



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

Afghanistan CP- Neg

Condition on Pashtun Participation Counterplan

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Explanation

This is a condition counterplan. It argues that instead of just doing the plan, that the United States should only implement the plan and withdraw military presence if the country where the troops are agrees to take a certain course of action. It is called a condition counterplan because the presence withdrawal is not guaranteed, that there is a “condition” on which the plan will not be done.

This condition counterplan should be used against the Afghanistan affirmative. It argues that the US will withdraw its counterinsurgency forces from the country if the Afghanistan government agrees to enter negotiations with the Pashtun ethnic group of Afghanistan. The Pashtun is an ethnic minority in Afghanistan, and the Taliban government that ruled until the US intervention is predominantly from the Pashtun group. As a result, Pashtun rulers have been excluded from the political process and the creation of the new government. The counterplan argues that it is best for the stability of the country if these people can vote and hold political office. Absent this political agreement, the counterplan argues that the Pashtun will seek to create their own country, which will cause wars in the region and cause the breakup of Pakistan.

Glossary

Pashtun: Ethnic minority in Afghanistan. The majority of the Taliban are of Pashtun ethnic background.

Karzai: Current President of Afghanistan.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A military alliance that includes the United States and many of the countries in Western Europe. There are many NATO members that have troops in Afghanistan in order to help the US stabilize the country

Taliban: Islamist political movement that ruled Afghanistan until 2001 when the United States invaded the country. The Taliban provided safe haven to Al-Qaeda, which allowed them to plan and execute the September 11th attacks. The Taliban is currently trying to regain power in Afghanistan and is the group that is leading the counterinsurgency against the United States.

Insurgency: Insurgency is an armed rebellion against a centralized governmental authority. The insurgency in Afghanistan is attempting to discredit both the American military presence and the secular central government led by Karzai.

Disenfranchised: A person who is disenfranchised is not allowed to vote.

Kabul: The capital city of Afghanistan.

Kandahar: The second largest city in Afghanistan. It may also refer to the province of the same name, which the city is the capital of.

Condition on Pashtun Participation INC Shell [1/2]

TEXT: The United States federal government should offer the government of Afghanistan that (insert plan text) on the condition that the government of Afghanistan enters into negotiations with the Taliban and establishes proportional representation in the government for the Pashtun population of Afghanistan.

Contention One: Competition. The plan commits to a withdrawal from Afghanistan no matter what. Withdrawal in the counterplan will not happen unless Afghanistan agrees to certain conditions. Afghanistan could say no and the plan would not happen.

Contention Two: Net benefits.

The Counterplan solves better than the Affirmative. Pashtun representation and negotiations with moderate Taliban are the only way to stabilize Afghanistan because they make up over 40% of Afghanistan's population and are currently being denied a voice in the government.

Daniel Korski, Senior fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008

["Afghanistan: Europe's forgotten war" January,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/c43ad7d70cf03ddadb_cem6bqqcx.pdf]

There will be no stability in Afghanistan unless "moderate" insurgents embrace constitutionalism and enter democratic politics. Since the Bonn Agreement in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the coalition has supported the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, better known as the Northern Alliance, which brought together the main Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara groupings. For obvious reasons it had no significant links to the Pashtuns who make up 42% of Afghanistan's population.22 After 2001, despite Karzai's Pashtun background, Pashtun tribal leaders were largely excluded from government and have been ever since. Many have thus aligned themselves with the resurgent Taliban. The coalition and the Afghan government must work to convince them that they can pursue their interests democratically. There have already been signs that this is at least possible. Though President Karzai's overtures to reclusive Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were rebuffed, the Taliban, while insisting on a number of conditions, have been receptive to the idea of negotiations as proposed within Karzai's "Peace Jirga". The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown recently gave his backing to these negotiations, again with conditions attached, but the US administration remains skeptical. Political agreements - like the failed Musa Qala deal in 2006 overseen by the then ISAF commander, General David Richards - should aim to isolate the "hard-core", many of whom are foreigners, from more moderate, indigenous groups. Such political agreements would also help avoid the violent tactics that may have won NATO military victories last year but cost vital public support because of high civilian casualties.2 An effective policy in the short term would be to identify insurgent leaders willing to cut a deal. The coalition could then operate a system of "divide and rule", whereby intransigent insurgents would see their erstwhile comrades rewarded with a package of financial and other incentives which add up to a better deal than that offered by the Taliban. These are not currently being offered to the extent required.

Condition on Pashtun Participation INC Shell [2/2]

Without representation, the Pashtun regions will secede and form their own state. This causes the country of Afghanistan to fall apart, which will cause the collapse of the Pakistan government and war

Stephen John Morgan, Former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, 3/4/07,

"Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?"

<http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedeviled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d'état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama" (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d'état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalized masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of Sharia law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out.

Solvency: Negotiations Allow For Pashtun Representation

Negotiations are key to incorporate the Pashtun back into Afghanistan's government

Tarique Niazi, environmental sociologist at the University of Wisconsin at Eau Claire, 8/16/07
 "Talk to the Taliban" FPIF, August 16, <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4474>

Yet the Jirga was "long on generalities and short on specifics." U.S. and NATO leaders should engage this institution to supply the missing "specifics" to foster peace. It is deceptively simple to dub the Afghan resistance as "Taliban militancy," or "al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism." Although Pashtuns reject al-Qaeda and its terrorism, as the Kabul Jirga resoundingly demonstrated, they are resentful of their loss of power in Kabul, which they held for 200 years, to an ethnic minority-dominated and U.S.-backed Northern Alliance. The Taliban, who are predominantly Pashtuns, are drawing on this sense of exclusion among their majority community to sustain their struggle. An ethnic balance to the current distribution of power, therefore, will help drain the Afghan resistance of energy and serve as well the long-term security interests of the Northern Alliance. Afghan President Karzai, aided by the 50-member Tribal Council, is best placed to pull off this feat. He is a devout Muslim, a former cabinet officer of the Taliban government, a member of the Pashtun royalty, a nominee of the ruling Northern Alliance, and the only hope for the international community to bring peace in Afghanistan. He already has been in discrete talks with the Taliban and with Hizb-i-Islami leader and former prime minister of Afghanistan Gulbadin Hikmatyar. His outreach is, however, unsupported by the international community, especially the Bush administration. Now that Asfandiyar Wali Khan and Mehmood Achakzai -- the two most influential Pashtun leaders who are pro-Afghanistan, pro-Karzai secular nationalists -- have added their voices to the call for talks with the Afghan resistance, the international community and especially the Bush administration should take notice.

Negotiations are key to get the Pashtun to play a larger role in Afghanistan

Ernie Regehr, adjunct associate professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, 9/30/07
 "Are calls for negotiation in Afghanistan premature?"
<http://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/istheafg>

In fact, however, even if the insurgents consider their fortunes to be rising in the south, that does not lift them out of an overall stalemate. The Taliban cannot avoid the hard reality that their base is confined to the south and that they cannot credibly regard themselves on the ascendancy in the country as a whole. They have to understand that they face a long struggle in the south, and, even if successful, they cannot expect to push beyond the Pashtun-dominated south and southeast -- and they also have to assume that a larger role for the Pashtun/Taliban in the country as a whole will only be achievable through negotiations.

Solvency: Negotiations Allow For Pashtun Representation

Negotiations are key to help the government regain control in Southern Afghanistan

Haroun Mir, consultant and policy analyst in Kabul, 9/14/07

“Taliban talk offer bodes well” Sept 14, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/II14Df02.html]

The positive reply by Taliban spokesman Qari Yusouf Ahmadi to the Kabul government's appeal for dialogue gives peace talks in Afghanistan a new momentum. The government of President Hamid Karzai welcomed the Taliban's statement, and immediately the United Nations special representative in Afghanistan, Tom Koenings, offered the UN's endorsement for the negotiation process. Karzai appears sincere about bringing the Taliban's moderate leaders into the political process, which would help the government regain control over some of the Pashtun-dominated provinces in southern Afghanistan. The idea of negotiating with insurgent groups such as the Taliban and the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has been an important government policy. A number of prominent Hezb-i-Islami members gained senior government positions after rejecting Hekmatyar's rhetoric against the government and the presence of coalition forces in the country. In addition, coalition forces in Afghanistan have tried on their own to reach out to the insurgent groups. For instance, the British military in Afghanistan has been directly involved in talks with the Taliban and reached a secret truce with them in Musa Qala district of Helmand last October. The making and unraveling of alliances in Afghan politics is a common practice. Yesterday's enemies could become today's allies, and vice-versa. The political fault lines among major political groups in Afghanistan are not over ideology anymore. The majority of them favor an Islamic state, and the secular political groups are still too insignificant to oppose them. The absence of national political parties and political ideologies forces the majority of Afghans to regroup along ethnic affinities.

AT: Afghanistan Says No

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Karzai will agree to the counterplan, he is increasingly desperate because of fear of US withdrawal

Thomas Walkom, National Affairs Columnist for the Star, 9/13/07

“Secret U.S.-Taliban discussions seem to be afoot”,
<http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/256053>]

Meanwhile, Karzai is increasingly desperate. It is clear that NATO countries like France are unwilling to bear more of the fighting load. It is also clear that those doing the fighting, like Canada, are growing weary. A political settlement with the Taliban now offers Karzai more leeway than it would after NATO's inevitable disengagement. Afghan leaders who wait too long to deal often end up with their heads chopped off.

Karzai agrees that reaching out to the Pashtun is necessary

Ernie Regehr, adjunct associate professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, 9/30/07

“Are calls for negotiation in Afghanistan premature?”
<http://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/istheafg>]

Military successes can lead to strategic setbacks for a variety of reasons, and in Afghanistan two important factors are battlefield victories accompanied by large numbers of civilian deaths and battles that are won on behalf of a government that many in the south in particular find corrupt and hostile to their collective interests. The UN mission in Afghanistan recorded over 1,000 civilian deaths from January 1 to August 31 at the hands of both pro- and anti-governmental forces, and independent monitoring indicates that the majority of these are attributable to pro-government forces.[ii] In addition, the Secretary-General says there exists in the Karzai government “a culture of patronage and direct involvement in illegal activities, including the drug trade, especially within the police force.” To achieve strategic success – that is, a stable security environment and a government that earns the confidence of most Afghans – the Secretary-General says the counter-insurgency effort will have to include “political outreach to disaffected groups.” In other words, the disaffected community now confronted on the battlefield needs to be engaged through a serious negotiation/reconciliation process. His call was echoed with growing urgency by Afghan President Hamid Karzai over the weekend.[iii]

AT: Taliban Says No

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The Taliban will agree to the negotiations, it's what they have always been trying to achieve

Antonio Giustozzi, Researcher at the Crisis States Research Center at the LSE, 2007,
Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Pg. 134-5]

If elements derived from Mao's classical theory were present in the Taliban's strategy, the question remains open of whether this genuinely reflected the determination to conquer political power or whether it was used as a tool of political pressure on the Karzai administration to force it to the negotiating table. For all their image of an extremist movement, there are some indications that the Taliban might have always been aiming for a negotiated settlement. Talks with Karzai had been going on at least since 2003, although it is not clear how far up the Taliban leadership Karzai's contacts were. It appears that the Taliban contacted Kabul through UNAMA and that Kabul agreed to negotiate one month later, after receiving the green light from the US embassy. US military authorities officially endorsed the possibility of talks with 'moderate members' of the Taliban in December of that year. The actual content of the negotiations, however, is not known, nor is it clear whether the 'moderate Taliban' were testing the ground for the leadership of the Movement or were acting on their own initiative and autonomously. Moreover, after a period of apparent suspension, negotiations were resumed, as admitted by President Karzai himself in 2007

Past attempts at negotiation show that the Taliban will participate

The Guardian newspaper, 10/15/2007

[“Taliban sets out demands to Afghan president” October 15,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/15/afghanistan.declanwalsh>]

The demands are unlikely to be taken seriously. However, British and Afghan officials supporting such contacts consider them a sign that a negotiated settlement may be possible with at least some insurgent commanders. But officials on all sides stress that the contacts are in their infancy and are unlikely to trigger an early end to the violence that has claimed more than 5,000 lives this year. A senior diplomatic source in Kabul confirmed that Mr. Muttawakil and Mr Zaeef, who was released from Guantánamo Bay in 2004, were part of a wide group of intermediaries between the government and Taliban commanders. "There are many groups involved. It's a very wide range," he said. The contacts are a tacit recognition from the coalition and the Taliban that, in the short term at least, neither side is capable of winning the Afghan war.

AT: Taliban Says No

The Taliban will agree to representation because it's what they are secretly pushing for

Antonio Giustozzi, Researcher at the Crisis States Research Center at the LSE, 2007, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan*. Pg. 134-5]

One possibility is that there might have been different attitudes towards negotiations with Kabul among the Taliban. Even as late as December: 2006, after President Karzai launched the idea of parallel 'Peace Jirgas' to be held in both Afghanistan and Pakistan at the beginning of 2007, with the aim of improving the cooperation of the Pakistani side in containing the insurgency, Qari Mohammed Yousuf, who claimed to be a representative of the Taliban in Pakistan but is sometimes dismissed as something short of a genuine spokesman of the Movement, stated that the Taliban might attend the Jirgas if they were invited, with some conditions. However, a few days later another Taliban spokesman, Sayed Tayeb Agha, said that the rebels would never participate in such exercises as long as foreign troops were still in Mghanistan. The Taliban might of course have also been indulging in a tactical attempt to sow divisions within the Kabul ruling coalition, between elements favorable to negotiations and others opposing them. However, some facts seem to show that negotiations might indeed have been on the agenda the leadership of the Taliban. The unofficial truce during the Presidential electoral campaign of 2004 would have made sense particularly if the Taliban were trying to build up Karzai as a legitimate negotiating partner (see 4.5 Seeking popular support). Furthermore, the fact that the Taliban until Spring 2007 had never targeted the UN in their terrorist attacks and ambushes is likely to have been due to the fact that they needed this organization as a broker in negotiations with the government. Otherwise it would have been easy for them to throw the government and its international sponsors into a deep crisis by forcing the departure of the UN mission. This could easily be achieved by assassinating a few international members of staff: Despite many limitations, the UN mission played a key role in shoring up an often incompetent government and in some cases helped in preventing the explosion of local civil wars, for example in the northern half of Afghanistan. If a political deal was ever an organic part of the strategy of the Taliban, it is obvious they would not want to divulge it. Most diplomats would agree that successful negotiations in conflict resolution must always be conducted in secret. In the case of the Taliban, moreover, it would have been difficult to ask the rank-and-file to risk their lives on the battlefield if the leadership had admitted that it was negotiating with Kabul. Given the initial weakness of the Movement, mustering together a credible military threat must have been a priority in order to achieve a strong negotiating position

Net Benefit: Pashtun Participation Good

Proportional representation for the Pashtun is key to prevent genocide and usher in democracy in Afghanistan

Daniel Korski, Senior fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008

[“Afghanistan: Europe’s forgotten war” January,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/c43ad7d70cf03ddadb_cem6bqqcx.pdf]

Afghanistan suffers from a lack of genuine party politics, which Afghans associate with the tyranny of the Communist Party in the 1980s and the civil wars of the 1990s. But a functioning party system is crucial to a durable, democratic settlement; parties create leaders, help define the political agenda, and can help mobilize people across ethnic boundaries. Although nearly 50 political parties have been registered, they do not even play a central role in elections, which have been hitherto almost entirely fought on the bases of ethnicity, religion, and local power. As the International Crisis Group writes, given the country’s ethnic polarization, it is “essential that the multi-ethnic, multi-regional population has pluralistic and participatory avenues to express its demands and articulate its grievances.”²⁴ This can be done by introducing an element of proportional representation, which would, under a partial list system, ipso facto encourage the development of political parties by reserving seats in the parliament for them. However, a critical mass of the population will need to be convinced that the state is effective, representative, legitimate, and capable of providing some basic services in addition to law and order. This is not simply a matter of transferring knowledge or building technical capacity. It is inherently a political task, which involves cultivating and buying off local power brokers, while encouraging modest but effective interventions within communities to promote social welfare. Strengthening provincial administrations to carry out such local initiatives is essential to this policy.

Proportional representation would create peace in Afghanistan

Daniel Korski, Senior fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008

[“Afghanistan: Europe’s forgotten war” January,
http://ecfr.3cdn.net/c43ad7d70cf03ddadb_cem6bqqcx.pdf]

Outreach to the Taliban. Since the Bonn agreements in December 2001, many Pashtun feel disenfranchised, creating a reservoir of support for the Taliban. The international community must encourage President Hamid Karzai to engage mid-ranking, “moderate” insurgents, by developing a package of financial and other incentives which could encourage them to support the government rather than the Taliban. These financial enticements should be paid in installments to ensure an ongoing commitment to the government. To minimize corruption and spread the benefits to local society they could also include a reconstruction “benefit package” – such as health clinics and schools -- for the leader’s local fief. At least €50 million should be allocated for such an EU-funded pilot scheme. At the same time, the government should be encouraged to engage the legislature more effectively and to introduce an element of proportional representation for the next parliamentary elections which might lead to more stable and representative political groupings

AT: Emboldens Taliban

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The alternative is worse. Keeping the Taliban out of the government and structure makes them more likely to derail the government and commit violence

Graeme Smith and Paul Koring, writers for The Globe and Mail, 3/1/08

“The Ugly Truth in Afghanistan” [http://www.e-](http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/4813676DF059E8828725740300602C06?OpenDocument)

[ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/4813676DF059E8828725740300602C06?OpenDocument](http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/4813676DF059E8828725740300602C06?OpenDocument)

Like a cancer, those pink splotches on the UN maps have spread until they now dominate the country's south and east. The latest map, updated in December, shows 14 of 17 districts in Kandahar are entirely designated as extreme risk. Military commanders often sneer at the United Nations threat maps, saying that civilian analysts exaggerate the risks, but security officials say the UN mapping generally reflects the military's own classified analysis, and it's far from the only measure by which Afghanistan's security has worsened in the past two years. In a blunt assessment this week, Vice-Admiral Michael McConnell, the U.S. intelligence czar, admitted that the Karzai government controls less than one-third of the country. The Taliban hold 10 per cent on a more-or-less permanent basis while the rest is run by local warlords, he said, describing the situation as deteriorating. Even that gloomy picture may represent an airbrushed version of events, some analysts say, because increasing collusion between Taliban and local powerbrokers - criminal groups, warlords, drug barons, ordinary farmers and even government authorities - allows the insurgents to operate freely in districts without exerting visible control. A rising campaign of intimidation in recent months also seems aimed at persuading those still undecided about the Taliban. Police officers' bodies, shot or beheaded, have been dumped in public places. Other corpses hang from trees, dangling from nooses with the word "spy" scrawled on a note attached to the body. More detailed notes are posted at night on the front doors of anybody suspected of having sympathies for the Kabul government, warning of deadly consequences for anybody who helps what the Taliban call a "puppet regime." It's well known that the insurgents rarely make empty threats. Even if villagers aren't afraid of the Taliban, many join up because they find the new government unpalatable. No regime has ever been overthrown at the ballot box in Afghanistan, so political opposition often becomes part of the insurgency. Many Afghans view the government as a family business, reaping the spoils from foreign donors at the expense of those who don't belong to the well-connected tribes or family networks. They watch government officials profit from the drug trade, and grow angry when eradicators destroy their small field of poppies. And in the battle-scarred landscape where Canadians operate, many people nurse deep grudges against the foreign troops after having their relatives detained or killed in the years of fighting. "That's where we're seeing the growth in this insurgency, from the local grievances," Joanna Nathan, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said.

AT: Permutation

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The permutation won't solve. Studies of other conflict situations show that unless the US adheres to the condition the negotiations will never happen

Jonathan Goodhand, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Mark Sedra, Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, January 2007

("Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan" International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 41-61)

In post-conflict settings, a peace accord characteristically furnishes a set of mutually-agreed benchmarks to guide the process and that can also be used to assess its progress.' However, the benchmarks agreed in Bonn did not have broad-based support as the agreement conferred legitimacy on a group of actors with a narrow political base. It marginalized the largest ethnic group in the country, the Pashtuns, and gave local commanders the space to rule their districts with impunity. Post-Bonn political contestation within the state has taken the form of a struggle between strongmen or jihadis, 'aristocrats' or traditionalists, and 'modernizers'. Each group has different constituencies and sources of legitimacy. Whereas the jihadis and the traditionalists were in the ascendancy in 2002, by 2004 the modernizers occupied a growing proportion of government positions. Bonn set a clear timetable for the political transition but remained vague about the economic and security spheres. It failed to adequately address the vital demilitarization and security sector reform processes and was silent on issues of development and economic reconstruction. The ambitious political milestones encapsulated in the BA included a new constitution and two elections, all to be completed within a very short timeframe. There were no substantive conditions attached to these benchmarks to ensure their observance according to standards accepted by all parties. Furthermore, although Afghanistan constitutes one of the most challenging contexts for a UN peacebuilding mission - in effect this was a peace operation in a context of ongoing war - UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, advocated a 'might footprint' approach, 19 contrasting sharply with the de facto trusteeship in Kosovo and the de jure protectorate in East Timor.

AT: Permutation

Conditions are the best way to force the Afghan government to include underrepresented groups and ensure accountability

Jonathan Goodhand, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Mark Sedra, Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, January 2007

("Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan" International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 41-61)

Peace conditionalities should be primarily directed towards building a strong, legitimate state. This involves forging a double compact between international actors and domestic elites on the one hand and between these leaders and Afghan society on the other/ the 'first compact' involves developing greater clarity between international and national actors on the rules of the game, their respective commitments and their actions if commitments are not met. Such a conditionally framework has the potential to get to grips with the problem of 'poor performance' in the international as well as the domestic sphere. There is scope for conditionally frameworks to challenge traditional accountability relationships and to place the onus on donors to prove their legitimacy and capacity to engage with peacebuilding processes. The 'second compact' involves strengthening the ability of the state to engage in its own bargaining processes to build peace and also to develop the capacity of societal actors to make demands on the state.

Conditions are essential for a war to peace transition in Afghanistan

Jonathon Goodhand, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, August 2006

“Conditioning Peace? The scope and limitations of Peace Conditionalities in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka” (Netherlands Institute of International Relations)

The Afghan case demonstrates the hard lesson that when the geo-political stakes are so high, strategic interests are likely to trump concerns with sustainable peace. Conditionalities are perhaps essential in the early days of a war to peace transition, particularly in the security and political spheres. But concerns about the war on terror prevented this from happening and arguably impeded the task of statebuilding and limited the potential for peace conditionalities. In practice it was less about conditionalities than pragmatic 'contracts' between international actors, national elites and peripheral elites. The international actors got 'security' whilst the state elites and regional warlords maintained their power. Rather late in the day there has been a realization of the need to think more carefully about the contracts and conditions required to build sustainable peace. But it is proving difficult to introduce conditionalities to a process that was largely unconditional in the early stages.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

Afghanistan CP Aff

Condition on Pashtun Participation Affirmative

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Solvency: Negotiations Fail

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[] **Karzai is perceived as too weak for negotiations to be successful**

Allan Woods, writer for the star, 2/21/2008

“Defense department studies say military force is not as effective as helping reconciliation” Feb 21, <http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/305534>]

Fen Hampson, an international affairs expert at Carleton University in Ottawa, disagreed that the Soviet reconciliation efforts could be characterized as successful. He said it is unrealistic to expect the Afghan government or the Taliban insurgency to cede the ground necessary to come to a peaceful solution to the conflict. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's position is too weak to pressure the insurgents into a negotiated settlement. "If you're going to be effective in sitting down with those elements of the Taliban who can be talked to, you've got to do it from a position of strength, not weakness, and he's still pretty weak."

[] **Negotiations will fail because the government will refuse to negotiate with Mullah Omar, a key Taliban leader**

Philip Jakeman, Afghanistan and Bangladesh researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi, 2k7

“Afghanistan: necessity and impossibility” 10/12, http://www.opendemocracy.net/terrorism/article/afghanistan_taliban_negotiations

The moment is ripe for negotiations; diplomacy promises benefits to both Kabul and the Taliban's political leadership. Unfortunately, this window of opportunity will most likely be squandered. For talks to succeed, Mullah Omar must play a central role in discussions between the Taliban and the Karzai government. But it is his centrality to any peace deal that sets a number of key external and internal actors against talking with the Taliban, making negotiations impossible

Solvency: Negotiations Fail

[] The negotiations will not be successful. The Taliban will never agree to a deal.

Michael Evans, writer for the Australian, 12/28/2007

“Scope to win over Taliban foot soldiers” The Australian, pg.

However, in a country such as Afghanistan, with its long history of warfare and the widespread hatred for foreign interventionists, whether British, American or Russian, such a concept would be bound to fail. This is partly because the real Taliban leadership -- only about a dozen senior commanders -- resides in Pakistan, notably in the city of Quetta; but mostly because the top of its hierarchy has no interest or reason to do deals. They are, as senior intelligence sources acknowledged, unreconcilable. There are no characters such as Gerry Adams or Martin McGuinness in the Taliban high command. The Taliban commanders want to be back in power in Kabul and would have no truck with well-meaning MI6 officers dropping in on them.

[] Previous attempts to negotiate prove that the Taliban make ridiculous demands and that they will not ever agree to a deal until they are defeated militarily

Antonio Giustozzi, Researcher at the Crisis States Research Center at the LSE, 2007,

Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Pg. 134-5]

Although only a handful of those accepting reconciliation then went back to fighting, lack of trust in the genuine character of the government's offer continued to affect the chances of success of the Commission. A number of other problems also existed. The performance of the Commission was allegedly hampered by the sometimes dubious choice of staffing, often responding more to patronage logic than to a concern with the effectiveness of the program. The appointment of a new and more respected chief of the Commission in Kandahar in September 2006 (Agha Lalai), for example, produced an immediate increase in the number of individuals accepting to support the government, particularly in Agha Lalai's own district of Panjwai, where over 10 per cent of the local insurgents were reported to have quit fighting in just seven months. There were also allegations that some elements in the National Security Council in Kabul, an institution modeled on the US original, opposed reconciliation and tried to sabotage it by mistreating applicants. According to officials of the Commission, another limitation was the lack of resources to provide the reconciled elements with shelter, jobs and protection, except for a few top defectors housed in Kabul under NSD protection. In fact, some former Taliban who expressed their support for the government were assassinated, such as former Deputy Interior Minister Mullah Abdul Samad Oanuary 2(06). Allegations also flourished that the Pakistani security services actively tried to prevent Taliban militants from accepting the government's reconciliation offer. The demand that defectors from the Taliban be provided with jobs and housing, however, sounds quite demagogic in a country where unemployment was estimated at 30-40 per cent of the workforce; it would have been seen as rewarding the wrongdoers at a time when the needs of most of the population were being ignored. In the end, it is obvious that as long as the Taliban were thinking that the insurgency was making progress, 'reconciliation' or surrender were not going to be attractive options .. Reconciliation was not going to take off until the Taliban would appear militarily defeated. Until the end of 2006 the main role of the reconciliation process was to offer an alternative to former Taliban who were not inclined to fight for their own reasons

Solvency: Taliban Say No

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[] **The Taliban won't negotiate because they think they're winning**

Ernie Regehr, adjunct associate professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo, 9/30/07

“Are calls for negotiation in Afghanistan premature?”

<http://www.igloo.org/disarmingconflict/istheafg>

Ripeness for negotiation generally flows from military stalemate – a situation in which neither side is moving toward victory and both sides are suffering. There is a reason experts call this a “hurting stalemate.” In Afghanistan, because the insurgency is still on the rise, is still gaining strength, some analysts argue that Afghanistan has not yet reached that hurting stalemate. The international forces admit that this war is not militarily winnable and so have ample incentive to pursue alternatives, given the apparently growing strength of the insurgents, Taliban-led forces are unlikely to regard themselves as on the run and under pressure to seek a negotiated compromise. And Mullah Omar’s quick rebuff of President Karzai’s offer would appear to confirm that further “ripening” is still needed.

[] **The Taliban won't negotiate because they think they're in a position of strength**

Joanna Nathan, senior Afghanistan analyst for the International Crisis Group, being interviewed by NPR, 10/4/2007

“Pressure Mounts for Karzai and Reconciliation” October 4, Pg.

NELSON: Joanna Nathan, senior Afghanistan analyst for the International Crisis Group, says that would be a mistake at a time when the Taliban feels that its making strategic gains, even though militants lose every battle with NATO-led forces. She says the government, instead, should be reaching out to Afghan communities in war-torn areas so they don't feel compelled to embrace the Taliban. Nathan says the so-called big-tent approach that Afghanistan has used to bring disparate factions into government over the past six years has failed. That's, in large part, because no one is held accountable for past actions. Ms. JOANNA NATHAN (Senior Afghanistan Analyst, International Crisis Group): This is just drawing in yet another group of people who are violent, you know, towards the population. It's telling people, basically, that six years of democracy is worth nothing, And you can't bomb your way into government, so, you know, I don't see this is a way to end the conflict.

Net Benefit: CP Strengthens Taliban

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[] **The counterplan increases the strength of the Taliban by making them seem more legitimate**

Henry Chu, correspondent for the LA Times, 11/9/2007

“In peace bid, Karzai opens up to Taliban” LA Times, Nov. 9

The new buzz about possible negotiations with insurgents could actually undermine the government's efforts to prevent more Afghans from linking up with the Taliban, analysts say. “This public talk of talks is incredibly damaging,” Nathan said. “If you have a community right now in the deep south or the borderlands on the east thinking, ‘Do I stand up to the Taliban?’ why will they, if they think the international community or the government are going to negotiate with them anyway?”

[] **Peace talks between the Taliban and the government will lead to a surge in terrorist activity**

Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times, 9/13/07

“Al-Qaeda fights back at Afghan peace bid”

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/II13Df01.html

Osama bin Laden's videotape can be seen in this context. Al-Qaeda has lost its supremacy in Iraq, and risks being sidelined in Afghanistan and Pakistan should the nascent peace process take hold. Bin Laden's appearance is a powerful reminder that al-Qaeda is still the leader in the global resistance. One can expect a "surge" in al-Qaeda's activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan in an effort to justify this tag and reclaim the resistance movements.

Net Benefit: Negotiations Increase Instability

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[] Taliban participation in the government would cause revolt and insurgency from the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan that will be much worse than the current instability

Amin Saikal, professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, 10/18/2007

“Don't cave in to the Taliban” October 18,

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/18/opinion/edsaikal.php>

Karzai and many of his allies, especially the U.S., have now come to feel more heat than they anticipated. Since the U.S. and its allies are not in a position to escalate sharply their troop deployment in Afghanistan, given America's preoccupation with Iraq and the deference of Washington's allies to domestic constraints, Karzai has found it expedient to make another bid for "peace" to take the sting out of the Taliban's insurgency. But he has plainly done so with the support of Bush and Khalilzad, whom he recently met in New York, for Karzai is not in a position to make major policy decisions of this sort without Washington's approval. If the Karzai government enters a coalition with the Taliban, it will not only amount to the defeat of what the United States and its allies have been promising in support of building a secure, stable and democratic Afghanistan, but also runs the risk of igniting a savage ethnic conflict in the country. Afghanistan is a very heterogeneous state, truly a nation of minorities. While the Pashtuns form the largest ethnic cluster, with extensive cross-border ties with Pakistan, the majority of the Afghan population is made up of non-Pashtun ethnic groups, which have cross-border ties with other neighbors of Afghanistan: Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the event of a Taliban entry to the government, the non-Pashtun groups would most likely seek to re-arm to fight the change. They would receive help from Afghanistan's northern and western neighbors, as well as Russia and India, which would view a Pashtun-led government that included core Taliban figures as seriously detrimental to their interests. The outcome could be another round of bloody ethnic conflict, with foreign forces caught helplessly between various warring factions. No one should underestimate the wider regional implications of such a scenario.

Net Benefit: Negotiations Increase Instability

[__] Empirically, the last time the US tried to incorporate moderate Taliban it caused instability with the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan

Amin Saikal, professor of political science and director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, 10/18/2007

“Don't cave in to the Taliban” October 18, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/18/opinion/edsaikal.php>

What could have led Karzai and his international backers, especially the United States, to walk down such a defeatist and dangerous path, which not only sends all the wrong signals to the Taliban and their supporters, as well as the people of Afghanistan, but also makes a mockery of the so-called war on terror? The idea of engaging the Taliban in reconciliation processes is not new. Karzai and the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and now the U.S. representative to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, had floated it as early 2003. In the following year, the two, sharing the Taliban's ethnic Pashtun background, offered amnesty to what they called "moderate Taliban" and invited them to join the political process. Although only a few Taliban figures took up the offer, it alarmed many non-Pashtun Afghans, who had suffered extensively under the Taliban's highly discriminatory, medieval-like rule between 1996 and 2001. This obliged Karzai and many of his Pashtun advisers to go slow on the idea.

[__] The counterplan would lead to the militarizing of the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and all out war throughout the country

William Maley, Director of the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy at the Australian National University, November 2007

“Talking to the Taliban”, The World Today

At a higher level, negotiations with the neo-Taliban are seen by many Afghans as opening the gates to a Trojan horse: those Afghan political and resistance leaders who opposed the Taliban before 2001, but then agreed to relinquish their weapons, would likely move to re-arm themselves as quickly as possible, fearing a back-door return of the hard-line core of the very forces that they for years stood almost alone in opposing. There is little doubt that they would find regional allies in Russia, Iran and Uzbekistan to assist their rearmament, and the scene would then be set for a truly disastrous outcome: the possible reigniting of large-scale conflict in many parts of Afghanistan.

Permutation

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[] **The permutation is the best option. Karzai will only negotiate after troops have already left Afghanistan**

Thomas Walkom, National Affairs Columnist for the Star, 9/13/07

“Secret U.S.-Taliban discussions seem to be afoot”,

<http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/article/256053>]

Much of what is going on involves the usual diplomatic dance: Afghan President Hamid Karzai says he is willing to talk; the Taliban reply that they are too, but only after foreign troops leave Afghanistan. And there matters appear to stall.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

South Korea Counterplan Neg

Condition on North Korea Counterplan

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Explanation

This is a condition counterplan. It argues that instead of just doing the plan, that the United States should only implement the plan and withdraw military presence if the country where the troops are agrees to take a certain course of action. It is called a condition counterplan because the presence withdrawal is not guaranteed, that there is a “condition” on which the plan will not be done.

This condition counterplan should be used against the South Korea affirmative. It argues that instead of committing to a unilateral troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula, that the US will only agree to remove its forces if North Korea agrees to end its nuclear program and give up its nuclear weapons. The counterplan argues that the US should use the troops in the Korean Peninsula as a bargaining chip with North Korea. North Korea has stated multiple times that a precondition to peace is a military withdrawal from the area, and that it would give up its nuclear program if it did not face any threats from the United States.

Condition on North Korea INC Shell [1/2]

TEXT: The United States federal government should offer the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that (insert plan text) on the condition that the government of Democratic People's Republic of Korea de-nuclearize, including the verifiable freeze leading to the dismantlement of their nuclear program.

Contention One: Competition. The plan commits to a withdrawal from South Korea no matter what. Withdrawal in the counterplan will not happen unless North Korea agrees to certain conditions. North Korea could say no and the plan would not happen.

Contention Two: Net Benefits

The counterplan would solve. North Korea will follow the condition and denuclearize

Hye-Ran Oh, Director of the Peace and Disarmament Team of Solidarity for Peace and Reunification in Korea (SPARK), 5/23/2010

Korea Policy Institute, A View of the North Korea — U.S. Nuclear Crisis from South Korea: An Interview with Hye-ran Oh, <http://www.kpolicy.org/documents/interviews-opeds/100523jttakagiinterviewhyeranoh.html>, Morrison)

[Takagi]: Would North Korea really denuclearize? The U.S. media has portrayed North Korea as failing to abide by its agreements to do so. How do you respond to that? [Oh]: North Korea has been very consistent. They have always said that their position is this: they are willing to give up their nuclear weapons if the U.S. abandons its hostile policies and aggressive posture against them. This is consistent with North Korea's stated reason for developing nuclear weapons — that it feels threatened by the U.S. This means that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is quite simple. All the U.S. has to do is abandon its hostile policies towards North Korea and stop threatening to undermine the sovereignty of North Korea. Under the Clinton administration, the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework was signed. However, because the U.S. believed that North Korea's regime was on the verge of collapse, it didn't follow through on what it agreed upon in the Geneva Framework (provision of light water reactors, and making timely shipments of heavy fuel oil). North Korea followed through on 90% of what it agreed to in the Framework, whereas the U.S. only followed through on 10% of its agreements. Then the Bush Administration publicly violated the Geneva framework - labeling North Korea as part of the "axis of evil" and including North Korea as one of 7 targets for potential preemptive nuclear strikes in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. Today, in regards to North Korea, there are no fundamental differences between the Bush administration and the Obama administration. Obama continues to carry out war exercises on the Korean peninsula and continues to isolate North Korea through economic sanctions. In Obama's recent Nuclear Posture Review both Iran and North Korea were exempted from its negative security assurance, meaning that while the U.S. agreed not to attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons — this does not apply to Iran and North Korea. And in the recently signed START treaty between the U.S. and Russia, where they agreed to decrease their strategic nuclear warheads to fewer than 1550, the U.S. still reserved the right to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent measure. However, there is a slight difference, in that the Bush administration always kept a military option on the table in terms of dealing with North Korea, whereas current Secretary of Defense Gates has publicly stated that the military option has been ruled out. So in that sense, there is a difference.

Condition on North Korea INC Shell [2/2]

The Counterplan solves the harms better. The counterplan would solve proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, but a withdrawal without a concession would embolden North Korea to be aggressive

Michael Horowitz, doctoral candidate at Harvard, 2005

The Washington Quarterly, Winter, "Who's Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage Over Pyongyang," http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf,

Unlike cultural influence, military influence is more tangible. Military influence can function in a negative fashion through threats and coercive actions designed to deter or compel certain behaviors. Positive military incentives can involve the provision of financial assistance, equipment, or even assurances not to attack under certain circumstances. Given that North Korea's security strategy, especially its public justification, largely revolves around perceived threats from the United States and, to a lesser extent, South Korea, developing military leverage over the North Korean regime seems quite possible. U.S. military leverage theoretically functions both in a negative fashion, as U.S. deployments and commitments deter North Korean military adventurism, and in a positive fashion, because incentives to ratchet down military tension might elicit cooperative behavior from Pyongyang. This is not to say that Washington should make direct military concessions to Pyongyang in response to threats; doing so would serve to reinforce the North Korean belief that their foreign policy goals can be best achieved through brinkmanship. Yet, U.S. military power remains a potential source of leverage and will inevitably be employed as a piece of a negotiated agreement to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program or if a new nuclear bargain is not achieved. Predictions about North Korean threat perceptions must take into account the multiple, credible interpretations of Kim Jong Il's motivations. Very little international support for U.S. military action against North Korea exists, making it difficult for the United States to leverage a military threat credibly unless the status quo on the peninsula deteriorates. Although the proposed U.S. withdrawal of some of its forces from South Korea has shaken up U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) ties, its impact on the U.S.–Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) military balance is likely to be very small. U.S. forces in South Korea have generally been viewed as a stopgap that will delay and damage, but not completely repel, an initial North Korean strike. Rather, U.S. air power and rapidly deployable reinforcements have always been critical. One goal clearly articulated by the North Korean regime over the last decade that may explain its recent behavior has been to obtain a "complete, verifiable, and irreversible security assurance,"³ a promise that the United States will not launch a preemptive or preventive military attack on North Korea. Another possibility, however, is that the negative security assurance demand is just a bargaining chip. U.S. negotiators have held out the possibility of a negative security assurance or other limited military concessions if North Korea made substantive concessions in its nuclear program, which the North Koreans have refused to make so far. For example, in the June 2004 six-party talks, the U.S. proposal for resolving the nuclear issue included an offer of a negative security assurance in response to North Korean nuclear dismantlement.⁴ Yet, granting a negative security assurance to Pyongyang without receiving at least a verifiable freeze leading to the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program carries some risks. Pyongyang might simply pocket the negative security assurance and use the diplomatic momentum to shift negotiations to other issues, such as the deployment of U.S. troops on the peninsula, a peace treaty, or the formal treaty relationship between the United States and South Korea. The point is not the specific demand, but rather the idea that unreciprocated concessions may convince Pyongyang that it has the ability to forestall resolution of the nuclear issue with indefinite demands.

Solvency: Conditions Solve

Conditioning military presence withdrawal on denuclearization would be successful

Richard Cronin, Report Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs, 6/1/94

CRS Report for Congress, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options," <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-470f.htm>)

The option would be based on a U.S. view that there were no other practical options to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program besides substantially meeting North Korea's bottom-line demand as the price of giving up its nuclear weapons program. Under this option, the United States would make a new effort to gain North Korean compliance with full IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities in return for concessions regarding the American military presence . Given North Korea's longstanding goal of securing a withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, its leaders might in theory, at least, be willing to allow inspections of their nuclear facilities in return for a reduction or elimination of the U.S. military presence. In view of North Korea's negotiating style and record to date, however, it would be just as likely to seek to use its nuclear card as a way of gaining its goals without making concessions, and even increasing its demands.

A condition would solve. North Korea needs to reduce military spending for economic reasons and the counterplan would provide an excuse

Selig Harrison, the director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, 2002

"Korean endgame: a strategy for reunification and U.S. disengagement" p. 192]

My assessment is that the hard-liners in the North will lose out – if Washington and Seoul are preparing to put the U.S presence on the bargaining table – because Pyongyang needs to reduce military spending for economic reasons. Should this assessment be incorrect, the United States might not be able to find an early escape from the Korean Quagmire. A more likely danger, however, is that arms-control negotiations will be sabotaged by hard-liners in the South because Seoul is under much less economic pressure than Pyongyang to cut defense spending. Suppose, for example, that the north is ready for an asymmetrical pull-back zone, but Seoul throws roadblocks in the way of an agreement in order to keep U.S forces in Korea. In such situation, the United States should not become a hostage to South Korea. Washington could cut off military sales to push the south towards a settlement, and if this does not work, it could negotiate a unilateral arms-control agreement with the north involving a partial or complete disengagement.

Solvency: Counterplan Solves Nuclearization

North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons for withdrawal from the peninsula

Jinwook Choi 6 – visiting professor at Ritsumeikan College of International Relations, 2006

Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, “The North Korean Domestic Situation and Its Impact on the Nuclear Crisis,” <http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/cg/ir/college/bulletin/e-vol.5/CHOI.pdf>)

Today North Korea seems to be determined to maintain nuclear weapons, which provide both a last resort for its security and a powerful means of political leverage vis-à-vis South Korea and the United States. North Korea may reluctantly give up its nuclear weapons only after it has obtained a security guarantee and secured political leverage through other means. Probably the most reasonable goal for the near future is a peace treaty with the United States and consequent withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. North Korea believes that this can be achieved only through bilateral talks with the United States. Ever since the second nuclear crisis broke out in October 2002, North Korea has made it clear that it wants nothing but a security guarantee or peace treaty. This position is starkly different from its position in the first nuclear crisis in 1994, when it demanded substitute energy from light water reactors, economic aid, normalization of relations with the United States, and removal of the nuclear umbrella over South Korea in return for abandonment of its nuclear program. It has become more urgent for Pyongyang to promote internal security and strengthen the solidarity of the North Korean people. For this purpose, Pyongyang may want to close the door to the United States, if it cannot expect any concessions from it. In the 2005 New Year’s joint editorial, North Korea hinted at its intention to isolate itself by emphasizing its method to promote internal stability: the improvement of agricultural production and people’s daily life. North Korea has said, “The United States regards the nuclear issue and the ‘human rights issue’ as two levers in executing its policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK,” and it has threatened to boycott the Six-Party Talks.

North Korea will give up nukes if its hostile relationship with the US ends

Arabia new 2000, 1/1/2010,

(“N.Korea Calls for End to Enmity with U.S.& Return to Nu.Talks”, Ebsco Host)

Pyongyang, January 01 (QNA) - North Korea expressed hope Friday in a New Year's message for an end to enmity with the United States and reaffirmed its commitment to a Korean Peninsula cleared of nuclear arms through negotiations. The statement carried in the joint newspaper editorial comes after a U.S. special envoy visited Pyongyang last month to press for the resumption of six-nation talks that focus on North Korea's nuclear arms ambitions, South Korean news agency (Yonhap) reported on Friday. The talks -- involving the U.S., the divided Koreas, China, Russia and Japan -- were declared dead last year by North Korea when it protested U.N. censure of its April long-range rocket launch. In the editorial carried by the official Korean Central News Agency, North Korea said it remains consistent in its efforts “to establish a lasting peace system on the Korean Peninsula and make it nuclear-free through dialogue and negotiations.” “The fundamental task for ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the rest of Asia is to put an end to the hostile relationship between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the USA,” the editorial was quoted as saying in a separate three-paragraph piece that did not elaborate. (QNA)

Solvency: Counterplan Solves Nuclearization

Withdrawal of troops from North Korea is a necessary condition for denuclearization

PETER HAYES, Professor of International Relations – Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology and Director – Nautilus Institute, 12/17/09

“Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea”, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09096Hayes.html>)

Of course, these are all tactical considerations, and however these issues play out in the aftermath of the Bosworth mission to Pyongyang, the DPRK has made it clear that having gained nuclear weapons, they will not give them up without the United States withdrawing END from Japan and South Korea. Given other DPRK demands for reduction in US hostility towards the DPRK including potentially a peace treaty and diplomatic recognition, ending END might only be a necessary, not a sufficient condition for them to dismantle their nuclear weapons. But unless something along these lines is done, it is hard to see what would induce the DPRK leaders to even consider seriously actual denuclearization.

AT: North Korea Says No

North Korea has publicly stated it will denuclearize after the US ends a hostile policy

Bruce Klinger, Senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 2/12/09

Prepared statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
<http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/kli021209.pdf>,

Although North Korea welcomed Barack Obama's election, it will await the details of his policies prior to fully revealing its strategy toward the new U.S. administration. North Korea first seeks to attain its goals through formal and informal diplomatic means, manipulating multiple parallel channels of engagement, and playing one opponent off against the other to gain negotiating leverage. Not content to remain totally silent, however, Pyongyang sent an early signal to the Obama administration. Last month, North Korea asserted that it would only denuclearize following establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the U.S. and the cessation of Washington's "hostile policy." Pyongyang claims to have weaponized all of its fissile material, providing enough for four to six additional nuclear weapons.

North Korea wants a drawdown of US troop presence

Defense & Security News 8/14/06

"North Korea Demands US Troops Pull Out Of South" www.defencetalk.com/north-korea-demands-us-troops-pull-out-of-south-7104/,

North Korea urged South Korea Sunday to push for the withdrawal of US troops and said the military presence could bring disaster. The communist state's Minju Joson newspaper said the South would "not be free from any misfortune and disasters" arising from the US military presence which dates back to the 1950-1953 Korean War. "The South Korean authorities should take a step to force the US troops to withdraw from South Korea as demanded by the people," Minju Joson said. The United States is reducing its forces in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000, with 2008 set as the deadline for the troop cut, and wants to be able to redeploy them outside the country in time of need. South Korea is pushing to secure wartime control over its troops which are currently under a US-led combined command. US troops are stationed in the South to help its 650,000-strong army face up to North Korea's 1.2 million-strong army. Rodong Sinmun, newspaper of the North's communist party newspaper, repeated Sunday that US "imperialists" were preparing an invasion by stepping up propaganda and military drills. They are engrossed in a vicious anti-DPRK (North Korea) smear campaign based on sheer lies. ... It is an operation to be carried out by them prior to invading it by force of arms," Rodong said. "These reckless moves against the DPRK have created such a tense situation on the Korean Peninsula that a war may break out there any moment."

Net Benefit: North Korean Proliferation

North Korean nukes provoke other countries into a nuclear arms race

L Ming - Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2004

informaworld.com

North Korean nuclear armament might also provoke Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to become involved in a nuclear arms race, and force the United States to beef up its military deployment in Northeast Asia, dramatically changing the strategic landscape. Nevertheless, Chinese perceptions of stability have not greatly changed since the end of the Cold War, even though North Korea's nuclear program has already been exposed. With the development of stronger economic ties with South Korea, and China's gradual shift in political relations with the United States over the past decades, Beijing has expressed clear-cut opposition toward any sort of provocation on the part of Pyongyang, which includes development of nuclear arms. At the same time, the PRC also makes it clear to the United States that it should avoid using force against the DPRK in resolving the nuclear issue. In other words, unless North Korea starts a war, the Chinese perception of stability is such that it can only rely upon peaceful means in resolving any issue on the Korean Peninsula. Of course, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea and the use of military force to overthrow the North Korean regime both have the same negative (and dangerous) implications for China.

North Korea Proliferation would lead to an imminent attack, destroying the global economy

William J. Perry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, 2006

“Proliferation on the Peninsula: Five North Korean Nuclear Crisis” <http://ann.sagepub.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/cgi/reprint/607/1/78>

The growing nuclear arsenal in North Korea is a security disaster for several compelling reasons, including the likely domino effect on proliferation. But the overriding reason is the possibility that a North Korean nuclear bomb will end up in one of our cities, not delivered by a missile, but by a truck or freighter. Al Qaeda has already stated unequivocally that it is seeking weapons of mass destruction. More chillingly, as reported by Graham Allison (2004), they have stated that they have a mission to kill 4 million Americans in revenge for specific wrongs that they believe the United States has inflicted on Muslim people. So we must take seriously the consequences of such a terror group gaining access to nuclear weapons, and the only plausible avenue for doing so is to buy or steal them from a nuclear power. If North Korea proceeds unchecked with building its nuclear arsenal, the risk of nuclear terrorism increases significantly. Of course, terrorists setting off a nuclear bomb on U.S. soil would not be equivalent to the nuclear holocaust threatened during the cold war. But it would be the single worst catastrophe this country has ever suffered. Just one bomb could result in more than one hundred thousand deaths, and there could be more than one attack. The direct economic losses from the blast would be hundreds of billions of dollars, but the indirect economic impact would be even greater, as worldwide financial markets would collapse in a way that would make the market setback after 9/11 seem mild. And the social and political effects are incalculable, especially if the weapon were detonated in Washington or Moscow or London, crippling the government of that nation. For all of these reasons, checking the nuclear aspirations of North Korea should be a top security priority for the United States.

Net Benefit: North Korean Proliferation

North Korea nuclearization leads to proliferation

Bruce Bennett, senior analyst at RAND, and Nina Hachigian, director of the Center for Asia Pacific Policy at RAND, 2007

“Regime Change in North Korea Will Not Make the World Safer” pg 69

A cessation of North Korean efforts to make nuclear weapons is the most critical short-term issue. However many nuclear weapons North Korea has, the United States will be far worse off if Pyongyang adds the five or six more weapons that it could by completing the work on its 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, plus other weapons that it could derive from uranium enrichment. The larger North Korea’s arsenal, the more empowered it will feel, and the greater the chances that it will be tempted to sell nuclear materials, especially if economically pressured. The United States cannot afford to wait months or years to freeze Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

East Asian proliferation causes fast arms race and nuclear war

Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2000

[, Foreign Policy, March 22, p. lexis]

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development.

Net Benefit: Nuclear Terrorism

North Korea's weak economy means they will sell nuclear weapons to terrorists

Scott Stossel, graduate of Harvard Law and Atlantic magazine editor August 2005,
http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/KayDavid.NorthKoreaTheWarGame.07.05.pdf

All-out war, however, is not the only—or even the gravest—threat North Korea currently poses to U.S. security. For some years now the fear that has kept homeland-defense experts awake at night is that terrorists will detonate a nuclear bomb in an American city. In fact, the danger that Saddam Hussein would sell nukes to terrorists was a basic rationale for invading Iraq in at least some of the Bush administration's iterations of it. But North Korea is, if anything, more likely than Saddam to do so, if it hasn't already. The country's weak economy has owed its continued functioning in part to the income from vast smuggling networks (primarily for drugs and counterfeit foreign currency) and sales of missiles and other arms to such fellow outlaw nations as Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. At some point the North Koreans may decide they have more than enough nuclear weapons for their own purposes and sell the extras for cash. The longer North Korea keeps producing nukes, in other words, the greater the likelihood that one will find its way to New York or Washington.

North Korea will mass produce Nuclear Weapons and sell them to terrorists

William J. Perry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, 2007
 North Korea Poses a Serious Nuclear Threat Pg 25-6

The first danger is that North Korea will sell some of their bombs or plutonium to a third party. The administration established some years ago an international initiative (Proliferation Security Initiative) designed to prevent the illegal transfer of nuclear material. This is a good program, but we should never believe that it has a high probability of preventing an experienced smuggler like North Korea from transferring enough plutonium to make a bomb, which is about the size of a grapefruit. To deal with the danger of selling nuclear material, the United States should issue a statement warning North Korea of the grave consequences to North Korea if a North Korean bomb is detonated in the United States, Japan, or South Korea, whether the bomb is delivered by North Korea or a third party. The statement should be as unambiguous as the one Kennedy made at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The second danger is that North Korea will finish work on their large reactor, which would give them the capability of making about 10 nuclear bombs a year. We should be prepared to take coercive actions to keep that from happening. The best venue for coercive diplomacy would be the 6-party talks. But we have spent more than three years in those talks with no results, so the talks are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. Indeed, the most recent 6-party talks were held [in December 2006] with no apparent progress.

AT: Permutation

The permutation would not work. The US needs to make a credible guarantee to stop war because the plan does not include verification.

Michael Horowitz, doctoral candidate at Harvard, 2005

The Washington Quarterly, Winter, "Who's Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage Over Pyongyang," http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf,

North Korea's negotiating strategy on the nuclear issue during the last decade has relied on a divide-and-conquer approach. The DPRK presents different negotiating stances to the various interested parties and changes its demands over time, allowing it to generate misperceptions among allies and extract enough economic resources to maintain elite control. In some ways, this strategy has been enormously successful, reinforcing the lesson for North Korean elites that threats and brinkmanship pay off while cooperation invites risk. As long as Pyongyang believes that it can make economic gains without having to make verifiable and irreversible concessions, it has no incentive to make such concessions. The cycles of brinkmanship that result have left the United States few options but to grant additional concessions to North Korea or risk the peninsula eventually deteriorating into armed conflict.

Influence over North Korea key to getting it to change

Michael Horowitz, doctoral candidate at Harvard, 2005

The Washington Quarterly, Winter, "Who's Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage Over Pyongyang," http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf,

After more than a decade and a half of crises, negotiations, and agreements, North Korea is now believed to have produced enough nuclear material for several nuclear weapons. What now? As long as the North Korean regime believes that the status quo is sustainable, they will have little incentive to dismantle their nuclear program completely. Regardless of one's preferred endgame for the Korean peninsula, establishing effective levers of influence over North Korea is a vital first step in moving toward sustainable resolution of the nuclear issue.

The permutation is not a credible guarantee which means the counterplan is superior

Richard Cronin, Report Coordinator and Specialist in Asian Affairs, 6/1/94

CRS Report for Congress, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: U.S. Policy Options," <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/94-470f.htm>)

While a U.S. withdrawal based on a credible non-proliferation regime might be security-enhancing, a diminished U.S. troop presence or a withdrawal based on anything less than a verifiable, inter-Korean confidence building system and full-scope IAEA nonproliferation safeguards, could well be highly destabilizing. Apart from critically weakening or eliminating the longstanding, effective U.S. deterrence role, a U.S. withdrawal without a verifiable nonproliferation regime would also likely cause South Korea to reconsider producing nuclear weapons. Such a train of events on the Korean peninsula could lead to a Japanese reassessment of the reliability of the U.S. security role in the Western Pacific and Japanese decisions to rearm and/or shift Japan's nuclear program towards weapons production



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

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South Korea Counterplan Aff

Condition on North Korea Counterplan Affirmative

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Solvency: Says No - Will Never Give up Nukes

North Korea would not agree to the counterplan, they see their weapons as necessary no matter what the offer

Michael Horowitz, doctoral candidate at Harvard, 2005

The Washington Quarterly, Winter, "Who's Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage Over Pyongyang," http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf,

In general, a serious lack of knowledge about the inner workings of the North Korean regime necessitates caution in attempts to interpret Pyongyang's behavior, including its demands for bilateral talks with Washington. Given the nuclear weapons program's centrality in North Korean strategy and its success both in eliciting economic gains and potentially prolonging the survival of the regime, North Korea will be extremely reticent to dismantle it completely, no matter how good the offer. When dealing with a country as economically and politically secluded as North Korea, the United States and its allies should be wary of accepting simple explanations for North Korean behavior. Essentially, it is unclear if anyone can really influence the hermit kingdom, but if leveraging the regime is possible, U.S. policymakers should consider that options may be much broader than military threats and appealing to China to use its influence.

North Korea will always keep nuclear weapons because they make it a player on the international stage

Blaine Harden, writer for the Washington post, 1/12/10,

Washington Post, U.S. rejects North Korea's new conditions for progress in nuclear talks, Jan 12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/11/AR2010011100485.html>,

TOKYO -- The Obama administration on Monday rejected new conditions set by North Korea for progress in stalled nuclear talks. In a statement, the Pyongyang government said that, as a confidence-building measure, it wants a peace treaty with the United States formally ending the 1950-1953 Korean War and the removal of U.N. sanctions that are squeezing its anemic economy. It also said it will not return to stalled six-party talks on nuclear disarmament unless U.N. sanctions are lifted. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, en route to the Asia-Pacific region for a nine-day trip, rejected North Korea's new conditions. "That is what they want, but that is not what we're offering," Clinton said. Although North Korea says it might rejoin disarmament talks, it has also said repeatedly in the past year that it has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons, which make it a player on the international stage.

Kim Jong-Il will never make peace because he's paranoid and fears a revolt if North Korea no longer has enemies

Jon Herskovitz, for Reuters 1/12/10

"Q+A-Why is North Korea seeking peace treaty with U.S.?", <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/TOE60B00C.htm> Reuters)

DOES NORTH KOREA REALLY WANT A PEACE TREATY? Probably not. A state of war is essential for maintaining the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's "military first" rule. He has asked the people in his impoverished state for years to accept sacrifices in order to help him buy weapons and build a nuclear arms program to prevent a U.S. invasion. Kim would put his paranoid nationalist rule at risk by losing enemies.

Solvency: Says No – Will Never Give up Nukes

The US needs sticks, not carrots to influence North Korea, they will say no

Michael Horowitz, doctoral candidate at Harvard, 2005

The Washington Quarterly, Winter, “Who’s Behind that Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage Over Pyongyang,” http://www.twq.com/05winter/docs/05winter_horowitz.pdf,

The limited U.S. presidential debate on North Korea focused on the importance of multilateral or bilateral talks, but this approach is a false dichotomy and ultimately holds little relevance. What is important is whether Pyongyang will feel pressure if it refuses to be willing to reach a negotiated settlement and whether renewed North Korean brinksmanship will fail to elicit economic benefits for the regime. Without the credible ability to make the status quo worse for Pyongyang and to checkmate its traditional, flailing brinksmanship strategy to get more concessions, the United States and its allies will remain relatively powerless to influence Pyongyang’s strategic choices.

North Korea will never denuclearize because of the prestige weapons give them. Even if they say “yes”, they’ll cheat

Bruce Bennett, Senior Policy Analyst for RAND, 3/13/08

“A New National Strategy for Korea: North Korea Threats Require Deterrence, Reconciliation”, Korea Herald, 3-13, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2008/03/13/KH.html>)

Arms control seeks to reduce the risks of conflict, the damage that conflict could cause, and the military cost to deter conflict or to achieve victory in conflict. For decades, South Korea, the United States, and the international community have tried to use arms control measures to moderate the North Korean threat, consistent with these objectives. Korean arms control efforts have focused on the North Korean nuclear weapons program because of the serious threat that it poses. The history of these efforts is, however, not very hopeful. North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in July 1977, and then joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985. In 1991, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. They agreed to ... not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons ... Moreover, they would ... not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. In 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States, closing the Yongbyon facilities; North Korea promised to abide by the provisions of the NPT. And now North Korea is delaying the agreements made under the six-party talks. North Korea has apparently pursued nuclear weapons development throughout this period. Two examples suggest the pattern. North Korea did operate a nuclear reprocessing facility, in violation of the Joint Declaration. And in 1999, Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan said he was shown three North Korean plutonium nuclear weapons. If Dr. Khan was right, North Korea did produce and possess nuclear weapons, in violation of the NPT and the Joint Declaration. Many experts on North Korea are skeptical that North Korea will ever dismantle its entire nuclear weapon arsenal, because these capabilities have been so critical to North Korea. Consider this: How is it that a nearly bankrupt country of only about 20 million people can stand up to three members of the U.N. Security Council and Japan, four of the wealthiest countries in the world? And in doing so, North Korea often comes out the victor. Would North Korea have such leverage without nuclear weapons? Would the North Korean regime be able to survive without such appearances of empowerment?

Solvency: North Korea Don't Want US involvement

North Korea Doesn't want any US involvement in Peninsula affairs

Choe Sang-Hun, for the New York Times, 6/27/10

“North Korea Rejects U.S. Proposal for Talks on Sinking of Warship”,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/world/asia/28nkorea.html>

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea on Sunday rejected an invitation from the American-led United Nations Command to hold talks on the sinking of a South Korean warship three months ago, which a multinational investigation has attributed to the North Koreans. After that investigation was completed, South Korea accused North Korea of torpedoing the ship, the Cheonan, which killed 46 South Korean sailors and led to a sharp escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Both the South Korean and American governments consider the attack a grave violation of the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War. The United Nations Command, which oversees the implementation of the armistice, proposed talks with North Korea. On Sunday, North Korea called the proposal “ridiculous.” “The U.S. forces side should no longer meddle in the issue of the North-South relations under the name of the ‘U.N. Forces Command.’ ” North Korea said in a statement carried by its state-run Korean Central News Agency. The Foreign Ministry added Monday that “continuing hostile U.S. policy and its military threat” have raised the need for North Korea to bolster its “nuclear deterrent” in a new, improved manner, the Associated Press reported.

Solvency: North Korea Will Cheat

Empirically, North Korea cheats on international agreements

Phillip C. Saunders, Senior Research Fellow – National Defense University, 2003,
 “Assessing North Korea's Nuclear Intentions”, 1-14, http://cns.miis.edu/north_korea/nucint.htm)

On the other hand, North Korea's demonstrated willingness to cheat on international agreements (including the Agreed Framework) makes a future deal very difficult to negotiate. Stringent verification measures would be required because there is no trust on the U.S. side. Moreover, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China would all like to see North Korea pursue significant economic and political reforms. The door to better relations that would support North Korean economic reforms is wide open, but North Korea has been reluctant to walk through it, possibly due to fears that too much openness might undermine the regime's political survival. Security threats are arguably unnecessary to achieve better relations (and may in fact undercut efforts to improve relations and prospects for economic cooperation).

North Korea will pocket the concession and cheat on the agreement

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy – Cato Institute, 2003
 “Pyongyang Preemption”, National Review Online, 1-6,
<http://article.nationalreview.com/267537/pyongyang-preemption/ted-galen-carpenter>)

But one ought to be skeptical about that approach. Given the failure of bribery in the past, there is little reason to assume that sweetening the bribe would induce Pyongyang to abide by its commitments. North Korea would likely pocket any new concessions and soon engage in a new round of cheating.

North Korea is too secretive, they can easily avoid any agreement

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, 1994,
 “Closing the Nuclear Umbrella”, Foreign Affairs, March / April, 73(2), Ebsco)

The recent crisis over North Korea's nuclear program is merely the latest evidence that the global nonproliferation regime, symbolized by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), is inexorably breaking down. Although U.S. concessions may ultimately induce Pyongyang once again to allow international inspections, that will be a meager accomplishment. It will hardly offer reliable guarantees that a regime as secretive and politically opaque as North Korea's cannot evade International Atomic Energy Agency scrutiny while pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Iraq, for one, was certainly able to do so while complying with all IAEA inspection requirements.

Solvency: Delay Hurts Counterplan

Even if North Korea says yes, they will delay the decision as long as possible

Joel S. Wit, Visiting Fellow – U.S-Korea Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2010

“Four Scenarios for a Nuclear North Korea”, February,
http://uskoreainstitute.org/bin/s/g/USKI_WP10-01_Wit.pdf

Questions remain about whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear arsenal. One school of thought argues that Pyongyang intends to keep its weapons, citing reasons ranging from the fact that no country has relinquished its arsenal after openly conducting a nuclear test to forecasts that the possession of such weapons guarantees the continued survival of the Kim Jong-il regime. Another school of thought argues that no one knows whether North Korea would be willing to give up its nuclear arsenal since, at least in recent years, no serious effort has been made to determine this through a coherent policy of providing incentives and disincentives to Pyongyang. A third school would argue that Kim Jong-il has not yet made up his mind whether he will give up his nuclear arsenal. Contrary to the popular impression that the North Koreans are reckless risk-takers, they are in fact extremely cautious. A decision of that magnitude will not be arrived at quickly or easily and will probably be delayed as long as possible.

Particularly true for North Korea

Sico van der Meer, Research Fellow – Netherlands Institute of International Relations and MA in History – Radboud University, 2008

“Nuclear Blackmail: Will North Korea Ever End its Nuclear Program?”, Strategic Insights, VIII(4), September,

Next to the strategy of playing the instability card, the North Korean regime uses the strategy of constantly slowing down all negotiation processes. Every possible detail is used to delay the negotiation processes as a whole. One example of many is the Banco Delta Asia affair. When in 2005 the North Korean accounts at this bank in Macau were declared “infected” by the United States and consequently frozen, North Korea refused to negotiate any further about anything as long as this relatively small problem was not resolved.[10] That time is on the North Korean side seems to be the idea in Pyongyang. As long as negotiations are possible, military action against the regime is highly unlikely, while at the same time the nuclear program may continue, at least to some extent. And as long as negotiations are dragging along, aid requirements due to floods and other disasters—that sometimes seem to be exaggerated to extract more support—will be taken more seriously by the international community. After all, nobody wants to see the regime in Pyongyang collapsing because of popular unrest as long as there could be nuclear devices available in the chaos that will arise, so food and energy supplies will surely follow upon these kind of aid requests.

Affirmative Plan Solves Better

Unilateral action allows the US to take the high ground on denuclearization, which solves better

Kongdan Oh, Research Staff Member – Institute for Defense Analyses and Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, 1992

“Background and Options for Nuclear Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula”,
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N3475.pdf>)

This option has already been exercised. One result of guaranteeing the nuclear-free status of South Korea should be to persuade the North Koreans that they do not need their own nuclear weapons to defend against a South Korean-U.S. nuclear threat. Unilateral withdrawal should thus be a significant CBM, but there is no guarantee that the North will respond positively. Unilateral arms reduction, while it may appear naive, does have several points to recommend it. At least in the short term, it reduces or eliminates the number of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Also, such a move enables the United States to take the high ground in the moral debate about denuclearization.

Unilateral security guarantee is a necessary first move – North Korea won’t accept a grand bargain without it

Mike Gravel, United States Senator, 10/14/09

“A Grand Bargain” <http://www.mikegravel.us/content/grand-bargain>)

President Obama can regain his footing in East Asia by aggressively backing Lee Myung-bak’s “grand bargain” and by making the only geopolitical move that could prove the sincerity of the key point of the bargain—the security guarantee to North Korea. The only proof that could possibly overcome Pyongyang’s paranoia to accept the “bargain” would be the unilateral withdrawal of all US forces from the Korean Peninsula--before the bargain is entered into. These forces are merely a legacy of the Korean War and do not relate to the real defense of South Korea. Militarily US forces are but a “trip wire.” No sane person contemplates refighting a 1950 style Korean War, with boots-on-the-ground up and down the peninsula, resulting in the devastation of one of the World’s 21st Century’s economic jewels.

Affirmative Plan Solves Better

Unconditional commitment to withdrawal sends a stronger signal, otherwise South Korea will drag their feet as much as possible (which means the counterplan won't solve the military modernization advantage)

Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004

The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 142-143)

Nevertheless, while it is important for Washington to work with Seoul to shape the withdrawal and inform other states in the region privately before any plan is announced, it is vital for the United States to emphasize that the decision has been made and to set a deadline, or else the ROK will have an incentive to delay fully augmenting its military as long as possible to maintain America's security guarantee. Moreover, the opponents of disengagement then would seek postponement rather than cancellation, since the former usually turns into the latter, as it did with President Carter's plan. Unfortunately, in the view of many supporters of the ROK defense subsidy, both American and South Korean, the timing will never be right, just as the point when Seoul is to reach military parity with the North always seems to slip a few more years into the future. Therefore, Washington must insist that only the timing and details of the pullout, not the denouement itself, are subject to negotiation. As mentioned earlier, the United States should encourage the South to use an American phase-out as a bargaining chip with North Korea. Seoul should announce the withdrawal and give the DPRK two choices. One is to engage in serious negotiations over adoption of confidence-building measures and arms reduction. The other is to watch South Korea build up its military to match that of the North. Such an offer could play an important role in attempting to forestall the DPRK's nuclear option through diplomacy. Although it is impossible to predict how North Korea would respond, this strategy would provide a useful test of Pyongyang's intentions. That would be useful for domestic ROK politics, given the fact, noted earlier, that many South Koreans have an inordinately romantic view of the North: Pyongyang would have to put up or shut up, without being able to use the United States as an excuse for any intransigence. And this strategy might offer the only realistic approach, assuming the North truly fears for its security. After all, Seoul could offer North Korea what it has long demanded, an American pullout joined with the prospect of economic development, while threatening to spend its adversary into the ground. In fact, in 1993 the Seoul government predicted as much: From a mid- and long-term perspective, the probability of peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea is predicted to increase. It is very likely that international cross-recognition of the two Koreas will come about as the worldwide conciliatory atmosphere warms after the Cold War era and as the four major regional powers come to increasingly desire stability on the Korean peninsula. When North Korea takes into account the considerable gap between the two Koreas in terms of national power, the predicted loss of their military supremacy and the expected limit of Kim Jong Il's charisma after Kim Il Sung dies, they are predicted inevitably to renounce their strategy of communizing the South by force and to embrace a pragmatic opening and reforming of their society.⁹ That assessment ultimately might turn out to be wildly optimistic, but the thesis should be tested—by Seoul. It has been evident for years that South Korea is a security free-rider, one that no longer requires American military support. Five decades' worth of American withdrawal plans and proposals have been generally halfhearted, mismanaged, and interrupted. Washington needs to adopt a new approach, based on South Korea's declining security value to America and increasing ability to defend itself. The United States should make a firm decision to pull out all of its troops, while cooperating with Seoul in determining the timing and ordering of the withdrawal. The disengagement decision needs to be final, with demobilization of the troops and cancellation of the Mutual Defense Treaty to follow. The details can and should be negotiated with Seoul, but it is time to free the American people from a commitment that costs far more than it is worth, absorbs valuable military resources, and keeps the Korean people in a dependent relationship that insults their nationhood and puts their destiny in another country's hands.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

Security Critique- Neg

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Explanation

The security critique argues that the way we talk about the harms in the 1AC have an effect on the real world. In essence, it argues that we are not just passive observers of the world, and instead that what we say shapes the world and how other people react to us. The link argument is that many threats or disaster scenarios in international politics, like the advantages in the 1AC, are not really accurate representation of reality, but instead are contrived, worst-case scenarios that are extremely unlikely to happen. Many critiques, such as this one, argue that the world is much more complex and we cannot know for certain what the effects of the affirmative plan would be.

Moreover, these “constructions” of how we think the world works have a potentially harmful effect on the stability of the world. By creating scenarios where we view other countries as threats, we become more likely to view similar scenarios as threatening. This turns the case because it makes conflicts between countries more likely.

The impact evidence argues that these disaster scenarios are really horror stories that are designed to increase the government’s control over the population. The government is responsible for our security, and in times of increased threat the government gains more power in order to protect us. For example, in World War II, the government gained the power to detain people indefinitely just because it suspected that they might have ties to the Japanese. The impact evidence argues that similar things would happen with the affirmative: the affirmative will take advantage of how scared everyone becomes of the harms in the 1AC and use that fear to implement whatever it wants to do, with potentially harmful consequences.

The alternative says that we have to rethink how we talk about international politics. Instead of focusing on security and the consequences like the affirmative, we should reject that form of speaking with the hope that we will be able to come up with a better way of talking about these issues.

Glossary

Sovereign: Being autonomous, with the ability to make one's own decisions. The United States is a sovereign state, as are the rest of the countries in the international system, because no other state has complete authority over it.

State: A synonym for country.

Security: The politics and reactions to threats from other entities to a country. Discussions about preventing wars, terrorism, or other things that have the potential to hurt a country and its citizens are referred to as security politics.

Security Dilemma: Refers to the fact that one country trying to become more secure may in the process make other countries less secure. For example, suppose the United States feels threatened by China, and decides to build more nuclear weapons in order to protect themselves. China may see this development and become concerned because the U.S. is now more powerful than it was before, and might potentially be able to beat China in a conflict. As a result, China may decide to build more nuclear weapons to counter the U.S. This in turn may make the U.S. feel insecure once more, and a cycle may emerge.

Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not possess them.

Security Critique INC Shell [1/3]

A. Link. The affirmative's war impacts are not correct descriptions of the world. Instead, they are horror stories that are manufactured based off of improbable worst-case scenario predictions in order to increase the control of the state. These depictions of a world full of instability justify real military buildup and make actual war more likely.

Ronnie Lipschutz, professor of politics at UC Santa Cruz, 1998

“Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium's End,” On Security, ed., <http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/index.html>]

What then, is the form and content of this speech act? The logic of security implies that one political actor must be protected from the depredations of another political actor. In international relations, these actors are territorially defined, mutually exclusive and nominally sovereign states. A state is assumed to be politically cohesive, to monopolize the use of violence within the defined jurisdiction, to be able to protect itself from other states, and to be potentially hostile to other states. Self-protection may, under certain circumstances, extend to the suppression of domestic actors, if it can be proved that such actors are acting in a manner hostile to the state on behalf of another state (or political entity). Overall, however, the logic of security is exclusionist: It proposes to exclude developments deemed threatening to the continued existence of that state and, in doing so, draws boundaries to discipline the behavior of those within and to differentiate within from without. The right to define such developments and draw such boundaries is, generally speaking, the prerogative of certain state representatives, as Weaver points out. ³ Of course, security, the speech act, does draw on material conditions "out there." In particular, the logic of security assumes that state actors possess "capabilities," and the purposes of such capabilities are interpreted as part of the speech act itself. These interpretations are based on indicators that can be observed and measured--for example, numbers of tanks in the field, missiles in silos, men under arms. It is a given within the logic--the speech act--of security that these capabilities exist to be used in a threatening fashion--either for deterrent or offensive purposes--and that such threats can be deduced, albeit incompletely, without reference to intentions or, for that matter, the domestic contexts within which such capabilities have been developed. Defense analysts within the state that is trying to interpret the meanings of the other state's capabilities consequently formulate a range of possible scenarios of employment, utilizing the most threatening or damaging one as the basis for devising a response. Most pointedly, they do not assume either that the capabilities will not be used or that they might have come into being for reasons other than projecting the imagined threats. Threats, in this context, thus become what might be done, not, given the "fog of war," what could or would be done, or the fog of bureaucracy, what might not be done. What we have here, in other words, is "worst case" interpretation. The "speech act" security thus usually generates a proportionate response, in which the imagined threat is used to manufacture real weapons and deploy real troops in arrays intended to convey certain imagined scenarios in the mind of the other state. Intersubjectivity, in this case, causes states to read in others, and to respond to, their worst fears. It is important to recognize that, to the extent we make judgments about possibilities on the basis of capabilities, without reference to actual intentions, we are trying to imagine how those capabilities might be used. These imagined scenarios are not, however, based only on some idea of how the threatening actor might behave; they are also reflections of what our intentions might be, were we in the place of that actor, constructing imagined scenarios based on what s/he would imagine our intentions might be, were they in our place . . . and so on, ad infinitum. Where we cut into this loop, and why we cut into the loop in one place and not another, has a great deal to do with where we start in our quest to understand the notion of security, the speech act.

Security Critique INC Shell [2/3]

B. Impact. Security rhetoric allows the government to control its citizens, which allows for violence and genocide

Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, 2000

Apocalypse From Now On

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of *The History of Sexuality* addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life ... [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

Security Critique INC Shell [3/3]

C. Alternative. The alternative is to reject the affirmative in order to move past the affirmative's focus on security issues. This will allow for more productive debates.

Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, 2008,
Critique of Security, p. 185-6

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"', reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.'" The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilized or gendered or humanized or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security.

Link: Threats

The affirmative creates threats in order to create the problem of security

Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Professor of Politics and Associate Director of the Center for Global, International and Regional Studies at the UCSC, 1995

On Security Pg. 8-9

Conceptualizations of security-from which follow policy and practice-are to be found in discourses of security. These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them. Hence, there are not only struggles over security among nations, but also struggles over security among notions. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as well. As Karen Liftlin points out, “As determinants of what can and cannot be thought, discourses delimit the range of policy options, thereby functioning as precursors to policy outcomes ... The supreme power is the power to delineate the boundaries of thought – an attribute not so much of specific agents as it is of discursive practices. These discourses of security, however clearly articulated, nonetheless remain fraught with contradictions, as the chapters in this volume make clear. How do such discourses begin? In his investigation of historical origins of the concept, James Der Derian (Chapter 2: “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”) points out that, in the past, security has been invoked not only to connote protection from threats, along the lines of the conventional definition, but also to describe hubristic overconfidence as well as a bond or pledge provided in a financial transaction. To secure oneself is, therefore, a sort of trap, for one can never leave a secure place without incurring risks. (Elsewhere, Barry Buzan has pointed out that “There is a cruel irony in [one] meaning of secure which is ‘unable to escape’. Security, moreover, is meaningless without an “other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity. Der Derian, citing Nietzsche, points out that this “other” is made manifest through differences that create terror and collective resentment of difference – the state of fear – rather than a preferable coming to terms with the positive potential of difference.

Link: Terrorism

“Terrorism” is an empty word that is used to make the Western world seem like victims and undeveloped people as attackers, and to justify violence against them.

Anastassia Tsoukala, Research Fellow at the University of Paris V-Sorbonne and Associate Professor at the University of Paris XI, 2008

(“Boundary-creating Processes and the Social Construction of Threat,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 33, Issue 2, April-June, Available Online via Academic Search Elite, p. 147-148)

The moral inferiority of terrorists is brought forth through the frequent use of a Manichean image of the world, where the good lies with the threatened Western countries and the evil with the aggressors, as is shown by the latter's lack of respect for human life and the indiscriminate character of their targets. To further underpin the dangerousness of the threat, the terrorist act is deprived of any political objective and is turned into a goal in itself, as if terrorists were solely aiming to inflict pain and suffering. This alleged affective insensibility facilitates the depoliticization of the conflict as it turns it into more classic patterns of criminal behavior. While implying that the retaliation will not be a conventional war,⁴⁵ the depoliticization and subsequent criminalization of the conflict create, by definition, a huge moral gap between the aggressors and the aggressed and confirm the already established moral superiority of the aggressed. The cultural inferiority theme prolongs the Manichean image underlying the moral inferiority theme by reinforcing the creation of an outer space, in rupture with the rest of the world, that terrorists can be relegated to. The uncivilized nature of this outer space is usually illustrated by the use of two opposed terms: barbaric, and civilized. Terrorism is seen as a challenge to the Western perception of civilization—that is, the belief in an uninterrupted civilizing process that gradually improves the human condition. The establishment of this view relies on a hierarchical classification of civilizations following two principles: The civilized world is synonymous with the Western world, and all non-Western countries are culturally inferior insofar as they do not share the same democratic ideals. As these democratic ideals include some major moral principles, mainly related to the human-rights issue, this alleged cultural superiority can easily imply a moral one, thus discrediting completely the political and philosophical system the terrorists rely on. This outcasting from the overall society further rests upon the alienation of the aggressors from the Muslim in-group. Following the assumption that terrorism has nothing to do with the true message of Islam, Muslims are totally depoliticized to be solely defined in cultural terms. Islam is presented as a peaceful and tolerant religion, distorted by its illegitimate appropriators (i.e., people pursuing other, nonspecified objectives). A clear line is thus drawn between the Muslim community and the few extremists, who are unable or [end page 147] unwilling to share the dominant values of both the British society and their own community.

Link: Proliferation

The notion of weapons spread perpetuates the notion that the weapons themselves spread and takes responsible agents out of the analysis of international relations

David Mutimer, associate professor of political science at York University and Deputy Director of the Center for International and Security Studies, 2000

The Weapons State, pg 61]

The second implication of the proliferation metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread is an extreme technological determinism. Animal reproduction is an internally driven phenomenon, and so the metaphor of proliferation applied to the development of nuclear technology highlights the autonomy in the growth of that technology and its problematic weapons variant. It is worth recalling Frank Barnaby's words: ~'A country with a nuclear power program will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons.'"¹⁹ In fact, the text from which this quotation is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the proliferation metaphor. The book is entitled *How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s*. Notice that the *weapons themselves* spread; they are not spread by some form of external agent-say, a human being or a political institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for the implications are so deeply ingrained in our conceptual system that they are not recognized as metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the *technological* and *autonomous* aspects of a process of *spread*, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread but *are* spread-and, in fact, are spread largely by the Western states. Second, the image downplays-to the point of hiding-any of the political, social, economic, and structural factors that tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalizing the security dilemma to the point that it is considered an automatic dynamic. The image of "proliferation" thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy by casting the problem as a technical one. The NPT controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supply-that is, the outward flow-of this same technology. The goal in both cases is to stem or at least slow the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques.

Impact: Turns Case

Using security to motivate policies ultimately causes more conflicts and violence

Claudia Aradau, Research Associate in the Centre of International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College London, December, 2001

RUBIKON, Date accessed May 10, 2007, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm>]

Survival refers not only to the fear of death, but implies countermeasures, the 'extraordinary measures' of the CoS. Michael Dillon has formulated the appeal to security as necessarily implying a 'specification, no matter how inchoate, of the fear which engenders it' and hence calls for 'counter-measures to deal with the danger which initiates fear, and for the neutralization, elimination or constraint of that person, group, object or condition which engenders fear'.[13] These countermeasures are directed at the other, the enemy to be eliminated. Or in metaphoric terms, to use Jef Huysmans' favorite analogy society-garden, counter-measures refer to unearthing the weeds threatening the harmonious growth of the garden.[14] The metaphor of war is constitutive of what both Ashley and Campbell have called the 'paradigm of sovereignty'.[15] In Campbell's formulation, sovereignty signifies 'a center of decision presiding over a self that is to be valued and demarcated from an external domain that cannot and will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign domain'.[16] This process of demarcation of friends and enemies, delineation of boundaries of order versus disorder has been the prerogative of the sovereign state, provider of security within its boundaries and preserver of 'law and order'. The injunction to preserve the internal order of the modern harmonious garden has targeted both internal and external enemies, the weeds that need to be rooted out for the benefit of the political community. As the 'war on drugs' will clearly illustrate, this approach is highly ambiguous for a political community predicated upon the friend/enemy differentiation. In this political community constituted upon the logic of war, securitizing moves are only liable to breed insecurity. Elimination of enemies or their circumscribing is the ultimate goal of war. Thus the sovereign logic of security ultimately endangers, threatens those who threaten us and in this sense it has disquieting effects on the political community. Moreover, the mutual constitutiveness of threats and threatened objects leads to a spiral of enemy constructions. The enemy needs to be eliminated and at the same time the very identity of society, for example, depends on enemy construction. The war logic of security is thus likely to lead to a paradoxical story, in which security is only likely to breed more insecurity and eventually violence.

AT: Permutation

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Doing the plan prevents us from truly rejecting security because it blinds us to alternative ways of thinking about the world

Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, 2008,
Critique of Security, p. 185-6

The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognizing that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."

AT: Permutation

[] The permutation will fail because it still makes security seem desirable, which will prevent going past it

Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy; Head of Department of Politics & History Brunel Univ, 2008,
Critique of Security, p. 3-4

This range of research - now quite formidable, often impressive and sometimes drawn on in this book - has a double lack. First, for all its talk about discourse, processes and the need for a critical edge, it still offers a relatively impoverished account of the different ways in which security and insecurity are imagined." To speak of different 'security fields' such as the environment, migration, energy, and so on, often fails to open up the analysis to the ways in which spaces and places, processes and categories, are imagined through the lens of insecurity and in turn appropriated and colonized by the project of security. Given the centrality of the state to the political imagination, to imagine the whole social order through the lens of insecurity is to hand it over to the key entity which is said to be the ground of security, namely the state." This is related to the second lack, which is that for all the critical edge employed by the authors in question, the running assumption underpinning the work is that security is still a good thing, still necessary despite how much we interrogate it. The assumption seems to be that while we might engage in a critical interrogation of security, we could never quite be against it. 'Why we might want "security" after all' is how one of the most influential essays in this area ends." As Didier Bigo points out, how to maximize security always seems to remain the core issue." And so there is a danger that these approaches do not quite manage to shake off the managerialism prevalent in more traditional security studies: the desire to 'do' security better. The common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and the good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to 'secure' us.

AT: Alternative Fails

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The alternative solves. Recognizing the problems with security allows us to us to begin to think differently about security in less dangerous forms.

Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of IR at Bilkent University (Turkey), 2005

("Conclusion," *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207)

The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the 'politics behind the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that 'everything is socially constructed' or that 'all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them' is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a 'reality' in line with the tenets of 'realist' Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the 'reality' 'out there', foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasizes the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call 'reality'. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalizing the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a 'threat to the future', or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic' vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a 'desired' future but is also cognizant of 'threats to the future'.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

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Security Critique Affirmative

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Critique Makes War More Likely

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Ignoring security concerns makes war more likely. Our enemies will take advantage of weakness and cause the impacts the plan tries to prevent

Charles Doran, Professor of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, June 1999
“Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange,” Survival, Volume 41, Number 2, Taylor and Francis Journals)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defense and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clausewitz’s most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defenses that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilizing efforts are made to try to provide that missing defense, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

Critique Makes War More Likely

The alternative is a huge leap of faith. Other actors might take advantage of our weakness and cause instability

**Alastair Murray, Politics Department, University of Wales Swansea, 1997,
Reconstructing Realism p. 181-182**

This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt's constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the possibility of effecting a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, what is problematic is his faith that such change, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt's entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything, in his account, is up for grabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearned, disposed of. This generates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the difficulties which it recognizes to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes its reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that states adopt a strategy of 'altercasting', a strategy which 'tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist alter in ego's effort to change itself) by treating alter *as if* it already had that identity'. Wendt's position effectively culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its opponent might not take its overtures seriously, might not be interested in reformulating its own construction of the world, or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited, are completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a systemic transformation simply outweighs any adverse consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have overdosed on 'Gorbimania'.

Threats are Real

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Threats aren't created by talking about them. War occurs because there are greedy leaders who take risks and start conflicts

Andrew Kydd, Professor of Political Science at University of California, Riverside, 1997
Autumn, Security Studies, page 154

The alternative I propose, motivational realism, argues that arms races and wars typically involve at least one genuinely greedy state, that is, states that often sacrifice their security in bids for power. In the case of the First World War, the four continental powers all had serious nonsecurity-related quarrels that played an indispensable role in producing the war. France was eager to regain Alsace-Lorraine, Russia sought hegemony over fellow Slavs in the Balkans when it could hardly integrate its own bloated empire, Germany dreamed of Weltpolitik and empire in the Levant, while Austria-Hungary was focused on its own imminent ethnic meltdown. All of these powers, had they sought just to be secure against foreign threat, could easily have conveyed that to each other and refrained from arms competition and war. Instead they engaged in competitions for power which eventually led to war.

Threats Are Real

Threats aren't created by the IAC, they actually exist. We should pay attention to threats because they provide us useful information that we can use to avoid conflicts.

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof at Södertörn University College, 2001

[Security Dialogue 32.3, "Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization," p. 360]

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Weaver's concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, 'One can view "security" as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.' The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Weaver's joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Weaver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and 'threat perceptions' important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Weaver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent 'politics of panic', as Weaver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Weaverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Weaver's world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena 'out there' by reconceptualizing them, as Weaver does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

Alternative Fails:

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The alternative will not shift away from the current way of thinking. Realism has existed for 700 years and there is no way the alternative could influence enough people.

John J. Mearsheimer, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2001

(The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Published by W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0393020258, p. 368-369)

Social constructivists provide another perspective on how to create a world of states with benign intentions that are readily recognizable by other states.¹⁷ They maintain that the way states behave toward each other is not a function of how the material world is structured—as realists argue—but instead is largely determined by how individuals think and talk about international politics. This perspective is nicely captured by Alexander Wendt’s famous claim that “anarchy is what states make of it.”¹⁸ Discourse, in short, is the motor that drives international politics. But unfortunately, say social constructivists, realism has been the dominant discourse for at least the past seven centuries and realism tells states to distrust other states and to take advantage of them whenever possible. What is needed to create a more peaceful world is a replacement discourse that emphasizes trust and cooperation among states, rather than suspicion and hostility. One reason to doubt this perspective is the simple fact that realism *has* dominated the international relations discourse for the past seven centuries or more. Such remarkable staying power over a lengthy period that has seen profound change in almost every other aspect of daily life strongly suggests that the basic structure of the international system—which has remained anarchic over that entire period—largely determines how states think and act toward each other. But even if we reject my materialist interpretation, what is going to cause the reigning discourse about world politics to change? What is the causal mechanism that will delegitimize realism after seven hundred years and put a better substitute in its place? What determines whether the replacement discourse will be benign or malign? What guarantee is there that realism will not rise from the dead and once again become the hegemonic discourse? The social constructivists provide no answers to these important questions, which makes it hard to believe that a marked change in our discourse about international politics is in the offing.¹⁹

Alternative Fails:

Talk alone does not solve – the alternative cannot occur in a vacuum that ignores the realities of policymaking.

Jef Huysmans, Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Government at Open University, 2002 ("Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Volume 27, Issue 1, February (Supplemental Issue), Available Online via Academic Search Elite, p. 50-51)

Although the critical edge of this literature cannot be ignored, denaturalizing security fields is not necessarily successful in moderating the normative dilemma. The research continues to map the security discourses, therefore repeating, in an often highly systematic way, a security approach to, for example, migration or drugs. Demonstrating the contingent character of the politicization does question the foundational character of this contingent construction, but it does not necessarily undermine the real effects. It does this only when these discourses rely heavily for their effects on keeping the natural character of its foundations unquestioned. This points to a more general issue concerning this kind of analysis. Although it stresses that language makes a difference and that social relations are constructed, it leaves underdeveloped the concept of security formation that heavily prestructures the possibilities to "speak" differently through rarifying who can speak security, what security can be spoken about, how one should speak about security, and so on. 27 Another related problem is that the approach assumes that indicating the mere existence of alternative practices challenges the dominance of the dominant discourse. This is problematic since the alternative constructions do not exist in a vacuum, or in a sheltered space. To be part of the game, they must, for example, contest political constructions of migration. Alternative practices are thus not isolated, but engage with other, possibly dominant, constructions. This raises the question of how the "engagement" actually works. It involves relations of power, structuring and restructuring the social exchanges. Staging alternative practices does not necessarily challenge a dominant construction. The political game is more complex, as Foucault's interpretation of the "sexual revolution" - the liberation from sexual repression - of the second half of the twentieth century showed. 28 In a comment on human-rights approaches to migration, Didier Bigo raises a similar point - that opposing strategies do not necessarily radically challenge established politicizations: "It is often misleading to counterpose the ideology of security to human rights because they sometimes have more in common than their authors would like to admit. They often share the same concept of insecurity and diverge only in their solutions."

Permutation

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Permutation. We shouldn't just ignore threats and a realist framework because there is too much useful information and too many useful lessons. Rather, we should combine the alternative and the plan.

Stefano Guzzini, Assistant Professor IR at the Central European University, 1998

("Conclusion: the fragmentation of realism," *Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415144027, p. 212)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

Permutation

Our use of the realist framework allows us to incorporate different ideologies to become a new ethic without risking backlash

Alastair Murray, Professor of International Relations at University of Wales, 1997,
Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, p. 202

Realism would seem to hold out the possibility of a more constructive path for international relations theory. The fact that it is engaged in a normative enquiry is not to say that it abandons a concern for the practical realities of international politics, only that it is concerned to bridge the gap between cosmopolitan moral and power political logics. Its approach ultimately provides an overarching framework which can draw on many different strands of thought, the 'spokes' which can be said to be attached to its central hub, to enable it to relate empirical concerns to a normative agenda. It can incorporate the lessons that geopolitics yields, the insights that neorealism might achieve, and all the other information that the approaches which effectively serve to articulate the specifics of its orientation generate, and, once incorporated within its theoretical framework, relate them both to one another and to the requirements of the ideal, in order to support an analysis of the conditions which characterize contemporary international politics and help it to achieve a viable political ethic. Against critical theories which are incomprehensible to any but their authors and their acolytes and which prove incapable of relating their categories to the issues which provide the substance of international affairs, and against rationalist, and especially neorealist, perspectives which prove unconcerned for matters of values and which simply ignore the relevance of ethical questions to political action, realism is capable of formulating a position which brings ethics and politics into a viable relationship. It would ultimately seem to offer us a course which navigates between the Scylla of defending our values so badly that we end up threatening their very existence, and the Charybdis of defending them so efficiently that we become everything that they militate against. Under its auspices, we can perhaps succeed in reconciling our ideals with our pragmatism.