms Evidence

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, assistant professor in the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University in Ankara, Dec 2005,**

“Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?”

<http://mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Kibaroglu-EuropeanSecurity-USnukesTurkey-December2005.pdf>

However, these should not be seen as insurmountable difficulties provided that the US also starts seriously drawing down its own nuclear arsenal; it also must put off the projects in the pipeline for developing new, ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons that were to assure its nuclear supremacy in the decades to come. The whole notion of national security and national interest must be overhauled in the face of a series of tragic attacks on civilians in all parts of the world. These attacks suggest even more deadly scenarios were the terrorist organizations to equip themselves with nuclear explosives. Perhaps they have already done so. If the family of sovereign nations is lucky, there may be enough time to implement a number of sober-minded steps that will get rid of the existing nuclear weapons, wherever they may be deployed or stockpiled.

## Harms Evidence

### **Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Political Analyst for Al-Ahram Newspaper, 2004.**

“Extinction!” <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm>

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

### **Ross Colvin and Caren Bohan, Sunday, reporters for Reuters 4/11/10**

“Obama: al Qaeda bid to go nuclear is top threat” Reuters

<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63A1YJ20100412> Accessed June 27, 2010

Obama, speaking on the eve of an unprecedented 47-nation summit in Washington aimed at thwarting nuclear terrorism, said he expected "enormous progress" at the conference toward the goal of locking down loose nuclear material worldwide." The central focus of this nuclear summit is the fact that the single biggest threat to U.S. security -- both short-term, medium-term and long-term -- would be the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon," Obama told reporters. We know that organizations like al Qaeda are in the process of trying to secure a nuclear weapon -- a weapon of mass destruction that they have no compunction at using," Obama said before talks with South African President Jacob Zuma. Nuclear non-proliferation experts say there are no known instances of terrorist groups obtaining highly enriched uranium or plutonium that could be used to make a crude nuclear bomb but note there have been 18 cases of nuclear material being stolen or going missing since the early 1990s. "This is something that could change the security landscape of this country and around the world for years to come," Obama said, warning of the potential consequences if a nuclear bomb were detonated. Obama's goal at the two-day summit is to get nations to agree to secure vulnerable nuclear material within four years and to take specific steps to crack down on nuclear smuggling.

## Harms Evidence

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, 06/10**  
[Arms Control Today, Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\\_06/Kibaroglu#25](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#25)]

In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran's dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran's nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey's NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors.[21] Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey's policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them.[22] Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran's nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran's program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons' presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies.[23] Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey's possible reactions to the developments in Iran's nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory.[24] The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a "nuclear-weapon state." [25] There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country's continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

## Harms Evidence

**Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Truman National Security Fellow, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 11/23/09**

“The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,” <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West. First, Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated. As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely, if the United States and European Union task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.

## Harms Evidence

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ph.D., Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, June 2010.**  
 [Arms Control Today, Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\\_06/Kibaroglu#25](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#25)]

This situation could lead to a divisive and unnecessary controversy between Turkey and its long-standing allies in the West. By insisting that the weapons remain on European territory, Turkey would not only alienate some of its Western allies that truly want to move the weapons out of their territories, but also create tension in its relations with its neighbors and newly emerging partners in the Middle East. On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran's 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor.[26] This "nuclear fuel swap" is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran's relations with the West over Tehran's nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East.

### **Washington Post, 10-24-08**

"Turkey's task, dismantling nuclear Iran"

Turkey's recent election to the UN Security Council for a two-year term is--for the rising regional power--both a gesture and a request from the international community. As a result of the vote, Turkey is charged with the task of negotiating the Council's primary agenda: the Iranian nuclear program. A certain test to Turkey's diplomatic prowess, it must work to maintain productive negotiations as an intermediary between Iran and western countries while simultaneously receiving pressure from the United States to vote for the expansion of sanctions. Despite the difficulty of the task, Turkey may well provide the best avenue to a solution in this escalating international crisis. Iran, which incidentally was denied a seat on the Security Council during the same session of voting, continues to argue that its nuclear program is strictly for energy production. And, despite three binding resolutions enforcing sanctions, it appears that there are no plans by the Iranian government to end the program anytime soon. Within the Security Council, the United States has spent the last month persistently arguing for further expansion of the sanctions. However, in light of the failure of the three current sanction resolutions, and compounded by Russia and China's current opposition to sanctions, the Security Council and the broader UN organization is clearly frustrated with the lack of progress--as reflected in the vote for Turkey. Joining the Council in January, Turkey will be given the opportunity to bring a new perspective to the ailing debates. Expectations are high as Turkey presented itself during the four-year campaign for one of the two non-permanent European seats on the Council as the diplomatic link between the East and West, a strategic partner of both the US and Iran, and--as a Muslim country--having a unique cultural sensitivity. Moreover, Turkey has its own security concerns and incentives that support an expanded diplomatic relationship with Iran, specifically: (1) to secure continued good relations with Iran and avoid any repercussions from associating with the western prospective (i.e., Iran restricting natural gas exports to Turkey); (2) prevention of nuclear proliferation in the region; (3) diminish any regional instability and tension that has arisen from Iraq; and, (4) to improve relations with the European Union and develop trust with the member states.

## Harms Evidence

**Hakki Uygur, of the SETA foundation for political economic and social research, Feb. 2008,**  
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions and Turkey,  
([http://www.setadc.org/pdfs/Policy\\_Brief\\_No\\_7\\_Hakki\\_Uygur.pdf](http://www.setadc.org/pdfs/Policy_Brief_No_7_Hakki_Uygur.pdf))

Iran is a key country for securing peace and stability in the Middle East. The U.S. administration itself has admitted several times that Iran has positively contributed to the solution of certain problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor is Iran as isolated as the international media sometimes portrays. Turkey is active in mediation attempts in the region. Indeed, the recent period witnessed the visits of several odd couples, such as Peres-Abbas and Musharraf-Karzai, to talk peace and cooperation in Turkey. In short, Ankara can play a role in bringing the U.S. and Iran closer to one another. If one considers the Iranian Spiritual Leader's recent statement that "the enmity with the U.S. will not last forever," Ankara may help the U.S. and Iranian administrations to overcome some of the prolonged problems that plague the relations between the two countries.

**Al-Arabiya News Channel, April 21, 2010**

"US hails Turkey mediation of Iran Nuke Standoff"

(<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/04/21/106452.html> Accessed June 25, 2010)

The United States State Department early Wednesday hailed Turkey's efforts to mediate the nuclear standoff with Tehran, but expressed renewed skepticism about Iran's willingness to engage in talks as representatives of the six major powers met over possible new sanctions against Iran. "I'll only say in order to play a mediation role, you have to have a country like Iran that is actually willing to engage seriously, and that's what's been lacking over the past several months," said State Department spokesman Philip Crowley. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said on Tuesday that diplomacy remains the best way to resolve the row over Iran's atomic program and that Ankara is ready to mediate between Tehran and world powers

**Robert E. Hunter, (Senior adviser at the Rand Corp. and former U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1993 to 1998), April 26, 2006,**

washingtonpost.com, (<http://www.rand.org/commentary/042606WP.html>)

A U.S. offer of serious talks with Iran that deal with the most critical issues of security, as seen from each side's perspective, may not be enough to deflect the Iranians from their current dangerous course. But it is far better than relying on the Iranians to blink in their current standoff with the United States. If America will not at least test a "grand bargain" to resolve differences with Iran, the two nations will continue drifting toward war.

## Harms Evidence

**Flynt Leverett, director of the New America Foundation's Iran Project and Professor of international affairs at Penn State, and Hillary Mann Leverett, CEO of a political risk consultancy, 10/29/09.**

[Politico, What serious diplomacy looks like -- in Turkey, p.  
<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28839.html>]

Turkey is, of course, a member of NATO and has long had a positive economic and strategic relationship with Israel. But, working from these four principles, the Erdogan government has in recent years effected major improvements in Turkey's relations with a much wider range of Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria. This opening to the broader Middle East has been very strongly in Turkey's interest. Expanding trade and investment links to Iran, Iraq, Syria and other regional states has boosted the growth of Turkey's economy and reinforced its status as an "emerging market" of international significance. Moreover, closer ties to Middle Eastern countries, along with links to Hamas and Hezbollah, have made Ankara an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues. Erdogan wants to position Turkey to act as a mediator between its Muslim neighbors and the West — including the United States, which needs to move beyond nice speeches by Obama and undertake concrete diplomatic initiatives to repair its standing in the Middle East. But if Washington is too shortsighted to see the necessity of realigning its relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Iran, the Erdogan government's opening to the broader Middle East gives Ankara a wider array of strategic options for pursuing Turkish interests — the essence of successful diplomacy. During his visit to Tehran this week, Erdogan met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — a rare honor for a foreign leader. (In 2007, Russia's then-President Vladimir Putin was also accorded a meeting with Khamenei.) Turkey's expanding ties to the Islamic republic — including gas supply contracts and preliminary agreements for major upstream and pipeline investment projects — are essential to consolidating Turkey's role as the leading transit "hub" for oil and gas supplies to Europe. While in Iran, Erdogan said that he hopes Turkish-Iranian trade — currently valued at roughly \$10 billion — will double by 2011 and strongly supported Iranian participation in the Nabucco gas pipeline. Meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Erdogan criticized international pressure on Tehran over its nuclear activities as "unjust and unfair" while other states maintain nuclear weapons. These statements signal that Turkey may well move ahead and conclude significant upstream and pipeline contracts in Iran despite U.S. opposition. The U.S. position on this issue is detached from economic reality. However much the Obama administration resists admitting it, the Nabucco pipeline will almost certainly not be commercially viable in the long run without Iranian gas volumes. In the end, Turkey's approach to Iran does more for Western interests than does the U.S. approach. Under the Erdogan government, Ankara is increasingly confident that it can pursue its interests in the Middle East without either succumbing to U.S. pressure or fundamentally sacrificing its relationship with Washington. Erdogan's planned visit to the White House strongly suggests that this confidence is eminently justified. Israelis and some of Israel's friends in the United States decry what they see as the expansion of Turkey's ties to other important Middle Eastern states at the expense of Turkey's ties to Israel. Ankara has indeed been sharply critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and its role in the continuing humanitarian crisis there — a posture manifested in Erdogan's highly publicized walkout from a joint event with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum and the postponement of NATO military exercises in Turkey that would have included Israeli forces. But criticism of Turkey from pro-Israel circles misses an important reality: At this point, Israel arguably needs a relationship with Turkey more than Turkey needs a relationship with Israel. There is an important lesson here for the Obama administration. America no longer has the economic and political wherewithal to dictate strategic outcomes in the Middle East. Increasingly, if Washington wants to promote and protect U.S. interests in this critical region, it will have to do so through serious diplomacy — by respecting evolving balances of power and accommodating the legitimate interests of others so that U.S. interests will be respected. Turkey's Middle East policy provides a valuable model of what that kind of diplomacy looks like.

## Harms Evidence

**Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN); 5/18/06,**  
Capitol Hill Hearing, Federal News Service, 1/n

The witnesses generally shared the view that no diplomatic options, including direct talks, should be taken off the table. Direct talks may in some circumstances be useful in demonstrating to our allies our commitment to diplomacy, dispelling anti-American rumors among the Iranian people, preventing Iranian misinterpretation of our goals, or reducing the risk of accidental escalation. Our policies and our communications must be clear, precise and confident, without becoming inflexible. I noted a comment by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an op-ed on Iran that appeared in Tuesday's Washington Post. Dr. Kissinger wrote, I quote: "The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War, i.e. no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialog within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union the evil empire," end of quote from Dr. Kissinger. Now, Dr. Kissinger's analogy, as well as the testimony we heard yesterday, reinforced the point that Iran poses a sophisticated policy challenge that will require the nuanced use of a range of diplomatic and economic tools.

**Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, and Haleh Esfandirari**  
**5/24/07,**

Iran, "Soft Power," [http://www.csis.org/component/option,com\\_csis\\_progj/task,view/id,957/](http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,957/)

There is always going to be a good case for dialogue with Iran, for the same reasons the US always talked to the USSR during the worst days of the Cold War, and should never have failed to recognize and talk to China. It is even more important to talk to hostile states than friends. The risks of misunderstandings are much greater, even limited progress in improving relations can help prevent wars, and present problems can lead to better relations in the future.

## Harms Evidence

**Vali R. Nasr, (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at CFR), February 12, 2007,**  
 Interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor of CFR,  
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/12623/nasr.html> [interviewer/ee specifications added]

[Gwertzman:] Some people suspect this is all a prelude to U.S. military engagement with Iran. What do you think? [Nasr:] The threat is there, without a doubt, and particularly when you have two countries that have an arena of disagreement and confrontation, don't have any communications between them, and are running around across each other in a chaotic place like Iraq. Even if there is no preplanned military confrontation, there's always the chance of it happening. We're in a situation where tensions between them can very clearly spiral out of control. And obviously the impasse over the nuclear issue represents the biggest challenge.

**Mark Gaffney. (Researcher, anti-nuclear activist, principle organizer of first earth day).**  
**05/08/03.** [www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3288.htm](http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3288.htm)

Would such an air war succeed? Yes, perhaps, then again, maybe not. In their current state of hubris the men around the president obviously believe they can accomplish anything with U.S. military power, now supreme on the planet. However, our leaders are not infallible. For every action there is a reaction, and, all too often, unintended consequences. Such a war would undoubtedly be perceived by the world as a serious escalation, and would likely produce a new anti-U.S coalition. Various states, in defiance of U.S. threats, might even come to Iran's assistance. The common border shared by Russia and Iran raises the stakes. To understand why, we need only consider how the U.S. would respond to a foreign attack on, say, Mexico. The Russians might supply Iran with advanced military arms, ground-to-air missiles, etc. Pakistani strong-man Pervez Musharraf would face growing pressure at home to assist a fellow Islamic state. With assistance from Russia and/or Pakistan, the Iranians might reconstitute their nuclear program in deep tunnels carved out of the country's rugged mountains, impervious to bombardment. To insure military success, the U.S. might be compelled to launch commando assaults with special forces, or even invade and occupy the country. Notice, this implies regime change, precisely what Ariel Sharon has advocated. Such a path--I hasten to add--would be insane, for reasons that should be apparent to anyone who can find Iran on a map. Iran is not Iraq! Iran is five times larger, a rugged mountainous country of sixty-five million people. What if invading U.S. forces should meet return fire, in kind? One shudders at the reaction in Washington should the Iranians turn on U.S. troops the same depleted uranium weapons that the U.S. has been using with such horrible effect on others. That would bring George W. Bush eyeball-to-eyeball with Vladimir Putin, the obvious supplier, and who knows, possibly with Pervez Musharraf. Lest we forget, both are nuclear-armed (unlike Saddam Hussein) and capable of defending themselves. The assumption that Putin will back down in a crisis on his own border could be a serious miscalculation. If U.S. hawks insist on victory, and escalate, events could spin out of control...

## Harms Evidence

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, assistant professor in the Department of International Relations of Bilkent University in Ankara, Dec 2005,**

“Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?,”

<http://mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Kibaroglu-EuropeanSecurity-USnukesTurkey-December2005.pdf>

Against this background, Turkish officials should start acknowledg[e]ing the need for action with respect to the US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey. Extended reliance on the presence of these weapons to defend the country may lead to missing some opportunities to take region-wide initiatives such as revitalizing the efforts to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZ/ME). Notwithstanding Turkey’s opposition to a Balkan NWFZ for reasons explained earlier in this paper, Turkey fully supported a proposal that aimed at establishing such a zone in the Middle East; this was originally cosponsored by Egypt and Iran as early as 1974. Turkey also expressed its concern that such a zone should encompass all kinds of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery. One principal reason for supporting the idea of a NWFZ/ME was the threat posed by the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction into the Middle East. Since Turkey was confident that its conventional arsenal could cope with its Middle Eastern neighbors, any proposal that would eliminate the non-conventional capabilities of these states would increase Turkey’s security. However, because Turkey was hosting US nuclear weapons, Turkish officials did not consider becoming part of the zone.

## Harms Evidence

**Aras Coskuntuncel, Staff writer for the Daily News, 6/20/10,**

Daily News & Economic Review, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=only-turkey-can-play-ultimate-mediator-role-in-islamic-world-expert-says-2010-06-18>)

Turkey should realize its potential as the sole mediator in the Islamic world that could bring peace to the Middle East, an American political scientist and author has said. “Turkey has a leadership role because of its power. It faces 360 degrees – the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and the Arab world – and only Turkey can bring even the United States and Iran together,” George Friedman, the chief executive officer of the leading global intelligence firm STRATFOR, told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review in an interview last week. “The Turkish economy is growing very rapidly, Europe is weakening now and the U.S. is withdrawing from Iraq... so the relative power of Turkey is growing independent of any policy,” Friedman said. “No matter what party is in power, it would have to manage this growth in power.” This growing power is what has attracted the company Friedman founded in 1996 to Turkey. “During the Cold War, you wanted to have somebody in Moscow,” he said. “During these days in history, there is no one place to have someone; there are three or four, and Turkey is absolutely one of them.” Friedman said STRATFOR, which collects and distributes global intelligence about current events, keeps a close eye on the broader region – from the Balkans to Egypt. “This is where history is going to be made for the next half century,” he said. Recent events in the Middle East have brought Turkey back into the spotlight. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strong condemnation of Israel after its deadly raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla carrying Turkish citizens and Turkey’s vote against U.N. sanctions on Iran have sparked an international debate over a shift in Turkish foreign policy, with some saying the country’s ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is trying to move its axis from West to East. According to Friedman, Turkey’s policy has not shifted; what has changed is Turkey’s power relative to the rest of the region. “What I would argue is, it’s not that the AKP decided to have a new foreign policy,” he said. “Turkey is facing the reality.”

Highlighting the conflicts within the Islamic world, Friedman warned that without solving these problems, there is no chance for Middle East peace. “The conflict is not between the Islamic world and the West,” he said. “It is within the Islamic world. Hamas against Fatah, Egypt against Hamas, the Jordanians don’t trust Fatah... Turkey is not pushing into this world; it’s being pulled into this world, and as soon as it’s in this world there are tensions and conflicts. It can’t make everyone happy.”

Friedman said what interests him about the Islamic world is the way people “focus on the relations with Israel rather than the very real conflicts in the Islamic world that give Israel its power.” “The Islamic world doesn’t want to hear this, but you can’t make war and you can’t make peace with Israel so long as you are at war with yourself. How there can be peace in the Middle East between the Arabs and the Israelis when there is not peace between the Arabs?” he said. “I think Turkey has a role to play in this but they have to decide what risks they want [to take].” It is easy for parties trying to mediate to be accused of being unfair, Friedman said, but added that Turkey’s power can help it can bring unity in the Arab world. “Nasser spoke of a united Arab [world]. I think this is where Turkish power, which is very real, is going to encounter reality,” he said. Friedman underlined Turkey’s role as a leader in the region and its effect on U.S. efforts for Middle East peace, something he said depends on peace between Hamas and Fatah, groups he believes only Turks could bring together. “U.S. President [Barack] Obama would like there to be peace in the Middle East, but he has to first broker peace among the Arabs. That is not possible,” he said. “Turkey, as a Muslim country, may have the credibility to do this.”

## Harms Evidence

**John Steinbach, researcher, Center for Research on Globalization, March 2002.**

[CRG, Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace,  
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html>]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezer Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).

**Niall Ferguson, Ph.D., Prof. of History at Harvard, William, 6-18-2007.**

[Los Angeles Times, Should we simply ignore the Mideast? <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ferguson18jun18,0,5521291.column?coll=la-opinion-righttrail>]

For some time I have been warning that the next great global conflict will begin in the Middle East, just as the two world wars had their origins in Eastern Europe. The lethal combination of ethnic disintegration, economic volatility and an empire in decline (in this case, the U.S.) makes an upward spiral of violence hard to avoid. Add to that the demographic pressures caused by high Muslim birthrates, the money generated by vast deposits of oil and natural gas and the risk that the most revolutionary power in the region will soon possess nuclear weapons-- and you have a recipe for Armageddon.

## Harms Evidence

**J. R. Nyquist, staff writer, renowned expert in geopolitics and IR, 4/2/01,**  
[http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\\_ID=22264](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=22264)

But why would Russia and China want a war in the Middle East at this time? First, such a war would result in an oil embargo against the United States which Russia would profit from. Secondly, as the U.S. economy declines into recession, an oil hit could have devastating impact. It could turn a recession into a depression that could destabilize Western institutions and cause conservative politicians and free market advocates to be discredited. There is also the possibility that if America becomes fixated on a Middle East war, the time would be ripe for the North Korean communists to launch an assault on South Korea. It might also be the ideal moment for China to blockade Taiwan. At the same time, Serbia could assert itself in the Balkans. Could America cope with four regional wars at once? With a failing economy caused by restricted energy supplies, unready armed forces and angry citizens, the U.S. might suffer a domestic implosion in the wake of a Middle East meltdown. Since America is now held together by wealth and comfort, the evaporation of that same wealth and comfort might signal a violent internal breakup. We should not ignore the fact that our country is deeply divided, ideologically and racially, and that peace is maintained only because the discontents have been bought off with cash. In light of this, we must consider the possibility that the push for war in the Middle East may ultimately be aimed at destabilizing the United States. We should also consider the possibility that Russia's military preparations, taking place over the past three years, are part of a larger plan in which the Middle East serves as a trigger mechanism. Consider Russia's recent deployment of nuclear weapons into the Kaliningrad enclave. Moscow denies the move, but U.S. intelligence has proof. Could it be, in this context, that Russian is planning to assert its dominance over Europe while China makes similar moves in Asia? Taking everything into account, it is entirely possible that the Middle East is being used to foster a whole train of calamitous events. Egyptian President Mubarak is therefore wise to warn the Palestinians against collaboration with Moscow's Middle East surrogates -- Syria, Iraq and Iran. Once a war is ignited and oil is cut off the whole world might come unglued, starting with America.

## Solvency Evidence

### **Aslıhan Tümer, disarmament campaigner for Greenpeace Turkey, 6-8-2006.**

[International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, NATO's Nuclear Sharing and Incirlik, [http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap\\_old/bulletin26/art11.htm](http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap_old/bulletin26/art11.htm)]

Apparently, the dangers are now perceived to come from the Middle East. But keeping nuclear missiles on the outer edge of NATO territory is at best provocative and increases the security threats in the region as well as globally. By basing nuclear missiles in this region, the US puts the local people at risk, with the Bull's Eye being right at Incirlik Air Base. The NATO nuclear weapons should be sent back to the US for dismantling. Not only is this a way to increase the security of Turkey as well as the Middle East, it would also send a positive message to countries in the region and globally by demonstrating the willingness of Turkey to support by words and deeds a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in the region and beyond. Sending these nuclear weapons back to the US and moving NATO towards peace-keeping rather than war-making would take us all on a path of peace and true security.

## Solvency Evidence

**Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, Truman National Security Fellow, University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 11/23/09**

“The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,” <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>)

For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.

**Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy 2010 and Beyond, April 6, 2010**

[“Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism, p. 1, [www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf](http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf)]

NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept states that war prevention requires “widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements”. As Presidents Obama and Medvedev hailed the follow-on START Treaty, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's long-held proposal that nuclear weapons must only be deployed in the territory of those countries to which they belong. Russia currently deploys more tactical nuclear weapons than NATO along its western borders close to many European countries. Notwithstanding this fact, the United States and NATO would enhance European security by removing the anachronism of US nuclear weapons deployed in countries that are non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT, and should leverage such a decision to achieve deep reductions in Russian TNW as well. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe might be only a modest step – a confidence building measure rather than a major disarmament or non-proliferation measure. But it would save money, reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, lessen the salience of nuclear threats in war planning and help to ‘reset’ strategic relations with Russia. It would be likely to go down well with the public in most, if not all, of the host countries, and the time is now ripe for NATO to demonstrate some leadership in this area.

## Solvency Evidence

**John Bergenas, The Guardian, April 5, 2010**

[<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/05/cold-war-thinking-nuclear>]

TNWs also served as an effective tripwire to ward off that threat. No such threat exists today, and irrespective of tactical weapons deployment, Europe remains under the US strategic nuclear weapons umbrella. Tactical weapons are severely constrained as useful military weapons as they must be delivered by aircraft vulnerable to air defenses and are based too far from Russia to offer real military utility in the highly unlikely event of a conventional clash with Russia. Moreover, conventional forces, missile defense and political mechanisms could serve as additional deterrents to any perceived threats against all US allies, including Iran. Indeed, the weapons themselves pose a greater threat as they are susceptible to theft and use by terrorist organizations, which are known to seek weapons of mass destruction.

**Miles Pomper, Senior Fellow, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Survival, February 2010**

[Survival volume 52, issue 1, pp. 75-96]

It is also far from obvious that the presence or absence of a limited number of US nuclear bombs in Europe influences Russian perception of the credibility of American extended deterrence. From Moscow's perspective, a US decision to interfere in a possible conflict is likely to be influenced by a much broader array of variables, including US interest in maintaining a global role, the overall indicators of US power, willingness to use advanced conventional weapons (which is perceived as very high), and so on. Another element of US security guarantees is troop deployment: the prospect of loss of American lives virtually assures that the United States would be involved in case of an armed conflict. The question on the minds of future Russian policymakers, were they to contemplate possible designs on European members of NATO, would be about the political will of US leaders, not specific assets.

**Alexandra Bell, Project Manager, and Benjamin Loehrke, Research Assistant, Ploughshares Fund, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 23, 2009**

[“The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>]

For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base.

## Solvency Evidence

**Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010**

[http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey\\_rep.pdf](http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf)

Turkey is also in the midst of a decades long effort to accede to the European Union. As a part of this process Turkey has had to make numerous changes to its laws and culture, in order to fit the model required of European Union member states (8). It is hard to imagine that Turkey would jeopardize its relations with both the United States and Europe by attempting to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. It would almost certainly result in a total rejection of Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union, and the United States would have significant economic leverage to apply in the form of loss of aid payments and the end of military cooperation. From a national security perspective, Turkey has no need to develop a nuclear weapon to protect its territory. The United States is heavily invested in Turkey militarily, and as a member of NATO Turkey is under the nuclear umbrella, and enjoys the guaranteed protection brought by the NATO treaty. In addition, Turkey has the second largest standing military force in NATO, second only to The United States. Turkey will be able to respond militarily to any foreseeable attack, including one using a nuclear weapon. An attack with a large number of nuclear weapons would be devastating, but would surely trigger a response from the other nuclear nations, as well as with the NATO weapons currently stationed in Turkey. Though Turkey certainly possesses the economic might and technical knowledge to produce nuclear weapons of its own, it has very little incentive to do so. Turkey would risk alienating itself from the West if it ever made an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. It would stand to lose billions of dollars in international investment and aid, as well as a possible loss of membership in NATO and the removal of the weapons stationed in Turkey under the nuclear weapons sharing program. Turkey's bid for full EU membership would also almost certainly be denied if a clandestine nuclear program were ever discovered.

**Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010**

[http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey\\_rep.pdf](http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf)

Even if the political will was in place, it would be difficult for Turkey to develop a nuclear weapon given the safeguards and treaties that are in place. Turkey would have to violate not just the NPT, including the AP, but presumably the various test ban treaties as well. It would have to build enough reprocessing or enrichment capacity to make nuclear weapons without the international community noticing, a difficult task. Any effort to build a nuclear weapon would almost certainly be discovered, and the consequences for Turkey would outweigh the benefits of having a nuclear weapon. The most likely scenario for nuclear proliferation originating in Turkey doesn't come from the Turkish state, but from any of the non-state actors in the region. There are many groups operating in the region acting independently of the established governments. Independent terrorist groups are much harder for the international community to influence and since the 9/11 attacks in New York have been seen as the primary nuclear threat to national security.

## Solvency Evidence

**George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of its non-proliferation program, and James M. Acton, physicist, lecturer in the Department of War Studies at King's College London, March 2008.**

[Adelphi Paper 48(396), Chapter One: Establishing Political Conditions to Enhance the Feasibility of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, p. 15—40]

Recent US discussions of the importance of seeking a world free of nuclear weapons have elicited intense, albeit quietly expressed, concern that this prospect could encourage nuclear proliferation by casting doubt on the viability of extended deterrence, that is, on the commitments made by Washington to project its military power to deter aggression against its allies and friends. Most prominently, it has been suggested that Japan might reconsider its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons because of a fear that US extended deterrence might be withdrawn.<sup>24</sup> (Turkey is also frequently cited in this regard.) The reasons for this are not immediately clear. The US would only eliminate its last nuclear weapons at the same time as all other actors, including China, eliminated theirs, with verification and enforcement provisions negotiated to all states' satisfaction. In this scenario, the nuclear threats against which the US currently provides an umbrella nuclear deterrent would have been removed. The US would presumably maintain its security commitments to allies and be prepared to meet these commitments with conventional means. The conventional balancing requirement could be met by building up US and Japanese capabilities to substitute for the loss of nuclear deterrence - assuming this were still necessary in the absence of Chinese nuclear weapons - or by conventional arms control.

**Sebnem Udum, Ph.D., candidate in International Relations at Bilkent U., visiting instructor at the Turkish Military Academy, November 2006.**

“Turkey’s Non-Nuclear Weapon Status -A Theoretical Assessment,”  
[http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pic/56/1-8-Udum\\_ISYP\\_BD.pdf](http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pic/56/1-8-Udum_ISYP_BD.pdf)]

Having said that, I argue that Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a viable decision: If Turkey decides to go nuclear, international pressure will be intense: Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective. It ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardize this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, relations with the United States are too important to be jeopardized: The United States is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, that would impair micro and macro balances. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, i.e. against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it is Iran, there are other more powerful actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target.<sup>14</sup>

## Topicality Evidence

### **Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Veit, United States Army, 2004**

“NATO’s Nuclear Forces: The Way Ahead”

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424072>

For over forty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has maintained a nuclear weapons presence in Europe to support its strategic objectives. As the strategic environment has changed during this period, so has the structure of the alliance’s nuclear forces. At one point, the alliance maintained a force numbering over 7000 nuclear capable artillery projectiles, mines, missiles, and aircraft-deliverable bombs.<sup>1</sup> This force was composed overwhelmingly of American weapons.

### **Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Veit, United States Army, 2004**

“NATO’s Nuclear Forces: The Way Ahead”

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424072>

At a higher level, maintaining an American presence overseas serves as a symbol of the nation’s commitment to honor its treaty obligations and to reassure its friends that the United States is a reliable security partner. The positioning of US nuclear weapons in Europe is the clear implementation of this goal. Given the sensitive nature of these weapons, the fact that 9 they are positioned on foreign soil is a strong signal of US participation in the alliance. Without these weapons, there are concerns that the United States might distance itself from a crisis and possibly not honor its nuclear and other commitments.

### **Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Veit, United States Army, 2004**

“NATO’s Nuclear Forces: The Way Ahead”

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA424072>

The final strategic objective for the alliance is to preserve the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe. The positioning of US nuclear weapons is not merely the garrisoning of forces in an allied state, it is part of an effort that has been termed as geopresence—a multifaceted presence that allows the US military to operate in any region of the world, promoted by conscious diplomatic, economic, military, and political involvement in the given region and with the required countries.<sup>25</sup>

## Allied Proliferation DA Answers

**Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010**

[http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey\\_rep.pdf](http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf)

Turkey is also in the midst of a decades long effort to accede to the European Union. As a part of this process Turkey has had to make numerous changes to its laws and culture, in order to fit the model required of European Union member states (8). It is hard to imagine that Turkey would jeopardize its relations with both the United States and Europe by attempting to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. It would almost certainly result in a total rejection of Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union, and the United States would have significant economic leverage to apply in the form of loss of aid payments and the end of military cooperation. From a national security perspective, Turkey has no need to develop a nuclear weapon to protect its territory. The United States is heavily invested in Turkey militarily, and as a member of NATO Turkey is under the nuclear umbrella, and enjoys the guaranteed protection brought by the NATO treaty. In addition, Turkey has the second largest standing military force in NATO, second only to The United States. Turkey will be able to respond militarily to any foreseeable attack, including one using a nuclear weapon. An attack with a large number of nuclear weapons would be devastating, but would surely trigger a response from the other nuclear nations, as well as with the NATO weapons currently stationed in Turkey. Though Turkey certainly possesses the economic might and technical knowledge to produce nuclear weapons of its own, it has very little incentive to do so. Turkey would risk alienating itself from the West if it ever made an attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. It would stand to lose billions of dollars in international investment and aid, as well as a possible loss of membership in NATO and the removal of the weapons stationed in Turkey under the nuclear weapons sharing program. Turkey's bid for full EU membership would also almost certainly be denied if a clandestine nuclear program were ever discovered.

**Brian Walsh, Senior Legal Research Fellow Heritage Foundation, 2010**

[http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey\\_rep.pdf](http://www.ne.ncsu.edu/faculty/yim/documents/NE591-S2010/Report/Turkey_rep.pdf)

Even if the political will was in place, it would be difficult for Turkey to develop a nuclear weapon given the safeguards and treaties that are in place. Turkey would have to violate not just the NPT, including the AP, but presumably the various test ban treaties as well. It would have to build enough reprocessing or enrichment capacity to make nuclear weapons without the international community noticing, a difficult task. Any effort to build a nuclear weapon would almost certainly be discovered, and the consequences for Turkey would outweigh the benefits of having a nuclear weapon. The most likely scenario for nuclear proliferation originating in Turkey doesn't come from the Turkish state, but from any of the non-state actors in the region. There are many groups operating in the region acting independently of the established governments. Independent terrorist groups are much harder for the international community to influence and since the 9/11 attacks in New York have been seen as the primary nuclear threat to national security.

## Allied Proliferation DA Answers

**Erkan Arslan, Naval Postgraduate School graduate, December 2007;**

[http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-](http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de:8080/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003460/Defense%20implications%20of%20a%20nuclear%20Iran%20for%20Turkey.pdf)

[halle.de:8080/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe\\_derivate\\_00003460/Defense%20implications%20of%20a%20nuclear%20Iran%20for%20Turkey.pdf](http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de:8080/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003460/Defense%20implications%20of%20a%20nuclear%20Iran%20for%20Turkey.pdf)

Turkey, being a state party to the NPT and a voluntary ratifier of additional IAEA protocols, has never sought the ways to become a nuclear-weapons-capable state and is unlikely to become one in the future; however, as Turkish scholar Mustafa Kibaroglu argues: “The loyalty of an increasing number of Turks, especially from the younger generations, be they in politics, in academia, in the military or in state bureaucracy, to the norms of the nonproliferation regimes cannot be taken for granted indefinitely, if the United States and the European Union fail to convince Iran to forego the nuclear weapons option. Otherwise, Iran’s nuclear ambitions may trigger young Turks to think nuclear more seriously.” It is important to examine Turkey’s nuclear activities in order to determine future capabilities and assess whether Turkey might become another nuclear proliferator in the case that “young Turks” start to consider nuclear options in the face of security challenges. It’s important to highlight that currently there are no nuclear power reactors in Turkey other than two small research reactors, but in the shadows of energy shortfalls, building a nuclear power station has become a highly debated issue. Turkey’s nuclear power research started with the establishment of the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center (CNRTC) with a one megawatt thermal pool type research reactor in 1962. Later in 1966 the Nuclear Research and Training Center (ANRTC) was established for planning and utilizing Turkey’s natural uranium reserves. Feasibility studies were conducted for the construction of a 300- to 400- megawatt reactor; however, economic and political crises halted the project. Later similar research was conducted in 1972 to install a 600-megawatt reactor, but again the project was interrupted by military intervention in 1980. Too many attempts and failures, on the other hand, supplied Turkey with a well-educated cadre of Turkish scientists, scholars, and technicians in the fields of nuclear engineering and nuclear physics. Turkey can be argued to have a nuclear weapon production capability, as Bowen and Kidd highlight in their article. However, common wisdom depending on open sources suggests that a nuclear-capable Turkey is unlikely, given the openness of Turkey’s nuclear research program, small uranium reserves, lack of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, and especially international pressure. In this regard, it is difficult to believe that Ankara could develop a weapons program in the near future as long as Turkish leaders keep their rationality in governing the country.

## START Disadvantage Answers

**Thomas Withington, Research Associate at the Centre for Defense Studies, King's College, London and an Associate Member of the Royal Aeronautical Society France, 8/13/2008,**  
“The tactical nuclear weapons game,” <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=89456>

Moreover, the two main parties in the US have indicated that they want to revisit the European tactical nuclear weapons issue. McCain made his statement to that effect in May, and, according Ingram; "there's some form of debate [in the Democratic Party] between those who say that they should be withdrawn unilaterally, and those who say they should be used as a negotiating tool" by which the US and Russian governments could negotiate a bilateral agreement to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons from the European continent. Whichever way one looks at the debate, it seems that both political parties would like to see the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe, but that differences exist on the conditions under which this could happen. Certainly, the cost to the Pentagon of administering and maintaining these weapons in Europe must be considerable at a time when a faltering US economy, high oil prices and escalating costs for defense equipment are all having a detrimental effect on the US defense budget.

**Philip E. Coyle, Senior Advisor World Security Institute, 3/17/2009,**  
“Prepared Remarks before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water, The Future of the DOE Complex Transformation Program”  
[http://appropriations.house.gov/Witness\\_testimony/EW/Philip\\_Coyle\\_03\\_17\\_09.pdf](http://appropriations.house.gov/Witness_testimony/EW/Philip_Coyle_03_17_09.pdf)

Notably, for three decades Congress has supported the continuing reductions in the stockpiles of US nuclear weapons regardless of the political party in power. Going beyond the Moscow Treaty reductions, nuclear strategists are entertaining prospects of lower and lower totals of nuclear weapons. A sum of 500 US nuclear weapons seems to be emerging as a straw man, and various posture proposals with a 500-warhead figure and also 1000 are being advocated.<sup>1</sup> The Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Authorization Act mandates two separate nuclear posture reviews that may affect future US policy.<sup>2</sup> Yet recent posture proposals still do not persuasively articulate the contemporary missions of the American nuclear forces that might remain after further reductions. If many of the proposed missions for nuclear weapons are inconceivable or irrational, those missions will not justify the retention of nuclear weapons to carry them out.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Turkey Neg (Set)

## Inherency Answers Evidence

**Oliver Meier, member of the arms control association, July/August 2006,**  
“News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?”  
<http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088>

NATO’s policy of basing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in several European countries has lasted long after the end of the Cold War, despite increasing pressure from parliamentarians, disarmament advocates, and public opinion. Now, a more mundane yet more tangible force may now tip the balance against the status quo: money. Public statements from and interviews with government officials and experts in Europe indicate that European governments may not be willing to make the investments in a new generation of nuclear-capable aircraft or participate in relevant technology sharing that would be needed to sustain the policy. Nuclear sharing was developed during the Cold War to deepen U.S.-European military ties and to create a forum where Europe could have a say in Washington’s nuclear policies. As the Cold War ended, about 4,000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons remained on European soil, intended to offset Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. In a series of bilateral understandings with the Soviet Union and then with Russia in the early 1990s, President George H. W. Bush sharply reduced that number. Today, an estimated 480 B-61 gravity bombs remain deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, which also possesses its own nuclear arsenal. Of these weapons, 180 are assigned for use by the five non-nuclear-weapon states. These weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime but can be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.

**Oliver Meier, member of the arms control association, July/August 2006,**  
“News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe?”  
<http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088>

U.S. and European officials readily acknowledge that they have held on to the weapons for predominantly political rather than military reasons. In its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO implied that improved relations with Russia meant that the weapons’ military purpose had largely ended, but called for retaining the weapons as a means of shoring up the political solidarity of the alliance. U.S. and European officials have also seen the weapons as a potential bargaining chip to encourage Russia to part with its own much larger arsenal of such weapons, variously estimated at about 3,000 deployed operational warheads. But the status quo is imperiled by the aging of NATO’s nuclear-capable fighter fleet. Over the next several years, a number of European NATO members involved in nuclear sharing arrangements have to decide whether to replace aging fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, commonly known as “dual-capable aircraft.” Amid budget pressures and growing public concern, some key groups are beginning to balk. These concerns come as NATO is expected to update the 1999 Strategic Concept, including a possible revision of its nuclear doctrine.

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **Sabrina Transverse, an American journalist who is currently the Istanbul bureau chief of The New York Times, 6/15/10**

“Turkey and Iran: Strange Bedfellows?” <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/turkey-and-iran-strange-bedfellows/633786/0>

Viewed from Washington, Turkey and Iran are strange bedfellows. One is a NATO member with a Constitution that mandates secularism, and the other, an Islamic republic whose nuclear program has been one of the most vexing foreign policy problems for the US in recent years. So why have the two countries been locked in a clumsy embrace, with Turkey openly defying the US last week by voting against imposing new sanctions on Iran? Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates mused that Turkey was “moving eastward,” a shift he attributed to the European Union’s tepid response to Turkey’s application to join it. But many here do not see it that way. Turkey simply disagrees with the US over how to approach the problems in the Middle East. The Obama administration chooses sanctions, Turkey believes cooperation has more of a chance. “I would be appalled if Turkey cut itself off from the West and aligned with the Islamic world, but that’s not what’s happening,” said Halil Berkay, a historian at Sabanci University. “Turkey is saying, ‘You’ve been talking about building bridges. This is the way to build them’.” For the United States, Iran is a rogue state intent on building a bomb and crazy enough to use it. Turkey agrees that Iran is trying to develop the technology that would let it build a weapon, but says Iran’s leaders may be satisfied stopping at that. “We believe that once we normalize relations with Iran, and it has relationships with other actors, it won’t go for the bomb,” said a Turkish official who works closely with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Part of Turkey’s motivation in reaching out to Iran is based in realpolitik. Iran is Turkey’s neighbor and also supplies the country with a fifth of its natural gas. The approach is also part of a broader policy of economic and political integration in the region that Turkey, under Erdogan, has pursued for nearly a decade. Iranians can travel to Turkey without a visa, as can Syrians, Iraqis, Russians and Georgians. More than a million Iranians travel to Turkey on vacation every year. The recent nuclear talks were part of that effort. They culminated in May in what Turkey, and its partner Brazil, said was a commitment by Iran to swap a portion of its low-enriched uranium with other countries. Iran would ship out part of its stockpile in exchange for a form of uranium less likely to be used for weapons.

### **UPI, 7/2/10,**

“Energy ties with Iran stable, Turkey says” [http://www.upi.com/Science\\_News/Resource-Wars/2010/07/02/Energy-ties-with-Iran-stable-Turkey-says/UPI-16271278079811/](http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/07/02/Energy-ties-with-Iran-stable-Turkey-says/UPI-16271278079811/)

Ankara plans to continue activity in the Iranian energy sector because it is not restricted by U.N. sanctions, the Turkish energy minister said. The Security Council voted June 9 to place new sanctions on Iran that allow for searches of banned goods in cargo to or from Iran and increase the number of individuals and companies subject to travel bans and an asset freeze. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz told Iran's state-funded broadcaster Press TV that his country would continue doing business with Iran in light of the Security Council measure. "Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals," he said. Yildiz added that his country was waiting for the results of technical studies to wrap up in the South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf. "After we receive the result of this study we will decide how to move forward," Yildiz said. According to Press TV, Iran exports more than 880 million cubic feet of natural gas to Turkey every day.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Alexandra Bell and Benajmin Loehrke, the project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. Loehrke is a research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 09**

“The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey”, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>,

In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

**Johan Bergenäs, Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate, Washington, DC office, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, Dr. William Potter, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, et al, April 2010**

“Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Non-strategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Moving Forward?” [http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing\\_tnw\\_april\\_2010.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/reducing_tnw_april_2010.pdf) accessed 7/2/10

Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the Baltic States, have historically been reluctant to support the removal of U.S. NSNW. These states generally perceive these weapons as a means of providing a highly visible deterrent to Russia and see their location and visibility as essential to assuring them of the U.S. defense commitment to Europe and of the value of NATO. To this end, Bruno Tertrais, a prominent European scholar, has stated that “a U.S. nuclear withdrawal could be perceived as a lessening of transatlantic security ties by countries which are particularly keen to shelter behind U.S. protection, such as Poland, the Baltic States and Turkey.” 46 Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn writing in March 2010 cite an unidentified ambassador from a new NATO member: Nuclear deterrence by the US and through NATO and with the American presence of American warheads in Europe is the ultimate test of NATO’s credibility. If that fails, you will see a different NATO – more will follow the Poles in seeking bilateral guarantees. It is the essence of NATO membership.47 Absent the nuclear link, experts fret that the new members will see little benefit from NATO as they will perceive a lack of concern for their security from Germany and other Western European NATO members. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace recently called for Germany to reassure “NATO’s easternmost members that their security interests will be robustly protected.” 48 Discounting the possibility of a Russian attack worthy of a nuclear response, Perkovich calls on Germany to “seek collective policies to obviate the range of conventional and non-military threats such as cyber warfare and energy coercion that can lead to escalatory crises.”

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **Gunnar Arbman and Lars Wigg, security analysts at Pugwash, 5/24/2002**

Workshop on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Sigtuna, Sweden. May 24th-25th, 2002,  
<http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/situgna.html>)

The discussion then turned to American TNWs deployed in some NATO states. Arguments for and against this deployment were presented, and it was regrettably concluded by the participants that there seems to be no unanimous European wish to have them removed at present, even if they mostly have a symbolic, political value. One view was that Turkey might decide to develop an indigenous nuclear arsenal if NATO TNWs were withdrawn from its territory. Moreover it was argued that there is a general American belief, perhaps erroneous, that its European allies want TNWs to remain deployed in some NATO countries.

### **Bruno Tertrais, Senior Research Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, 2008**

Real Instituto Elcano article titled The Coming NATO Nuclear Debate from  
 9/26/2008 [http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_eng/Content?WCM\\_GLOBAL\\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\\_in/zonas\\_in/defense+security/ari117-2008](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/defense+security/ari117-2008).

Ankara deserves particular attention. The presence of US nuclear weapons on Turkish soil is fairly unpopular within the country, but the military elite view it as a significant component of their relationship with the US. The US nuclear presence reassures allies that might otherwise be tempted to go nuclear. A withdrawal could affect Ankara's perception of its security if faced with a nuclear-capable Iran. Should this be the case, many observers agree that Turkey could consider a nuclear program for itself. Turkey currently has a significant civilian nuclear research program, but does not have the installations required for making fissile material. It would need to either construct a uranium enrichment plant or build a dedicated plutonium production reactor. This would require a break in its current nuclear policy. Furthermore, producing fissile material with such installations would imply a withdrawal from the NPT. To be fair, such an option would appear credible only if three conditions were met: a severe crisis of confidence between Ankara and Washington, a crumbling of the NPT regime and expectations that the EU will refuse to admit Turkey (for it is difficult to imagine the EU admitting in its ranks a new nuclear nation).

### **Mustafa Kibaroglu, Assistant professor of IR at Bilkent University, December 2005.**

“?” Journal of European Security 14.4,

However, the fundamental reason why Turkish officials want to keep the weapons has more to do with the nature and the scope of Turkish\_/American relations in particular, and Turkey's place in the Western alliance in general. First and foremost, the deployment of the remaining tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey is believed to strengthen the bonds between the US and Turkey; these bonds were severely strained during and after the crisis in Iraq in late 2002 and neither party got what it wanted.<sup>24</sup> Withdrawing the US nuclear weapons from Turkey during such a delicate period could weaken the bonds in the longstanding strategic alliance (or the ‘partnership’ as many Turkish and American analysts would prefer to term it)

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Sebnem Udum, PH.D. Candidate at Bilkent University, 2007,**

Journal on Science and World Affairs,” Turkey’s non-nuclear weapon status A theoretical assessment”, [http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2\\_Sebnem.pdf](http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2_Sebnem.pdf)

On the other hand, a decision for Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear, international pressure would be intense. Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey firmly to the West and the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state policy, based on the modernization process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkey’s nuclear aspirations would jeopardize this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States, which is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, which would impair micro and macro balances. Condemnation and isolation from the international community would be unbearable militarily, politically and economically. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, that is, against which country would Turkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, there are other more powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20].

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Gabe Schoenfeld, Ph.D. from Harvard University's Department of Government, 7/19/2010, The Wall Street Journal,**  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575342941580221462.html>

U.S. intelligence has already had two horrendously costly lapses this decade: the failure to interdict the plot of Sept. 11, 2001, and the erroneous assessment that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction. Both brought us into wars. A third failure may now be unfolding, with consequences that might dwarf the preceding two. To avoid this, we need an inquest. The status of Iran's nuclear program is the issue. In December 2007, our intelligence agencies put out a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which in its opening sentence baldly declared that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." In a stroke, this authoritative pronouncement eliminated any possibility that President Bush, then entering his final year in office, would order a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Perhaps even more significantly, it undercut White House and international efforts to tighten sanctions on Iran. After all, if the Iranian nuclear program had been halted in 2003, what would be the point? But the NIE, or at least the unclassified summary around which public discussion revolved, was badly flawed. It relegated to a footnote the all-important fact that the most difficult part of a bomb project—"uranium conversion and enrichment"—was proceeding apace. The only thing that Tehran was said by the NIE to have stopped was "weaponization," the design of an actual warhead. This is the technically least complex facet of the enterprise. Behind the scenes, the intelligence services of Germany, Great Britain, France and Israel all took issue with the NIE. It became the subject of fierce criticism in Congress and the press. It is now clear that while the U.S. dithered, Tehran forged ahead. Evidence has surfaced that the flawed 2007 NIE was the result of political cookery. Paul Pillar, a former top analyst at the CIA, has frankly acknowledged that in downgrading the Iranian nuclear threat analysts may well have had policy implications foremost in mind. The intelligence community was severely burned for its erroneous conclusion about Iraq's WMD in 2002, which the Bush administration employed to justify going to war with Iraq. As a result, Mr. Pillar stated in a January 2008 NPR interview, "estimators might have shaped [the 2007 Iran] estimate in a way that would take this military option off the table." In his book published last year, "The Inheritance," David Sanger of the New York Times quotes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (a former CIA chief himself) declaring "that in his whole career in intelligence he had never seen 'an NIE that had such an impact on U.S. diplomacy.' He did not mean it as a compliment."

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Gabe Schoenfeld, Ph.D. from Harvard University's Department of Government, 7/19/2010, The Wall Street Journal,**

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575342941580221462.html>

Since late last year, U.S. intelligence has been preparing a new estimate of Iran's nuclear program. The critical question is whether the forces that led to politicization in 2007 have been eradicated. Will the drafters of the new Iran NIE call the shots as they are, or will they once again use intelligence as a political lever? Already some hints are emerging. In late June, CIA Director Leon Panetta flatly declared that the Iranians "clearly are developing their nuclear capability." Regarding "weaponization," he stated that "they continue to work on designs in that area." This explicit statement is an unequivocal reversal by our nation's premier spy agency. But could this stunning turnabout somehow be every bit as politicized as the 2007 NIE? This troubling possibility cannot be overlooked. Mr. Panetta, a former congressman and Bill Clinton's White House chief of staff, is a political creature to the marrow of his bones. The turnabout on Iran that he apparently has played a role in engineering may owe in part to a paradox: Intelligence that today emphasizes the Iranian nuclear danger is useful for precisely the same political purpose for which it was employed by intelligence analysts back in 2007, namely to take the military option off the table. Such intelligence bolsters the case for internationally agreed-upon sanctions, the Obama administration's favored policy toward Tehran and the only course that might obviate the use of force. In pressing ahead, the Obama administration has used the intelligence agencies to provide classified briefings to foreign officials. The stronger the evidence, the stronger the case for action short of war. And to be even more specific, there are various competing timelines now circulating in the intelligence world for when Iran will have passed the nuclear point of no return. The longer the time frame, the more room is left for sanctions to work their will. Israel, which may have its own reasons for coloring intelligence, contends that we might only have 12 months left. U.S. intelligence, as is clear from various public statements and congressional testimony by ranking officials, is pushing the timeline further out, to as few as two years and as many as five. What is the right number? If we and the rest of the world are not to be surprised by an Iranian detonation, it is the critical question. We need absolute confidence that the answer, even if indeterminate, is not once again based on cooked intelligence. That is why a neutral outside panel should be brought in to scrutinize the discredited 2007 NIE and the entire estimating process in this sensitive arena. Previous intelligence lapses, like those leading up to 9/11 or with Iraq's WMDs, have been thoroughly investigated by independent commissions, unleashing potential for corrective action. Who made mistakes and why? Are those same individuals in the process of introducing errors again? The national intelligence officer who oversaw the writing of the 2007 NIE was Vann Van Diepen. Today he is a senior official at the State Department, where he "spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation."

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Steve Chapman, member of the Chicago Tribune editorial board since 1981, 2/8/08** “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,”

[http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the\\_implausibility\\_of\\_nuclear.html](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/02/the_implausibility_of_nuclear.html), accessed 7/2/10

Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small."

**John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009**

“The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, [http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf)

There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were utterly to fail, collapsing in full disarray—Pakistan is frequently brought up in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would likely remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb would most likely end up going off in their own territory, would still have locks (and, in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled), and could probably be followed, located, and hunted down by an alarmed international community. The worst case scenario in this instance requires not only a failed state, but a considerable series of additional permissive conditions including consistent (and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood script writers than to people experienced with reality.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009**

“The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, [http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf)

There has also been great worry about “loose nukes,” especially in post-Communist Russia—weapons, “suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, both Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs have adamantly denied that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought such weapons. They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years, after which they become “radioactive scrap metal.” Similarly, a careful assessment conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance. Even some of those most alarmed by the prospect of atomic terrorism have concluded that “It is probably true that there are no ‘loose nukes’, transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way.”<sup>10</sup> It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly Chechen ones of course, with whom it has been waging a vicious on-and-off war for well over a decade. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.” Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide pursuit launched. And most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by sensors in the hands of pursuers.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that will trigger a non-nuclear explosion that will destroy the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high security vaults, and things can be organized so that two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb, but to store, to maintain, and to deploy it. If the terrorists seek to enlist (or force) the services of someone who already knows how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger stresses, that “only few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained only in a limited set of functions.<sup>13</sup>

## Harms Answers Evidence

### **John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009**

“The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, [http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf)

The National Security Council (MGK), bringing together the president, the prime minister and some members of the Cabinet with top military brass, convened yesterday to talk about new measures to take against the increase in terrorist attacks of the outlawed PKK. The meeting started in the afternoon under the chairmanship of President Abdullah Gül at the War Academies Command in İstanbul. The outcome of the meeting has not yet been made public officially, but the generals and the government were expected to talk about a number of possible measures including assigning special roles to police special operations teams in the fight against terrorism and perhaps a change in Turkey's southeastern border with Iraq to allow better control of the areas infested by the PKK. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, force commanders and Gül arrived at the War Academies Command yesterday hours before the start of the MGK meeting to attend a conference to be delivered by Gül. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also started his preparations early, arriving at the Prime Ministerial Office inside Dolmabahçe Palace in İstanbul with those ministers who are members of the MGK. State Ministers and Deputy Prime Ministers Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek and Ali Babacan, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin, Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül and Public Order and Safety Undersecretary Muammer Güler met with the prime minister here. Turkey may suggest changes to the country's existing borders with Iraq in order to more effectively fight terrorists hiding out in the mountains that line the border. Government officials and top commanders brought up the possibility in a key security and anti-terrorism meeting yesterday. As they talked, Gül was giving a conference at the War Academy. During his speech, Gül said terrorism is Turkey's foremost issue. “There have been deep-rooted changes in our country, from politics and the economy to commerce and the system of law. The real target of this transformation is to keep up with the times, not lag behind the necessities of the age,” he said.

### **Walter Pincus, Washington Post Staff writer, 7/20/2010,**

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/19/AR2010071905187.html>

Hommert told the senators that critical non-nuclear components "are exhibiting age-related performance degradation." He cited specifically that the earlier B-61 radar, which begins the fusing process of the weapon as it descends toward the target, includes vacuum tubes that now will be replaced by computer chips. Plans also call for replacing the battery component and the neutron generator in each bomb, the latter device being the one that initiates the fission process leading to the nuclear explosion. The nuclear package of the B-61 was developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and its director, Michael R. Anastasio, told the committees that his staff was turning to the nuclear bomb, having finished work on the extension program for W-76, the warhead carried by the submarine-launched Trident intercontinental ballistic missile. Los Alamos will refurbish a new detonator cable assembly for the B-61 as well as foams and polymers that have shown decay and are needed to protect the nuclear package. Anastasio also added that the extension program will see installation of "safety and security features," which probably means devices that would allow disarming the bomb if someone stole it.

## Harms Answers Evidence

**Amy Woolf, Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Congressional Research Service, 1/13/06,**  
 “Nonstrategic nuclear weapons”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/1466811/US-Air-Force-rl32572>

Specifically, the United States has maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons. For example, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that “the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces, backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader contemplating the use of WMD against the United States, its overseas deployed forces, or its allies.”<sup>28</sup> These statements do not indicate whether nonstrategic nuclear weapons would be used to achieve battlefield or tactical objectives, or whether they would contribute to strategic missions, but it remained evident, throughout the 1990s, that the United States continued to view these weapons as a part of its national security strategy.

**Oliver Meier, member of the arms control association, 2008,**

““NATO Mulls Nuke Modernization, Security”<http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2088>

Reports about security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons bases in Europe have led to renewed calls from parliamentarians of European allies for an end to NATO's nuclear weapons-sharing arrangements. But a senior NATO official interviewed by Arms Control Today rejected the reports about security problems, predicted a continuation of NATO's nuclear weapons policies, and called for a modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.” There is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure,” Guy Roberts, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy, told Arms Control Today Aug. 14. On June 19, Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists released the classified findings of a February U.S. Air Force blue ribbon review (BRR), which he had obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. The “Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures” found that most European sites where U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed “require significant additional resources to meet [Department of Defense] security requirements.” The review had been launched following an August 2007 incident in the United States, when a B-52 bomber flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana wrongly and unknowingly armed with nuclear cruise missiles. (See ACT, July/August 2008.)

## Harms Answers Evidence

**John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, April 30, 2009,**  
“The Atomic Terrorist?” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,  
[http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Mueller_Terrorism.pdf)

Alarm about the possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons have been repeatedly raised at least since 1946 when atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer contended that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could “destroy New York.” Thirty years later, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the problem to be “immediate,” and explained at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it variously already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.”<sup>3</sup> Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In the wake of 9/11, concerns about the atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that day used no special weapons. By 2003, UN Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be a “a high probability” that within two years al-Qaeda would attempt an attack using a nuclear or other weapon of mass destruction. And it is in this spirit that Graham Allison in 2004 produced a thoughtful, influential, and well-argued book, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, relaying his “considered judgment” that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.” He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in 1995 to predict that “In the absence of a determined program of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out.”<sup>4</sup> He has quite a bit of company in his perpetually alarming conclusions. However, thus far terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

### **Sally McNamara and Baker Spring, heritage foundation senior policy analyst and FM Kirby Research fellow in National Security Policy 3/4/2010**

[<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe>. Accessed July 19, 2010J.T]

From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear deterrence, not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots. A Threat to NATO Not since radical leftist sentiment gripped Western Europe in the 1980s has the transatlantic relationship faced such a serious ideological challenge to the mutual security of North America and Europe. The removal of American tactical nuclear weapons from European and NATO bases would spell the end of the alliance and the concept of indivisible security.

### **Scott Horton, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, 2007**

USAWC Strategy Research Project, “NATO’s Nuclear Glue”

NATO has already reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Its strategy remains one of war prevention but it is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation.<sup>44</sup> The collective security provided by NATO’s nuclear posture is shared among all members of the alliance. Moreover, the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO reinforces the political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance. At the same time, the participation of non-nuclear countries in the implementation of the alliance’s nuclear policies demonstrates alliance solidarity as well as the common commitment of member countries to maintaining their security and the widespread sharing among them of responsibilities and risks.<sup>45</sup> It also removes an incentive for countries such as Germany to develop their own nuclear weapons. As former defense secretary James Schlesinger has written, US nuclear weapons are the “glue” holding NATO together.<sup>46</sup> His comments date back to 1986, yet numerous staff officers on joint planning staffs and headquarters could have heard the same quote from current senior US defense officials.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

### **PAP News Wire, 3/17/2010**

PAP News Wire, LexisNexis,

Washington: The United States urged Turkey on Wednesday to support more sanctions against Iran over Tehran's nuclear program, saying Ankara could face consequences if it moves out of step with the international community. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon, the State Department's top diplomat for Europe, said U.S.-Turkey relations were strong despite a row over a resolution by U.S. lawmakers branding the 1915-era killings of Armenians by Turkish forces as "genocide." But he said Turkey, a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council that has been leery of the U.S.-led push to further punish Iran, must show it is "on board" with the move toward new sanctions. "Many would be disappointed if Turkey is an exception to an international consensus on dealing with Iran," he told a news briefing before a speech on U.S. relations with Turkey, a fellow NATO member and pivotal regional ally to Washington.

### **Turkish Weekly Journal, 6/4/2010,**

<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/102907/u-s-political-analysts-events-around-quot-freedom-flotilla-quot-can-deteriorate-u-s-turkey-relations.html>

As we saw with recent visits of Erdogan to Iran and the Turkish-Brazilian Nuclear deal, Turkey is playing a leadership role in the region's conflicts. The U.S does not want to provoke it into leading a revolt of the middling powers against U.S policy, Landis said. Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University Nathan J. Brown believes that the current crisis in the relations of Turkey and Israel will provoke real problems for the U.S. "The U.S-Turkish alliance is as actually even older than the U.S-Israel alliance and it is more formal (since Turkey is a member of NATO and Israel is not). This crisis presents real problems for the US for that reason, since both sides will look very much to the US for support and it can not satisfy both at the same time," Brown told Trend via e-mail. He said that the Turkish-Israeli relationship is under severe stress and the Turkish-U.S relationship under less severe but still serious stress. Director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Schenker, said that the recent actions of Turkey in the Middle East are increasingly contrary to U.S. policy in the region. The support for international humanitarian convoy is one of them. "The Turkish-sponsored flotilla to Gaza complicates the newly resumed U.S-brokered proximity talks between Israelis and Palestinians. A few weeks before that, Ankara brokered a problematic deal with Brazil and Iran, which would allow Tehran to continue enriching Uranium, and make it more difficult for Washington to build a coalition to sanction Iran, " Schenker told Trend via e-mail. The flotilla incident will not necessarily deepen the rift between Ankara and Washington. But it is important, because this Turkish provocation and other recent Turkish initiatives that seem geared toward frustrating Administration policies in the Middle East are indicative of how deep the rift between Washington and Ankara has already become, he said.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

### **Ben Katcher, Policy Analyst for the American Strategy Program, 6/3/2010**

#### The Washington Note

Cook says: The Obama administration has yet to grapple with the ways the structural changes in the international system have affected U.S.-Turkey relations. All the talk about strategic cooperation, model partnership, and strategic importance cannot mask the fundamental shift at hand. The stark reality is that while Turkey and the United States are not enemies in the Middle East, they are fast becoming competitors. Whereas the United States seeks to remain the predominant power in the region and, as such, wants to maintain a political order that makes it easier for Washington to achieve its goals, Turkey clearly sees things differently. The Turks are willing to bend the regional rules of the game to serve Ankara's own interests. If the resulting policies serve U.S. goals at the same time, good. If not, so be it...

### **Ascribe Newswire, 2/3/2010**

The broadening of Turkish foreign policy has been accompanied by important domestic changes that challenge many of the basic tenets of the Kemalist revolution on which the Turkish Republic was founded, particularly secularism. Kemalism remains an important social and political force in Turkey. However, the democratization of Turkish political life in the last several decades has led to the emergence of new political and social elites that have increasingly challenged the Kemalist elite's traditional dominance of Turkish political life. These changes have made the security partnership with Turkey more difficult to manage, according to the report. Turkey today has interests in a number of regions -- particularly the Middle East and Caucasus -- that it did not have two decades ago. As a result, Turkey's government is less willing to automatically follow the United States' lead on many issues, especially when U.S. policy conflicts with Turkey's own interests. At the same time, Turkey has increased its regional influence.

## Solvency Answers Evidence

**Michael M. Lieberman, a Truman National Security Project fellow, 7/9/2010,**  
“Turkish Dislike: The Need for a Measured Response”

<http://themoderatevoice.com/79052/turkish-dislike-the-need-for-a-measured-response/>

Some have sought to transcend these narrow perspectives, arguing that the supposed rift comes with a sterling silver lining. In fact, Turkey asserting itself in this fashion, they say, should actually comfort Israel and its allies. In their view, with “Turkey as the central interlocutor between the Islamic/Arab world and Israel and the West... Iran will increasingly find it harder to carry out its agenda of destabilizing the region and the globe.” This view is attractive, and not unwarranted, but tends towards overoptimism. Iran relies on harder currency than public opinion to sow discord. Weapons, cash and training for the likes of radical and irreconcilable elements of Hezbollah, Hamas and even the Taliban enjoy a more favorable rate of exchange. Turkey’s eclipse of Iran can only be viewed as a positive development if it distinguishes itself by responsible and constructive behavior. What good will Turkey’s enhanced role be to the West and Israel if it calls for a one-state solution? Or if it recognizes a unilaterally declared Palestinian state? Or when, as it has already done, it acts to undercut placing new sanctions against Iran? It is no gain to have a more influential and powerful Turkey pursuing causes detrimental to Western and Israeli interests on matters of such grave concern—indeed, in this way Turkey’s credibility in the Muslim world is very much a double-edged scimitar. If hopes existed that Turkey could capitalize on its unique position by acting as an honest broker between Israel and Syria or moderating elements of Hezbollah or Hamas, it is doing all it can to dash them. Its sharp rhetoric and diplomatic maneuverings aside, Turkey has taken a number of very real concrete steps to Israel’s detriment. It has now canceled official defense deals, threatened to sever diplomatic ties and adopted a policy of denial on military overflights. This last step is yet another boost to Iran, weakening Israel’s deterrent against its nuclear plans. The net benefit to Turkey’s current behavior would have to be large indeed to compensate for its obvious demerits.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# **START DA- Neg (Set)**

## Explanation

This disadvantage argues that the plan would have harmful repercussions for President Obama's agenda. It argues that, currently, Obama is pursuing a treaty agreement with Russia over the number of nuclear weapons that each country can have and how they can be stored. The U.S. and Russia have both signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and it is up to the United States Senate in order to ratify it before the agreement will go into effect between the two countries. The disadvantage argues that START will be ratified by the Senate now because Obama is expending all of his effort convincing Senators and promising them favors in exchange for their votes.

The plan interferes with the ratification of the START treaty because it drains Obama's political capital. The disadvantage argues that the affirmative plan would be extremely unpopular and take lots of effort from Obama in order to pass, because members of Congress and the general public at large are highly in favor of the American forward deployments that the affirmative is reducing. As a result, Obama would have to spend his political capital in order to convince members of the Senate to go along with the affirmative plan. Because of this, he will not have enough influence left to also convince them to vote for the START treaty.

The impact of this is that the START agreement is important to create cooperation between the US and Russia that will spill over into other issues. A strong US-Russian relationship is important to manage many of the emerging threats of the new century.

## Glossary

**START:** Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. START is actually the name of several agreements between the US and Russia regarding nuclear arms control. The most recent agreement, signed in 1993, is about to expire. It is for this reason Obama and Medvedev are trying to agree to a successor treaty, to help maintain stability.

**Political Capital:** An ethereal measure of the President's ability to implement his agenda. Political capital is a measure of how likely other politicians would be to change their own position to support something Barack Obama supports that they do not support because he would like them to. Generally, the more popular a President is, the higher his political capital. A President can often gain political capital by implementing policies or doing favors that help the person he is trying to convince in one way or another. For example, if Obama were to issue an executive order that that was popular with many Republican congressmen, his political capital among them would likely increase. Political capital decreases when the President undertakes controversial or unpopular decisions, as he must convince them to support his policy for it to be passed

**Agenda:** The set of goals and policies that the President would like to accomplish. For example, Obama's agenda would include passing health care, passing some kind of climate legislation, and getting rid of nuclear weapons.

**Senate Foreign Relations Committee:** Subgroup of the Senate that looks at bills relating to foreign policy. A bill must be approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before it can be voted on by the entire Senate and passed.

**Midterm Election:** Congressional election for the House of Representatives and the Senate every two years. When a President is not on the ballot in the same election, it is called a midterm election, as it is in the middle of the President's term. All members of the House of Representatives and one third of the Senate is up for reelection every Congressional Election. There will be midterm elections this November.

**Ratification:** The constitutional power of the Senate to review treaties that are negotiated by the President and the State Department. The executive (Presidential) branch negotiates agreements with other countries and asks the Senate for its approval. Before a treaty can go into effect, the Senate must ratify it, which means that 66 or more members of the Senate must vote for the treaty to go into effect.

**Dmitri Medvedev:** President of Russia

**Partisan:** A negative term referring to members of Congress sticking only to the views of their party and not willing to compromise.

**Bipartisan:** Supported by both parties in Congress, the Democrats and Republicans.

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Desmond Butler, writer for the associated press 7/23/2010,**

“US-Russia nuke treaty facing hurdles in US Senate”,

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwGbzbS9cELaiIfmBjxLP1o4G8-QD9H4KUL80>

WASHINGTON — The once smooth path for Senate ratification of a major nuclear arms control agreement with Russia is looking a little dicier. Conservatives opposing New START, a replacement for a Cold War-era treaty, are trying to make it an issue in November's congressional elections. While they are unlikely to kill the agreement, they could force Democrats to delay a ratification vote until after the election. That could be damaging to President Barack Obama. A narrow victory after a lengthy, contentious debate could destroy his hopes for achieving more ambitious goals, including further reductions of nuclear weapons and ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty. "A delayed ratification with a close vote would be a blow to U.S. leadership around the world," said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, a foundation that advocates a world free of nuclear weapons. "People would doubt the president's ability to negotiate other agreements." The administration still hopes to win approval for New START before the Senate begins its summer break in August. To do that would require the support of at least eight Republicans, along with all 57 Democratic and two independent senators to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority in the 100-member Senate. The administration is expressing confidence, but so far only one Republican senator, Richard Lugar of Indiana, has announced his support. Administration officials say they could wait until the "lame duck" session that takes place after November's election, but before new lawmakers are sworn in. The White House does not want to postpone a vote until next year because Republicans are expected to pick up seats in the election. Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START agreement in April. It would shrink the limit on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country, down about a third from the current ceiling of 2,200. It also would make changes in the old treaty's procedures that allow both countries to inspect each other's arsenals and verify compliance. An affiliate of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, has taken the lead in opposing the treaty. The Heritage Action for America, an advocacy group, has started a petition drive and may run political advertisements on the issue during the election season. It also is lobbying in the Senate. Though arms control is hardly a major issue in a campaign season dominated by economic worries, the divisive political environment makes it difficult for Republicans to buck the conservative mainstream and hand Obama a victory that might be considered his top foreign policy achievement.

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Jordan Fabian, Writer for the Hill, 7/23/10,**

“Kerry confident Senate will ratify START this year”, <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/110549-kerry-confident-senate-will-ratify-start-this-year>,

The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed confidence Friday that the upper chamber will ratify a key nuclear arms treaty with Russia before the year is up. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) acknowledged Republicans concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that the Obama administration hoped would pass quickly after it was signed three months ago. But Kerry assured that it would pass before the new year. In an interview with Bloomberg News to air this weekend, the Massachusetts senator was asked if the Senate could ratify the treaty before the November midterm elections. "I don't want to get into the odds-making on it," he replied. "What is important is the Senate will pass it." Pressed on whether the Senate would vote this year, Kerry replied, "I believe we will pass it this year."

**Global Security Newswire, 7/23/10,**

“Obama Jockeys for Republican Backing on "New START"”,  
[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20100723\\_8943.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100723_8943.php),

The Obama administration recently urged supportive U.S. lawmakers to back new missile defense assurances and billions of dollars in nuclear weapons complex funding to help lock down Republican support for a pact to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the New York Times reported yesterday (see GSN, July 23). U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April signed the "New START" pact, which would obligate both nations to cap their fielded strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads, down from the maximum of 2,200 allowed each country by 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The deal would also limit U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear delivery vehicles to 700, with another 100 platforms allowed in reserve. The pact has been submitted for ratification by the Senate and by Russia's legislature (see GSN, July 22). Ratification of the treaty in Washington would require 67 Senate votes, a number that must include no less than eight Republican endorsements in this Congress. Although enough GOP lawmakers are likely to back the treaty to secure its passage, discussion of the pact could become increasingly polarized with the approach of November's midterm election (Peter Baker, New York Times, July 22).

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Thom Shanker and Christopher Drew, writers for the international herald tribune, 7/24/10,**  
 “Pentagon faces rising pressure, political and economic, to trim budget”

With time running out for major votes before the November election in the United States, the White House is trying to reach an understanding with Senate Republicans to approve its new arms control treaty with Russia by committing to modernizing the nuclear arsenal and making additional guarantees about missile defense, Peter Baker reported from Washington. The White House has pressed allies in Congress in recent days to approve billions of dollars for the nation's current nuclear weapons and infrastructure even as administration and congressional officials work on a ratification resolution intended to reaffirm that the treaty will not stop U.S. missile defense plans. Approving a treaty requires a two-thirds vote, meaning that the president needs the support of at least eight Republicans. White House officials are optimistic that they can reach an agreement that will attract enough Republicans but are racing against the calendar because the closer it gets to the election, the more partisan the debate may become.

**Associated Press 7/23/10,**

“GOP opposes U.S.-Russia nuclear treaty”, <http://online.worldmag.com/2010/07/23/gop-opposes-u-s-russia-nuclear-treaty/>,

The administration still hopes to win approval for the program before the Senate begins its summer break in August. That would require the support of at least eight Republicans, along with all Democratic and two independent senators. So far only one Republican senator, Richard Lugar of Indiana, has shown support. White House officials do not want to postpone a vote until next year because Republicans are expected to pick up seats in the upcoming election. Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., and other GOP senators are holding out support over another issue: an insistence that the administration increase money available to maintain and improve existing nuclear warheads. The Obama administration appears willing to accommodate Republicans on that issue and has requested a 10 percent increase.

**Peter Baker, writer for the New York Times, 7/22/2010,**

“White House Presses Republicans on Arms Treaty”,

[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23start.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23start.html?_r=1),

The White House pressed allies in Congress in recent days to approve billions of dollars for the nation's current nuclear weapons and infrastructure even as administration and Congressional officials work on a ratification resolution intended to reaffirm that the treaty will not stop American missile defense plans. The effort to forge a genuine bipartisan coalition contrasts with most of President Obama's legislative drives in the past year because a treaty requires a two-thirds vote, meaning that the president needs at least eight Republicans. White House officials are optimistic that they can reach an agreement that will attract enough Republicans but are racing against the calendar because the closer it gets to the election, the more partisan the debate may become. At stake is perhaps Mr. Obama's most tangible foreign policy achievement, a treaty that bars the United States and Russia from deploying more than 1,550 strategic warheads and 700 launchers. If the president fails to get the New Start treaty ratified, it will undercut his effort to rebuild the relationship with Moscow and his broader arms control agenda.

## Uniqueness Evidence

### **Voice of Russia Newspapers 5/11/10**

[“U.S Congress to ratify START before beginning of August”, May 11,  
<http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/05/11/7637519.html> ]

Brookline expert has told the ITAR-TASS correspondent in New York that the U.S. Congress may ratify the Russian-American new START treaty before the start of August this year. This is a highly optimistic prediction. The U.S. Congress breaks up for the summer holiday on August 9th, leaving not a lot of time for pre-ratification debate, according to Mr. Paifer’s forecast. The START treaty is to be ratified first by three committees of the Congress—the Foreign Relations, Intelligence and Armed Forces committees, after which the treaty will be submitted to the full Senate for ratification. Stephen Paifer has rightly said that it will not amount to an extraordinary occurrence if the treaty is ratified before the end of the year, instead of before the start of August. There are even suggestions that the START treaty will go into force by next year, although it will not be the best option. Nobody can today say with any degree of certainty when American lawmakers will announce their verdict on the START agreement. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry has refused naming even an approximate date, but the oldest republican in the committee, Richard Lugar is hopeful that the U.S. Senate will ratify START treaty before the end of this year. The U.S. Senate has 100 members and 67 of them – that is two thirds must vote in favor of ratification for it to become law. The White House should now work hard to persuade the required numbers of senators to vote for ratification. The task is not easy, but the Obama administration has the necessary arguments to convince all the doubting Thomases to support ratification, and the treaty itself is an ally of the White House in this regard. It is balanced and takes into account the strategic interests of both countries. In addition, the START treaty will give a hefty push to the process of nuclear disarmament by encouraging other countries to join Russia and the U.S in the effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Presidents Medvedev and Obama have agreed on a simultaneous ratification. The agreement is supported by both the Russian public and the political elite, but Russian deputies will carefully scrutinize all the details of the treaty’s passage through Capitol Hill. The fate of START treaty is in the hands of U.S. lawmakers.

### **CNN 4/9/10**

[“U.S.-Russia arms treaty to face GOP scrutiny in Senate”,  
<http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/08/start.treaty.senate/index.html>]

A Senate GOP leadership aide told CNN that as long as the administration can satisfactorily answer questions about verification, missile defense and the modernization of the existing U.S. stockpile, Republicans will likely support the new treaty. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nevada, said Thursday that he is confident there will be enough votes for the treaty to pass. Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty must pass a two-thirds vote threshold. That means at least eight Republican senators must sign on to the ratification in addition to all 59 Democrats and independents in the Senate. "Strategic arms control treaties similar to this one have historically passed the Senate with strong bipartisan support, and I am confident that this agreement will receive the 67 votes from both sides of the aisle needed for passage," Reid said in a press release. "There is no need to play politics with something as important as this is to our national security." White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said he hopes Congress will ratify the treaty with a large bipartisan majority.

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Mimi Hall, writer for USA TODAY 6/23/10**

War in Senate brewing over U.S.- Russia arms deal”,

[http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-06-23-nuke-treaty\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-06-23-nuke-treaty_N.htm))

The White House views the treaty as a crucial step toward Obama's goal of stopping the global spread of nuclear weapons and an example that should be set by the two countries that hold 90% of the world's stockpile. The treaty demonstrates a commitment to non-proliferation, Rhodes says. If the Senate doesn't vote before the November elections and Obama's Democratic party loses control of the Senate, passage could get trickier. But most experts say the treaty likely will get through with 80 or more votes. "The American people want to see Congress accomplish something, and START is a made-to-order agreement," says Andy Johnson, head of the national security programs at the politically moderate think tank Third Way. "If the Republicans delay the process, they open themselves up to the charge of putting politics over national security."

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Desmond Butler, writer for the associated press 7/23/2010,**

“US-Russia nuke treaty facing hurdles in US Senate”,

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwGbzbS9cELaiIfmBjxLP1o4G8-QD9H4KUL80>

Tom Daschle, a former Democratic Senate Majority leader, who supports the treaty, says Heritage's influence may explain why so many Republicans have been reticent about taking a stand. "It is certainly serious enough to silence some Republican senators," he said. He added that he expected enough Republicans eventually would come around for passage. Heritage won some prominent support when a likely GOP presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, announced opposition to the treaty in a newspaper column this month. Some Republicans say that U.S. negotiators made too many concessions and that the treaty does not establish adequate procedures for making sure the two sides abide by its terms. They also fear that Russia could use the treaty to limit U.S. missile defense plans. Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona and other Republicans are holding out support over another issue, insisting that the administration increase money available to maintain and improve existing nuclear warheads. The administration appears willing to accommodate Republicans on that issue and has requested a 10 percent increase. It has rejected criticism of the treaty, however, and has tried to win over Republicans by citing the support of some of the party's foreign policy luminaries, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz and former President George W. Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley. The administration says that Russia has strong incentives to abide by the treaty because the U.S. arsenal is technologically superior and the costs of maintaining large stockpiles is harder for Russia to bear. The defeat of the treaty would damage Obama's efforts to repair U.S.-Russian relations and to rally international cooperation on eliminating nuclear weapons. Administration officials say that Republicans will ultimately come around because rejecting the treaty would leave the two countries dangerously uncertain about each other's arsenals. The authority to conduct inspections expired with the old START treaty last year. "There is a simple question to ask: What is this and what if we don't have the treaty?" said Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher, the State Department's top arms control official. "I think that the risk of not having this is significant."

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Jacob Heilbrunn, senior editor at the National Interest 7/12/2010,**

“The New START treaty deserves to be ratified”, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/12/opinion/la-oe-heilbrunn-start-20100712>

President Obama signed a nuclear arms control agreement — the New START treaty — with Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in Prague in April to much fanfare. Senate hearings on the treaty are taking place. But in a reprise of Cold War debates, hard-liners are seeking to block Senate ratification of the treaty, where it needs a two-thirds majority, by depicting the deal as a dangerous sellout to Moscow. The treaty, deserves careful scrutiny, but **it** is in danger of becoming the victim of a hazing campaign. The Heritage Foundation announces on its website that it "has been leading the charge against New START treaty, as we do with all threats to American sovereignty and independence. And our message is getting through to our target audience in Congress." Indeed it is. Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) is citing the foundation's studies. Other Republican senators expressing doubts include Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, James M. Inhofe of Oklahoma and Jim DeMint of South Carolina. The most inflammatory attack, however, has come from former presidential candidate Mitt Romney. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, he claimed the treaty represented Obama's "worst foreign policy mistake yet." It's not a mistake. The treaty would not eviscerate American national security. It would enhance it, which is why it enjoys the bipartisan support of the Foreign Relations Committee leaders, Sens. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana. It's also why GOP foreign policy eminences such as Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz and Richard Burt endorse the treaty. By capping each side's deployed warheads at 1,550, the New START treaty would cut Russia's and America's arsenals by about 30%. It would also restore verification procedures that lapsed with the expiration of the START I treaty. Each Russian missile would be given a unique serial number, and onsite inspections would take place. Tracking nuclear weapons and materials safeguards U.S. security. And the more concerned conservatives are about Russian intentions, the more they should welcome the verification procedures contained in the New START treaty.

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Peter Baker, writer for the New York Times 7/22/10,**  
“White House Presses Republicans on Arms Treaty”,  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23start.html?\\_r=1,](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/us/politics/23start.html?_r=1)

The critical player is Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, the Republican whip, who has criticized the treaty but also signaled that his reservations could be assuaged. In particular, he has sought to modernize the nuclear force, and the administration has proposed spending more than \$100 billion over 10 years to sustain and modernize some strategic systems. “I’ve told the administration it would be much easier to do the treaty right than to do it fast if they want to get it ratified,” Mr. Kyl said Thursday in an interview. “It’s not a matter of delay,” he added, but “until I’m satisfied about some of these things, I will not be willing to allow the treaty to come up.” Mr. Kyl sounded hopeful that he could reach agreement, ticking off three ways the White House could assure him that the proposed nuclear modernization program would be adequate: ensure enough first-year money in the next round of appropriations bills, include enough second-year money in a follow-up budget proposal and revise the long-range modernization plan to anticipate additional costs in later years. “I’m not questioning the administration’s commitment to this,” he said, “but this is a big deal, and it needs to have everybody’s commitment to it at takeoff, and I really don’t see that the groundwork has really been laid.” Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has met with Mr. Kyl once and invited him and other senators to talk about the treaty again next week. Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has likewise been talking with Mr. Kyl regularly and is trying to help resolve Republican demands to inspect at least some of the secret negotiating record. “If they get Kyl, it’s over,” said Samuel Charap, an analyst at the Center for American Progress, a research organization close to Mr. Obama. “He carries a lot of weight, and he has made himself such a hard get that if they get him, it will be a big deal. But the question is, are they willing to pay the price he’s asking in light of what they want to do in the future?” So far, administration officials say they are willing to pay that price because they are also committed to modernization. With Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, the Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking Republican, already supporting the treaty, Democrats hope they can win the votes of other Republicans on the committee like Senators Bob Corker of Tennessee and Johnny Isakson of Georgia. “We certainly would like to support Start,” Mr. Corker said in an interview. “The crux of what’s happening right now for folks like me that would like to support the Start treaty is really ensuring that we have an appropriate and thoughtful modernization program.” While he said the current plan was still too vague, he added, “I really think there’s a good opportunity to have a good outcome here.”

## Link Evidence

### **Justin Logan, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO, 3/23/2010**

“The Domestic Bases of America's Grand Strategy,”

[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11606](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11606)

John J. Mearsheimer, an influential security studies scholar, assessed the president's decision-making process involving the Afghanistan "surge" this way: In Afghanistan, as in Vietnam, it simply does not matter whether the United States wins or loses. It makes no sense for the Obama administration to expend more blood and treasure to vanquish the Taliban. The United States should accept defeat and immediately begin to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Of course, President Obama will never do such a thing. Instead, he will increase the American commitment to Afghanistan, just as Lyndon Johnson did in Vietnam in 1965. The driving force in both cases is domestic politics. (Emphasis added.) Or take, as another example, the striking explanation offered in 2009 by Leslie Gelb, the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, describing why he supported the invasion of Iraq: My initial support for the war was symptomatic of unfortunate tendencies within the foreign policy community, namely the disposition and incentives to support wars to retain political and professional credibility. (Emphasis added.) At the time of Gelb's initial support for the Iraq war, he was president of the Council on Foreign Relations — a position that, in theory, should allow the person who holds it to establish conventional wisdom, or at least offer him or her the luxury of not following it. If anyone should be immune from domestic political pressure, after all, it should be the president of CFR. And yet even as powerful and influential a policy maven as Gelb reports having felt the pull of "incentives" that induced him to "support wars to retain political and professional credibility."

### **Sergey Rogov, director of the Russian Academy of Science US and Canada Institute, January 2010,**

“Russian pundit views Obama's first year, prospects for relations with USA,” p. Lexis

The domestic political situation in the United States has now changed considerably. The ratification of the START treaty requires not a simple majority of votes in the Senate, but a qualified majority - 67 out of 100 votes. The Democrats do not have that number. In December last year all 40 Republican senators and the independent Senator Joseph Lieberman sent Obama a letter stipulating requirements for the new treaty that would make it unacceptable to us. Therefore, at the moment, any talk of how ratification must take place in Russia and the United States simultaneously seems purely theoretical. If Obama had the political capital, then of course the White House could push this agreement through. However, he has well and truly squandered that capital recently. Nevertheless, one year is not long enough to draw conclusions about a presidency. Remember the first years of John Kennedy or Ronald Reagan. They did not achieve any particular successes in that time. It is now possible to conclude that 2010 will be decisive for Obama. If he is able to seize the initiative, then the implementation of his ambitious program both within the country and in the international arena will become a reality. Maybe the "reset" will change from a mere declaration into a real, mutually beneficial partnership between Russia and the United States. I am convinced that only Russian-American agreements on START and other key issues can create a basis for ensuring international security in the multipolar world. This process will become multilateral; Europe, China, India, and other centers of power will take part. That cannot happen without collaboration between Russia and the United States.

## Link Evidence

**Sergey Rogov, Director of the Russian academy of Science's US and Canada Institute, 4/9/10**  
"Russian pundit questions outlook for US ratification of new arms cuts deal,"

However, Obama will have to obtain the ratification of the treaty by the Senate this year, Rogov said. "Obama will need to use up **all his political capital** in order to obtain the treaty's ratification this year. Why does it have to be this year? There will be mid-term Congress elections in November and one-third of Senators are to be elected. It appears that the Republicans will win back five or six seats. It is even possible that they will win back the majority and in this case Obama will need not eight Republican votes but 13 or 15 or even more," he added. "Taking into account the fact that radical right-wing extremist ideas have become popular in the Republican Party, the new Republican Senators will be even more conservative," the expert said. Nevertheless, he did add that the incumbent American administration has "good connections in the Senate".

**Travis Sharp, military policy analyst at center for arms control and non-proliferation 8/28/09**  
"Local priorities vs. national interests in arms control," 8/28, <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/local-priorities-vs-national-interests-arms-control>)

As such, the Senate could become a stumbling block in President Barack Obama's plans to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal and strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. While past treaties such as START I and SORT were approved overwhelmingly by the Senate, those agreements didn't alter the triad's fundamental configuration. Warheads and delivery vehicles were retired, but the constellation of bases and supporting defense contractors, though reduced, remained in place. The force posture being considered by the Obama administration, however, challenges the long-standing status quo and therefore, threatens the local interests of many senators. With a two-thirds Senate majority of 67 votes needed for approval, treaties in the 111th Congress must not only attract support from all 60 caucusing Democratic senators, they must also win affirmation from at least seven Republicans. Based on the guidelines laid out by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the upcoming START follow-on shouldn't be hindered by the 67-vote threshold. But what happens after the next round of negotiations, when warhead numbers will really begin to be lowered? Pushing deeper nuclear reductions through the Senate will be extraordinarily difficult and will require a Herculean political effort from the White House.

## Link Evidence

### **Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown, Mar/Apr 2010**

[“Enemies Into Friends”, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2010, Vol. 89, Issue 2]

IF THE Obama administration's tentative engagement with the United States' rivals is to be more than a passing flirtation, Washington will have to conduct not only deft statecraft abroad but also particularly savvy politics at home. Progress will be slow and incremental; it takes years, if not decades, to turn enmity into amity. The problem for Obama is that patience is in extraordinarily short supply in Washington. With midterm elections looming in November, critics will surely intensify their claims that Obama's outreach has yet to pay off. In preparation, Obama should push particularly hard on a single front, aiming to have at least one clear example that his strategy is working. Rapprochement with Russia arguably offers the best prospects for near-term success. Washington and Moscow are well on their way toward closing a deal on arms control, and their interests intersect on a number of other important issues, including the need for stability in Central and South Asia. Moreover, the United States can piggyback on the progress that the European Union has already made in reaching out to Russia on issues of trade, energy, and security. Obama also needs to start laying the groundwork for congressional support. To help clear the legislative hurdles ahead, Obama should consider including in his stable of special envoys a prominent Republican--such as former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Senator Chuck Hagel, or former Secretary of State James Baker--to lend a bipartisan imprimatur to any proposed deals that might come before Congress. He must also be careful not to overreach. For example, his call to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether, however laudable in theory, may scare off centrist senators who might otherwise be prepared to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Obama should also be mindful of the order in which he picks his fights. If advancing rapprochement with Russia is a priority for 2010, it makes sense to put off heavy lifting with Cuba until the following year. It is better to shepherd a few key items through Congress than to ask for too much--and risk coming back empty-handed.

### **Justin Logan, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at CATO, 3/23/2010**

“The Domestic Bases of America's Grand Strategy,”

[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11606](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11606)

Grand strategy happens to be one of the areas in which the academy has been producing work that could be helpful to the FPE. However, because the debate over grand strategy in the academy is free from the domestic political forces exerting themselves on the FPE, some of the options currently being seriously discussed are political non-starters in Washington. For instance, one of the main competitors in the academic debate on the subject has been "restraint," a strategy formally proposed in 1997 but whose current leading exponent is Barry Posen of MIT. Posen describes restraint as a strategy in which Washington would "conceive its security interests narrowly, use its military power stingily, pursue its enemies quietly but persistently, share responsibilities and costs more equitably, watch and wait more patiently." It is difficult to describe an approach that resembles actual American strategy less than this one. The reason for this is the role of domestic politics in U.S. grand strategy. Washington is on strategic auto-pilot, and it has been for some time. Serious changes to grand strategy will require either dramatic changes in U.S. domestic politics, or the rise of an external challenge that forces the FPE to think much more carefully about the formation and execution of U.S. grand strategy.

## Link Evidence

### **Xinhua News 6/27/10**

“US Republicans blast Obama’s withdrawal date”, 6/27/10,  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/28/c\\_13372358.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/28/c_13372358.htm)

U.S. ranking Senate Republicans on Sunday blasted President Barack Obama's Afghanistan strategy, dismissing the July 2011 deadline as a "political decision" not based on military strategy. "It was purely a political decision, not one based on facts on the ground, not one based on military strategy," Republican Senator John McCain said on NBC's "Meet the Press," referring to a strategy unveiled by President Obama in December, which called for a buildup of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan and beginning pulling out in July 2011. "You tell the enemy you're leaving, they will wait," he said. "In wars you declare when you're leaving after you've succeeded."

### **Gwynne Dyer, London-based independent journalist, 6/29/10**

"Between the Lines: The Fall of Stanley McChrystal"  
<http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=11983>)

No matter who is running Afghanistan two or three years later—and it won't necessarily be the Taliban—it's highly unlikely that hordes of Afghans would "follow the Americans home" and blow them up. If Obama and friends understand this, then they will have realized that the best way to end the Afghan war is simply (as they used to say about Vietnam) to "declare a victory and leave." But they cannot say this out loud in the United States, where most of the population believes the mantra that says the "war on terror" must be won in the hills of Afghanistan. It would take more time and political capital than Obama has to persuade the American public that this is arrant nonsense (though it is). So if he really wants to extract American troops from an unwinnable and unnecessary war, then he is condemned to do so by subterfuge. He must engineer an apparent but temporary military success in Afghanistan, do a quick hand-over to Karzai & Co., and get out while the going's good. Obama's best hope of creating an apparent military success is to announce the withdrawal of U.S. troops in the near future. If the Taliban understand his implicit message to them, they will let him have a temporary "victory" in order to get him out. But if that's what Obama's up to, then it's understandable that General McChrystal was deeply frustrated (though that doesn't excuse his behavior). General Petraeus will be equally frustrated.

## Link Evidence

### **Nikolai Sokov, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2009**

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4

[http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\\_german\\_leadership/german\\_leadership\\_6\\_issue\\_4.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf)]

If some in the Obama administration support withdrawal of the weapons once the arms control agenda allows the issue to come forward, some politically powerful figures outside the administration are taking the opposite point of view. The bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture in its report referenced above stressed the value of “extended deterrence” and said that this mission could force the United States to retain weapons it does not need for its own security. The report gave considerable weight to the opinion of those allies in Europe who consider these weapons essential to prevent coercion by Russia and Iran. It should be noted that recent studies and interviews with representatives of these countries challenge the accuracy of this representation of their countries’ views by the commission. <sup>35</sup> The strong emphasis on the argument that some European countries are staunchly opposed to the withdrawal of TNW is widely attributed to commission co-chairman James Schlesinger, who has been championing this theme of late.<sup>36</sup> Still, the political salience of this message, particularly among congressional Republicans is undeniable.

### **Nikolai Sokov, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2009**

Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4

[http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\\_german\\_leadership/german\\_leadership\\_6\\_issue\\_4.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf)]

The U.S. public is also likely to be divided on the issue. Indeed, a recent public opinion poll indicates that Obama’s call for eliminating nuclear weapons has been greeted skeptically by the American public; on the other hand, keeping nuclear weapons away from terrorists registers as a top security concern.<sup>37</sup> Thus, when the issue becomes ripe for decision, it is likely to provoke considerable controversy in Washington. Given such political constraints, it is likely that the Obama administration will not want to act unilaterally, but rather will seek to take action in the context of the upcoming decisions on a new NATO Strategic Concept—the first such document in a decade. Indeed, NATO has been preparing for this task for some time having authorized in 2007 an internal review of nuclear deterrence requirements for the twenty-first century.<sup>38</sup> Working through this process would allow the United States and selected other allies (most likely the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent France) to find means for reassuring the most concerned states that their Article V protections will remain intact without the forward deployment of TNW. Some European sources indicate that the United Kingdom in fact has been pushing for such discussions to take place, but has been held back by Germany, which wants to postpone any discussion until after its September 2009 national elections.

## Link Evidence

**Youkyung Lee and Carin Zissis, Researchers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 2008**

“U.S-South Korea Alliance”

[www.cfr.org/publication/11459/ussouth\\_korea\\_alliance.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11459/ussouth_korea_alliance.html)

The rearrangement of the U.S.-South Korea military alliance has represented a hot domestic political issue in South Korea since the negotiation of command structural began. Citing concerns about Seoul’s defense preparedness, some conservative sectors in Korea insist on renegotiating the year of the transfer. The rise of South Korea’s defense budget from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2007 to 3.2 percent in 2008, and the costs of relocating U.S. troops out of the Yongsan garrison in Seoul, also faced criticism. Others were suspicious of the U.S. military presence and remembered the 2002 killings of two South Korean teenagers who were accidentally struck by a USFK armored vehicle, an incident which sparked widespread street protest.

**Lilly J. Goren, assistant professor of political science at Carroll University in Waukesha and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Assistant Professor of Modern Canadian History at St. Jerome's University, Ontario, 2000**

“Comparative Politics of Military Base Closures.”, Canadian-American Public Policy)

In democracies, domestic military base closures are seldom easy decisions for governments to make or implement. "There is a profound difference between extending benefits to large numbers of people and taking benefits away," political scientist Paul Pierson has explained. "The politics of retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains."(1) It has always been more politically saleable for representative governments to distribute goods rather than to "de-distribute" them.(2) Domestic military bases in the United States and in Canada are prime examples of both sides of this coin. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, both the United States and Canada have faced a number of expected difficulties in their respective efforts to consolidate and modernize their domestic basing situations. Although the militaries in both countries want elected representatives to consent to the closure of surplus military bases, significant roadblocks have surfaced. The number of bases in the United States dwarfs the relatively smaller number in Canada. While the U.S. had 312 major bases in 1988, Canada had just 35 in the same year, or roughly a 10:1 ratio. Still, the relatively large size of extraneous infrastructure costs represented a significant portion of military expenditures in both nations. Furthermore, any base closing will obviously affect the surrounding community, area or region. In political terms, then, the issue has been salient both above and below the forty-ninth parallel despite the obviously disparity in the size of the U.S. and Canadian military establishments.

## Link Evidence

### **Satoshi Ogawa, Washington correspondent, Yoshikazu Shirakawa and Hideki Kawasaki, Staff Writers, November 8, 2009**

“U.S. Senate move threat to realignment; Attempt to slash budget seen by some as warning to Hatoyama over Futenma”

Some U.S. lawmakers oppose the relocation plan, apparently reflecting the opinion of the U.S. Marine Corps that such a move would weaken deterrence against China. Observers also point out that lawmakers are displeased that the United States will have to shoulder a huge financial burden for the relocation project, which is meant to ease Japan's burden. The United States is supposed to pay 4.18 billion dollars for the relocation, while Japan would shoulder 6.09 billion dollars. The U.S. administration has tried to persuade the military and Congress, explaining the dangers presented by the Futenma station, which is in downtown Ginowan.

### **The Mainichi Daily News, 6/23/10**

**[“U.S. Lawmakers Submit Resolution to Express Gratitude to Okinawa”, The Mainichi Daily News, June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2010,**

**<http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100623p2g00m0in032000c.html>,**

A group of bipartisan lawmakers submitted a resolution Tuesday to the U.S. House of Representatives to express gratitude to the Japanese people, especially to the people of Okinawa, for hosting the U.S. military. The House could take a vote on the resolution on Wednesday, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty entering into force, parliamentary sources said. The draft resolution says the "robust forward presence" of the U.S. military in Japan "provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of Asia-Pacific peace, prosperity and regional stability." The resolution "recognizes that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the stationing" of the U.S. military in Japan and "expresses its appreciation to the people of Japan, and especially on Okinawa, for their continued hosting" of the U.S. armed forces, it says. The text also touched on a joint statement released by the Japanese and U.S. governments in May that reconfirmed their commitment to a 2006 bilateral accord on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, which includes a plan to relocate the U.S. Marines Corps' Futenma base within Okinawa.

## Impact Evidence

### **RiaNovosti 5/14/2010**

[“Russia, U.S. say new START treaty marks end of 'Cold War’”, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20100514/159012782.html>]

The new strategic arms reduction treaty marks the official end of the "Cold War" and must be ratified as soon as possible, Russia and the United States have announced in a joint statement. "The Treaty ushers in the transition to a higher level of cooperation between Russia and the U.S. with respect to disarmament and non-proliferation" the statement said on Thursday. "It lays the foundation for qualitatively new bilateral relations in the strategic military field and, in effect, marks the final end of the "Cold War" period." The new START treaty, signed on April 8 in Prague, replaced the 1991 pact that expired in December 2009. The document stipulates that the number of nuclear warheads be reduced to 1,550 on each side over seven years, while the number of delivery vehicles, both deployed and non-deployed, must not exceed 800. The statement talked of increased security and improved relations between the two powers. "We believe that the newly agreed reductions in strategic offensive armaments will strengthen the security of both Russia and the U.S. and will make relations between our countries more stable, transparent, and predictable," the statement said. "The Treaty, therefore, is not only in the interests of our two countries, but of the entire world community. Everyone will win as a result of its implementation." U.S. President Barack Obama informed his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev earlier on Thursday that the treaty had been forwarded for ratification to the U.S. Senate. The Kremlin immediately confirmed it was ready for simultaneous ratification. The pact must be ratified by both houses of the Russian parliament and by the U.S. Senate to come into force.

### **Jeffrey Tayler, contributing editor for The Atlantic, November, 2008**

“Medvedev Spoils the Party”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200811u/medvedev-obama>)

Like it or not, the United States cannot solve crucial global problems without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth; possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence in Iran and North Korea, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationship—a strategic partnership, even—regardless of its feelings about the current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing “full-spectrum dominance.” Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to worries about resource depletion, environmental degradation, and global warming – the greatest challenges facing humanity. No country can confront these problems alone. For the United States, Russia may just prove the “indispensable nation” with which to face a volatile future arm in arm.

## Impact Evidence

**James Collins, Ambassador to Russia from 1997 – 2001, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recipient of the Secretary of State's Award for Distinguished Service, 2/16/2010.**

“START is key to reducing the nuclear threat,”

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=30993>)

Two decades after the end of the Cold War, Americans and Russians are increasingly intertwined in global financial and energy markets, and we share immediate and vital national security interests in preventing terrorism, state failure and drug trafficking throughout the Eurasian region. Yet our communication on security issues has been in dangerous decline for the past decade. In a sense, this should come as no surprise, since the most recent comprehensive U.S.-Russian security treaty was actually signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. Any “reset” that puts U.S.-Russian relations on a more productive footing will depend first and foremost on forging a durable bilateral agreement to replace START. Arms control is not in itself a solution to U.S.-Russian tensions, or a guarantee of security from the nuclear terror threat, but if history is any guide, it is where we must begin.

**Jacob Heilbrunn, senior editor at the National Interest 7/12/2010,**

“The New START treaty deserves to be ratified”, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/12/opinion/la-oe-heilbrunn-start-20100712>

And so it goes with other objections relating to bombers, multiple warheads and other details, where these opponents contort the text and the weapons totals in order to reach the most alarming conclusions. Just about the only thing the critics aren't accusing Obama of is handing over his nuclear briefcase to the Kremlin. What's at the bottom of conservative objections has far less to do with the New START treaty's provisions than its spirit. Writing in the Wall Street Journal on Thursday, Kyl made it clear he finds the idea of a nuclear-free world abhorrent. He warns that Obama will not spend enough to modernize America's nuclear force. Kyl and his brethren are living in the past. Russia is no longer an implacable Cold War foe, although treating it as one could reverse that. In furthering arms reductions, Obama is wisely improving relations with Russia and helping to fulfill Reagan's vision of a nuclear-free world, a goal shared by Kissinger and Shultz who advocate a move toward "global zero." Instead of dithering over the New START treaty, the Senate should approve it this fall.

## Impact Evidence

**Victor Israelyan, former ambassador to the USA from the USSR, 1993.**  
Russia and America, page 5

What are the prospects for the different approaches to Russian-American relations within Russia's social circles and corridors of power? What would be the effect on the United States and Russia, as well as the rest of the world, of each of these approaches? It is probably easier to answer these questions by referring to the approach of opposition to and confrontation with the United States. The whole sorry history of Soviet-American relations during the Cold War provides ample evidence of what leads to. The confrontation of the two superpowers created a permanent threat to all mankind. Returning to it under the new conditions, which find Russia (as distinct from the Soviet Union) without military or economic---to say nothing of political---parity with the United States, promises Russia no gain. Use of the only trump card which Russia retains---the nuclear arsenal that exists---would mean suicide. Attempts to resurrect the image of the United States as enemy, saddling Russian foreign policy with Cold War stereotypes, would be marked adventurism.

## Impact Evidence

**James Collins, Ambassador to Russia from 1997 – 2001, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recipient of the Secretary of State's Award for Distinguished Service, 2/16/2010.**

“START is key to reducing the nuclear threat,”

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=30993>)

But arguments from both hawks and doves have missed an urgent point: that without a new treaty, Washington will be unable to manage the risks associated with Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, which still poses the single greatest existential threat to the United States. With around 4,000 deployed nuclear warheads, a staggering 1,000 tons of weapons-grade nuclear material, hundreds of deployed ballistic missiles and thousands of experts with the knowledge to construct such systems from scratch, Russia is still potentially the world’s nuclear supermarket. Agreements governing these arsenals are essential to preventing the many national security nightmares of nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups from becoming realities. To protect America, we must agree to, and verify, limits on what the Russians have, know how they are using it, and take adequate steps to ensure that devastating weapons and dangerous materials remain safe from terrorist theft.

**Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/2004**

(Al-Ahram Online. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm> |

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## Impact Evidence

**James Collins, Ambassador to Russia from 1997 – 2001, Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recipient of the Secretary of State's Award for Distinguished Service, 2/16/2010.**

“START is key to reducing the nuclear threat,”

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=30993>)

As of Dec. 5, 2009, when the 1991 START agreement expired, we lack any enforceable, verifiable treaty to provide that level of information. We need a new treaty in force not only to plug holes left gaping by the old treaty's expiration, but also to increase our security by imposing further limits on what new nuclear weapons the Russians can develop and deploy. A successor to START would likely lower the maximum number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads allowed to between 1,500 and 1,675 on each side — still enough to destroy the world many times over, but far below the 6,000 allowed under the old treaty. Strategic delivery vehicles — missiles, bombers and nuclear missile submarines — will be further cut from 1,600 to around 800. Reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal and taking missile launchers in both countries off alert reduces the likelihood of accidental nuclear war, keeping Americans safer.

### **PR Newswire, 4/29/98**

Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, “NEJM Study Warns of Increasing Risk of Accidental Nuclear Attack

An ‘accidental’ nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many “war games” it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an “accidental” launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

**START DA Aff (set)**

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Taylor Rushing, writer for the Hill, 7/2/2010,**

“Russian spy ring may be last straw for Obama nuclear arms treaty”,

<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/106903-russian-spy-ring-may-be-last-straw-for-obama-nuke-treaty>”

The White House was hoping that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed three months ago by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, would move quickly through the Senate. But now it may not get a vote on the floor until after the November elections. The pact to reduce warheads, missiles and launchers in both countries could be cleared by the Foreign Relations Committee this month, but that timetable could also be pushed back. While a simple majority is enough to pass it through the panel, the full Senate will need 67 votes for ratification. The House does not vote on treaties. Given the partisanship of the upper chamber and the midterm elections four months away, there is little chance of securing the vote of every Senate Democrat and the backing of least eight Republicans anytime soon.

**Desmond Butler, Associated Press, 7/23/10,**

<http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iwGbzbS9cELaiIfmBjxLP1o4G8-QD9H4KUL80>

The once smooth path for Senate ratification of a major nuclear arms control agreement with Russia is looking a little dicier. Conservatives opposing New START, a replacement for a Cold War-era treaty, are trying to make it an issue in November's congressional elections. While they are unlikely to kill the agreement, they could force Democrats to delay a ratification vote until after the election. That could be damaging to President Barack Obama. A narrow victory after a lengthy, contentious debate could destroy his hopes for achieving more ambitious goals, including further reductions of nuclear weapons and ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty.

## Uniqueness Evidence

**Taylor Rushing, writer for the Hill, 7/2/2010,**

“Russian spy ring may be last straw for Obama nuclear arms treaty”,

<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/106903-russian-spy-ring-may-be-last-straw-for-obama-nuke-treaty>”

This week’s arrest of 11 alleged Russian spies in the U.S. has made the passage of the treaty an even steeper uphill climb. According to court documents, two of the alleged Russian agents were asked by Moscow to collect information about the treaty. Much of the push-and-pull in the Senate on START has centered on a struggle between Kerry and GOP Whip Jon Kyl (Ariz.), a skeptic of the treaty. Kyl has cited missile defense issues when expressing opposition to START. Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) said the treaty “is not likely to come up before October” and perhaps not until after the election. He said there has been no Democratic whipping so far, but acknowledged the treaty will be a challenge to ratify. “Kyl is leading the charge against it,” Durbin said. If the treaty does not get approved this year, it would be a major setback for Obama, who has stressed the need to reduce arms while maintaining a strong U.S. defense. Obama’s work on the arms treaty was cited as one of the reasons the president was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.

The last START treaty ended in December, and although both countries have agreed to observe its terms, actual verification has ended. Proponents use that to bolster the case for ratification, as well as the damaging message that would be sent around the world by Senate failure to ratify the treaty. Republicans seem to be following Kyl’s lead more than Lugar’s. The Senate GOP whip emphasizes that he has not ruled out voting for the treaty. “We’ve just barely begun that process,” Kyl said. “There are a whole series of things that I’m going to be looking for to demonstrate the administration’s ability to begin carrying a robust modernization before I think it’s wise to take up the START treaty.” Lugar called the treaty “critically important.” He also said the treaty was “modest” in the number of warheads it would reduce on both sides. “Having spent 19 years of my life attempting to work with Russians to take warheads off missiles and destroy missiles, it’s critical to have American and Russian contractors working together eyeball to eyeball with boots on the ground,” Lugar said. “It was a real blow that we came to the end in December and there was no treaty. Now we have an opportunity to renew that and set the stage in our relations with Russia for a longer-term treaty.” Kerry said the White House has been very supportive, with Vice President Joe Biden — Kerry’s predecessor as Foreign Relations chairman — taking a leading role along with others such as Gates. Democrats also appear likely to have the support of their more conservative members, such as Evan Bayh of Indiana and Ben Nelson of Nebraska; both say they are likely yes votes. However, Nelson isn’t optimistic about the treaty’s chances, suggesting that Republicans seem more interested in politics than answering their concerns. “Most of the criticism that’s being registered against it right now was — oddly enough — was not registered against previous treaties,” Nelson said. “Why? The conclusion is that it may not pass. If they’re using these arguments today to be against this treaty, and they didn’t raise them back then, and that’s going to be the basis for voting against it, there may not be enough votes.”

## Uniqueness Evidence

### **Christian Science Monitor, 7/23/10**

The White House will be scrambling in the coming weeks to answer the objections and questions of key Republican senators to aspects of a new arms control treaty with Russia. President Obama would like to see the treaty ratified by the end of the year. But with the November midterm elections fast approaching, and with some Republican voices calling for no significant legislation to be considered in a post-election lame-duck session, prospects for what is widely considered to be President Obama's most significant foreign-policy achievement to date may be wilting with every passing hot Washington summer day. Democrats, many nonproliferation advocates, and some of Washington's NATO allies are pushing for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START. They warn that allowing it to languish jeopardizes the vaunted "reset" of US-Russia relations. Beyond that, they see President Obama's vision for arms reduction hanging in the balance. But several influential Republican senators, including Jon Kyl of Arizona and John Thune of South Dakota, are pressing for reassurances on the treaty's provisions. They are also using the debate over ratification to elicit administration commitments on related arms issues, such as the modernization of the nation's nuclear weapons complex and missile defense. Skeptical Republicans would also like some guarantees that subsequent arms negotiations with Russia will address tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia maintains a significant advantage. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to vote on the treaty before the August recess. Passage there is not in doubt, however, especially since the ranking member, Richard Lugar (R) of Indiana, has already announced his support. But full Senate ratification requires a two-thirds vote, or 67 senators – which explains the White House clamber to address Republican concerns.

## Uniqueness Evidence

### **Mike Memoli, The Chicago Tribune, 8/5/2010**

[http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2010/08/mcconnell\\_hopes\\_obama\\_becomes.html](http://www.swamppolitics.com/news/politics/blog/2010/08/mcconnell_hopes_obama_becomes.html)

For the first time in 18 months, President Obama sat down for a one-on-one meeting with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell yesterday. The White House had said the meeting would focus on the president's frustration with the Senate GOP over his judicial nominations and executive appointments. Speaking with reporters this morning at a breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor, McConnell said he viewed the meeting instead as the president acknowledging his diminished political capital. "When he began this term he was sitting on a 70 percent approval rating, he had a 40-seat majority in the house on the way to getting 60 in the Senate. He didn't feel like he needed us," McConnell said. "Most people feel there's going to be a mid-course correction. The president's a very smart guy and I think he figures he'll be seeing a lot more of me in the future. I enjoyed our discussion and I look forward to seeing more of him."

### **Scott Horsley, NPR, 8/6/2010,**

“Job Report Taxes Obama’s Political Capital” <http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/08/06/jobs-report-taxes-obamas-political-capital/>

The anemic economic recovery is taking a political toll on the president, amplifying his other challenges. Dennis Jacobo of Gallup, which regularly polls Americans about both the economy and politics, says consumer confidence and spending have been in a slump since spring -- around the time of the European debt crisis. And the president's approval rating is just 45 percent. "Obviously, given the lack of progress in the economy and the soft patch now and our measures that show the economy is the major concern of most Americans, that's not unexpected," Jacobo says.

## No Internal Link Evidence

### **K. E. White, Proliferation Press, 4/7/2010**

“Will Obama’s START Treaty Pass the Senate?” <http://proliferationpress.com/2010/04/07/blog-on-blog-can-obamas-start-pass-the-senate>

But will partisan interests be the dominant ratification factor? Three reasons why not: First, I think it’s unlikely the 2010 midterms will be dominated by this foreign policy question. If anything, Afghanistan may be the foreign policy weakness dominating the air-waves—a topic unlikely to help either side. Second, domestic issues dominate the 2010 landscape. Why would Republicans throw out a messaging campaign that works (jobs, debt and incumbent dissatisfaction) by getting into the wonky world of non-proliferation—especially when both the NPR and New Start Treaty preserve America’s nuclear deterrent? And finally, fighting the treaty may not deliver Republicans the victory they want. Instead of having air-time devoted to a fight over a judicial nomination or spending disagreements, they will allow Obama to play up his role as Commander-in-Chief. So not only do they risk they will lose, they haven’t necessarily blocked Obama either: he can always go the executive agreement route and get by with 60 votes and a House majority. In sum, I think Sharp’s first factor remains the most important. First, do Senators make this a priority-one issue to fight or support. (My guess: even Obama’s opponents would rather stroke healthcare and debt fears). Second, is what they are told make the treaty look radical or modest. It seems most observers, with some exceptions, consider the NPR and New START a modest step. Result: I think it’s very likely Republican won’t push back too hard, and save their powder for fights down the road where 1) they have more political influence and 2) are combating a more substantial—and controversial—proposal.

### **Ari Melber, staff writer and political science bachelor, 11/08**

<http://www.thenation.com/blogs/notion/382337>

Because now, Obama's team wants everyone to know. The massive list of energized activists is the biggest stick Obama will carry in Washington. It enables direct communication at a remarkable scale. The next President can instantly address 16 percent of his national supporters, based on the popular vote. To put it another way, the list dwarfs the audience of all the nightly cable news shows combined. So even after the gauzy honeymoon talk fades, when people start second-guessing how much "political capital" Obama really has, there will be this resilient network of people committed to enacting the Obama agenda. In a policy fight with Congress -- or a message battle with the press -- these are the people that will take action to get Obama's back. They will call their neighbors, or their members of Congress. They'll knock on doors, or storm local meetings. They'll write letters to the editor or, naturally, email and prod their networks. They can also hold Obama accountable, of course, by using the same networked technology to pressure the new administration. Peter Daou, a web strategist and former adviser to Hillary Clinton's campaign, raised that prospect in the article

## Link Turn Evidence

### **Christopher Preble, Director Foreign Policy Studies at Cato Institute, 2009**

“The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous, And Less Free,” p. 133-134

If the American people were given the choice, they would almost surely choose a different course. Tufts University Professor Daniel Drezner observes, "Most Americans, on most issues, articulate what George W. Bush characterized as a 'humble' foreign policy during the 2000 campaign. They want a prudent foreign policy based on security against attacks and threats to domestic well-being. In polls, Americans consistently reject hegemony in favor of burden sharing. In a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in July 2006, 75 percent of respondents believed that the United States "should do its share to solve world problems together with other countries" and only 10 percent wanted the United States to "remain the preeminent world leader in solving international problems." By a similar margin, respondents agreed with the proposition that "The U.S. is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be." Bruce Stokes and Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center point out in their book *America against the World* that since the end of the Cold War, "no more than 13 percent of Americans have said the United States should be the single most important leader in the world."

### **George C. Edwards, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and the director of the Center for Presidential Studies at Texas A&M University – March 2000**

Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume 30. Issue 1. “Building Coalitions”

Leading the public is at the center of the modern presidency. As parties weaken and bargaining resources diminish, presidents see themselves increasingly dependent on public support to accomplish their goals; and they devote substantial time, energy, and resources to obtaining this support. Presidents “go public” more than ever, depending on a steadily expanding White House public relations infrastructure to take their messages to the American people. In 1995, for example, the White House spent \$18 million advertising on behalf of the president-a year before the presidential election (Woodward 1996, 344). Thus, presidents are involved in a permanent campaign to build supportive coalitions. As Bill Clinton reflected on the results of the 1994 elections, he concluded that the principal cause of the Democrats’ stunning defeat was his failure to communicate his achievements. “I got caught up in the parliamentary aspect of the presidency and missed the leadership, bully pulpit function which is so critical” (Woodward 1996, 22). The president’s remark reflects four fundamental and widely shared premises about presidential leadership: 1. Members of Congress are responsive to public opinion. 2. Public support is crucial to the president’s success. 3. The president must not only earn public support with his performance in office but also must actively take his case to the people. Moreover, he must not only do it at reelection time but all the time. 4. Through the permanent campaign, the White House can persuade or even mobilize the public. Leading the public-changing opinions and mobilizing citizens into action-is perhaps the ultimate resource of the democratic political leader. It is difficult for others who hold power to deny the legitimate demands of a president with popular support. Commentators on the presidency often assume that the White House can persuade or even mobilize the public if the president is a skilled enough communicator.

## Link Turn Evidence

**Kobe Tago, PhD in Advanced Social and Int'l Studies. Associate Prof of Int'l Politics, Grad School of Law, Kobe University, Japan, 2009**

When Are Democratic Friends Unreliable? The Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops from the 'Coalition of the Willing', *Journal of Peace Research* 2009; 46; 219

The democratic political cycle is closely related to the reliability of commitment. During national elections, it is very important for a democratic political leader to secure the support of a majority of voters and hold on to power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Mayhew, 2004). Therefore, to maximize her/his chances of winning the election, a leader may terminate unpopular policies during the election campaign, including costly international commitments. International commitments often entail unavoidable material costs for a state and thus sometimes come into disfavor among domestic audiences. A leader may reverse an ongoing committed policy in exchange for additional electoral support from the public. For instance, the South Korean (ROK) government's pledge to host US military bases on its soil was not supported by a majority of voters in the 1990s (Cooley, 2005: 213). Because voters did not support further fortifications in the US-ROK alliance, before major elections, the South Korean government is seeking a realignment of the alliance with more favorable conditions. A similar situation can be observed in Japan. Okinawa hosts more than 70% of the US military bases in Japan. When Okinawa's municipal elections were imminent, to obtain more votes in Okinawa, Tokyo's central government announced its willingness to open negotiations with the USA for transferring some of the bases from the island (Mulgan, 2000). These episodes suggest that close attention should be paid at the time of key elections to the incentives of a leader to break an international commitment that is unpopular with the domestic audience.

**Jonathan Singer, My Direct Democracy, 3/3/2009,**

“By Expending Capital, Obama Grows His Capital”

<http://www.mydd.com/story/2009/3/3/191825/0428>

From the latest NBC News-Wall Street Journal survey: Despite the country's struggling economy and vocal opposition to some of his policies, President Obama's favorability rating is at an all-time high. Two-thirds feel hopeful about his leadership and six in 10 approve of the job he's doing in the White House. "What is amazing here is how much political capital Obama has spent in the first six weeks," said Democratic pollster Peter D. Hart, who conducted this survey with Republican pollster Bill McInturff. "And against that, he stands at the end of this six weeks with as much or more capital in the bank." Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and, specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49 percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent blame the Obama administration.

## No Impact Evidence

**Fred Weir, Correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, 4/8/2010,**

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0408/Obama-Medvedev-sign-START-treaty-on-nuclear-weapons-but-Russia-is-uneasy>

It was a warm and smile-filled "kumbaya" moment for the US and Russia, whose relationship has seen some stomach-churning ups and downs in recent years. President Obama hailed the agreement as an "important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation and for US-Russia relations." But the gloomy signals coming out of Moscow this week suggest that the Russians harbor serious doubts about the viability of the treaty they just signed and even deeper misgivings about Barack Obama's changes to US nuclear weapons doctrine that are ostensibly aimed at moving toward a nuclear weapons-free world. We are seeing, in sharp relief, that the US and Russia view the strategic landscape through completely different lenses," says Dmitry Suslov, an expert with the Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, a Moscow think tank whose members include top Kremlin advisers. "Moscow is laying down the message that this new treaty is fine, but we should not interpret this as a new era in relations. The strategic picture is changing in ways that Russia is not completely comfortable with, and we need to keep our options open."

**Doyle McManus, LA Times, 7/12/2009**

"The end of Obamania," <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/12/opinion/oe-mcmanus12>

Obama went to Moscow to "reset" U.S.-Russian relations, which under George W. Bush had veered from unrealistic enthusiasm to bitter recriminations. He succeeded in changing the tone, but the concrete results were modest. The two nuclear powers agreed on a framework for reducing their atomic arsenals, but since both sides went into the talks wanting to cut, the nuclear issue was the easy part. More difficult were the issues each country sees as its top priority: for the United States, the problem of Iran; for Russia, the desire of its onetime possessions Ukraine and Georgia to escape from Moscow's orbit. Obama avoided the rookie mistake that John F. Kennedy committed at his first summit meeting in 1961, when the new president left the Russians thinking he was young, untested and uncertain. Obama said clearly that Russia must respect the sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia. But he certainly didn't leave with the issue resolved. On Iran, which aides said was a dominant subject of the meetings, there was no sign that Obama got the Russians to budge. The U.S. wants Russia to support tougher economic sanctions to push Iran toward giving up its nuclear fuel production. Russia, which views next-door neighbor Iran as both a business opportunity and a local security problem, has no appetite for that kind of confrontation. "Iran is Russia's important partner," Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on the eve of Obama's visit. "We cooperate and do so very productively." More sanctions "will only deteriorate the situation," he said. And that was his last word on the subject. At their news conference, Obama wanted to talk about Iran, but Medvedev wouldn't mention the place. The Russians agreed to a joint study on the threat of ballistic missiles from countries such as North Korea and Iran, but that's about all. "People have made too much of the 'reset.' They've talked about it as if it had magical properties or strategic content," said Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations, a 25-year veteran of U.S.-Russia diplomacy. "But what happens when you reset a computer? You don't change the content. All you do, if you're lucky, is get the bugs out and start working again." Obama and his aides may succeed in building a less angry, more businesslike relationship with the Russians, but will that change Moscow's views on Iran? Not likely. As Sestanovich puts it: "Russians don't think the problem is solvable."

## No Impact Evidence

**Jon Kyl, Senator from Arizona, 7/8/2010,**

“The New Start Treaty: Time for a Careful Look ”,

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704293604575343360850107760.html>

One example is the president's support for a multilateral treaty that would lock the U.S. into a permanent, comprehensive nuclear test ban. Another is the administration's pledge to pursue, after New Start comes into force, yet another new treaty with Russia that would make significantly deeper reductions in nuclear forces. And then there's the guideline in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review that effectively limits the technical freedom of our military and scientific experts to consider new designs to update aging nuclear weapons. All this in the service of a utopian idea of nuclear zero. Such is the context for the debate about New Start. The treaty's main purpose is to oblige Russia and the U.S. to make specified reductions in their nuclear arsenals. But Russia would be making the reductions for financial reasons anyway, so we've agreed to concede something for nothing. And, as the numbers of our nuclear weapons go down, the importance of modernization to improve the safety and reliability of our arsenal goes up. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently noted, the U.S. is "essentially the only nuclear power in the world that is not carrying out these kinds of modernization programs."

**Michael A. Needham - CEO of Heritage Action for America, 7/12/2010**

“Right Strikes Against START” <http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/07/12/right-strikes-against-start/>)

A credible argument can be made that New START empowers Russia (and, by default, other nuclear countries) and weakens America. Yet, Senators Kerry and Lugar seem more interested in sully the messenger. Even the enforcement of the treaty is questionable, as the provisions are embarrassingly insufficient. Paula A. De Sutter, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification Compliance and Implementation stated that, “The Russians can do so much under this treaty to advance and expand their strategic forces ... and our ability to determine whether or not they are doing that and whether it violates the treaty is very, very low.” Additionally, the Bilateral Consultative Commission is able to change the treaty without further Senate approval, according to former Senator Jim Talent (R-MO), because the drafters never bothered to define what they are able to change.

**Fred Weir, Correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, 4/8/2010,**

<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0408/Obama-Medvedev-sign-START-treaty-on-nuclear-weapons-but-Russia-is-uneasy>

Some experts say Lavrov was addressing domestic skeptics, including the powerful prime minister, Vladimir Putin, who has publicly criticized the treaty. "President Medvedev is very worried about possible domestic opposition to this treaty," says Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Several parties in the Duma, including United Russia [which is led by Putin], and the Communists, have expressed doubts. Medvedev sees a ratification battle looming." But Lavrov's tough language also reflects Moscow's deep disappointment that the accord contains no firm link between the substantial cuts both sides will be making to their stocks of offensive atomic weapons and Russia's demand for follow-on negotiations to limit strategic missile defense. Many in Moscow fear that a US technological breakthrough in defensive weapons might undermine its aging strategic deterrent, which is heavily deployed on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

## Impact Turn Evidence

**Jim Talent, distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 7/8/2010,**

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128379210>

First and foremost, Romney objected to START on the grounds that it would impede America's ability to complete a global ballistic-missile-defense system. The evidence supporting this concern is overwhelming. Article Five of the treaty explicitly prohibits the conversion of former ICBM silos to the purpose of missile defense; the Russians have publicly stated that the treaty limits America's discretion to complete ballistic-missile defense, and the preamble of the treaty explicitly links reductions in offensive capability to reductions in defensive systems. Those who think the preamble unimportant should consider the words of Russian general Yevgeniy Buzinsky, chief of the International Treaty Directorate in the Russian Defense Ministry: "This [treaty language on missile defense in the preamble] makes it possible for us, in case the Americans increase their strategic ABM system, to claim that they are not observing the [terms] of the treaty." Senator Kerry's response not only fails to answer these concerns, it actually lends credibility to them. Kerry states that the preamble to the treaty is not binding by itself and denies that the treaty "impedes our ability to build missile defense against attacks from rogue countries." He does not say that START would leave America free to construct a missile-defense system that could be used against Russian nuclear missiles. And that's the crux of the matter. There is powerful evidence — especially in the context of the president's decision last year, at Russia's insistence, to abandon the Polish and Czech missile-defense bases — that the treaty reflects an agreement that the United States will not build a missile-defense system that could be used against Russia. The implications of that agreement go far beyond America's relationship with Russia, because it is impossible to build a robust missile defense against, for example, Iran, which could not also be used against Russian missiles. So to the extent that START limits missile defense against Russia, it must and will narrow the options we have to defend against Iran, and, for that matter, North Korea. That is a key point that Romney and others are making. The Senate simply must demand a satisfactory answer. Ballistic-missile defense may be the most important defensive system the U.S. is building today. Even if the New START agreement were otherwise better than it is, the benefits would not come close to justifying any sacrifice in America's ability to defend itself against nuclear missiles.

## Impact turn Evidence

**Jim Talent, distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 7/8/2010,**  
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128379210>

2. Romney claims that the treaty favors the Russians in three important areas: It does not limit tactical nuclear weapons, which permits the Russians to retain their huge advantage in that area; its limits on launchers will require the U.S. to reduce its capabilities while letting the Russians increase theirs; and it permits the parties to put ICBMs on bombers and rail-based launchers. Kerry doesn't address the first two points, implicitly conceding them. On the last point, he ignores the issue with rail-based ICBMs (even though the Russians had rail-based ICBMs during the Cold War) and claims that if the Russians were "foolish" enough to put ICBMs on bombers, the U.S. could "get the new weapons incorporated in the treaty or withdraw" from the treaty. This argument concedes that, as critics claim, the treaty currently does not cover using bombers for ICBMs. So far, supporters of START have acted as if the treaty were a kind of aspirational expression of the desire for a nuclear-free world, and that anyone who opposes it is an enemy of such a future. But no one should doubt that this START treaty, like its predecessors, will require real changes that will have a real impact on American security. The more the administration ignores or dismisses the concerns of critics, the clearer it is that the changes embodied in this treaty will not be for the better, and could be disastrous. As the case now stands, the Senate should vote against ratification.

**James Carafano, Senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 6/29/2010**

“Five reasons to hate New START”, The Daily Caller, <http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/29/five-reasons-to-hate-new-start/>

Then, despite any promises the White House or Congressional leaders might make on modernizing nuclear “infrastructure,” Obama will never build the capacity we need to field a new generation of nuclear weapons (with better safety, security and reliability features) to replace the ones we have now—weapons better suited to providing deterrence in the 21st century. If Obama gets his way, the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be on an irreversible course to atrophy and obsolescence. 5. We Could All Die. Obama’s road to zero is the superhighway to disaster. The notion that as the U.S. draws down its reliance on nuclear weapons the other lemmings will follow is simply bogus. With a lower bar to being a nuclear power on par with the U.S., adversaries likely will step up their programs. Nervous friends and allies will go their own way and build their own weapons arsenals. A new arms race will result. The likelihood of a nuclear conflict will go up, not down. How much of this GOP leaders understand is another matter. Part of their concern over the bill might be that they are looking over their shoulders, worrying that if conservatives ever stop and realize how bad this treaty is for U.S. interests, they will get really mad ... and they might turn that anger on both parties. Whatever their motivation, however, lawmakers should be under no illusions that New START is anything other than old problems in a new package.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Japan Counterplan- Neg

## Condition on US-Japan FTA Counterplan

Explanation .....1  
 Glossary.....2

Condition on US-Japan FTA INC Shell .....3

Solvency Extensions  
 Solvency: Conditioning Solves Japan FTA..... 4-6  
 Solvency: AT: Fast Track Prevents Passage.....7  
 AT: Japan Says no – Japan Wants FTA ..... 8-9  
 AT: Japan Says no – Lobbies will Push ..... 10

Net Benefit Extensions  
 Net Benefit: US-Japanese Relations ..... 11-12  
 Net Benefit: US-Japanese Relations ..... 13  
 Net Benefit: Relations Extension ..... 14  
 Net Benefit: FTA Key to World Economy ..... 15  
 Net Benefit: World Economy Impact.....16  
 Net Benefit: Free Trade Good..... 17

Competition Extensions  
 AT: Permutation..... 18

## Explanation

This is a condition counterplan. It argues that instead of just doing the plan, that the United States should only implement the plan and withdraw military presence if the country where the troops are agrees to take a certain course of action. It is called a condition counterplan because the presence withdrawal is not guaranteed, that there is a “condition” on which the plan will not be done.

This condition counterplan should be used against the Japan affirmative. It argues that the US will withdraw its troops from Japan if Japan agrees to a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. An FTA is a special kind of treaty that prevents either the US or Japan from imposing tariffs on imports from the other country. Absent the condition, the Japanese would not agree to the FTA because of the disapproval of some domestic constituencies. The counterplan argues that the FTA is important for the world economy, because it will serve as a model agreement that the rest of Asia will model off of. The impacts argue that free trade between countries prevents war, because it makes them more dependent on each other.

## Glossary

Free Trade Agreement (FTA): A negotiated treaty between two countries that eliminates the majority of the tariffs between them, designed to encourage more trade.

Free Trade: Free trade is an idea grounded in classic economics. “Free trade” is achieved when countries can sell their goods in other countries on equal terms as the domestic country’s goods – ie there are no tariffs, quotas, or other means of limiting foreign products. Since World War II, it is generally held that free trade is beneficial to the global economy and promotes peace between nations.

World Trade Organization: International organization that was created to promote free trade between countries. Many important and large countries are members of the WTO, with the most notable exception being Russia. The WTO also serves as the body that hears disputes and enforces penalties over violations of free trade agreements.

Fast Track: Special power of the President in negotiating trade agreements that has since expired. The Fast Track authority, sometimes called Trade Promotion Authority, forces the Congress into a direct vote on the agreement instead of allowing it to make modifications, and prevents Congress from filibustering any agreement.

Naoto Kan: Prime Minister of Japan

Tokyo: Capital of Japan

## Condition on US-Japan FTA INC Shell [1/2]

**TEXT: The United States federal government should offer the government of Japan that (insert plan text) on the condition that the government of Japan enters a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United States.**

**Contention One: Competition. The plan commits to a withdrawal from Japan no matter what. Withdrawal in the counterplan will not happen unless Japan agrees to certain conditions. Japan could say no and the plan would not happen.**

**Contention Two: Net Benefits**

**A Free Trade Agreement between Japan and the United States is key to the world economic recovery, as well as free trade efforts throughout Asia**

**Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council. 02-07,**

“Getting Asia Right through 2020.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

For these reasons, the United States and Japan should declare intentions to commence negotiations on a comprehensive free-trade agreement as soon as possible. While the near-term expiration of trade-promotion authority makes this unlikely before the 2008 election, U.S. and Japanese leaders should nonetheless keep this goal in sight. This agreement would not only harmonize tariffs and customs procedures, it would reach far deeper, aiming toward convergence of the regulatory and investment environment, with the goal of significantly increasing productivity on both sides of the Pacific. An FTA, consistent with Doha obligations, could meaningfully level the playing field and enhance transparency across the board, significantly boosting opportunities for foreigners and newcomers in the Japanese market. Also, an FTA done right would undoubtedly open the door much wider for U.S. investment in Japan, in turn helping Japan meet the challenge of structural adjustment even in the face of an aging society. Over the next 20 years a U.S.-Japan FTA should aim to bring Japan’s level of inward direct investment up from 2.1 percent of GDP to the U.S. level of 14 percent of GDP (even so, this would be below the G-7 average of 20 percent of GDP). Finally, and critically, a WTO-compatible bilateral free-trade agreement could serve as the hub for a network of market economies in the region. In particular, a U.S.-Japan FTA could be part of a web of FTAs that the United States has or is negotiating with Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. This would provide a powerful incentive for China to meet its WTO obligations and, importantly, also become part of this web of high-quality FTAs. In sum, the direct economic benefits of a comprehensive U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement would likely be considerable. However, the political and strategic benefits for all of the members of the Asia-Pacific community would be even greater. For the United States and Japan to sign an economic alliance agreement—based on common core principles every bit as strong as those that underlay the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—would send a remarkably powerful signal to the region and the world. It would show that, economically and politically, our two nations share the same dreams and aspirations for our people’s future and for the stability and prosperity of the world.

## Condition on US-Japan FTA INC Shell [2/2]

### **Promotion of free trade through international agreements prevents war and ensures prosperity**

**Daniel Griswold, associated Director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at CATO, 5/1/02**  
The Insider, “Seven Moral Arguments for Free Trade”,  
<http://www.insideronline.org/feature.cfm?id=106>)

In an 1845 speech in the British House of Commons, Richard Cobden called free trade “that advance which is calculated to knit nations more together in the bonds of peace by means of commercial intercourse.” Free trade does not guarantee peace, but it does strengthen peace by raising the cost of war to governments and their citizens. As nations become more integrated through expanding markets, they have more to lose should trade be disrupted. In recent years, the twin trends of globalization and democratization have produced their own “peace dividend”: since 1987, real spending on armaments throughout the world has dropped by more than one-third. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of major international wars has receded. Those nations most closely associated with international terrorism – Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea – are among the least globalized countries in the world in terms of non-oil trade and foreign investment. Not one of them belongs to the World Trade Organization. During the 1930s, the industrialized nations waged trade wars against each other. They raised tariffs and imposed quotas in order to protect domestic industry. The result, however, was that other nations only raised their barriers even further, choking off global trade and deepening and prolonging the global economic depression. Those dark economic times contributed to the conflict that became World War II. America’s post-war policy of encouraging free trade through multilateral trade agreements was aimed at promoting peace as much as it was prosperity.

## Solvency: Conditioning Solves Japan FTA

**The counterplan would solve. Japan views the US military presence as a bargaining presence over economic and trade issues**

**Robert V Hamilton, a former Marine officer who spent 2 years stationed in Okinawa, (1996-98) while serving as a National Science Foundation Fellow, 11/2000.**

Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 84, Iss. 11; pg. 58, 3 pgs “Selling' the U.S. Military presence in Japan”  
<http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?Ver=1&Exp=07-23-2015&FMT=7&DID=63701842&RQT=309>

With the Cold War's common threat defunct, it is only natural that the Japanese people have their doubts about the current U.S. military presence on their soil. Opinion polls show that 70% of Japanese, while supporting the maintenance of the alliance, want to see the troop level here reduced. Japan today faces a major crisis in public finances, yet the government is spending \$4 billion a year for stationing of U.S. forces. Such host-nation support, if foregone rent and other unrealized revenues from government-owned land are included, would amount to \$5 billion. This burden is far too heavy compared with the \$60 million that Germany pays and the \$290 million paid by South Korea.<sup>2</sup> Note that while the Japanese generally support a U.S. military presence in Japan, their complaint is that the Americans are charging much more for their bases in Japan as compared to Germany and South Korea. Dissatisfaction with the current arrangement is also being seen within the Japanese Government, as budget bureaucrats have begun to publicly question why the Japanese taxpayer has to pay for items like carpeting and lighting at U.S. military facilities in Japan. Regretfully, as the powerful Japanese budget bureaucrats-many of whom have past experience in U.S.-Japan trade negotiations-get involved in this process, the U.S.-Japan security partnership more and more resembles just another trade battle between the two nations. This time, however, instead of arguing over automobile or steel imports, the point of contention will be the appropriate dollar value of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. In keeping with former Prime Minister Hosokawa's complaints, the Japanese budget negotiators might ask why Japan has to pay \$5 billion a year, while the United States only charges the South Koreans \$290 million a year and the Germans only \$60 million for its U.S. bases there. Behind the scenes, the American response may well be that the social and economic costs of training and arming a Japanese military to replace the Americans is cost prohibitive to the Japanese Government, and that paying the American military \$5 billion a year is a great bargain for Japan. One might even envision American base negotiators arguing that the presence of 45,000 military personnel in Japan at an annual cost of \$5 billion amounts to a cost to the Japanese of only about \$100,000 per soldier per year-a great price in exchange for the services of members of the best fighting forces in the world. Of course, these kinds of money for-services economic arguments are never made in public, but the U.S. Government is stating a dear policy of this kind of linkage in calling the annual \$5 billion Japanese payment a "critical" part of the alliance. A most unfortunate result of using money as the glue to hold the partnership together will be a message sent to the Japanese population that U.S. military personnel based in Japan are to be treated as a commodity to be haggled over, in the same way that the U.S. and Japanese Governments argue over trade in automobiles and steel.

## Solvency: Conditioning Solves Japan FTA

**Stronger security partners make economic issues and trade agreements a bargaining chip for US military presence.**

**Catherine Lutz is Research Professor at the Watson Institute for International Studies and Professor of Anthropology at Brown University. The Asia-Pacific Journal. 3/6/09.**

<http://japanfocus.org/-Catherine-Lutz/3086>

The assumption that US bases served local interests in a shared ideological and security project dominated into the 1960s: allowing base access showed a commitment to fight Communism and gratitude for US military assistance. But with decolonization and the US war in Vietnam, such arguments began to lose their power, and the number of US overseas bases declined from an early 1960s peak. Where access was once automatic, many countries now had increased leverage over what the US had to give in exchange for basing rights, and those rights could be restricted in a variety of important ways, including through environmental and other regulations. The bargaining chips used by the US were increasingly sophisticated weapons, as well as rent payments for the land on which bases were established.[9] These exchanges were often become linked with trade and other kinds of agreements, such as access to oil and other raw materials and investment opportunities (Harkavy 1982:337). They also, particularly when advanced weaponry is the medium of exchange, have had destabilizing effects on regional arms balances. From the earlier ideological rationale for the bases, global post-war recovery and decreasing inequality between the US and countries – mostly in the global North – that housed the majority of US bases, led to a more pragmatic or economic grounding to basing negotiations, albeit often thinly veiled by the language of friendship and common ideological bent. The 1980s saw countries whose populations and governments had strongly opposed US military presence, such as Greece, agree to US bases on their soil only because they were in need of the cash, and Burma, a neutral but very poor state, entered negotiations with the US over basing troops there (Harkavy 1989:4-5).

**Economic pressures are linked to the security relationship between the US and Japan. Lessening security tensions will help the US and Japan agree to a trade agreement**

**Chalmers Johnson, PhD in Political Science, and E.B. Keehn PhD, PhD, a Japan and Asia specialist, editor and author with over 20 years experience working with, the Japanese government, Foreign Affairs July/August 1995.**

“East Asian Security: The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy”

The Department of Defense may still see Japan as the linchpin of its security policy in Asia, but mutual interests are no longer assured. U.S.-Japanese economic tensions will continue to heighten in the years ahead, and these will inevitably bring new pressures on the security relationship. As Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono pointed out in January Japan’s national interest is now more important than its “mere identity” as a member of the West because “[t]here is a growing view that we have entered an era when nations pit their economic interests and those of their region in competition against one another.”

## Solvency: AT: Fast Track Prevents Passage

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Fast track is only one of many procedures used to help ratify Free Trade Agreements**

**Todd Tucker, GTW research director and author of a major post-election report on the role of fair trade in 140 federal and state level races. and Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch division , published May 2009**

“The Rise and Fall of Fast Track Trade Authority”, <http://www.fasttrackhistory.org/index.html>

The Obama administration now faces the challenge of negotiating with Congress to replace Fast Track. As our review shows, the Fast Track mechanism was but one of various procedures employed by Congress to coordinate trade-agreement negotiations and approval. As President Kennedy noted in 1961, an old delegation method that does not meet the needs of its era "must not simply be renewed, it must be replaced." This review has also shown that the Fast Track mechanism was not necessary to ensure U.S. trade agreements or trade expansion. Under other delegations – or in the absence of delegations – trade has expanded and agreements have been signed, negotiated and put into effect. For instance, while the Clinton administration was without Fast Track, trade expanded over 30 percent from 1995 to 2000. And by its own reckoning, the Clinton administration negotiated and passed 130 trade and investment agreements without Fast Track, including the Jordan FTA, which passed unanimously under normal congressional floor procedures. Additionally, the China WTO accession agreement (which was the basis for Congress' approval of permanent most favored nation treatment for China) passed under regular congressional procedures.

## AT: Japan Says no – Japan Wants FTA

[ ]

[ ]

### **Japan will say yes, it has asked for it in the past**

**William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service. 7/9/07**

“U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options.”

With the conclusion of negotiations on a U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement (KORUS FTA) on April 1, 2007, and the formation of FTAs among other East Asian countries, interest seems to have increased in the possibility of a U.S.- Japan FTA. Japanese business leaders are concerned about being adversely affected by the trade preferences that South Korean exporters would gain under the proposed KORUS FTA. On May 8, a Japanese government advisory panel recommended that Japan undertake the formation of an economic partnership agreement (EPA), Japan’s version of an FTA with the United States.

## AT: Japan Says No – Japan Wants FTA

**Japan will say yes because the Prime Minister Kan is pushing free trade agreements now in order to save the economy**

**Michael Auslin, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute. 7/1/10,  
“Can Mr. Kan Save Japan?”**

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575337661778908390.html>

Has Japan entered its "Kan do" era? That's certainly the hope of the struggling Democratic Party of Japan at the ascension to power of Naoto Kan as prime minister after the disastrous run of Yukio Hatoyama. Mr. Kan has a rocky road ahead. He must repair strained relations with the United States, restore the public's trust in the DPJ, and craft policies to restore economic health to a country that is still suffering from deflation. Whether he succeeds or fails may well seal the fate not only of the DPJ to maintain its legitimacy, but also of Japan to pull out of its current malaise. A visit to DPJ headquarters this week and discussions with top party officials makes it clear that those inside the party still believe in its mission and their ability to create a new Japan. Yet my conversations show equally that the party must do more to turn its vision into reality through concrete policies. The party's new manifesto, issued this month, moves beyond the vaguer pronouncements of the seminal electoral manifesto of last summer, but still lacks the specifics needed to turn aspirations into policy. Above all else, the DPJ wants to purge the party of the influence of campaign cash and to end Japan's deflationary environment. It is telling, perhaps, that money, both as the root of all evil and as the reflection on the weak economy, is the major policy challenge. The DPJ swept into power last August promising to end the culture of corruption fostered by the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party and pull Japan out its two decade-long economic slump. So far, money politics has claimed the first DPJ premier and has continued to drag down the economy. The DPJ's plans include reducing the corporate tax rate (particularly on small- and medium-sized enterprises), continuing regulatory reform and promoting comprehensive economic zones, though few specifics have been announced yet. In addition, the Kan administration will seek to conclude free-trade agreements, increase foreign direct investment in Japan, and focus on "infrastructure exports" such as high-speed railways and nuclear power plants.

## AT: Japan Says no – Lobbies will Push

### **Declining Agriculture means Japanese farmers will be forced to support the FTA**

**Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council. 02-07,**

“Getting Asia Right through 2020.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

At the same time, there are powerful internal forces at work that augur well for free trade. For example, the demographic shift in Japan’s agricultural sector alone compels a fundamental shift in protectionist policy. The Japanese agricultural sector is in decline, with its contribution to GDP falling by half from 2.4 percent in 1990 to less than 1.2 percent in 2004 (agriculture’s contribution to GDP was only one-twentieth that of industry’s). The vast majority of farmers are part time, with “agricultural households” earning only one-quarter of their income from agriculture. Moreover, the farming population is in steep decline with the number of farming households projected to fall from 2.9 million today to as low as 2.1 million in 2015. The percentage of farmers over the age of 65 is nearly double those between the ages of 15 and 64. The only segment of the farming population that is expanding in numbers is that over the age of 70. Incredibly, the average age of farm workers in Japan in 2015 will be over age 65, with the elderly especially concentrated in the back-breaking rice cultivation sector. In sum, Japan faces a demographic crisis in agriculture. Driven by demography, Japan has very strong reasons to liberalize agriculture further and few viable alternatives. Agriculture can and should be a central part of a U.S.-Japan FTA, with all sectors, including rice, on the table. However, such an FTA needs to weigh the sensitivity of Japan’s farmers and “rice culture.” An elegant solution to the liberalization challenge could be to phase in a reduction in tariffs over the next 10 years, dovetailing with the retirement of farmers and the decline in the agricultural population. At the same time, Japanese need to realize that liberalization does not mean the obliteration of agricultural industry in Japan. As in the sectors where liberalization has already occurred, such as apples, beef, oranges, and produce, rice farmers will undoubtedly shift to high-quality niches, such as organic cultivation, as well as increase efficiency via economies of scale. Liberalization, even of agriculture, can be a win-win proposition for Japan.

### **Japan will say yes because the business lobby will be strongly in favor of it**

**Shinya Ajima, staff writer for Japan Today, 2009.**

“Prospects elusive for Japan-U.S. FTA.

<http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/prospects-elusive-for-japan-us-fta>

Negotiations for a Japan-U.S. FTA “could...serve as a model for a broader regional agreement among like-minded countries and provide impetus for further progress in multilateral negotiations,” the Japan Business Federation and the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan said in a joint statement released last month. The message from the business lobbies apparently promises their commitment to efforts to establish a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area at a time the governments in the region work to create a web of bilateral or multilateral accords. Given the regional structure, Japan has made efforts to first achieve liberalization deals with some countries in Asia and South America with which Tokyo believes it could find common ground relatively easily, the officials said.

## Net Benefit: US-Japanese Relations

**Counterplan solves the affirmative better. The US and Japan would drift apart after the US withdrew without a comprehensive trade agreement to keep them interacting. This solves relations and prevents an arms race in Asia.**

**Ezra F. Vogel, Director of the Fairbanks Center and Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University and Patrick M. Cronin, a senior fellow and Asian team leader at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. 11/1995**

“Unifying U.S. Policy on Japan, No. 51, Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Some critics contend that the threat of withdrawal of American troops would force Japan to accept more responsibility for its own military affairs. But as Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki has pointed out, when Japan has been most firmly engaged in an alliance with either Great Britain or the United States, it has reinforced democratic tendencies within Japan; but when it has acted independently of these alliances, it has reinforced powerful nationalistic, inward-looking trends. A threat of withdrawal of the American commitment to Japan could strengthen the forces of Japanese ultranationalism and trigger hostile reactions by China and other regional neighbors. So a withdrawal of American commitment is likely to further destabilize relations. A Japan detached from a strong American alliance is likely to intensify the rivalries between China and Japan and to accelerate the risk of an arms race in Northeast Asia. Few in Asia would see a rupture in the U.S.-Japan security alliance as anything else but the cessation of decades of stability and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region. As long as we maintain a firm overall relationship with Japan we can afford to be forthright in our pursuit of specific trade goals. At the same time, more consideration needs to be given about how to work with allies in Japan and to formulate our position on trade matters so that it strengthens our base of support for our position in Japan. We need to devote more resources to monitoring the results of earlier trade agreements as a basis for pressuring for implementation. We need to devote a higher proportion of our activities, as Australia and South Korea do, to market development and positive trade promotion in Japan. We also need closer coordination between our efforts to open markets and promote trade.

## Net Benefit: US-Japanese Relations

### **An East Asian arms race would cause extinction**

**Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/22/2000**

[Joseph, Foreign Policy, March 22, p. lexis]

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. The threat of nuclear breakout in Asia has been around for years. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, flirted with nuclear-weapon programs in the 1970s but backed down under U.S pressure. There are, however, two new developments that make the current situation so volatile. First, technologies and capabilities have advanced to the point where more nations could proceed rapidly to nuclear-weapon status, if they reached the political decision to do so. Second, the United States is backing away from its commitments to the international nonproliferation regime and undertaking actions - such as the deployment of missile defense systems - that could catalyze the reaction chain. Developments within Japan illustrate how these two dynamics interact in new and dangerous ways. In 1998, many Japanese were disturbed by how quickly the world accepted India and Pakistan's de facto status as new nuclear powers. This was not the bargain the Japanese had agreed to when-after a lengthy internal debate-they joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1976. If tensions rise and nuclear-weapon deployments increase in Asia, Japan may well conclude that its security is best served not by relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but by building its own nuclear arsenal. Japanese withdrawal from the NPT would almost certainly trigger the collapse of the treaty. Some in Asia might soon decide to follow Japan's lead. Japan will carefully watch South Asia-the area of the world most likely to see a nuclear weapon used in combat. But the Asian reaction chain is more than a South Asian rivalry gone nuclear. India's nuclear tests and current deployment plans have much more to do with China and the United States than Pakistan. Most experts date the beginning of the Indian nuclear program to China's 1964 test. China, in turn, says it was forced to develop its nuclear weapons to counter the United States.

## Net Benefit: Relations Extension

**Economic cooperation key to the Alliance, means only the CP solves**

**Ezra F. Vogel, Director of the Fairbanks Center and Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University and Patrick M. Cronin, a senior fellow and Asian team leader at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. 11/1995**

“Unifying U.S. Policy on Japan, No. 51, Institute for National Strategic Studies.

The problem of balancing U.S. economic and security interests with Japan is far more acute and involves much higher stakes than with other nations. Japan has the second largest economy in the world. Calculated at 100 yen to the dollar, Japan's GNP last year was roughly \$5 trillion to America's \$7 trillion. While GNP may not be an accurate measure of the purchasing power of the Japanese people, it is a good indicator of the nation's capacity to buy things around the world. Former Ambassador Mike Mansfield's conclusion, "The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world," has been ratified by recent developments. If the two wealthiest democracies—which share many common interests in regional and global affairs—cannot align their policies, then one wonders how the international community can avoid slipping into Hobbesian anarchy. The United States must produce an integrated strategy toward Japan and devise appropriate policies and political structures to realize it. The following discussion argues against coercive linkage and suggests a four-part plan for comprehensive management of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. It advances a strategy that would encourage Japan to accept more responsibility for the course of international affairs, and to become a stalwart participant in and defender of an open, free-trading system. And it would assure U.S. cooperation with Japan to achieve its announced goals of playing a broader role in reinforcing regional and global stability. Such a strategy will not be easy to implement. Japan is now ruled by a fragile political coalition that makes it difficult to take bold initiatives, and internal cleavages over how many of its troops Japan should contribute to resolve international conflicts run deep. But the failure to enunciate a lucid overall strategic approach perpetuates an ambiguity that erodes confidence in American leadership and invites the dismantling of the existing system without offering a palatable or realistic alternative. As Asian nations grow stronger economically, politically, and militarily, American leaders must grasp the significance of an integrated and consistent strategy toward Japan, not just for the results it can produce *vis-a-vis* Japan itself, but for the impact such a policy can have on America's standing throughout the region.

## Net Benefit: FTA Key to World Economy

**A US – Japan Free trade Agreement is key to the global economy by sending a signal of integration**

**Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council. 02-07,**

“Getting Asia Right through 2020.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Well into the future, the United States and Japan will hold the keys to economic prosperity and stability in Asia. Our two nations have a primary responsibility to exercise leadership and wise stewardship over the international economic system of which Asia is a major driver. Likewise, we need to consider ways to help each other successfully overcome our respective economic, structural, and strategic challenges. With the Doha Round of international trade talks in disarray, it is all the more important that we consider ways to expand the density and depth of our economic partnership, keeping a clear eye not simply on economics but also national strategy. The United States and Japan need to move quickly toward promoting and ensuring the forces of free trade and economic integration by launching negotiations toward a bilateral free-trade agreement. This would become the hub for an emerging network of FTAs in Asia and provide energy to the whole world economy.

**US – Japan economic cooperation key to prevent global economic crises**

**Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council. 02-07,**

“Getting Asia Right through 2020.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The United States and Japan have special responsibilities within global institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization. The United States and Japan should sustain their commitment to these vital institutions and should exert leadership in shaping their respective agendas to ensure they are fully leveraged to assist in alleviating global economic and health challenges.

## Net Benefit: World Economy Impact

### **A weak global economy would cause war**

**Walter Russell Mead 09 the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2/4/09,**

“Only Makes You Stronger,” <http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=1>]

None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

## Net Benefit: Free Trade Good

### **Free trade forces countries to be dependent on each other, preventing major wars**

**Copley News Service, 12/1/1999**

For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

### **Trade solves war by allowing countries to fight with money instead of bullets**

**Ascribe Newswire 12/7/01**

“Countries That Share Capital Market and Monetary Policy Linkages Are Less Likely to Go to War, Says Study”, December 7

UNIVERSITY PARK, Pa., Dec. 7 [Ascribe Newswire] -- Countries that maintain in-depth financial and economic ties with each other are less likely to engage in military conflict, according to a Penn State study. "Political analysts have observed for several centuries that international trade inhibits interstate war between countries by raising the cost of military violence," says Dr. Quan Li, assistant professor of political science. "Recent studies by John Oneal, Bruce Russett and several others evolve along this liberal reasoning. Our study, however, shows mathematically that it is not the prospective loss of trade, but the costly signaling of resolve by manipulating economic ties that render exchanges of violence unnecessary." "Furthermore, we show statistically that compared with trade ties, capital market and monetary policy linkages are more effective in inhibiting conflict behaviors. In short, monetary ties allows countries to fight with money rather than with bullets."

## AT: Permutation

[ ]

### **A US – Japan Free Trade Agreement solves, but pressure is key to get Japan to agree**

**William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service. 7/9/07**

“U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Significance, Prospects, and Policy Options.”

A third option would be for the United States and Japan to form a comprehensive bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). This option might prove attractive because tariffs and other customs restrictions on U.S.-Japan bilateral trade are already low or non-existent, providing a foundation on which to build an FTA. In addition, proponents would argue that the two countries could construct the FTA to cover policies and practices that are critical to the relationship. For example, the FTAs that the United States has concluded recently go beyond trade in goods and address services, foreign investment, and intellectual property rights. A U.S.-Japan FTA would fit into current Japanese and U.S. trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties with Asian partners. Critics of the FTA option have pointed out U.S. agricultural producers (and WTO rules) would require that Japan allow free trade to include access to its agricultural markets — a step that it has been very reluctant to take.

**Pressure from the United States is the key issue. Japan is politically incapable of independently starting the free trade talks.**

**Wendy Cutler, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC 2-22-07**

Affairs “A Closer Japan-U.S. Economic Relationship

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=970>

Panel Discussion. Oakley Johnson asked whether the partner country has in every case been the party that initiated FTA negotiations with the U.S. If so, is Japan in a position to ask for the launch of negotiations? Atsushi Yamakoshi said that Keidanren can ask the government to initiate a preparatory study. [OFF-THE-RECORD begin] Wendy Cutler said there is often a lot of flirting going on, and it is unclear who approached whom. She doubted that her counterparts in Japan would ask. Commencing negotiations would be difficult because it would require a complex interagency dialogue including the Ministry of Agriculture. The decision to launch an FTA would have to be a bold one from the top level of Japanese government. This would be required to get the ministries in shape to discuss these issues. We can start by working through each country’s list of priorities and figuring out what is and is not reasonable. Lots of preparatory work would be involved, and no one would want the leaders to commit to a failed process. [OFF-THE RECORD end]



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Japan Counterplan Aff

## Condition on US-Japan FTA Counterplan Affirmative

### Solvency Answers

Solvency: No Fast Track .....	1
Solvency: Japan Says No .....	2-3

### Net Benefit Answers

Net Benefit: CP Kills US-Japan Relations Turn .....	4
Net Benefit: AT: Rearmament.....	5
Net Benefit: Free Trade Bad.....	6-7

## Solvency: No Fast Track

[ ]

[ ]

**[ ] Elimination of fast track authority means that even if Japan agrees the US won't be able to pass the agreement, so the CP has no effect**

**TWN News, 6 July 2007,**

<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo070703.htm>

The United States government's ability to negotiate trade deals took many knocks last weekend when its President's "fast track authority" expired with no hope for a quick renewal. This throws into question whether it is possible for partners of the US to negotiate trade deals with confidence that any agreement (whether bilateral trade agreements or a WTO Doha agreement) that is concluded will be honored by the US. First, fast track authority expired on midnight of 30 June. Second, the Democrat's Congressional leaders issued a statement indicating they will not renew the fast track anytime soon. Third, the Democrats also announced that they would not approve two bilateral FTAs the US administration has already concluded, under the old fast track authority, with South Korea and Colombia.

**[ ] Their own author admits that the lack of fast track in the United States prevents a free trade agreement**

**Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council. 02-07,**

“Getting Asia Right through 2020.” Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The United States and Japan should declare intentions to commence negotiations on a comprehensive free-trade agreement. While the pending expiration of trade-promotion authority makes the achievement of an FTA in the near term unlikely, U.S. and Japanese leaders should nonetheless keep this goal in sight. A Doha-consistent agreement would have direct economic benefits for the United States and Japan, and the political and strategic benefits for all members of the Asia-Pacific community would be even greater.

## Solvency: Japan Says No

[ ]

[ ]

### [ ] **Japan is dependent on US support and would reject a conditional withdrawal**

**David Arase, associate professor in the Politics Department at Pomona College 5/25/09,**  
International Studies Association "The U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in the Post-Clinton Era" All  
Academic Research Database Bockmon)

The paper will argue that since the mid-1990s Japan has become more, rather than less dependent on the U.S. A rising China and a resurgent U.S. economy, in comparison with Japan's economic stagnation, demographic decline, and weak domestic political leadership, have left Japan with fading hopes for an equal partnership with the US. This trend was set by President Bill Clinton's ill-fated attempt to create a strategic partnership with China. Since the start of the George W. Bush administration, this trend has continued despite the official U.S. rhetoric stressing Japan's primary strategic importance in Asia. The more hawkish U.S. line toward a rising China, sharpening tensions in the Taiwan Straits, the decision to jointly develop and deploy Theater Missile Defense, the unresolved issue of nuclear and missile proliferation on the Korean peninsula, and the global war on terrorism have all worked to reduce Japan's independent policy options and increase its dependence on the U.S. Each of these polarizing Northeast Asian security policy areas will be examined to show how Japan, against its own inclinations and misgivings, is being forced to fall in line with U.S. policy and pressure. It will also be noted that more broadly, Japan in this new environment has been forced to respond to U.S. requests for more robust alliance cooperation in out-of-theater operations, most notably in the deployment of Japan SDF troops in post-invasion Iraq to aid in the reconstruction effort. The outlook, then, is for stronger U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation so long as polarizing tensions remain high.

## Solvency: Japan Says No

[ ] Japan will say no – powerful farmer lobby will prevent it

**Michael Auslin, director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute. 7-1-10,**  
“Can Mr. Kan Save Japan?”  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575337661778908390.html>

Above all else, the DPJ wants to purge the party of the influence of campaign cash and to end Japan's deflationary environment. It is telling, perhaps, that money, both as the root of all evil and as the reflection on the weak economy, is the major policy challenge. The DPJ swept into power last August promising to end the culture of corruption fostered by the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party and pull Japan out its two decade-long economic slump. So far, money politics has claimed the first DPJ premier and has continued to drag down the economy. The DPJ's plans include reducing the corporate tax rate (particularly on small- and medium-sized enterprises), continuing regulatory reform and promoting comprehensive economic zones, though few specifics have been announced yet. In addition, the Kan administration will seek to conclude free-trade agreements, increase foreign direct investment in Japan, and focus on "infrastructure exports" such as high-speed railways and nuclear power plants. Yet Japan faces difficulties reaching these goals, as any movement on free trade continues to be hamstrung by the powerful farmers' lobby. The country also faces tough competition abroad; countries ranging from China to France and South Korea are aggressively hawking their fast trains and nuclear plants around the globe.

## Net Benefit: CP Kills US-Japan Relations Turn

[ ]

[ ]

**[ ] The US should not condition withdrawal on trade agreements – breeds resentment and destroys relations – turns the net benefit.**

**Ted Galen Carpenter, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas and vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 1996**  
 “Toward a New Relationship with Japan”

Several steps must be taken to implement substantive changes. First, the United States should inform Japan that it intends to withdraw its forces from Japanese territory over the next five years and that it will renounce the security treaty two years later. At that point, Japan will be expected to provide entirely for its own defense. Washington should implement its withdrawal strategy without rancor and state explicitly that the move is not motivated by traditional complaints about burden sharing or by the more recent tensions over trade disputes. Under no circumstances should the United States use the security commitment as a bargaining chip. That approach would be a blueprint for Japanese resentment, and the damage to U.S.-Japanese relations could last decades.

**[ ] Conditioning the military on open trade will openly anger Japan. Japan controls negotiations because of military dependence on Japanese technology.**

**Chalmers Johnson, PhD in Political Science, and E.B. Keehn PhD, PhD, a Japan and Asia specialist, editor and author with over 20 years experience, July / August 1995**  
 “East Asian Security: The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy”

The real meaning and danger of the DOD report are that it is the Clinton administration’s answer to the failure of its trade policy over the past two years. Even though it staffed its trade apparatus with lawyers and economists who knew nothing about East Asia, the administration still seems surprised that its efforts to open Japan’s markets have turned out no differently from those of the previous three administrations. The Japanese have also used their formidable lobbying capabilities to savage the Clinton administration as protectionists and wreckers of the Japanese-American alliance. In this continuing effort, in which Japan argues that the United States must abandon its attempts to open Japanese markets to American goods lest Japan “retaliate” against U.S. bases by reducing their financial assistance, the Department of Defense has become a virtual pawn of the Japan lobby. The real leverage Japan has over the Pentagon is not U.S. bases there (although, in the words of the DOD report, “Japan supplies by far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies ) but the military’s dependence on important Japanese technologies flat-panel computer displays, for example.

## Net Benefit: AT: Rearmament

**[ ] Japan will never seek nuclear weapons because there's no political support and they wouldn't be able to get the nuclear fuel**

**Takashi Yokota, Associate Editor at Newsweek Japan responsible for the coverage of defense and diplomatic issues, 6/12/09**

"The N Word – Why Japan won't go Nuclear.", <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/06/12/the-n-word.html>,

Japan, moreover, now occupies the nuke-free high ground and would risk losing its innocence if it went nuclear. According to an internal 1995 study by Japan's defense establishment, reversing the country's no-nukes policy would trigger the collapse of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, as the withdrawal of the world's only nuclear victim could fatally undermine confidence in the system. Such a move would also severely damage relations with Washington—Tokyo's most important ally—and the alarm in Beijing and Seoul could set off a nuclear race across East Asia. Japan would get the blame. The consequences for Japan's energy supplies and economy could be equally catastrophic. If Japan broke out of the NPT, the countries that now supply it with nuclear fuel, including Canada, Australia and the United States, would surely hold back their shipments, which are currently conditioned on the fuel's peaceful use. That would be a nightmare for Japan, which relies on nuclear energy for nearly a third of its electricity. There's one other roadblock to consider: Japan's top nuclear hawks have seen their power weaken considerably in recent years. Abe lost most of his clout after abruptly resigning as prime minister two years ago. In February, Nakagawa resigned as finance minister in disgrace after appearing drunk at a news conference. And Aso is practically a lame duck these days, with little room for bold moves. Of course, the political environment may change if North Korea continues to act belligerently or if China proves to be a real threat, as Japanese hawks fear. But even then, most Japanese experts believe that their country would stop short of building a bomb of its own. At most, it might temporarily allow the United States to base nukes on Japanese territory. Another option would be to develop the means to stage a conventional strike against North Korea's launch pads. But even the strike plan won't become reality anytime soon, as senior lawmakers and experts say current proposals are "amateurish" and poorly thought out. And any revision of the non-nuke policy would be a much greater stretch, given the weakness of the hawkish wing of the ruling LDP. There are still many good reasons to try to rein in North Korea's nuclear program, and its attempts to build missiles that could deliver those weapons to the U.S. and Japan. But the risk that Japan will go nuclear is not one of them.

**[ ] Japanese Rearmament prevents war over China and Taiwan**

**Richard Lowry, National Review editor, 7/4/2005**

"Time for the Sun to Rise," <http://smarties.goodleaf.net/?eid=181>,

China's ambitions are what make a more rational, up-to-date Japanese defense posture so imperative. China is pursuing what it calls "comprehensive national power" — economic growth, military power, and diplomatic influence....To the extent that China has to worry about, not just a U.S. defense, but a Japanese defense of Taiwan, it complicates China's planning and makes a military move marginally less likely. This is the purpose of a strong Japan more broadly. It creates a balance of power in East Asia — of the sort that once existed in Europe — that makes any Chinese hegemonic ambitions more difficult to achieve.

## Net Benefit: Free Trade Bad

[ ]

[ ]

### [ ] **Studies show that free trade increases poverty in many parts of the globe**

**Saul Landau, author of *The Business of America*, writer for *Counterpunch* magazine, 6/10/04**  
 “Force-feeding lies about free trade,” <http://www.counterpunch.org/landau06102004.html>

Unfortunately, no major newspaper or TV news show offered prime space to the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) biannual report. This document calls into question the entire "globalization" or "free market" system. Increased international trade, it concludes, has not led to reduction in poverty in the world's poorest countries. Indeed, during this boom of world trade poverty has increased, as has the income gap between rich and poor. The study found little linkage to show that trade had enlarged the income of the poorest in the world's 50 least developed countries. UNCTAD officials confirmed that trade had helped integrate some poor countries into the world economy; but their negative trade balances had grown more distressing as a result of the neo-liberal trade policies. So opening up markets does not spread benefits? Why does it take a panel of experts to state what observant people already knew: world trade investment--without tariffs, taxes or government regulation harms the world's 3 billion plus neediest people and helps the wealthiest. Data to back this conclusion comes from a recent report from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. The report's authors estimate that 227 million Latin American and Caribbean citizens live below the limits of poverty. In the first years of 21st Century, this region recorded an unemployment rate of 10.3 percent almost akin to the depression of the 1930s.

### [ ] **Globalization makes more war likely by exacerbating the gap between the rich and poor and hurting the environment**

**Stephen Staples, Director of the Polaris Institute's Project on the Corporate-Security State, 8/29/03**

“How Globalization Promotes War”, <http://www.unitedforpeace.org/article.php?id=1948>,

Globalization, more correctly called corporate globalization, is founded upon a conservative, free market-oriented worldview that seeks to limit the economic impact of government actions. The institutions and agreements that codify globalization, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), place restrictions on government services and regulations that might inhibit corporate profits — while championing the government’s role in providing national security. 1. Globalization promotes the conditions for war. Ethnic and religious differences mask the underlying economic causes of the more than 30 wars raging around the world today. Inequality, competition for dwindling resources, and environmental degradation are factors in the outbreak of armed conflict that are worsened by free trade. Globalization undermines the ability of governments to regulate and mitigate the damaging effects of the market, which leads to an intensification of all of the economic causes of war.

## Net Benefit: Free Trade Bad

**[\_\_] Free trade facilitates terrorism. Osama Bin Laden associates the US with the spread of free trade**

**Antulio Echevarria – Lieutenant Col., Director of Strategic Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003,**

“Globalization And The Nature Of War,” Strategies Studies Institute,  
[www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Globalization-War-SSI%20Mar03.htm](http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Globalization-War-SSI%20Mar03.htm),

In the global war on terrorism, the element of blind natural force is playing the decisive role. Globalization has, among other things, contributed to the creation of fertile breeding grounds for terrorism as some groups try to resist its encroachment. Al Qaeda has associated the United States with the spread of globalization, which it sees as a form of decadence. Building on the perception that Islamic society’s current political and economic problems are the result of the West’s decadent values and duplicitous policies, Al Qaeda has penetrated Islamic nongovernmental organizations and woven itself into the social, political, and religious fabric of Muslim societies. Consequently, it has managed to create a substantial support base that may enable it to regenerate itself indefinitely.<sup>53</sup> Despite the arrest of hundreds of operatives in North America and abroad since the attacks of September 11, 2001, for example, Al Qaeda has created new cells and reconstituted older ones.<sup>54</sup> While operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere have led to the killing or capture of some 16 of its 25key leaders, Al Qaeda’s ideology remains intact and will probably continue to draw young Muslims.<sup>55</sup>

**[\_\_] A terrorist attack would cause extinction**

**Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/2004**

(Al-Ahram Online. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm> |

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Turkey Counterplan- Neg

## Condition on Kurdistan Counterplan

Explanation .....	1
Glossary.....	2
Kurdistan Counterplan INC Shell.....	3-4
<u>Solvency Extensions</u>	
Turkey Says Yes - General.....	5
Turkey Says Yes - Nukes .....	6
AT: Turkey Won't Agree to Kurdistan .....	7-8
<u>Net Benefit Extensions</u>	
Net Benefit: Stabilizes Middle East .....	9
Net Benefit: Kurdistan Key to Hegemony .....	10
Net Benefit: Kurdistan Creates Economic Growth .....	11
<u>Competition Extensions</u>	
AT: Permutation.....	12-13

## Explanation

This is a condition counterplan. It argues that instead of just doing the plan, that the United States should only implement the plan and withdraw military presence if the country where the troops are agrees to take a certain course of action. It is called a condition counterplan because the presence withdrawal is not guaranteed, that there is a “condition” on which the plan will not be done.

This condition counterplan should be used against the Turkey affirmative. It argues that the US will withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey if Turkey agrees to the creation of a new country for Kurdish peoples called Kurdistan. The counterplan argues that currently the Kurds are pushing for their country to be recognized, but Turkey is blocking the process. The US tactical nuclear weapons are a key bargaining chip, and that Turkey no longer wants them there. In exchange for the removal of nuclear weapons, Turkey will allow the Kurds to declare themselves an independent nation. The counterplan further argues that an independent Turkish state will help US stability and be a key ally in the region

## Glossary

Incirlik: The name of the base where the US tactical nuclear weapons are stored.

Kurdistan: Name of the fictional state the Kurds are trying to create.

Kurds: Ethnic minority group that exists in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. Because of a history of oppression by these countries, the Kurds are seeking their own state.

Hezbollah: Islamist terrorist organization based in Lebanon.

European Union: Political Union between many of the states of Europe. Turkey is attempting to join the European Union, but one of the reasons it has been denied is because of abuses of Kurdish people in Turkey.

PKK: Acronym for Kurdistan Workers Party. The PKK is a group that has launched armed assaults against Turkey in an attempt to gain independence. They are considered by many to be a terrorist organization.

## Kurdistan Counterplan INC Shell [1/2]

**TEXT: The United States federal government should offer the government of Turkey that (insert plan text) on the condition that the government of Turkey provides all necessary support for the establishment of the sovereign nation of Kurdistan.**

**Contention One: Competition. The plan commits to a withdrawal from Turkey no matter what. Withdrawal in the counterplan will not happen unless Turkey agrees to certain conditions. Turkey could say no and the plan would not happen.**

**Contention Two: Net Benefits.**

**Turkey would say yes, because they want a decreased military presence**

**David Cloud, writer for the New York Times 10/12/07**

"Military Seeks Alternatives in Case Turkey Limits Access",  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/europe/12military.html>)

Turkey signaled its displeasure by recalling its ambassador to Washington on Thursday, the day after the House Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the resolution. Meanwhile, Bush administration officials stepped up their warnings that passage of the measure by the full House could have dire consequences. For the second day in a row, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates warned about the "enormous implications" for American military operations in Iraq if Turkey limited flights over its territory or restricted access to Incirlik Air Base. "All I can say is that a resolution that looks back almost 100 years to an event that took place under a predecessor government, the Ottomans, and that has enormous present-day implications for American soldiers and Marines and sailors and airmen in Iraq, is something we need to take very seriously," Mr. Gates told reporters in London. In public, only Turkish legislators have explicitly warned of limiting the American military presence, though other members of the government have also warned of consequences. "This is an issue where the Turkish officials have made clear their very strong concerns about this and have raised questions about potential consequences in the event that this resolution passes," said Tom Casey, a State Department spokesman. Though a NATO ally, Turkey has proved a roadblock to American military actions before, especially in March 2003, when its Parliament refused to authorize movement of American ground troops through its territory during the initial invasion of Iraq.

## Kurdistan Counterplan INC Shell [2/2]

**Kurdistan would prevent Middle Eastern wars, help control terrorism, and would provide the US deterrence in the region**

**Chia Mustafa, Harvard Graduate and a senior political and foreign affairs advisor to Movement for Change, 2009**

Iraqi Kurdish political movement "The Case for Kurdistan"

A Kurdish state can also provide many military, political, and social benefits to its western allies. These benefits become most evident when one looks at the number of U.S. soldiers who have been stationed within Kurdistan since 2003. In a report on 60 Minutes, Bob Simon observes that while Iraqi Kurdistan is the safest and most stable region of Iraq today, there are currently only forty U.S. soldiers stationed in Kurdistan and their presence is a mere formality.<sup>3</sup> Unlike other Middle Eastern states—apart from Israel—Kurdistan could become an entryway for Westerners who wish to gain a foothold in the Middle East. Because of its location, a friendly Kurdish state could also offset America's loss of any strategic assets offered by Turkey and other nearby Arab countries. At the same time, a pro-western, secular, democratic Kurdish state could act as a buffer state or counter-force to regional aggressors such as Iran and Syria. If the Kurds take up an active role against regional terrorism (a fight in which they have already been quite active and successful) they would have the ability to cut off funding and smuggling to groups like Hezbollah, the Taliban, and Al Qaida. Kurdistan could be one of the greatest assets to the West. It shares many of the same traditional enemies and has never been hesitant to combat their aggression.

**A Middle East War would cause the use of nuclear weapons**

**John Steinbach, Nuclear Peace Foundation, 03/2002**

[http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00\\_steinbach\\_israeli-wmd.htm](http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2002/03/00_steinbach_israeli-wmd.htm),

Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familiar pattern (Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

## Turkey Says Yes - General

**Turkey will agree to the condition, multiple sources in Turkey want decreased US presence**

**Amy Holmes, CNN political contributor and conservative commentator 1/18/06**

“Contentious Allies: How Social Movements in Turkey Impacted the American Military Presence”, paper presented at the American Studies Association national conference  
[http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/1/0/5/5/1/pages105519/p105519-2.php](http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/0/5/5/1/pages105519/p105519-2.php).

By studying the history of the US presence in Turkey – one of its most important allies during the Cold War and a country which straddles Europe and Asia – I hope to show how popular attitudes in Turkey changed over time and how both organized social movements and unorganized forms of unrest against the US military presence eventually undermined the ability of the US to operate there and led the US authorities to sharply reduce the number of personnel stationed in Turkey. I have classified these types of social unrest into four categories: 1) opposition within the parliament 2) strikes of Turkish workers at American military facilities 3) student movements and 4) unorganized violence and rioting. Finally, analyzing how micro-level social unrest can influence macro-level processes could contribute to an understanding of the external limits of US military expansion.

## Turkey Says Yes - Nukes

**Turkey would agree, it wants the U.S. to remove Tactical Nuclear Weapons to help Middle East stability**

**Mustafa Kibaroglu, Professor of arms control and disarmament in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara 06/2010,**

Turkey, Arms Control Association “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”,  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010\\_06/Kibaroglu](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu)

In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.[21] Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them.[22] Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens.

## AT: Turkey Won't Agree to Kurdistan

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Turkey would agree to a Kurdish state, they could siphon off Kurdish militants**

**David Perlmutter associate professor at Louisiana State University, is a military historian, 9/5/2002,**

LA Times, "A Remedy in Iraq: Kurdish Autonomy" Google Newspapers

On the face of it, the moral sanction for an independent Kurdish state is unambiguous. The Kurds have existed as an independent people since ancient times. Unlike more prominent local aspirants for nationhood—the Palestinians—the Kurds have a separate language, culture, ethnic heritage and a continuous political precedent of seeking statehood. Indeed, legally, there should be an independent Kurdistan. The Treaty of Serves, which delineated the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, recognized that the Kurds deserved their own state. Of course, the devil's details for an independent Kurdistan in what is now the "no-fly" zone of northern Iraq are great. Most regional powers, such as Turkey, Syria, and Iran, oppose a Kurdish state because they believe that it would encourage hopes—and uprisings—for autonomy by their own Kurdish minorities. For example, Turkey—our must-have ally for any war on Iraq—has been fighting a decades-long insurgency war with Kurdish separatists. Other Arab states oppose Kurdish liberation because they fear the precedent of breaking up Iraq. The Kurds (and the United States) could provide treaties and assurances that Kurdistan's borders with its neighbors would be fixed and extraterritorial Kurdish ambitions suppressed. Another "carrot" could be that rebellious Kurds in border nations could emigrate to the new Kurdish state. Turkey would be happy to siphon off all its Kurdish militants.

## AT: Turkey Won't Agree to Kurdistan

[ ] **The Kurdish issue is blocking Turkey from joining the EU**

**Dr. John Brademas is President Emeritus of New York University, PBS, 5/14/2008,**

“Turkey’s Tiger: Report Card: Turkey and EU Membership?: The Kurds”,

<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/turkeys-tigers/report-card-turkey-and-eu-membership/the-kurds/838/>

A dimension of Turkey’s ambition to join the European Union is the Kurdish question. Of the 30 million Kurds, as many as 18 million live in Turkey, eight million in Iran, five to six million in Iraq, and a million and a half in Syria. Turkey is deeply hostile to the prospect of an independent Kurdistan. A 2005 Human Rights Watch report declared, “On a key benchmark for European Union membership, the Turkish government has failed to honor pledges to help 378,000 displaced people, mainly Kurds, return home more than a decade after the army forced them from their villages in southeastern Turkey.” In a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on June 7, 2006, Human Rights Watch asserted that Turkey was using an anti-terror law to prosecute three Kurdish activists who attempted to stage a peaceful protest near the Iraq border. “This trial... is a litmus test of Turkey’s commitment to reform,” said Human Rights Watch officials, noting that the association of which the prisoners were members was closed last May for doing its business in the Kurdish language, a charge, said HRW, that violated standards established by the European Union Rights Convention, which Turkey agreed to over half a century ago. Human Rights Watch added, “As of November 2005 not a single private broadcaster had been given permission to broadcast in Kurdish.” In a report issued on July 18, 2006, “Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk,” the International Crisis Group warned that “Turkey, in particular, has indicated it will not tolerate Kirkuk’s formal absorption into the Kurdish region, and it has various means of coercive diplomacy at its disposal, including last-resort military intervention, to blockade the Kurds’ ambitions.” A peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue would clearly help Turkey in its ambition to join the European Union. Solving the Kurdish question is, of course, not solely up to Turkey.

[ ] **Turkey will do anything to Join the EU**

**Today’s Zaman, Turkish English-language based daily international and domestic newspaper, 6/29/10**

“Turkey Committed to EU Goal, Says Erdoğan” <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-214533-100-turkey-committed-to-eu-goal-says-erdogan.html>,

Turkey has not given up its ambition to join the European Union and has no intention of cutting its ties with the West, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said. Erdoğan, speaking in an interview published in Canada’s Toronto Star newspaper on Sunday, also reiterated Turkey’s conditions for normalizing relations with Israel, whose commandos killed eight Turks and one American aboard an aid ship trying to break an Israeli embargo on the Gaza Strip. Relations will remain strained until Israel apologizes for the raid on the ship, pays compensation to the families of the nine people killed, agrees to an international probe as called for by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon into the incident as opposed to an Israeli inquiry and lifts its embargo on the Gaza Strip, according to Erdoğan. Harsh criticism of Israel following the deadly raid came as Turkey voted against US-backed sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council. Both developments fueled claims in the West that Turkey is turning away from the West and building alliances with countries such as Iran and Syria. Asked to comment on claims that Turkey is turning away from the West, Erdoğan said: “That would be a very wrong conclusion. Turkey is developing contacts all over the world. But Turkey has not cut off relations with anyone. Such a thing is not on the agenda.” He also said Turkey continues “with determination to walk on the European path, despite the efforts on the part of the European Union to prevent the opening of some of the chapters that are part of the negotiations process.”

## Net Benefit: Stabilizes Middle East

### **An independent Kurdistan would stabilize the economies of the Middle East**

**Saeed Kakeyi, writer for The Kurdish Aspect, 6/14/10**

“Kurds, Oil, and International Political Economy”

<http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc061410SK1.html>,

Provided that Kurdistan have gained Independence or at least a Federated States within the countries where they are now, so they could plan and implement their own development strategies; it could easily contribute vigorously in the market balance of the region. Kurdistan possesses all elements of a quick and strong economic development, such as: abundance source of energy; ample water resources; optimal rainfall in a temperate climate and a cheap labor force. All these factors are good incentives which will attract investments not only in food production but also in other economic fields.

### **US support of an independent Kurdish state leads to effective Middle East disengagement and Turkish cooperation, stabilizing the region**

**David A. Andelman, executive editor of Forbes.com, is 10/28/2007,**

“Knuckleheads In Kurdistan”, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-andelman/knuckleheads-in-kurdistan\\_b\\_70177.html?page=2&show\\_comment\\_id=10270379#comment\\_10270379](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-andelman/knuckleheads-in-kurdistan_b_70177.html?page=2&show_comment_id=10270379#comment_10270379),

It happens that in the ensuing nine decades, the Kurds and their region of Kurdistan have turned out to be the lone promising island of peace and prosperity in the nation of Iraq. Certainly the way the borders were carved -- leaving a large chunk of Kurds in the reconstituted Turkey that was all the peacemakers left of the once vast Ottoman Empire -- was just one of a host of errors. Nevertheless, the world may now be in a position today to reverse, even rectify these errors. Peace and prosperity may be just two of a host of consequences. Arriving at a solution to the tensions across the Turkish-Kurdish frontier may also lead to an independent nation of Kurdistan, a model for the rest of Iraq and a roadmap to eventual American disengagement from the entire region. But first we have to get there. And that's where the problems arise. There are, quite simply, a host of strong passions on all sides of the frontier -- and I say all sides because Iran, with its own small Kurdish population, and a big stake in the future of the rest of Iraq, also has a dog in this fight. Indeed only 20 percent of all Kurds are in Kurdistan itself. Some 55 percent are actually in Turkey, another 20 percent are in Iran and smaller numbers are scattered across Asia and the Caucasus including 200,000 in Afghanistan and even 100,000 in Israel. None of this, however, should prevent an independent nation of Kurdistan. Certainly there are far more Albanians in Albania than in Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. Yet that doesn't prevent Kosovo from aspiring to independence. Indeed, an independent Kurdistan could play for the Kurds the same role as a homeland that the Jews lusted after and, after centuries, won for themselves. Still, we have to take this one baby step at a time. First, we need to encourage General Buyukanit and his military not to take steps that would make Kurds grieve with an unimaginable intensity. We, and by that I mean not only the United States but also the European Union which can dangle a real carrot in the form of potential Turkish membership in the EU, must persuade Turkey that a free and independent Kurdistan on its border would be the best possible guarantee that PKK guerrillas are tamed and held in check. It's pretty clear that a Congressional resolution bashing Turkey for its unquestionable genocide of another resident minority, the Armenians, ninety years ago, would remove much of our ability to talk calmly and rationally with the current rulers of Turkey.

## Net Benefit: Kurdistan Key to Hegemony

**Kurdistan is key to US hegemony in the Middle East because it would serve as a key area for bases and power projection**

**David Perlmutter associate professor at Louisiana State University, is a military historian, 9/5/2002,**

LA Times, “A Remedy in Iraq: Kurdish Autonomy” Google Newspapers

The regional consequences of Kurdistan are attractive as well. Certainly a shrunken Iraq would be of even less danger to its neighbors. Yet the U.S. would have to establish a strong military presence, much like in South Korea. The Kurds would welcome permanent American bases and troop deployments. This shift of U.S. power and personnel would lessen our reliance on the increasingly hostile Saudi people and unreliable Saudi regime. In addition, al-Qaida would lose its greatest recruiting slogan: that U.S. soldiers are trampling the holy sand of Arabia.

## Net Benefit: Kurdistan Creates Economic Growth

### **An independent Kurdish state would lead to enormous oil and natural gas revenue for the United States**

**Chia Mustafa, Harvard Graduate and a senior political and foreign affairs advisor to Movement for Change, 2009**

Iraqi Kurdish political movement “The Case for Kurdistan”

It is all too often argued—with condemnable political expediency—that support for a Kurdish state would hurt American interests by upsetting America’s relations with its Arab allies. Well, I say, if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em, so here is an expedient argument of my own: America could make huge profits from its support for a Kurdish state because modern Kurdistan rests on some of the world’s largest oil reserves, many of which have not yet been tapped. So far, only the oil fields in the Diyala province near Kirkuk have been monopolized, but the region appears to be rich in oil throughout. If this oil is utilized correctly, and not mismanaged by the inefficient Iraqi bureaucracy that governs it today, America could gain handsomely. And oil is not the only commodity available in large quantities in Kurdistan; Northern Iraq is rich in natural gas, uranium, plutonium, coal, marble and water. An established Kurdish state could provide the Western world with the perfect opportunity to secure alternate routes for oil and natural gas pipelines, decreasing the influence of countries like Russia in the natural gas industry, and organizations, like OPEC, in the oil industry. Within the next couple of years, three new oil pipelines will be built in Kurdistan, with two running through Turkey and one through Azerbaijan and Armenia. These new infrastructure projects could secure a stable source of income for Kurdish people and create alternate trade routes for the Western world.

## AT: Permutation

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Incirlik base is a key bargaining chip between the US and Turkey**

**Michael Gass, former Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist and veteran of the Gulf War during operations in Iraq in 1991, 6/23/201**

[TruthOut, Israel's Actions Could Have US Military Base Implications, <http://www.truth-out.org/israels-actions-could-have-us-military-base-implications60697>]

One of the main US bases for operations in the Middle East is Incirlik AB, which is located in Adana, Turkey. During both the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Incirlik AB played a major role in US and NATO operations. The United States has had to walk a fine line with the Turkish government as it supports the Kurdish people in northern Iraq since there is great animosity between the Kurds and Turks. In 2009, the US ambassador to Turkey issued a statement that US forces would remain at Incirlik AB, Turkey. Apparently, Turkey had threatened to close Incirlik AB over the proposed Armenian genocide resolution. US unconditional support for Israel after its attack on the aid flotilla could very well strain US-Turkish relations to the point that the Turkish government once again looks to close Incirlik AB. The loss of Incirlik AB in Turkey would be a huge blow to future military operations by the United States and NATO in the Middle East. It is so vital to the United States and NATO, and such a huge bargaining chip for the Turkish government, that there is no long-term lease for its use by the United States. New agreements are negotiated on a periodic basis, and Turkey has used the base as a bargaining chip before. The troops the United States kept in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War have already been moved to the bases the US built in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. Those Iraq military bases are now scheduled to be closed after Iraq ordered the withdrawal of all US troops by 2011. Those troops are now being moved to the bases the US built in Afghanistan since our invasion in 2002. Without US military assistance, there is little hope of President Karzai keeping control of the government. He simply doesn't have the security forces necessary to protect his government at this time. Given this fact, there is little doubt that the US and Afghanistan will enter into an agreement to keep US bases in Afghanistan despite President Obama's reassurance that US troops will eventually leave the country. However, until Karzai's power is secured, Incirlik AB remains the one operational base in the Middle East region maintained by the United States that is stable.

## AT: Permutation

### [ ] **The Incirlik base is a key bargaining chip for the Kurdish issue with Turkey**

**Eral Yilmaz, staff writer for World Markets, 1/21/04**

[World Markets Analysis, "Turkish Prime Minister to Warn US President on Iraqi Kurdish Federation" Lexis Nexis]

During his meeting with US President George W. Bush on 28 January, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will indicate Turkey's displeasure at movements by Iraqi Kurds towards the establishment of a federal Iraqi state based on ethnicity, despite US claims that it is in favor of the territorial unity of Iraq. Recent weeks have seen a number of top-level spats between Turkish officials decrying the US's apparent reluctance to implement its Iraq policy, while Iraqi Kurdish leaders have continued to clamor for extensive autonomy in northern Iraq, the exile of Arabs from the province and for Turkey not to interfere in the Kurds' internal affairs. Erdogan's message to Bush will claim that despite the US's policy of equal representation for all ethnic groups, US policy on the ground in Iraq is actually discriminatory and is exacerbating the communication problem between different ethnic groups, which could lead to civil war in the country. Erdogan will state that Iraq's neighbors have a right to a say in the country's future as the chaos threatens to infect the region. Significance: Erdogan may be gearing up to deliver a 'harsh' message to the US President, but the Turkish government will have to re-assess the value of its bargaining chips if it wishes to have any impact on the US's Iraq policy. The government's willingness to allow the US to use the Incirlik military base in southern Turkey to rotate US troops in and out of Iraq was expected to be in exchange for the US refusing Iraqi Kurdish demands for a federal Iraq. Instead, the US put more pressure on the European Union (EU) to accept Turkey's membership bid. Turkey is wary of an Iraqi Kurdish autonomous region on its southern border in case this encourages its own Kurdish minority to seek independence.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Turkey Counterplan Aff

## Condition on Kurdistan Counterplan Affirmative

### Solvency Answers

Solvency: Turkey Says No - General.....	1
Solvency: Turkey Says No - Nukes.....	2
Solvency: Turkey Says No to Kurdistan .....	3
Solvency: Kurdistan Impossible.....	4-5

### Net Benefit Answers

Net Benefit: Kurdistan Kills US-Turkey Relations.....	5
Net Benefit: Turkey Relations Impact .....	7
Net Benefit: Kurdistan Causes Middle East Instability .....	7-9
Net Benefit: Non unique Turkish State Exists.....	10

## Solvency: Turkey Says No - General

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Turkey will reject the condition because the US has no leverage over Turkey**

**Vugar Seyidov, political reviewer for AzerTAG news agency, 4/14/10**

“US has no leverage on Armenia, Turkey,” <http://www.news.az/articles/13234>,

The Americans have no levers of pressure on Turkey either. Whoever thinks that Turkey can be blackmailed with the resolution on the recognition of the fictional 'genocide' is mistaken. This is a senseless threat. Recognition will give nothing, except for five days of joy to the Armenians. Then there will come the realization 'what next?' Nothing. The world can recognize the 'genocide' and this will be nothing but a senseless political declaration. A court recognition is more important but it will never happen as the Malta tribunal was held long ago and did not recognize the genocide. There will be no new court hearing in the Hague, as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court allows the consideration of acts of genocide that took place after 2002. Parliamentarians can adopt any resolution. They have no importance for Turkey. Lawmakers in several countries have passed resolutions and Turkey has not collapsed as a result. This made the Armenians happy for a couple of days and that's all. Their brandy is finished.

## Solvency: Turkey Says No - Nukes

**[ ] Turkey wants to maintain US nuclear weapons to deter Iran and Russia, so they would say no**

**Nikolai Sokov, Senior Research Associate at the MIIS Center for Nonproliferation Studies, July 2009**

“Issue 4: Tactical (Substrategic) Nuclear Weapons,” in Four Emerging Issues in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation: Opportunities for German Leadership, online:

[http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717\\_german\\_leadership/german\\_leadership\\_6\\_issue\\_4.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf)

On the other hand, Turkey and new NATO members in Eastern Europe are more eager to retain American tactical nuclear weapons to insure against a resurgent Russia or a more capable Iran, just as they show greater interest in the European leg of the U.S. missile defense system. They also see the presence of the weapons as a means of insuring that the alliance remains focused on territorial defense rather than shifting to out-of-area efforts, such as the conflict in Afghanistan or the effort to inject NATO into areas such as arms control and nonproliferation.

**[ ] Both Turkish political and military officials are heavily in favor of maintaining the TNWs, so they would reject the counterplan**

**Lale Sariibrahimoglu, writer for Today's Zaman, 5/4/09**

“Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil”, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174286>

But Mustafa Kibaroglu, an associate professor at Ankara's Bilkent University and an expert on arms control issues, told Today's Zaman that Turkish decision makers, i.e., both the political and the military leadership, are for maintaining those weapons on Turkish soil to continue their deterrence capabilities in the region, which includes the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Second, Turkey sees the US as the backbone of deterrence in the region and does not favor the idea of scrapping the nukes from its soil. Kibaroglu, in an article he had published by the Routledge publishing house in December 2005 under the headline "Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?," gives an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the Turkish reluctance over the idea to scrap US nukes on its territory. Kibaroglu states in his article that the attitude of Turkish officials toward US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. "However, since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with reducing the number of US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries, including Turkey," he asserts. Turkey's possible reluctance to agree on the withdrawal of nukes from its soil sets another example of the Turkish state's inability to adjust itself to the new realities of the world following the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, recalled a Turkish security analyst. Neighboring Iran's possible attempts to acquire nuclear weapons may also harden the Turkish policy of agreeing to the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from its soil, asserted the same analyst.

## Solvency: Turkey Says No to Kurdistan

[ ] Turkey views the Kurds as terrorists and would not agree to a state for them

**Shane Donovan, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, Fall 2006,**  
Global Catastrophe, Vol. 28 (3), <http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1567>

Prospects for autonomy for Turkish and Iranian Kurds look no better. From 1980 to 1999, Turkey categorically refused to negotiate with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), on the grounds that it was a terrorist organization. However, since the capture and imprisonment of the group's founder Abdullah İcalan in 1999, the organization has largely disintegrated. Turkey, however, cites the violence of those years whenever the prospect of Kurdish autonomy is broached and uses it to silence discussion. In Iran it is almost impossible for Sunnis to run for public office because of discriminatory laws, and most Kurds are Sunni. This tactic has been used to disenfranchise Kurdish regions in the west of Iran, especially in the former Republic of Mahabad, a region that fought and lost a brief war for independence against the Iranian government in 1945. In addition, the teaching of Kurdish has been banned in schools. The Kurdish independence movement in Iran is all but dead.

## Solvency: Kurdistan Impossible

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Kurdistan is impossible because neighboring states besides Turkey would never agree**

**Michael M. Gunter, professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University, author of five critically praised scholarly books on the Kurdish question, he is a former Senior Fulbright Lecturer in International Relations in Turkey and Israel, Spring 2004, *Middle East Policy* “Why Kurdish Statehood is Unlikely”**

With the possible exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish statehood is unlikely in the near future for several reasons. In the first place, Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds) is completely contained within already existing states - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To create an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these preexisting states. No state on earth would support a doctrine that sanctions its own potential breakup. Thus, the international community has generally been hostile to any redrawing of the map that was not part of the decolonization process. Between Iceland's secession from Denmark in 1944 and the collapse of communism in 1991, the only successful secessionist movements were in Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1991). The collapse of colonialism after World War II and the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, led to two waves of state creation. However, there are no more empires to collapse and accordingly very few possibilities for further state creation today. A Kurdish state would probably only emerge if there were a major collapse of the existing state system of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East. With the exception of Iraq, this is highly unlikely to happen. The Kurdish situation, therefore, is reminiscent of that of the Poles between 1795 and 1919. It took the upheaval of World War I to shake loose a Polish state from the shackles of internal colonialism imposed by Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia. Although the Gulf War in 1991 did result in a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq (more on this below), only a total re-rolling of the international dice that might follow another world war would be likely to lead to the creation of an independent Kurdistan for all the Kurds.

## Solvency: Kurdistan Impossible

**Kurdistan is impossible, the people that make up “Kurds” are not homogenous and would fight**

**Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, editorial for the American Chronicle, 5/9/07**

<http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/26681>

When the criminal supporters of this fantasy fall short of ‘historical arguments’, they transfigure themselves to oppressed peoples’ advocates: like all the other peoples, Kurds ‘must’ have a national home! This is the supreme stage of their fallacy! In fact, there cannot be a Kurdistan, because simply there are no ‘Kurds’. Kurds are not one people. To start with basics, Kurds are not one people, they do not speak one single language, they do not write their languages by means of one writing system only, they do not believe in one and the same religion, they have no common culture and lifestyle, and they have very varied perspectives and targets. Gathering under one roof all the populations that the Western centers of colonial conspiracy intend to include within the borders of a coffin (do not call it ‘country’ if you please) will be lethal to most of these peoples, and in addition detrimental to the security of other ethnic groups that will form the various ‘minorities’ of that place – if we consider all the different peoples that are called ‘Kurds’ as one ethnic group, and therefore the rising local ‘majority’. Little Academic Knowledge about the ‘Kurds’ Of course, no one would consider the academic knowledge about one people / nation as a prerogative to achieve independence and national statehood. However, at this point is revealed the fallacy of the secretive Western groups of power that intend to materialize this plan; they mendaciously present all these peoples as one: the ‘Kurds’! Quite contrarily to their assumptions, onsite reality is strikingly different from the Western labs where the falsehood of the ‘one Kurdish people’ is being fabricated. These various peoples – erroneously called at the international level ‘Kurds’ – are not just one people, but many; they have different origins that cannot be retraced easily. How could we put them together just for the needs of the next explosion in the Middle East?

**Even top Kurd activists think a Kurdish state is impossible**

**Aliraqi, news agency, 8/16/03,**

<http://www.aliraqi.org/forums/showthread.php?t=22562>

Iraq's Kurdish leaders decided to adopt practical goals, opting to work for a democratic Iraq rather than a separate state, a senior Iraqi Kurdish leader said. "We must be realistic," said Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a representative on the 25-member interim council announced in Baghdad on July 13, adding, "The parties ... must look to the possible, achievable, tangible goals of the people. We think that the best way for the Kurds is now this democratic, parliamentary, federative, pluralistic Iraq." Talabani has been an advocate for Kurdish rights for more than fifty years. He and Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led the Kurdish zone in northern Iraq that had near-autonomy from Saddam Hussein's regime since shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. "Both parties suffered too much, sacrificed too much. Now, something achievable is the federation within the framework of Iraq. Independence is impossible, I am not asking for impossible things," he said.

## Net Benefit: Kurdistan Kills US-Turkey Relations

**[\_\_] Kurdistan would create divisions and kill US-Turkey relations because it would undermine a united Iraq**

**Robert Olson, is a leading international authority on transnational Kurdish nationalist movements; a topic on which he has published 95 research articles and essays, 9/4/2009, *Kurdistanica* “An Independent Kurdistan?” <http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=node/151>,**

What, then, is holding the Kurds back from declaring independence? There are several factors: one, it currently goes against the US stated position of supporting an “unified” Iraq; two, such a declaration would put an end to any federation negotiations between Arab Iraq and the new Kurdish state. This would also entail the possibility that the Kurds would face a newly aroused Iraqi Arab nationalism, this time infused with an Iraqi Shi’a nationalist discourse, rather than a Sunni discourse, which could be even more strident. A declaration of independence would also greatly irritate Turkey which has a strong Kurdish nationalist movement among its estimated 15-17 million Kurds. Turkey has so far supported the US position of advocating a unified Iraq in order to contain the spread and influence of Kurdistan-Iraq, much more prosperous than the poverty laden and economically underdeveloped Kurdish regions in the southeast of Turkey. If the Kurds of Iraq declare independence, there is no guarantee that Turkey will continue its policy of tolerating such a state. Iran, with a Kurdish population of an estimated 6 million (out of a total population of 69 million) and Syria with an estimated Kurdish population of 1.5 (out of a total population of 18 million) also face strong Kurdish nationalist movements and would be strongly opposed to an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.

**[\_\_] Kurdistan would create instability and anger all regional actors in the Middle East, especially Turkey**

**Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009 Mediterranean Quarterly 20:4, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/carpenter-middle-east-vortex-unstable-iraq.pdf>**

Despite its economic and political achievements, there is almost no prospect for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan. Washington opposes such a step, fearing that proclaiming Kurdish independence would not only lead to further fragmentation of Iraq but would antagonize all of Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors, especially Turkey. That is a legitimate concern. The underlying problem is that the Kurds are the largest nationality in the world without an officially recognized state. Although the British government promised the Kurds a homeland following the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, London reneged on that commitment, and Kurdish territory was divided among Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Any talk of an independent Kurdistan sets off alarm bells in Tehran, Damascus, and especially Ankara, since fully 50 percent of Kurds live in Turkey. Ankara is already less than pleased with the existence of a de facto Kurdish state in Iraq.<sup>9</sup> And Turkish leaders have reason to be uneasy. The Turkish military has waged a war for some two-and-a-half decades against Kurdish secessionists, led by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Fighting flared during 2007, with PKK fighters striking targets inside Turkey and then taking refuge across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara’s patience finally ran out in late 2007, and Turkish military forces launched attacks on some of those sanctuaries. Turkey had actually threatened a much larger operation, and Washington feared that the incursions could lead to a full-scale war between Turkish military units and the Peshmerga. US officials prevailed upon Ankara to limit its military operations in exchange for US intelligence and other assistance against the PKK and a commitment from Iraqi Kurdish leaders to take action against PKK activities in their territory.<sup>10</sup>

## Net Benefit: Turkey Relations Impact

[ ] US-Turkey relations are key to maintain hegemony and stability in the Middle East

**Henri Barkey, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, specialist in Turkish politics, 2003**

“The United States and Turkey.” Allies in Need, pp 209-211.

U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since 1990. The cold war’s straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the cold war was based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies’ interests and on globally expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention has shifted to mid-level powers such as Iran and Iraq with ambitions to acquire nonconventional weaponry and the means to deliver them. This policy vision lacks the simplicity of containment, but it has impacted Turkey significantly. Turkey’s proximity to many regions in flux or in conflict together with Ankara’s long-standing adherence to the NATO alliance helped Washington interpret this country’s geostrategic importance. Simply put, Turkey is important for the United States for four reasons. First, it serves as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power, as the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated. Saddam Hussein’s resilience in the aftermath of the war has made Ankara essential to sustaining the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes routinely patrol the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein’s forces away from Kurdish-controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey’s cooperation. Second, Turkey is also different and valuable because it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously. Its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms that are deployable, and it is committed to maintaining its spending on defense given its location in a ‘bad neighborhood.’ Third, Turkey is a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist’ regimes like Iran intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey’s strong links to the United States, NATO, and the West in general are in direct opposition to some of Iran’s regional preferences, if not designs. Hence, even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey’s reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s have changed the strategic setting in the Middle East—although much exaggerated by Arab countries—which helped Washington perceive Ankara as a more balanced regional player. Finally, for Washington, Turkey represents an alternative and successful example for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as the only Muslim NATO member and EU candidate. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey has had a vibrant, albeit flawed, democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization—well ahead of Latin America and, save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East.

## Net Benefit: Kurdistan Causes Middle East Instability

[\_\_] **An independent Kurdish state would spark conflict over the oil located in Kirkuk**

**Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009**  
Mediterranean Quarterly 20:4, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/carpenter-middle-east-vortex-unstable-iraq.pdf>

The potential for a major dust-up with Turkey over the PKK is not the only situation in which Kurdistan could be the catalyst for a regional crisis.<sup>1</sup> Another flash point involves the future political status of the city of Kirkuk and its oil riches. Kirkuk is an ethnically mixed city of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen (kinsmen that Turkey has pledged to protect). During Saddam Hussein's rule, Baghdad pursued a blatant policy of Arabization, expelling Kurdish families and replacing them with Arabs. Since his overthrow, that process has been reversed, with Kurdish authorities expelling Arabs (and some Turkmen) and Kurds moving in. The Kurdistan government keeps pressing for a referendum among voters in Kirkuk on the city's political status, with the goal of incorporating it into Kurdistan's jurisdiction. That referendum, which the Iraqi central government originally promised to hold before the end of 2007, has been repeatedly postponed—much to the annoyance of Kurdish authorities. It will not be possible to avoid that issue forever, though. Kurdish officials seem to be running out of patience and have begun to take a harder line on Kirkuk and other matters. Regional president Masoud Barzani spurned a UN proposal to resolve the contentious internal border disputes. The principal option pushed by UN officials was to make Kirkuk province into an autonomous region—not under the direct control of either the Baghdad government or the Kurdish regional government. American officials have repeatedly expressed support for a UN-brokered solution. Barzani has no patience for such a scheme. Indeed, the Kurdish government is moving decisively in the opposite direction. In June 2009, the region's parliament approved a draft constitution that extended Kurdish political and economic rights to all disputed territories, including Kirkuk. That constitutional provision asserted unequivocally that the disputed territories are inseparable from the "geographic and historic entity" today known as Iraq's Kurdistan region. Barzani also issued a chilling warning: "If any regional country, or even Baghdad, interferes in an internal matter, and individuals inside the region conspire against the region's security and well-being," he stressed, "actions will be taken in accordance with the law against those who want to undermine the unity of the Kurdish house."<sup>14</sup> Whatever the result of the referendum on Kirkuk when it is finally held, there is likely to be trouble. If the Kurds lose, the resulting anger throughout Kurdistan would probably eradicate any lingering facade of loyalty to the Iraqi state. But given the ongoing ethnic cleansing, the Kurds are almost certain to win, and that result would have explosive potential on multiple fronts.

## Net Benefit: Kurdistan Causes Middle East Instability

[\_\_] **A Kurdish state would face pressure from Iran Turkey and Syria and suffer domestic uprisings**

**Robert Olson, is a leading international authority on transnational Kurdish nationalist movements; a topic on which he has published 95 research articles and essays, 9/4/2009, *Kurdistanica* “An Independent Kurdistan?” <http://www.kurdistanica.com/?q=node/151>,**

The Kurdish leadership also faces certain dilemmas. Kurdistan-Iraq is landlocked and dependent on its Turkish, Iranian and Syrian neighbors for most of its land and air communications. This is especially the case if Arab Iraq were to adopt a hostile position toward the new state. In such a situation how would Kurdistan-Iraq be able to prosper economically? Would Kurdish officials and economic entrepreneurs be satisfied with such a small market to exploit? What would the new state’s position be if the above circumstance compelled the Kurds to become a client state and ward of the US—with US military bases? This would make its neighbors, especially Iran, but including Turkey, very nervous. If the Islamic Republic or Iran, and the Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria were to topple or there were internal strife in either country, such developments would most assuredly affect Kurdistan-Iraq. Probably the most important reason for the Kurdish leadership to not declare independence at this time, it that the two major Kurdish factions, the KDP and PUK, have themselves not resolved issues of power-sharing and the politics of institutionalizing a state are substantially different from those of being a unit within a federation which, in turn, could lead to more division—at least, a unity with any democratic pretensions. Lastly, the Kurds must consider that the US might lose interest in sustaining its military and economic commitments to Iraq, and to its Kurdish ally, due to increasing public lack of support for the war in Iraq.

## Net Benefit: Non unique Turkish State Exists

### [ ] Kurdistan has functionally existed since 1991

**Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and policy studies at the Cato Institute, 2009**  
Mediterranean Quarterly 20:4, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/carpenter-middle-east-vortex-unstable-iraq.pdf>

Although the Kurds have not proclaimed an independent country, in every sense that matters Iraq's Kurdistan region is de facto independent, and the "Kurdish regional government" is the governing body of a sovereign state.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, it is a de facto sovereign state with far-reaching territorial goals. Within Iraq, the Kurds claim the northern city of Kirkuk and its extensive oil deposits. There have also been nasty clashes with Iraqi Arab factions in the ethnically mixed province of Nineveh, where Kurds insist that several villages should be part of the Kurdish region.<sup>5</sup> Thanks to US assistance, Kurdistan has enjoyed de facto independence since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. When Washington began to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, the Kurds took advantage of that protection to establish and consolidate their region's self-rule. Unable to bring his air power to bear, Saddam Hussein could not reassert Baghdad's control, since the Peshmerga was more than a match for Iraqi ground forces. More recently, the Peshmerga have been strong enough to prevent infiltration by al Qaeda or Iraqi Arab Sunni and Shiite militias.

### [ ] A Kurdish state already exists in Northern Iraq with its own flag, President, and government

**Eldad Beck, writer for the Jerusalem Post, 4/14/10,**  
<http://www.jpost.com/JerusalemReport/Article.aspx?id=173112>

Over the few last years, a de facto Kurdish state has been created in northern Iraq, with its own flag, president, government, parliament, police, television and radio stations and even its own stamps. This semi-independent republic is the homeland of only 5 million Kurds; another 12 million live in Turkey, 5 million in Iran and 2 million in Syria, under various degrees of oppression; a smaller number is in Armenia and others are living in exile in different countries. Even though Kurdistan is still officially connected to Iraq and subject to the national policy made in Baghdad (including its relations with Israel), the Iraqi Kurds have managed for the first time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to establish the basis for a future independent state of their own. In the new Iraq, based on a rotation agreement between the country's three main ethnic groups - Arab Shi'ites, Arab Sunnis and Kurds, a leading Kurdish politician, Jalal Talabani, now holds the office of Iraq's presidency.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Topicality File

## Topicality File

Explanation .....1

Topicality Violations

Presence is Non-Combat INC Shell .....2-3

Presence is Troops INC Shell..... 4

Presence is Troops Extension .....5

Reduce is not Eliminate INC Shell ..... 6

Definition of Words in the Resolution

Afghanistan.....7

And/Or ..... 8

Country..... 9

Federal Government ..... 10

IN ..... 11

Iraq ..... 12

Its ..... 13

Japan ..... 14

Kuwait ..... 15

Military.....116

Police..... 17

Military Presence .....18-20

Reduce ..... 21

Turkey ..... 22

Substantial ..... 23

United States..... 24

**Resolved:** The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.

## Explanation

There are three topicality violations in this file. Topicality argues that the affirmative plan is not an example of the resolution.

This year's resolution is:

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.

Topicality argues that the affirmative plan either does something partly not related to this, or has nothing to do with the resolution at all. Think of topicality like the prompt to an essay you would have to write in school. The prompt tells you broadly what you should be writing about, and you write about a specific example of something laid out in the prompt. If you write about something besides what the teacher wants you to be writing about, you will get a bad grade. The same is true in debate - if the affirmative is arguing something that is not an example of the resolution, then they are not doing their job.

Topicality arguments work by defining words from different sources in order to determine what we should be arguing about. Then, because there are many definitions for every word, the negative provides reasons why debaters should be abiding by their interpretation of the resolution.

There are three topicality violations in this file. Two of them define the phrase "military presence" in order to construct arguments. One interpretation defines military presence as military forces that are not performing direct combat roles, which would mean that the Afghanistan affirmative would not be topical, as many of the US forces in Afghanistan are actively fighting. The second topicality argument defines military presence as troops, in a country, as opposed to equipment, vehicles, or weapons. This argument would make the Turkey affirmative not topical, as the Turkey affirmative removes nuclear weapons. The final topicality argument is based off of a definition of reduce, and argues that "reduce" implies that an affirmative cannot completely eliminate the US' military presence in a country, and instead that it must leave some behind. This would make the South Korea and Japan affirmatives not topical, as they eliminate the entirety of the US presence in those countries.

## Presence is Non-Combat INC Shell [1/2]

**A. Interpretation. Military presence consists of military assets that are permanently stationed and not performing active combat roles, but instead doing things such as training foreign armies or showing a commitment to deterrence.**

**James S. Thomason, Senior Analyst, Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, Ph.D., International Relations, Northwestern University, 2002,**  
“Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD Volume I: Main Report” <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>

**WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE? Our working definition** of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions.<sup>1</sup> By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.” We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. In more positive terms, what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing? Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve inter-operability of US and friendly forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for them.<sup>2</sup>

## Presence is Non-Combat INC Shell [2/2]

**B. Violation. Withdrawal from Afghanistan would not be topical because the troops there are actively fighting, which is not an example of US military presence.**

**Robert S. Carter, military analyst at the army war college, 4/11/02,**  
“Considerations for Planning Overseas Presence” Strategy Research Project  
<http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA404187>

For purposes of this paper, the use of the term "overseas presence" is intended to refer to those units and personnel that are permanently based overseas - or - in the case of some assets (e.g., naval forces) - are deployed to a particular region on a regular, rotational basis. (For example, U.S. forces currently fighting terrorism in Afghanistan would not be considered part of U.S. overseas presence by this definition.

**C. Standards.**

**1. Our interpretation should be preferred because it provides the best education. It comes from an important defense analyst who is discussing how the term is used by the military. Using this definition is best for debate because it allows our debate rounds to closely mimic the ones that are going on in the real world about these important issues. This means our definition would provide better education about the topic issues than other ones.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue. Having a clear definition of what the topic includes is essential to fair debate. Without topicality, debate rounds would not be competitive or interesting, and no one would learn because no team would be prepared to debate a case that is not part of the topic. For these reasons you must reject an affirmative that is not topical.**

## Presence is Troops INC Shell

### A. Interpretation. “Military presence” in the resolution refers to soldiers, not equipment

#### Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 2010

<http://www.oxfordadvancedlearnersdictionary.com/dictionary/presence>

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary is the world’s best-selling advanced learner’s dictionary, used by over 35 million learners of English worldwide.

#### Presence

a group of people, especially soldiers, who have been sent to a place to deal with a particular situation.  
The government is maintaining a heavy police presence in the area.a military presence

### B. Violation. The affirmative withdraws nuclear weapons from Turkey or other equipment, not troops.

### C. Standards.

**1. Our interpretation is best to ensure predictable limits. An interpretation of military presence that includes equipment makes the topic too broad. The military uses many different types of guns, missiles, tanks, and allowing those would make research and debate too difficult for the negative, creating an unfair research burden and as a result the affirmative would win far too frequently. This interpretation forces the debate to be centered around the troops, the critical issue of the topic.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue. Having a clear definition of what the topic includes is essential to fair debate. Without topicality, debate rounds would not be competitive or interesting, and no one would learn because no team would be prepared to debate a case that is not part of the topic. For these reasons you must reject an affirmative that is not topical.**

## Presence is Troops Extension

### **Military presence as troops is the most commonly used definition**

**Major Michael P. Mahaney, United States Marine Corps, 2001,**

Striking a Balance: Force Protection and Military Presence, Beirut, October 1983

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391840&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Two final terms require clarification. The first of those terms is presence. Although repeatedly tied to the concept of peace operations, the word is never defined, and cannot be found in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The importance of this word in 1983 and today cannot be overstated. Presence is defined by the dictionary as "The state or fact of being present," and "The immediate proximity in time and space."xvi The second term frequently associated with peace operations is interposition. Like presence, interposition is currently not defined by the Department of Defense. The most commonly used and generally accepted definition is to impose a physical presence between the hostile parties. Benis Frank, while writing the definitive history of the Marine operation in Lebanon, associated the term presence with the international law concept of interposition. He defined interposition as "...the commonly accepted tenet in international law of 'interposition' which results when a major power provides military assistance in the form of troops at the request of a legally constituted and established government unable to protect foreign citizens and property."xvii

## Reduce is not Eliminate INC Shell

**A. Interpretation. “Reduce” means to decrease, but not to eliminate. It must leave something remaining.**

**Words and Phrases Dictionary, 2002**  
(volume 36B, p. 80)

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c.203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may “reduce” the witness fees and other costs, but “not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases” which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word “reduce,” in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.—Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

**B. Violation. The affirmative completely eliminates US military or police presence**

**C. Standards.**

**1. Our interpretation is best for education. A case that withdraws completely from a topic area would be able only to focus on the broad, generic issues of military presence in that area. By forcing an affirmative to leave part of the military presence behind, it forces everyone to research the specific issues and make choices about what part of the US military force there is the least valuable.**

**2. Our definition is also best because it provides the most predictable limits. Our definition comes from a judge trying to define the ordinary meaning of reduce, which means it is the one most people are likely to think of. Predictable limits are important for conducting research.**

**D. Topicality is a voting issue. Having a clear definition of what the topic includes is essential to fair debate. Without topicality, debate rounds would not be competitive or interesting, and no one would learn because no team would be prepared to debate a case that is not part of the topic. For these reasons you must reject an affirmative that is not topical.**

## Afghanistan

**Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010.** Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 26 Jun. 2010  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan>

Country, south-central Asia

### **Afghanistan generally defined**

(**Dictionary.com**, unabridged, 6/25/10, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/afghanistan>).

Afghanistan: (n.) a republic in central Asia, NW of India and E of Iran. 23,738,085; 250,000 sq. mi. (647,500 sq. km). Capital: Kabul.

## And/Or

**Ballentine's Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus**, Jonathan S. Lynton, Ph.D, J.D, Published 1995

**And/Or**- Both or either. This synthetic term is sloppy because it is imprecise. It is best to avoid it in legal writing if possible

### **And**

**Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1969**

And: A conjunction which, taken by itself calls for the things or matters conjoined to be considered jointly. 50 Am J 1st Stat § 281. A word ordinarily

### **Or**

**Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1969**

Or: A conjunction normally in the disjunctive. A conjunction properly used with "either" in stating a proposition in the alternative. State ex rel. Crow v St. Louis. 174 Mo 125, 73 SW 623. Usually a word of substitution in a will. Re Boyle's Estate, 121 Colo 599, 221 P2d 357, 36 ALR2d 1106. In a deed, implying at disjunctive or alternative. 23 Am J2d Deeds §218. The disjunctive form but to be interpreted in a copulative sense when necessary to the spirit and intent of the instrument in which it appears. 17 Ant J2d Contr §283. Subject to construction as "and" where the obvious intention appearing from the entire context of the instrument so requires. Davis v Vermillion, 173 Kan 508, 249 P2d 625. Subject to construction as "and" in a statute or municipal ordinance where such is in keeping with the intent of the statute or ordinance ' as such appears from the entire context. 37 Am J1st Mun Corp § 187; 50 Am J1st Stat §282. See and/or. 3

## Country

### **Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1969**

Country: A nation or land, also the people of a nation or state; any place out of court; the persons living therein in the district available for jury duty; a jury. A settlement in pais (in the country) is a settlement without court. As the word "country" is used in the revenue laws of the United States, it has always been construed to embrace all the possessions of a nation, not however widely separated, which are subject to the same supreme executive and legislative control. In *Stairs v Peeslee* (US) 18 How 521, 15 L Ed 474, 476. In adopting this definition, the Philippine Islands, were held to be neither a foreign country nor another country within the meaning of the Cuban treaty. *Faber v United States*, 221 US 649, 659, 55 L Ed 897, 899, 31 S Ct 659. °°  
See jury of the country; trial by the country. \_

## Federal Government

**Blacks Law Dictionary** 8<sup>th</sup> edition (Legal dictionary, 2004, edited by Bryan A. Garner)

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters. --- Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. The U.S. government. --- Also termed national government.

**Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1969**

The government of the United States; the government of a community of independent and sovereign states, united by compact. *Piqua Bank v Knoup*, 6 Ohio St 342, 394. See United States

IN

**Ballentine’s Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus** , Jonathan S. Lynton, Ph.D, J.D, Published 1995

**In-** Within. “in” generally indicates location. The word in also precedes Latin and French phrases in the law and can have various meanings, including in, on, to, within, into, within, while, according to, in the course of, at, or among.

**Words and Phrases Vol. 28 2008** [204-215]

—Reynolds v. Larkins, 14 P. 114, 10 Colo. 126 Colo. 1887. In the act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, etc., the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties.

**Words and Phrases Vol. 28 2008** [204-215]

C.R.S. ’63, 75-2-42.—Anderson v. Spencer, 426 P.2d 970, 162 Colo. 328.—Int Liq 69 Colo. 1967. “In” as used in statute requiring board when reviewing application for liquor license to consider the number, type and availability of liquor outlets located in or near the neighborhood is a spatial concept meaning inside of or within the bounds or limits of.

## Iraq

**Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010.** Merriam-Webster Online. 26 June 2010  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/iraq>

Country SW Asia in Mesopotamia; a republic since 1958, formerly a kingdom \* Baghdad area 168,927 square miles (437,521 square kilometers), population 18,838,000

(**Dictionary.com**, unabridged, 6/25/10, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Iraq>).

Iraq:(n.) republic in SW Asia, N of Saudi Arabia and W of Iran, centering in the Tigris-Euphrates basin of Mesopotamia. 22,219,289; 172,000 sq. mi. (445,480 sq. km). Capital: Baghdad.

## Its

**Merriam Webster 94** (Merriam-Websters Brothers, publisher Merriam Webster; publish date: November 1, 1994; from the dictionary titled Merriam Webster's Dictionary of English Usage)

Its- pronoun belonging to or connected with the thing or animal mentioned.

**Merriam Webster 94** (Merriam-Websters Brothers, publisher Merriam Webster; publish date: November 1, 1994; from the dictionary titled Merriam Webster's Dictionary of English Usage)

It - pronoun the thing or animal being spoken about that has already been mentioned. It is sometimes used to introduce a statement that does not involve a particular event or person

## Japan

**Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010.** Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 26 Jun. 2010  
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/300531/Japan>

Island country, East Asia, western Pacific Ocean.

(**Dictionary.com**, unabridged, 6/25/10, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/japan>).

**Japan:** (n.) a constitutional monarchy on a chain of islands off the E coast of Asia: main islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku. 125,716,637; 141,529 sq. mi. (366,560 sq. km). Capital: Tokyo. Japanese, Nihon, Nippon.

## Kuwait

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010. Merriam-Webster Online. 26 June 2010  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/kuwait>

Country SW Asia in Arabia at head of Persian Gulf; a sheikhdom, before 1961 under British protection area 6880 square miles (17,819 square kilometers), population 1,575,570

(**Dictionary.com**, unabridged, 6/25/10, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kuwait>).

Kuwait: (n.) 1. a sovereign monarchy in NE Arabia, on the NW coast of the Persian Gulf: formerly a British protectorate. 2,076,805; ab. 8000 sq. mi. (20,720 sq. km).

## Military

**Dictionary of Government and Politics** (2nd Edition) 1998, ed. P. H. Collinm, p. 179

**military 1** adjective referring to the army; military attaché = army officer who is based in an embassy and reports on

military affairs to his home government; a period of military rule = government by the army; the country was ruled by a military government for nine years; the military dictatorship has agreed to return to civilian rule next year **2** noun the Military = the Army

Jay M. Shafritz : The **Harper Collins Dictionary of American Government and Politics** 1992 ; page 364

**Military 1.** Pertaining to war, or the affairs of war, whether on land, sea, or in the air **2.** The whole organization of defensive and offensive armed force in a society; the armed forces and the civil service and political direction of them. **3.** Land as opposed to naval or air forces.

## Police

(Merriam Webster, police, 2010, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/police>)

the internal organization or regulation of a political unit through exercise of governmental powers especially with respect to general comfort, health, morals, safety, or prosperity b : control and regulation of affairs affecting the general order and welfare of any unit or area c : the system of laws for effecting such control

the department of government concerned primarily with maintenance of public order, safety, and health and enforcement of laws and possessing executive, judicial, and legislative powers b : the department of government charged with prevention, detection, and prosecution of public nuisances and crimes

a private organization resembling a police force <campus police> b plural : the members of a private police organization

**“Police” means an organization that enforces the law and protects people.**

Cambridge Online Dictionary, '10 ([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/police\\_1](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/police_1))

*plural noun*

the official organization that is responsible for protecting people and property, making people obey the law, finding out about and solving crime, and catching people who have committed a crime members of this organization

## Military Presence

**Military Presence includes installations overseas, buildings, and infrastructure.**

**Anita Dancs, an assistant professor of economics at Western New England College and a Foreign Policy In Focus analyst, 2009**

“The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence” <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0907dancs.pdf>)

Hostility in countries that host U.S. bases has brought about a change in basing arrangements. The Pentagon has increased use of “warm facilities” with limited military presence. These changes, however, make it increasingly difficult to even know how many military bases exist outside the United States. Of the total Department of Defense inventory listed in the Base Structure Report for fiscal year 2008, 16% of its installations are overseas, along with 19% of all its buildings, and 23% of all other structures (e.g. roads, bridges, communication lines, electric power distribution). In total, the inventory includes 865 bases that are not located within the United States.

**Military presence includes civilian personnel and personnel classified as afloat within the U.S. territories.**

**Anita Dancs, an assistant professor of economics at Western New England College and a Foreign Policy In Focus analyst, 2009**

“The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence” <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0907dancs.pdf>)

By the end of the 2008 fiscal year, 25% of active-duty personnel were stationed overseas and aboard ships in international waters, excluding those fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This number, approximately 350,000, may understate the true extent to which personnel are overseas but not involved in current conflicts. For one, the Department of Defense also has civilian personnel, with 7%, or more than 45,000, stationed in territories or in foreign countries. Secondly, the number of active-duty military personnel classified as afloat within the U.S. and its territories in 2008 fiscal year accounted for 6% of troops. But many of these troops are likely afloat in U.S. territorial waters far from the United States, which adds to the overseas military presence.

## Military Presence

### **Military forces means bases with combat forces**

**Christopher Layne, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, 2010**

“Definition of Military presence” May 12<sup>th</sup>, <http://abnormalmeans.com/2010/05/definition-of-military-presence/>)

My interpretation would be that “military presence” means bases with combat forces (or bases that normally are maintained by skeleton units but are maintained to receive combat forces crisis/surge type circumstances). I do not think in the normal meaning of the term that the US has military bases in N. Korea.

### **Military presence includes airpower, naval forces, and military equipment**

**Department of Defense, 8/6/1996**

(Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the American Bar Association, Orlando, Fla., “The Risks If We Would Be Free” Volume 11, Number 77  
<http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=959>)

Our military presence includes substantial airpower operating out of Saudi and Kuwaiti airbases. This permits us to enforce the U.N.-sponsored "no-fly" zone over Iraq. Our presence also includes naval forces operating continuously in the Arabian Gulf, also enforcing United Nations sanctions. And it includes two brigade sets worth of pre-positioned military equipment -- one in Kuwait and one afloat offshore -- and we are adding a third brigade set in Qatar.

This pre-positioned equipment allows us to insert a substantial deterrent force into the region in a fraction of the time that it took us in 1990. We actually exercised this potential in October of 1994, when Saddam Hussein again sent his forces toward the Kuwaiti border.

That time, however, we were able to respond quickly enough that we were able to deter an attack.

## Military Presence

**Military Presence includes bases where intelligence gathering, training, and military-led development aid can be found.**

**Transnational Institute, July 2009**

“Foreign Military Bases and the Global Campaign to close them” <http://www.tni.org/primer/foreign-military-bases-and-global-campaign-close-them>)

Over the past decades, there has been a slow decline in the total number of foreign military bases, largely as a result of the end of the Cold War. But at the same time, there has been a rapid growth in the number of countries ‘hosting’ a foreign military presence. In other words, the new strategy seems to be to have smaller detachments in ever increasing number of countries. Together with the shift towards smaller bases in more countries, there has also been a shift away from massive troop deployments to smaller spread-out facilities, where intelligence gathering, training, and military-led development aid can be combined. The recent spread of bases is a clear indication of what are considered the new international battle grounds: Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

**Military Presence strengthens deterrence, strengthens the US, stabilizes the environment.**

**James S. Thomason, Senior Analyst, Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, Ph.D., International Relations, Northwestern University, 2002,**

“Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD Volume I: Main Report” <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>

An overwhelming majority of US commentators and students of US foreign policy and military activities favor an internationalist role for the United States as well as some kind of continuing overseas military presence.<sup>3</sup> Virtually all contend in broad terms that some US overseas military presence will continue to help advance US interests and security objectives. Most experienced observers believe that US overseas military presence is effective (to some degree) in strengthening deterrence, assuring friends and allies, positioning the US to be able to protect key interests in crisis situations, stabilizing the security environment, preserving an open international economic environment, and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons.

## Reduce

**Merriam Webster, reduce, 2010,**

<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce>)

to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number

**Reduce means making something smaller.**

**Cambridge Online Dictionary, '10**

(<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/reduce>)

reduce verb

to make something smaller in size, amount, degree, importance, etc

**Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1969**

to lessen. To break a thing down into its various elements. To analyze a problem so that it can be solved. To impoverish. To bring to want.

## Turkey

**Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010.** Merriam-Webster Online. 26 June 2010

<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/turkey>

Country in western Asia and southeastern Europe; from confusion with the guinea fowl, supposed to be imported from Turkish territory

(**Dictionary.com**, unabridged, 6/25/10, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/turkey>).

Turkey: (n.) a republic in W Asia and SE Europe. 63,528,225; 296,184 sq. mi. (767,120 sq. km). (286,928 sq. mi. (743,145 sq. km) in Asia; 9257 sq. mi. (23,975 sq. km) in Europe). Capital: Ankara.

## Substantial

**THOMAS.gov 92** – Summary of H.R.4421, the Comprehensive Base Closure Reform and Recovery Act of 1992, <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d102:HR04421:@@L&summ2=m&>

Comprehensive Base Closure Reform and Recovery Act of 1992 - Title I: Environmental Restoration At Military Installations To Be Closed - Requires, with respect to each military installation which is on the National Priorities List (for substantial environmental cleanup) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and which is to be closed under Federal base closure Acts or otherwise by the Department of Defense (DOD): (1) that at least 75 percent of the environmental remedial action required under Federal law be completed before the installation is closed or substantial reductions in its operations have occurred; and (2) that all of the required remedial action be occurred no later than two years after such installation is closed or substantially reduced. Defines a "substantial reduction" as the reassignment of more than 50 percent of its personnel.

**US Code 5/17/2010** TITLE 10. ARMED FORCES SUBTITLE A. GENERAL MILITARY LAW PART IV. SERVICE, SUPPLY, AND PROCUREMENT CHAPTER 148. NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE, DEFENSE REINVESTMENT, AND DEFENSE CONVERSION SUBCHAPTER II. POLICIES AND PLANNING, lexis

"(f) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

"(1) The term "major defense program" means a program that is carried out to produce or acquire a major system (as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code).

"(2) The **terms** 'substantial reduction' and 'substantially reduced', with respect to a defense contract under a major defense program, mean a reduction of 25 percent or more in the total dollar value of the funds obligated by the contract."

### **Substantially- (Substantial)**

**The Guide to American Law** (83, The Guide to American Law, 6/26)

Of real worth, value, and significance.

### **Encyclopedia of American Law, 1998**

Substantial- of real worth and importance; of considerable value

## United States

**Merriam Webster 10** <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/united%20states>

country North America bordering on Atlantic, Pacific, & Arctic oceans; a federal republic \* Washington area 3,619,969 square miles (9,375,720 square kilometers), population 281,421,906

**The New Oxford American Dictionary, 2005**

<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?entry=t183.e83104>

A country that occupies most of the southern half of North America as well as Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands; pop. 293,027,000; capital, Washington, D.C. Full name United States of America.

(The U.S. is a federal republic comprising 50 states and the Federal District of Columbia. It originated in the American Revolution, the successful rebellion of the colonies on the eastern coast against British rule in 1775–83. The original 13 states that formed the Union drew up a federal constitution in 1787, and George Washington was elected the first president in 1789. In the 19th century the territory of the U.S. was extended across the continent through the westward spread of pioneers and settlers and acquisitions such as that of Texas and California from Mexico in the 1840s. After a long period of isolation in foreign affairs, the U.S. participated on the Allied side in both world wars and emerged from the Cold War as the world's leading military and economic power.)