



# BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

## 2010-2011 Varsity Packet Tournament One

- Afghanistan Affirmative
- Afghanistan Negative
- South Korea Affirmative
- South Korea Negative
- Allied Prolif DA
- Allied Prolif DA Aff
- Readiness DA
- Readiness DA Aff
- Afghanistan CP
- Afghanistan CP Aff
- South Korea CP
- South Korea CP Aff
- Security K
- Security K Aff

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

# Afghanistan – Aff

# Afghanistan Affirmative

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## Explanation

In response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the United States led an international military intervention into Afghanistan, resulting in the removal of the Taliban government. Eventually, an interim authority was established led by President Hamid Karzai, a new Constitution was drafted and a national assembly was elected. Karzai was elected and then re-elected in November 2009.

During his 2008 campaign, President Obama promised to focus American attention back on the conflict in Afghanistan. After he conducted a yearlong review, in December 2009 he announced that the United States would deploy significantly more troops to Afghanistan. He raised the number of soldiers from 32,000 to over 90,000. At the same time, he announced that America would begin to pull out its troops in July 2011, with no definite date for complete withdrawal.

By June 2010, the conflict in Afghanistan had become the longest war in America's history, surpassing the previous record of eight years and seven months by the Vietnam War. President Obama's stated goals for our operation in Afghanistan: to ensure that "Afghanistan is stable, can stand on its own two feet when it comes to security issues, and is not a base for terrorist activity launched against the United States."

**SUMMARY OF THE AFGHANISTAN AFFIRMATIVE:** America's current policy toward Afghanistan is to expand our forces there to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Unfortunately there is little chance this strategy will work, and violence continues at significant levels. Many observers predict that the U.S. will not adhere to the July 2011 deadline to begin withdrawal, as military assessments on the ground will be pessimistic. Therefore, the United States will indefinitely continue its policy of combating the insurgency with tens of thousands of American troops.

Not only is this force expensive in terms of American lives and dollars, a large military presence will not increase stability in Afghanistan. Instead, it causes the connection between al-Qaeda and the Taliban to tighten, increases anti-Americanism, and also increases the success of terrorist recruiting. Past experience with counter-insurgency strategies in other countries proves it will be a failure. Indeed, evidence indicates the Taliban is gaining strength and the government is becoming more anti-American.

Not only will our large military presence be counterproductive in Afghanistan, it will also increase radicalization in neighboring Pakistan. The large occupation force will increase anti-Americanism in Pakistan, which threatens the pro-American regime in power. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, so a civil war of any kind would present a huge risk that weapons of mass destruction will fall into terrorists' hands. In addition to threatening a civil war, radicalization of Pakistan would increase the likelihood they would be dragged into a conflict with archenemy India. A nuclear war could result.

The affirmative plan would reduce our military presence by changing our mission from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism. It would not be a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. It would leave about 10-15,000 troops in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future to remain on guard against terrorist bases and activities. It would facilitate targeted strikes against specific terrorist actions.

An announcement of our future reduced presence would create positive political change within Afghanistan and Pakistan, strengthening our efforts to produce stability and modernization.

## Glossary

### **Important People and Groups:**

Hamid Karzai: President of Afghanistan

Pashtun: One of the many Ethnic groups that make up Afghanistan

David Petraeus: American general, head of US forces in Afghanistan

Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Muslim terrorist organization active in Pakistan and Afghanistan

Taliban: Sunni Muslim political movement that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until it was overthrown by the American invasion in 2001. It operates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The organization provided shelter to members of Al-Qaeda, and allowed them to plan the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks.

National Assembly:

Al Qaeda: Militant Islamic group led by Osama Bin-Laden. The group was responsible for the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks and several other high profile terrorist attacks against the United States.

### **Terms:**

Insurgency: Insurgency is an armed rebellion against a centralized governmental authority. The insurgency in Afghanistan is attempting to discredit both the American military presence and the secular central government led by Karzai.

Counter Insurgency: Military strategy designed to overcome insurgent attacks. Often relies on winning popular support of the occupied population in order to enlist its help in overcoming the insurgent attacks

COIN :Counter Insurgency, strategy currently adopted by the US military in Afghanistan

Radicalization: Refers to the surrounding areas of Afghanistan becoming more militantly Islamic and opposed to US interests and policies in the region.

## Afghanistan IAC [1/8]

### **Contention 1: Inherency**

**The United States is committed to an expanded military presence in Afghanistan, oriented toward propping up the government and conducting counterinsurgency against the Taliban.**

**Michael Cohen, Fellow, New American Foundation, Spring 2010**

[Dissent Magazine, Spring 2010 pp. 5-9]

The United States has been fighting the war in Afghanistan for more than eight years. That's longer than U.S. participation in the Second World War or the Iraq War. By the end of 2010, it will have surpassed the length of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It has taken the lives of just under one thousand Americans, more than nine thousand others have been wounded, and it has cost more than \$250 billion. Most important, the original goal of the mission has been achieved; al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan has been destroyed and its Taliban allies pushed from power. Yet when Barack Obama delivered a major speech on the topic at West Point in December, he was not there to claim victory but to make the case for why the United States should stay longer in Afghanistan and actually increase its military presence. The president's announcement that thirty thousand more troops would be deployed to Afghanistan meant the U.S. military footprint would rise to nearly one hundred thousand—all this to face a Taliban insurgency that by some estimates totals around twenty thousand core fighters and an al Qaeda organization in Pakistan that counts perhaps two hundred key operatives.

## Afghanistan IAC [2/8]

### **Contention 2: Harms**

#### **The United States Military presence in Afghanistan risks an expanded regional war and a Nuclear Attack on the United States**

#### **The US is losing the war in Afghanistan on every front – there is no chance of success**

**Dorransoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia, 2010** (Gilles, 5/11, “Karzai comes to Washington,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779>)

Current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has not been successful and the security and political situations across the country continue to deteriorate. The coalition has failed to defeat the Taliban and there simply aren't examples of improvement on the ground. The situation is bad everywhere. Counterinsurgency in practice is different than how it was sold in Washington. The only place that counterinsurgency has been tried is in Marjah and the result has not been good, despite some early favorable press reports. There is no similar operation planned in the future. The upcoming offensive in Kandahar will not be counterinsurgency, because there is no way to clear a city of nearly one million people. Furthermore, military operations in Marjah and Kandahar are unlikely to alter the course or outcome of the war. Will the upcoming offensive in Kandahar help militarily or politically? Without a credible and reliable local partner in Kandahar, there is virtually no chance for success. Ahmad Wali Karzai, President Karzai's half brother, is the dominant leader in Kandahar and despite efforts by the United States to have him removed, he will continue to be the local strongman. Under Ahmad Wali Karzai's control, opportunities to reform the local government will be blocked. Due to low levels of trust in local officials and high levels of corruption in the local judiciary, people in Kandahar routinely seek Taliban judges to settle their disagreements. The total corruption of the local government has enabled the Taliban to set up a shadow government. Also, thousands of coalition troops will not make major gains in a city of almost one million inhabitants. Small tactical successes are within reach, and undoubtedly will be highlighted in U.S. media, but this will not shift support to the Afghan government. Coalition forces are not welcome in Pashtun areas and the heavy fighting will undoubtedly increase tensions and casualties on all sides, further eroding the coalition's political capital.

FYI: Hamid Karzai = President of Afghanistan

FYI: Pashtun = One of the many Ethnic groups that make up Afghanistan

## Afghanistan 1AC [3/8]

**More troops are counterproductive. Adding more causes them to kill more civilians, which increases anti-Americanism and resentment in Afghanistan, providing support for the Taliban and other terrorists.**

**Dorrnsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia, 2010** (Gilles, 5/11, “Karzai comes to Washington,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779>)

The supposed “ink spot” strategy—whereby the coalition establishes control in a key part of a province and security radiates outward—is not working, because of the social and ethnic fragmentation. Stability in one district doesn’t necessarily bleed over into the neighboring one, since groups and villages are often antagonistic to one another, and compete for the resources provided by the war economy. In this context, to secure an area means essentially to stay there indefinitely, under constant attack by the insurgency. Even if only 20 percent of a village sympathizes with the insurgents, “clearing” cannot work. As long as the coalition persists in its current strategy, increasing the number of troops in country will not only be inefficient, it will be dangerously counterproductive. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said not so long ago, more troops would fuel opposition amongst the Afghan population. Considering the growing illegitimacy of the Karzai regime, more foreign troops will be resented as a military occupation. To this end, the coalition’s communiqués stating that the foreign presence in Afghanistan will go on for two generations—which were intended to reassure the Afghan partners—are staggering diplomatic blunders, especially in a country where feelings towards outsiders are at best ambiguous. The more foreign troops fight to take territory back from the Taliban, the more the population rejects them, because it sees them as the major provider of insecurity. In addition, more troops mean more casualties, leaving the coalition less time to do its work before public opinion turns too far against the war. Yet it is unrealistic to expect quick results, especially in training the Afghan National Army. And at the same time, it is more and more difficult to argue in support of the discredited Karzai regime.

## Afghanistan IAC [4/8]

**Also, the large American military presence increases recruitment of terrorists and militants that cross the border into Pakistan, which will lead to the collapse of the Pakistani government.**

**Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter, Foreign Policy Analyst at Cato Institute and Vice President for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, 2009** ( “Escaping the 'Graveyard of Empires’”, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf> |

Contrary to the claims that we should use the U.S. military to stabilize the region and reduce the threat of terrorism, a 2008 study by the RAND Corporation found that U.S. policies emphasizing the use of force tend to create new terrorists. In “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qai’da,” Seth Jones and Martin Libicki argue that the U.S. military “should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim societies, since [a U.S. military] presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.” <sup>22</sup>Some policymakers claim the war is worth waging because terrorists flourish in failed states. But that argument cannot account for terrorists who thrive in centralized states that have the sovereignty to reject external interference. <sup>23</sup> That is one reason why militants find sanctuary in neighboring, nuclear-armed Pakistan. In this respect, and perhaps most important, is the belief that our presence in the region helps Pakistan, when in fact the seemingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistan risks creating worse problems for Pakistan. Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue stress on an already weakened nation. Christian Science Monitor correspondent Anand Gopal finds, “In late 2007, as many as 27 groups merged to form an umbrella Taliban movement, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, under guerrilla leader Baitullah Mehsud.” He continues, “Three of the most powerful, once-feuding commanders—Mr. Mehsud and Maulavi Nazeer of South Waziristan and Hafiz Gul Behadur of North Waziristan—formed an alliance in response to US airstrikes.” <sup>24</sup>America’s presence has already caused major problems for the government in Islamabad, which is deeply unpopular for many reasons, including its alignment with U.S. policies. <sup>25</sup> There are also indications that it has raised tensions in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. For Islamic militants throughout the region, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan— like the occupation of Iraq—is an increasingly potent recruiting tool. Only by prolonging our military presence do we allow the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, the Haqqani network, and even Pakistani Taliban militants to reframe the conflict and their position within it as a legitimate defense against a foreign occupation. In this respect, policymakers should recognize that not everyone willing to resist U.S. intervention is necessarily an enemy of the United States. Most importantly, we must understand that not every Islamic fundamentalist is a radical Islamist, let alone one who is hell-bent on launching a terrorist attack against the American homeland.

## Afghanistan 1AC [5/8]

### **A collapse of the government in Pakistan will cause nuclear war**

**William Pitt, New York Times correspondent and bestselling author, 5/8/09**

“Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,

<http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183>)

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.

### **A collapse of the Pakistani government would also allow nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of terrorists to be used against the United States**

**Bruce Riedel, senior fellow, Middle East Policy, Brookings, National Interest, June 23, 2009**

[<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21644>]

The new regime would be quick to take control of the nuclear arsenal as it purged the army of any dissident voices. And it would welcome Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri from their hiding places of the last decade (although they would presumably keep a low profile to avoid being attacked by outside security services). Certainly al-Qaeda, LET and a host of other terrorist groups would have much more room to operate, free of any significant constraints on their activities from the Pakistani authorities. Even worse, the new government might abet their terrorist activities, providing the use of embassies and missions abroad for staging operations. In the end, we would be left with an extremist-controlled Pakistan, infested with violence, an almost completely dysfunctional economy, harsh laws and even-harsher methods for imposing them, and above all a nuclear-armed nation controlled by terrorist sympathizers.

FYI: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)= A Muslim terrorist organization active in Pakistan and Afghanistan

## Afghanistan 1AC [6/8]

**A nuclear terrorist attack against the United States would cause massive destruction and possibly extinction**

**Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/2004  
Al-Ahram Online. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm> |**

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

**Plan: The United States federal government should withdraw all forces performing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.**

## Afghanistan IAC [7/8]

### Contention 3: Solvency

**Withdrawal would immediately reduce support for the Taliban. The American troop presence is the single greatest factor undermining Afghanistan in the status quo.**

**Gilles Dorronsoro, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009,**  
 “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,”  
[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan\\_war-strategy.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf))

This three-zone strategy is not, per se, a gamechanger, and it must be accompanied by an incremental, phased withdrawal. The withdrawal would not be a consequence of “stabilization,” but rather an essential part of the process. Since the presence of foreign troops is the most important factor in mobilizing support for the Taliban, the beginning of the withdrawal would change the political game on two levels. First, Jihad would become a motivation for fewer Afghans; instead, the conflict would be mostly seen as a civil war. Second, the pro-government population (or, more exactly, the anti-Taliban one) would rally together because of fear of a Taliban victory. There is an argument against withdrawing combat troops: namely, that al-Qaeda would retain its sanctuary in Afghanistan because the Afghan state would not have control of some parts of the country, especially in the east. Though superficially compelling, this argument is weak for two reasons. First, the international coalition lacks the resources to control the periphery of the Afghan territory anyway. Second, the withdrawal of combat troops does not preclude targeted operations with the agreement of the Kabul government. So, in terms of physical security, the withdrawal of combat troops does not bring clear gains for al-Qaeda.

There are two important reasons for withdrawal.

First, the mere presence of foreign soldiers fighting a war in Afghanistan is probably the single most important factor in the resurgence of the Taliban. The convergence of nationalism and Jihad has aided the Taliban in extending its influence. It is sometimes frightening to see how similar NATO military operations are to Soviet ones in the 1980s and how the similarities could affect the perceptions of the population. The majority of Afghans are now deeply opposed to the foreign troops on their soil. The idea that one can “stabilize” Afghanistan with more troops goes against all that one should have learned from the Soviet war. The real issue is not to “stabilize” but to create a new dynamic. The Taliban have successfully framed the war as a Jihad and a liberation war against (non-Muslim) foreign armies. The concrete consequence of this moral victory is that the movement has been able to gain ground in non-Pashtun areas. The situations in Badghris Province (northwest) and in Badakhshan Province (northeast) are extremely worrisome, because the Taliban have been able to attract the support of some Pashtun tribes and fundamentalist networks. A province like Wardak, initially opposed to the Taliban in the 1990s, is now one of its strongholds. Insecurity bred by the narcotics trade and the infighting of local groups in the north also provides the Taliban opportunities to find new allies on a more practical, rather than ideological, ground. This trend is extraordinarily dangerous, since the spread of the war geographically would put Western countries in an untenable position.

FYI: Pashtun = One of the many ethnic groups that makes up Afghanistan

## Afghanistan IAC [8/8]

### **Additionally, withdrawal would shift momentum away from the insurgents and provide legitimacy to the Afghan Government**

**Gilles Dorronsoro, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009**, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan\\_war-strategy.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf))

Second, withdrawal would create a new dynamic in the country, providing two main benefits. The momentum of the Taliban would slow or stop altogether, because without a foreign occupier the Jihadist and nationalist feelings of the population would be much more difficult to mobilize. Furthermore, the Karzai regime would gain legitimacy. If Karzai (or his successor) receives enough help from the international coalition, he would be able to develop more centralized institutions in the strategic areas or at least keep local actors under control. The regime would remain corrupt but would appear more legitimate if it succeeded in bringing security to the population in the strategic zones without the help of foreign troops. The support of the urban population, which opposes the Taliban, is a critical issue. Corruption is a problem primarily if it accelerates the independence of Afghanistan’s peripheral regions.

### **Finally, withdrawal prevents radicals from gaining control of Pakistan**

**Malou Innocent, foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, 6/28/2010**, “Away from McChrystal and Back to the Basics,” Huffington Post, 6/28, [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11934](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11934))

Moreover, if America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the region, discontinuing policies that add more fuel to violent religious radicalism should be the first order of business. The dominant political force within Pakistan is not radical fundamentalist Islam, but rather a desire for a sound economy and basic security. But the foreign troop presence risks uniting otherwise disparate militant groups from both sides of the border against a hostile occupation of the region.

## Global War Add On

### **Instability in Afghanistan threatens other countries because interconnections due to drug trafficking**

**Rollie Lal**, PhD, Assistant Professor @ Vlerick Management School – Leuven, 2006

“Central Asia and its Asian Neighbors,” <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A450305&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

The relationship between the Central Asian states and their neighbors is complex and heavily influenced by the situation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan forms the link between regions, and it has endured a great deal of meddling from various sides, as in the past few decades, the United States, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries have attempted to push for a friendly government in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, and the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has also gained in importance as a feasible key transport route for increased trade and security cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and India and Pakistan.1 Stability in Afghanistan has had a profound effect on Central Asian security as both religious radicalism and drugs emanating from Afghanistan threaten the region. During the Afghan-Soviet war, the United States in effect, through Pakistan, supported fundamentalist Islamic teachings and military training of Afghan, Pakistani, and other Central Asian militants in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.2 The growth of Islamic fundamentalism from the Afghan-Soviet war accelerated the spread of a religious ideology throughout the formerly communist countries. The Taliban trained Uzbek, Tajik, and Uighur radicals, spurring the growth of destabilizing fundamentalist movements throughout the region.3 In 1992, leaders of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) fled Tajikistan to take refuge and regroup in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Russia.4 During the 1990s, Afghanistan also became a haven for the IMU.5

### **Specifically, instability in Afghanistan creates war in Central Asia**

**International Crisis Group, Nonpartisan organization working to prevent conflict worldwide, Asian branch, 9/28/01,**

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1761&l=4>

Two decades of conflict in Afghanistan have already had a major impact on Central Asia. During the Soviet period, Central Asia bore a heavy burden of casualties from the war in that country. In more recent years, the IMU, which is supported by the Taliban, has carried out incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from bases in Afghanistan. Refugees from the Afghan civil war have been a major problem for Tajikistan. Indeed, all the countries are concerned that war may spill over into their territory. Moreover, much of Afghanistan’s drug production flows to Europe through Central Asia. Central Asian governments have been inclined to repress even moderate and non-violent religious groups for fear that they will become a significant source of opposition. By forcing most political opposition underground, however, nations like Uzbekistan have made extremism more attractive to broader sections of their populations. It is also easy to understand that societies dominated by corruption, crime and Mafia-like economic elites might find attractive the message of discipline and order carried by Islamist groups. All of these countries continue to struggle with widespread poverty and difficulties in implementing market reforms. The 55 million people of Central Asia have shown themselves increasingly dissatisfied with their political and economic circumstances. In this environment, strategic partnerships between the international community and the current governments in the region may produce dangerous and unintended consequences

## Global War Add On

### **Instability in central Asia is the most likely scenario for great power war**

**Svante E. Cornell, Research Director at Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, January, 2001**

(The Caucasus Under Renewed Russian Pressure. Cornell Caspian Consulting.

[http://www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/10\\_0101russianpressure.html](http://www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/10_0101russianpressure.html)

Especially from a national interest-oriented approach, there are compelling reasons to refute such a Russia-first policy. The Caucasus and Central Asia are areas that carry a deep importance for Eurasian security, and affect the west profoundly. First, the region's chronic instability permits the operation and growth of terrorist movements that often have a global and specifically anti-American scope. Second, and related to this, the surge of the drugs trade throughout the region targets western societies and provides a major source of funding for terrorist groupings. Third, the Caspian is an emerging oil producing region vital to unimpeded energy access, and an important alternative to Middle Eastern oil on which the developed world is increasingly dependent. Finally, regional conflicts in this volatile area have the potential of developing into major power confrontations that cannot but affect the security of the U.S. and its allies. Arguing that the west lacks interests in this region is hence untenable. As for the possibility of working in tandem with Russia, the U.S. and the Europeans have spent a decade trying to portray their activities in this region to the Russian leadership as a win-win situation. Russia, it is argued, will benefit as well from the opening up of the region to the world economy. However, the Russian elite to a large degree still reasons in terms of a zero-sum game. Appeasing Russia by granting it concessions in the Caucasus and Central Asia may not necessarily lead it to accept the U.S. stand on other policy priorities such as missile defense. Quite to the contrary, appeasement may be understood as a sign of weakness, prompting increasing Russian inflexibility on such issues. On a more principal level, the U.S. claim to leadership in today's world is not based simply on its superior might compared to other states. Rather, the U.S. claims to support freedom and liberal market principles as ways to promote stability and peace. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted, American primacy serves to prevent the emergence of a destructive international anarchy which would in the end affect America itself: there is a historical opportunity for the U.S. to promote an enduring framework for geopolitical cooperation.[10] Nowhere is the risk of such anarchy developing and spreading higher than in Central Eurasia, surrounded as it is by major powers such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The configuration of power in this region is more than anywhere else characterized by multipolarity and instability, and as a result the U.S. by virtue of its global primacy can have a major influence in the developments there. In order to do so, the U.S. needs a strategy. In the late 1990s, the U.S. has been engaging the region, but has done so in an ad hoc manner, with a policy characterized more by reactive tactical measures than proactive policies based in a strategy aiming to affect the situation positively. Basically, the U.S. has not had the initiative in the developments in the region. More than any other power, America has had the potential of projecting stability into this unstable region. However, by its lack of predictability and endemic insecurity regarding its commitment to the regional states, U.S. policy has as often been destabilizing as stabilizing. The recent decision to join forces with Moscow over Afghanistan is an illustration of this. Having been on the sidelines of the Afghanistan conflict in the 1990s, Washington was better positioned than anyone else to act as a mediator in future negotiations between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, and moreover as a facilitator in the relations among regional powers with interests in Afghanistan. However, Washington forfeited this advantage, made itself a party in the conflict by imposing unilateral sanctions on one of the belligerents, thereby in practice militarily supporting the Northern Alliance.[11]

## Inherency: Troop Buildup Continues In Afghanistan

### **Troop Buildup continues in Afghanistan**

**Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, April 26, 2010**

[[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0426\\_afghanistan\\_troops\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0426_afghanistan_troops_ohanlon.aspx)]

Probably sometime in late May or early June, American military forces in Afghanistan will outnumber those in Iraq for the first time since 2003. This is a significant development. While an artificial milestone in some ways, it is worth noting, since it tells us a good deal about the two wars and where our efforts stand in each. As of this writing in late April, we now have nearly 90,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and just under 100,000 in Iraq. Contractors employed by American firms and the American military roughly double these numbers in both places (though most of those hires are not Americans). The U.S. buildup in Afghanistan continues, as does the drawdown in Iraq, at the pace of a couple thousand GIs per month in Afghanistan and more than 5,000 a month in Iraq. The total U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan is expected to total about 100,000 by summer's end, at which point our military presence in Iraq will have declined further to 50,000.

### **The U.S. is committed to a counter-insurgency strategy**

**Michael Cohen, New American Foundation, World Policy Journal March 2010**

[<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+myth+of+a+kinder%2c+gentler+war.-a0223748533>]

Shortly after he assumed command of all U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal provided his soldiers with operational guidance for fighting insurgent Taliban forces. McChrystal's words directly reflect the Pentagon's new model of U.S. warfare and inform the philosophy behind the current U.S. military escalation in Afghanistan: "The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that: protects the Afghan people, allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of; provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency." According to McChrystal, the "Afghan people are at the center of our mission ... in reality they are the mission." These sentiments are reflective of what has become the new way of American war--population-centric counter-insurgency (COIN). The focus on COIN doctrine was enshrined by Gen. David Petraeus and the 2006 publication of the Army and Marine counter-insurgency manual, FM 3-24, which calls for a military approach that seeks to convince the population that counter-insurgents, acting on behalf of a sovereign government, can be trusted and are worthy of popular support.

## Inherency: US Not Planning to Withdraw

### **Obama's withdrawal strategy allows him to push off reductions indefinitely**

**National Review Online, 6/24/2010**

[6/24/10, " Is Obama Backing Off the Timetable for Withdrawal in Afghanistan? ",  
<http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NWJhM2U3NDcyNDhINzdiMGEzNWYzMTJjMGMzNWY1NTc=>]

Obama was careful not to frame July 2011 as a withdrawal date, but the beginning of a transition. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility," he said. That part isn't so much news. But immediately after, Obama also said that at the end of this year his administration will undertake a second comprehensive review of its Afghanistan strategy. That point was also hit today by SecDef Gates and CJCS Adm. Mullen. Gates said that the administration would be looking to see if "by December we have enough evidence to demonstrate, if you will, the proof of concept" of the strategy. By connecting the deadline talk with the strategic review talk, Obama and his national security principals are begging us to add the missing premise: if the review doesn't show things proceeding smoothly in Afghanistan, the deadline could be pushed off, indefinitely. Of course, nobody in the administration wants to say that outright. But the hopes seems to be that it will be reassuring enough to signal it.

### **Despite promises there will be no immediate troop withdrawal in Afghanistan.**

**Times of India, 6/25/2010**

(No immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan:

Obama<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/US/No-immediate-withdrawal-of-troops-from-Afghanistan-Obama/articleshow/6088533.cms>)

WASHINGTON: US President Barack Obama on Thursday categorically ruled out immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan from July 2011, the date he had earlier set for drawdown of troops from the war torn country. "We didn't say we'd be switching off the lights and closing the door behind us. We said we'd begin a transition phase that would allow the Afghan government to take more and more responsibility," Obama said at a White House joint press briefing with his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev. "Here's what we did not say last year. We did not say that, starting July 2011, suddenly there would be no troops from the US or allied countries in Afghanistan." Obama said in response to a question. That is the tragedy that was put forward and what we've also said is, is that, in December of this year, a year after this strategy has been put in place, at a time when the additional troops have been in place and have begun implementing strategy, that we'll conduct a review and we'll make an assessment, he said.

## Harms: War Cannot Be Won - Cultural Differences

### **A large military presence in Afghanistan creates instability- culture insensitivity increases tensions**

**Dorrnsoro, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9/23/09**

(Gilles, The National Interest, "Afghanization,"

<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22218>)

The Taliban have successfully exploited local grievances against corrupt national officials and the behavior of the foreign forces, framing them as a jihad. Moreover, the Taliban are generally careful not to antagonize the population. They are much more tolerant of music and beardless men than they were before 2001, and Mullah Omar has repeatedly made clear that fighters should show respect for the people, paying for the food they take, for instance. In a land of mixed religious and nationalist feelings, local solidarities tend to work in favor of the Taliban and against foreigners, who remain extremely unpopular in the Pashtun belt, especially when fighting occurs. This political context is a key driver of the insurgency. How does the coalition control the (supposedly) cleared areas? There is no trust between the coalition and the Afghan population—especially the Pashtuns—and after eight years in the country, it has definitely lost the battle for hearts and minds. The coalition forces simply don't know how to be accepted locally: patrolling the villages is useless, and the linguistic and cultural barriers are de facto insurmountable when the average soldier's stay in the country is no more than six months. The behavior of the coalition forces has also not been beyond reproach, and has included cultural insensitivity, heavy-handed searching of houses, aggressive behavior on the roads, arbitrary imprisonment, beating of prisoners and of course the inadvertent bombing of civilians.

FYI: Pashtun = ethnic group within Afghanistan

### **Counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan will fail because the military doesn't know enough about Afghan culture**

**Nir Rosen, Fellow at the New York University Center on Law and Security, February 2010,**

Boston Review, "Something from Nothing: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,"

<http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php>)

The troubles with COIN are institutional. The American military and policy establishments are incapable of doing COIN. They lack the curiosity to understand other cultures and the empathy to understand what motivates people. The new counterinsurgency manual gets it right: political factors have primacy in COIN. But the military is not a political party, and the Surge is the exception to the rule: Afghanistan 2009 is not Iraq, certainly not Iraq 2007, and confusing the two cases—rural/urban; ungoverned/governed; history of expelling occupiers/no comparable history; largely organized insurgency/multiple, competing insurgencies—promises disaster. The Americans have been ignoring the right lessons from Iraq—such as the use of community outposts—and internalizing the wrong ones. For example, all of the talk about bribing Afghan tribes shows that the Americans do not understand why Sunnis stopped resisting in Iraq (they lost) and overemphasizes the importance of tribalism in Afghan society.

FYI: COIN = Counter-Insurgency

## Harms: War Cannot Be Won - Troop Requirements

### **Troop demands are too high – impossible to win the counterinsurgency**

**Gilles Dorransoro, Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009,**

“Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,”

[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan\\_war-strategy.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf))

It is already clear, based on counterinsurgency literature, that the number of troops in Afghanistan is far too low to control the territory. There are just not enough troops to fight a serious war in half of the Afghan provinces, and the Taliban presence is growing in the north as well as the south and east. The current level of troop commitment is not enough to seal the border or to control the ground extensively. Hence, it is not reasonable to assume that we can militarily defeat the armed opposition at the current level of engagement. It is possible to send more troops and money to Afghanistan, but the numbers will still be relatively limited. Resources invested in Afghanistan have grown substantially since 2001 but remain relatively small in comparison with those committed to Iraq. In addition, there is no possibility of transferring all the resources invested in Iraq to Afghanistan. There will never be more than 150,000 international coalition troops in Afghanistan, yet just sealing the Afghan–Pakistani border would necessitate tens of thousands of troops. Without a change in the political dynamics, a surge is not going to be sufficient to defeat the insurgency. In addition, inserting more troops would imply a higher cost in lives and money; as a result, the United States would have less time to achieve its objectives, because the growing human and financial costs would make Congress and the public more impatient for success.

### **We would need over 600,000 troops in order to stabilize Afghanistan, four times the current amount**

**Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, 12/9/2009**

Ivan Eland, “Can the U.S. Withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq?”

<http://www.independent.org/events/transcript.asp?eventID=145> )

Now, even if the surge had been the deciding factor in the reduction of Iraqi violence, the question is can you transplant that to Afghanistan? Afghanistan is a much different country and a much harder fight to win. Here are some of the reasons: The Taliban has a more zealous insurgency than Iraq. Afghanistan is a bigger country, has more people than Iraq, and there are fewer forces there. According to the U.S. military’s own rules of counterinsurgency warfare, the U.S. would have to have nearly 600,000 troops in Afghanistan to be effective. Now, of course that’s a rule of thumb, but the basic principle is that we’re way under that and there’s no hope that we’ll ever get up that high. So, I think we see the daunting task ahead. Iraq is flat. Afghanistan is mountainous, of course, making it much easier for the guerrillas. Unlike Iraq, the Afghan Taliban have a sanctuary in Pakistan, which is supposedly our ally, but which only goes after the Pakistani Taliban and not the Afghan Taliban. Now, the Afghan Taliban is always useful to the Pakistani government to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan, especially when the U.S. is likely to leave as the President signaled his intention to at least start pulling out troops by 2011. So that was I think a message to elements of the Pakistani military that they should keep supporting the Afghan Taliban. Now, in Iraq the insurgency was primarily urban whereas in Afghanistan it’s rural. Because of the war, the civil war, and the assassinations, in addition, the tribal leadership is weaker in Afghanistan than in Iraq and there is no Awakening Movement in Afghanistan.

## Harms: War Cannot Be Won - Nationalism

**Even if the US won every battle, it would lose the war because of massive resistance to foreign occupiers**

**Gilles Dorronsoro, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, expert on Afghanistan, 5/112010**

“Karzai comes to Washington,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40779>)

Afghanistan may be the right war, but the United States could very well fight it in the wrong place. Present plans call for most of the new troops to be deployed to the southern and eastern regions of the country, where they could win every battle and still fail to hold the ground. In a land already notoriously averse to foreign invaders, the southern province of Kandahar is particularly hostile to outsiders. In the 1980s, when the Soviets or the Afghan government wanted to punish one of their soldiers, they sent him there. Helmand, the other hot spot in the south, has no cities and few towns—very little of strategic value, except the road to Herat. In the eastern provinces, it’s important for Obama and his team to recognize that regardless of how the United States revises its strategy, American troops and their NATO allies will still face “hit and run” attacks from across the Pakistani border to the east. There is no quick fix to this situation: even with the full support of the Pakistani government and military (a very optimistic hypothesis) the border will stay out of control for years. And even if Kandahar and Helmand could be secured, U.S. troops would be stuck there, unable to prevent a stubborn Taliban infiltration and progression in the north. And when U.S. troops inevitably withdraw, what little order had previously existed would dissolve overnight. Regardless of how well U.S. troops there fare, the Afghan National Army forces that eventually replace them will be simply unable to ward off the Taliban. This is the Taliban’s historical base and they understand the political dynamics of these regions better than any foreign forces ever could.

## Harms: Impact Extensions - Afghanistan

### **Instability in Afghanistan creates war in Central Asia**

**International Crisis Group, Nonpartisan organization working to prevent conflict worldwide, Asian branch, 9/28/01,**

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1761&l=4>

Two decades of conflict in Afghanistan have already had a major impact on Central Asia. During the Soviet period, Central Asia bore a heavy burden of casualties from the war in that country. In more recent years, the IMU, which is supported by the Taliban, has carried out incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from bases in Afghanistan. Refugees from the Afghan civil war have been a major problem for Tajikistan. Indeed, all the countries are concerned that war may spill over into their territory. Moreover, much of Afghanistan's drug production flows to Europe through Central Asia.

## Harms: Impact Extensions - Pakistan

### **Pakistan instability causes an Indo-Pak nuclear war**

**Richard Lugar - US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, 1/28/04**

“LUGAR STATEMENT ON INDIA-PAKISTAN,” January 28th, Lexis Nexis Congressional

Only Pakistan and India can resolve the issues between them. Yet, it is more important than ever that the United States sustain active engagement in South Asia to encourage continuation of this positive momentum. We have seen opportunities for peace squandered in South Asia in recent years. To ensure success, it is crucial that both parties prevent extremists from disrupting the process. Stability in this troubled region is vital to U.S. national interests, both because an Indo-Pakistani conflict could escalate into nuclear war and because of the potential nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Hostility between India and Pakistan boosts Islamic extremists in the region, and provides them fertile ground for terrorist recruitment. Greater instability also means that nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands. A stable South Asia in which Pakistan and India engage each other will eventually weaken the extremists. It will allow both countries to focus more time, energy, and resources on building better lives for their people.

### **Pakistan instability risks nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists**

**Graham Allison and John Deutch, Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School AND a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 3/30/09**

[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18935/real\\_afghan\\_issue\\_is\\_pakistan.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18935/real_afghan_issue_is_pakistan.html))

The problem in Pakistan is more pressing and direct. There, the U.S. does have larger vital national interests. Top among these is preventing Pakistan's arsenal of nuclear weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. This danger is not hypothetical -- the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, is now known to have been the world's first nuclear black marketer, providing nuclear weapons technology and materials to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Protecting Pakistan's nuclear arsenal requires preventing radical Islamic extremists from taking control of the country. Furthermore, the U.S. rightly remains committed to preventing the next 9/11 attack by eliminating global terrorist threats such as al Qaeda. This means destroying their operating headquarters and training camps, from which they can plan more deadly 9/11s.

## Harms: Troops in Afghanistan Increase Risk of Terrorism

**A small force is sufficient to keep the Taliban down and prevent the recreation of al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan**

**David Cortright, director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, OCTOBER 19, 2009,**

“No Easy Way Out”, [http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article\\_id=11917](http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11917) |

This analysis suggests the need for a thorough reorientation of U.S./NATO policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Obama administration has responded to requests for more troops in Afghanistan by calling first for the development of a new strategy. This is a sound approach, but the contours of a new strategy have yet to appear. U.S. commanders remain wedded to a policy of counterinsurgency and the maintenance of a large and expanding military footprint in the country. Stewart and other analysts have advocated an alternative approach of reducing the number of foreign troops and demilitarizing Western strategy. A smaller number of foreign troops would be enough, they argue, to assure that the Taliban does not return to power. Special operations forces would be sufficient to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda and disrupt any attempts to re-establish terrorist bases. These more limited objectives would fulfill the primary objective of Western policy without the enormous costs and risks of prolonged counterinsurgency. These approaches would be combined with an increased international commitment to development, responsible governance and the promotion of human rights in the region. By demilitarizing its involvement and increasing its commitment to diplomacy, democracy and development, the United States and its allies could achieve their purposes more effectively and with greater justice.

**Presence in Afghanistan only increases terrorism and Taliban resurgence**

**Rebecca Griffin, Political Director of Peace Action West, 12/2/09,**

“President Obama’s escalation in Afghanistan: unrealistic and costly”,

<http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2009/12/02/president-obamas-escalation-in-afghanistan-unrealistic-and-costly/>

History has proven that military force is highly ineffective when it comes to dealing with terrorist groups. The RAND Corporation reviewed all terrorist groups that ended in the last 40 years, and determined that only 7% were defeated by military force. Policing and intelligence and political reconciliation were far more useful, and they extrapolate from this information that the US should have a light military footprint in Afghanistan if any. Escalation will backfire. Not only is sending additional troops unlikely to improve the situation on the ground, it could easily exacerbate the situation. Afghanistan expert Gilles Dorronsoro noted that the presence of foreign troops is the top factor in the resurgence of the Taliban, and recommended that “the best way to weaken, and perhaps divide, the armed opposition is to reduce military confrontations.” Rather than reducing the momentum of the Taliban, the stated goal of President Obama’s policy, escalation will light a fire under a growing insurgency. President Obama is correct in noting that the Taliban is not popular with the Afghan people, but the United States’ popularity is on the wane. In a poll in early 2009, just 18% of Afghans said the number of foreign forces should be increased. US intelligence reports this year noted that only about 10% of the insurgency is ideologically motivated Taliban; the majority are people fighting to repel foreign invaders or for economic gain. The US is adding fuel to the fire by aggressively pursuing insurgents who have no international agenda with an escalation of troops.

## Harms: Al Qaeda is Capable of a Serious Terrorist Attack

### **Al Qaeda is still a serious threat to US security**

**Bruce Hoffman, Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May/June 2008**

“The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs , May/June 2008

Sageman's impressive resumé cannot overcome his fundamental misreading of the al Qaeda threat, which is at the heart of his book. He contends: "The present threat has evolved from a structured group of al Qaeda masterminds, controlling vast resources and issuing commands, to a multitude of informal local groups trying to emulate their predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up. These 'homegrown' wannabes form a scattered global network, a leaderless jihad." According to Sageman, al Qaeda has ceased to exist as either an organizational or an operational entity and is therefore irrelevant to U.S. security concerns. Sageman believes that "al Qaeda Central has receded in importance" and goes so far as to assert that it has been "neutralized operationally." Instead, the principal terrorist threat today, Sageman claims, comes from diffuse low-level groups. But this view flies in the face of the two most recent authoritative analyses of terrorist threats to the United States: the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and the annual threat assessment presented by the director of national intelligence, Mike McConnell, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence this past February. The publicly released portion of the 2007 NIE, for example, stated unambiguously that al Qaeda "is and will remain the most serious threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities." This was also the unambiguous conclusion offered by the former CIA and National Security Council official Bruce Riedel in these pages a year ago ("Al Qaeda Strikes Back," May/June 2007). The unmistakable message is that al Qaeda is a remarkably agile and flexible organization that exercises both top-down and bottom-up planning and operational capabilities. It is not exclusively focused on the grass-roots dimension that is Leaderless Jihad's sole preoccupation. The NIE further stated, "We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership." These findings are dismissed by Sageman as "alarmist" without any further analytic explanation or empirical justification whatsoever.

**Al Qaeda is actively seeking nuclear weapons for use – nuclear energy expansion means risks are multiplying fast**

**Michael Evans, Pentagon Correspondent, Washington, 4/12/10,**

“Hillary Clinton fears al-Qaeda is obtaining nuclear weapons material”,

[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us\\_and\\_americas/article7094876.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7094876.ece)

Terrorists including al-Qaeda pose a serious threat to world security as they attempt to obtain atomic weapons material, Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, declared on the eve of a global summit in Washington to prevent a nuclear terror attack. President Obama will call on the leaders of 47 nations today — the biggest gathering of heads of state by a US leader since the founding of the UN in 1945 — to introduce tougher safeguards to prevent nuclear material ending up in the hands of terrorists. As far back as 1998, Osama bin Laden stated that it was his Islamic duty to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. During the two-day Nuclear Security Summit, Mr Obama will try to convince representatives, including David Miliband, who is standing in for Gordon Brown, that the dangers of loosely guarded atomic material are so grave that a global agreement is needed to stop al-Qaeda going nuclear.

## Harms: Global War – Instability Draws in Others

**Afghanistan instability has historically drawn in large powers such as Russia with catastrophic consequences for global security**

**Elie Krakowski, Ph.D., Columbia, MA, Johns Hopkins, International Studies, 7/1/02,**  
"How to Win the Peace in Afghanistan"  
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/403lrkrt.asp>

Success in Afghanistan is important, however, not solely because the United States has invested its military might and honor there. It is also crucial to the peace and independence of the surrounding states--for the same Islamist terrorists who targeted the Twin Towers and the Pentagon dream of creating an Islamist empire across a swath of Asia. Strategically insignificant on its own, Afghanistan has been a bone of contention between empires. And it still is. It is this characteristic--that it sparks the desires of outsiders--that continues to dominate today. This is why any settlement of Afghanistan's massive problems has little chance of success unless it addresses adequately the regional context. Contenders for control over Afghanistan in the nineteenth century were the British and Russian empires. In the second half of the twentieth there was a southward thrust by the Soviets (1979-1989), followed by an attempted northward thrust by the Pakistanis after the Soviet troop withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-2001). It was this second attempt to control Afghanistan from the outside that served to destabilize not just that country but also all those around it, a process that has not yet been brought to an end. And it is that destabilization that would be measurably increased should the United States fail in Afghanistan, with catastrophic consequences for all concerned.

## Harms: Global War – Central Asia War Impact

### **Instability in Central Asia is the most probable Scenario for Nuclear War**

**Stephen J. Blank, Expert on the Soviet Bloc for the Strategic Studies Institute, 2000**

(American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region. World Affairs. 9-22)

Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The outbreak of violence by disaffected Islamic elements, the drug trade, the Chechen wars, and the unresolved ethnopolitical conflicts that dot the region, not to mention the undemocratic and unbalanced distribution of income across corrupt governments, provide plenty of tinder for future fires. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors also have great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and proteges. One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia, or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia's declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost everywhere else in the CIS or the "arc of crisis" from the Balkans to China. As Richard Betts has observed, The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential for serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vital interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other's perceived interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have the capability to inject conventional forces; and (5) neither has willing proxies capable of settling the situation.(77)

## Solvency: Withdrawal Creates Local Cooperation in Afghanistan

### **Announcement of U.S. withdrawal would force cooperation from warlords and the government**

**David Wildman, executive, United Methodist Board of Global Ministries, April 14, 2010**

[[http://www.fpif.org/articles/afghanistan\\_should\\_we\\_stay\\_or\\_should\\_we\\_go](http://www.fpif.org/articles/afghanistan_should_we_stay_or_should_we_go)]

But I think most of all the United States needs to announce an exit strategy. When that happens the warlords who are with parliament, who are getting kickbacks and a lot of the reconstruction funding, will start changing their tune. The Karzai government with all the corruption that is associated with that will start changing its tune. The Taliban and other armed groups are likely to change their tunes. It will become more possible for the rest of the international community to engage in non-militarized strategies to address people's needs.

### **Withdrawal can achieve US security goals cheaper and more efficiently by enlisting support of local groups**

**Andrew J Bacevich , professor of international relations and history at Boston University, 12/30/08**

“Winning In Afghanistan” <http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/30/winning-in-afghanistan.html>

All this means that the proper U.S. priority for Afghanistan should be not to try harder but to change course. The war in Afghanistan (like the Iraq War) won't be won militarily. It can be settled—however imperfectly—only through politics. The new U.S. president needs to realize that America's real political objective in Afghanistan is actually quite modest: to ensure that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda can't use it as a safe haven for launching attacks against the West. Accomplishing that won't require creating a modern, cohesive nation-state. U.S. officials tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested with tribal leaders and warlords. Rather than challenge that tradition, Washington should work with it. Offered the right incentives, warlords can accomplish U.S. objectives more effectively and more cheaply than Western combat battalions. The basis of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should therefore become decentralization and outsourcing, offering cash and other emoluments to local leaders who will collaborate with the United States in excluding terrorists from their territory. This doesn't mean Washington should blindly trust that warlords will become America's loyal partners. U.S. intelligence agencies should continue to watch Afghanistan closely, and the Pentagon should crush any jihadist activities that local powers fail to stop themselves. As with the Israelis in Gaza, periodic airstrikes may well be required to pre-empt brewing plots before they mature. Were U.S. resources unlimited and U.S. interests in Afghanistan more important, upping the ante with additional combat forces might make sense. But U.S. power—especially military power—is quite limited these days, and U.S. priorities lie elsewhere. Rather than committing more troops, therefore, the new president should withdraw them while devising a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan.

## Solvency: Limited Presence More Effective in Afghanistan

**The smaller, well-focused policy of the plan is the only way to build political support for our efforts over the longer term. Large counter-insurgency efforts are unsustainable.**

**Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, Senior Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, October 2009**

[Survival Magazine, volume 51, issue 5, pp. 47-67

[www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=713240928](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=713240928)]

An effort on that scale would garner majority US domestic support only if the public sees likely victory and Congress, the White House and the Beltway punditry line up decisively behind the policy. The emerging trends are pointing in the contrary direction. As monthly and annual US casualties in Afghanistan reached historical peaks in August 2009, and the Afghan national election loomed, a poll conducted by ABC News and the Washington Post indicated that most Americans did not support an extended US military commitment in Afghanistan.<sup>31</sup> Congressional Democrats are balking at anticipated requests for more troops.<sup>32</sup> And even conservative columnists, like the influential George F. Will, have turned against a maximalist Afghanistan policy.<sup>33</sup> Overall, increasingly strong perceptions of the Karzai government as inept and corrupt are making prospects that the United States could enlist it as an effective counter-insurgency partner and lend it the legitimacy required to rebuild the country seem more and more baseless. The upshot is that only if the United States establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have the political flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threat in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the administration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will lose considerable traction in the region. These factors suggest that the United States should limit its Afghanistan/Pakistan policy to counter-terrorism and disown country-wide counterinsurgency and state-building in Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington must remain highly sensitive to the dynamic whereby decreased military activity in Afghanistan combined with robust operations in Pakistan could induce al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan and render it a main threat once again. In that light, any abrupt wholesale American military withdrawal from Afghanistan would be too risky. Instead, the United States should seek to facilitate a glide-path to a substantial drawdown - and with it fewer casualties and lower expenditures in Afghanistan - over the next few years.

**The United States can better achieve its goals with a scaled-down counter-terrorism policy**

**Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, Senior Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, October 2009**

[Survival Magazine, volume 51, issue 5, pp. 47-67

[www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=713240928](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=713240928)]

That policy would reflect the reality that a deeply committed counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is potentially counterproductive, probably unwinnable and in any event unnecessary. The United States can protect its interests and fulfill its international security obligations with a far more circumscribed counter-terrorism effort focused on Pakistan. Under such an approach, US policy would recognize Afghanistan as the residual problem that it has, in fact, become.

## Solvency: Limited Presence More Effective in Afghanistan

### **A limited presence will stabilize the country and stop Al-Qaeda**

**Austin Long, assistant professor of international Affairs at Columbia University, 2010,**  
“Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan”, Orbis, Volume 54, Issue 2, 2010,  
Pages 199-214

Second, the President has directed an increase in force levels beginning this year. A counterterrorism strategy would have these additional forces concentrate on achieving the expansion of the Afghan security forces that Gen. McChrystal has called for. 2010 will be a time of feverish arming and training of Afghan forces while Coalition forces hold the line. President Obama has already directed that beginning in early 2011, the United States will begin to draw down its conventional forces as Afghan forces stand up. By the time of the 2012 presidential election or soon thereafter, the United States would shift fully to the posture described above (essentially a 20-24 month drawdown). The strategic goal of this transition is to ensure the survival of an Afghan state while acknowledging that probably 35-40 percent of the country (i.e. almost all of the Pashtun regions) will be under the de facto control of militants. At present, militants control, by fairly pessimistic estimates, perhaps 20-30 percent of the country (though they are able to conduct attacks in a larger area than that).<sup>32</sup> Rather than seeking to reverse this control, the counterterrorism option seeks to contain it. This will limit al Qaeda's potential haven and ensure that the United States has continued access to the bases it needs through reassurances to the government and local allies.

## Solvency: Plan Helps Stabilize Pakistan

### **More troops are counterproductive, a small military presence can secure the Afghan-Pakistani border more efficiently**

**Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, 4/24/09,**

“Withdrawing from Afghanistan”, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/04/24/withdrawing-from-afghanistan/> |

I described the situation to my Cato colleague Chris Preble, for lack of a better analogy, the Afghanistan–Pakistan border is like a balloon: pushing down on one side forces elements to move to another — it doesn’t eliminate the threat. The fate of Pakistan — a nuclear-armed Muslim-majority country plagued by a powerful jihadist insurgency — will matter more to regional and global stability than economic and political developments in Afghanistan. But if our attempts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan, where does that leave us? Like A.I.G., is Afghanistan too big to fail? No. President Obama earlier this month issued a wide-ranging strategic review of the war and the region, and declared “the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” But al Qaeda, as we very well know, is a loosely connected and decentralized network with cells in over 60 countries. Amassing tens of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops in one country — or any country — is unnecessary. Until Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, changes priorities, this is a stalemate and we are throwing soldiers into a conflict because policymakers fear that, if we leave, it will get worse. Sound familiar? The only military role necessary in Afghanistan is trainers and assistance for the Afghan military, police, and special forces tasked with discrete operations against specific targets. The bulk of the combat forces can and should be withdrawn. As for Pakistan’s impulsive act of gallantry in Buner this week, that’s certainly welcome news. But Mukhtar Khan, a Pakistani freelance journalist whom I’ve talked to on numerous occasions, records here that last year in Buner, a lashkar (tribal militia) successfully beat back the Taliban’s incursions.

### **US military presence destabilizes Pakistan**

**Paul R. Pillar, 28-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, a visiting professor at Georgetown University for security studies, 10/14/09,**

“Counterterrorism and Stability in Afghanistan”,

[http://cpass.georgetown.edu/documents/AfghanHASCPillarOct09\\_1.doc](http://cpass.georgetown.edu/documents/AfghanHASCPillarOct09_1.doc) |

In the meantime, an expanded U.S.-led counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is more likely to complicate than to alleviate the task of Pakistani security forces, insofar as it pushes additional militants across the Durand line. A larger U.S. military presence in the immediate region also would make it politically more difficult for the Pakistani government to cooperate openly on security matters with the United States, in the face of widespread negative sentiment inside Pakistan regarding that presence.

## AT: Afghan Military Unprepared

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### [ ] **The Afghan military will be strong enough to defend the key regions in Afghanistan**

**Austin Long, assistant professor of international Affairs at Columbia University, 2010,** “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan”, Orbis, Volume 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 199-214

There are a few critical regions that will have to be defended, but this should not be too arduous. The first is Kabul and its surrounding area, for both symbolic reasons and to ensure the viability of Bagram airbase. The second is Jalalabad and the surrounding area, along with the road links east to the Khyber Pass and west to Kabul. The third is Kandahar City and the surrounding area, along with the road link to Kabul. This is a total of about 750 kilometers of highway along with the three cities. The 750 kilometers could probably be guarded reasonably effectively by about ten ANA kandaks (battalions) a total of about 6,000 personnel (less than 5 percent of the force goal for late 2010). This would yield one kandak for every seventy five kilometers. These forces could be replaced or supplemented by ANP along with local defense organizations such as Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) or CDI. Similarly, each of the three cities could be allocated ten kandaks to secure it. This total of forty kandaks is less than the number deemed combat ready in 2007 (forty six according to the Afghan Ministry of Defense). Consequently, there should be plenty of Afghan security forces to accomplish this mission even if the expansion of security forces in 2009-2010 is not very successful.<sup>33</sup> These forces would retain the ability to call on U.S. air support if needed through the brigade level U.S. advisers and in extremis could be supported by the U.S. conventional forces stationed at the three air bases, giving high confidence that they can hold these cities. Both the central government and local allies will also continue to benefit from U.S. aid, greatly reducing their incentive to turn on the United States. The United States, via the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and special operations forces, very effectively paid off various groups when it toppled the Taliban in 2001-2002.<sup>34</sup> According to one report, the United States continues to pay the brother of President Hamid Karzai for his support, including providing individuals to serve in a paramilitary force.<sup>35</sup> If the largesse continues to flow, there seems little reason to believe support for the United States will not continue among the beneficiaries (i.e. key elites and their followers).

## AT: Afghanistan Government is Ineffective / Corrupt

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**[ ] The US will continue to support the local government even after withdrawal. Also, withdrawal increases leverage over the government, allowing it to reform.**

**Austin Long, assistant professor of international Affairs at Columbia University, 2010,**  
 “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan”, Orbis, Volume 54, Issue 2, 2010,  
 Pages 199-214

During this transition, the United States will have to continue supporting the central government even as it builds up local allies. This balancing act is required to ensure the continued existence of a formal, if weak, central state, which will in turn simplify the negotiations for the U.S. counterterrorism posture. Tying the local allies to the central state in some way would help with this and an expanded CDI or the similar Afghan Public Protection Program provides a means to do this.<sup>36</sup> Some might argue that this increases the risk of warlordism, which may or may not be true but is also irrelevant to the strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda.<sup>37</sup> The transition will also mitigate the moral hazard endemic to support to counterinsurgency. Put simply, the United States and its allies are more committed to a stable, democratic Afghanistan than the Afghan government. The McChrystal Report rightly notes the massive problems with corruption and poor governance in Afghanistan that hobble the counterinsurgency effort.<sup>38</sup> Yet as long as the United States and its allies are willing to pour ever more troops into the country, it has little leverage over the government.<sup>39</sup> In this circumstance, the threat to cut support, which Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has suggested, is not terribly credible.<sup>40</sup> With a transition to a small footprint and the development of local allies, a clearer signal will be sent that the Afghan government has to do more. The transition will not solve this problem, but it will at least be a step in the right direction.

## AT: History Proves Affirmative Will Fail

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**[ ] Past counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan were not a failure, they were just being judged by the wrong benchmarks**

**Austin Long, assistant professor of international Affairs at Columbia University, 2010,**  
 “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan”, Orbis, Volume 54, Issue 2, 2010,  
 Pages 199-214

It will therefore take about three years to get to this posture. But will it work? First, this is clearly not the U.S. posture before September 11, 2001, so any comparisons to that period are inapt. Second, arguments that this was essentially the United States posture from 2002-2006 are much closer to the mark. However, here the argument is that this posture “failed” because the militants have made a comeback. Yet this misinterprets the strategic goal completely. If the strategic goal is a stable Afghanistan, then the strategy was a failure. If the strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it was a success: there are, at present, few al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and certainly no senior leadership. In an interview on October 5, 2009 national security adviser James Jones noted of al Qaeda in Afghanistan that the “maximum estimate is less than 100 operating in the country, no bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies.”<sup>41</sup> The counterterrorism option merely seeks to ensure that this minimal level of al Qaeda presence continues in the future. Alternately, this argument conflates all militants under the rubric al Qaeda. This is problematic: if any thug with a Kalashnikov is a threat to U.S. national security then readers should prepare for a rough future as there are millions of them spread across the globe. It is this conflating of the local fighter with the global terrorist that David Kilcullen's Accidental Guerilla rails against, so it would behoove the United States to avoid this error.<sup>42</sup>

## AT: Plan is a Total Withdrawal

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[ ] **There is a difference between drawdown and complete withdrawal. Troops will remain, but abandon the current comprehensive strategy of counterinsurgency**

**Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson, Senior Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, October 2009**

[Survival Magazine, volume 51, issue 5, pp. 47-67

<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=713240928>]

These factors suggest that the United States should limit its Afghanistan/Pakistan policy to counter-terrorism and disown country-wide counterinsurgency and state-building in Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington must remain highly sensitive to the dynamic whereby decreased military activity in Afghanistan combined with robust operations in Pakistan could induce al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan and render it a main threat once again. In that light, any abrupt wholesale American military withdrawal from Afghanistan would be too risky. Instead, the United States should seek to facilitate a glide-path to a substantial drawdown - and with it fewer casualties and lower expenditures in Afghanistan - over the next few years.

## AT: Topicality

**“Military presence” refers to combat forces only.**

**Christopher Layne 2010**, Prof. and Robert M Gates Chair in Intelligence and Nat'l Security at the Bush School of Gov't and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, May 12,  
<http://abnormalmeans.com/2010/05/definition-of-military-presence/>

My interpretation would be that “military presence” means bases with combat forces (or bases that normally are maintained by skeleton units but are maintained to receive combat forces crisis/surge type circumstances). I do not think in the normal meaning of the term that the US has military bases in N. Korea.

### **Military presence in Afghanistan is troops**

**Michael Evians, Defesne Editor for The Times, 8/10/2009**

“Another 45,000 US troops needed in Afghanistan, military advisor says”

If Mr Cordesman’s recommendation reflects the view of General McChrystal, who recently presented the findings of a 60-day review of Afghanistan strategy to Washington, it would mean sending another nine combat brigades, comprising 45,000 American troops, in addition to the 21,000 already approved by President Obama. This would bring the total American military presence in Afghanistan to about 100,000, considerably closer to the force that was deployed for the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq.

## AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

**Withdrawal won't affect US credibility or resolve. Instead, the US looks much worse fighting a war incorrectly**

**Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, September 14, 2009,**

“Withdrawal without winning?”

[http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/14/withdrawal\\_without\\_winning](http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/14/withdrawal_without_winning)

A third but subsidiary argument is that withdrawal would undermine American credibility around the world. Again, the fact that this is an echo of Vietnam does not make it wrong, but it does seem to me much less plausible than the other arguments. Who exactly is going to lose faith in us, and what are they going to do differently? Much could depend on the course of events in other countries, especially Iraq, which could yet descend into civil war. But if it does, would American appear more resolute -- and wiser -- for fighting in Afghanistan? Of course if we withdraw and then we or our allies suffer a major terrorist attack many people will blame Obama, and this is a political argument that must weigh more heavily with the White House than it does with policy analysts. It is worth noting that these issues are much less ideologically-charged than those surrounding the war in Iraq (or in Vietnam). This means that it should be easier for the concerned community to address them seriously, although not necessarily to come up with (correct) answers, and for people to change their minds. This makes it particularly unfortunate that we have not had a searching and thorough discussion. Although some deeply-rooted beliefs are involved, such as those involving the propensity for dominoes to fall and perhaps an estimate of how great a danger terrorism is, we are mostly in a more pragmatic realm. Of course Yogi Berra was right when he said that prediction is difficult, especially about the future. But once we move beyond the alluring but unsustainable claim that our inability to exclude the possibility that withdrawing would be very harmful means that we must fight, it becomes clear that we are building a large and risky war on predictions that call for closer examination.

## AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

**The plan would not be a signal of weakness. A smaller force will signal that the US is still committed and force action from Afghanistan leaders, making the US look more successful**

**Marc Lynch, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Int'l. Affairs at George Washington, 12/12/2009**  
International Herald Tribune, "A Time Limit is Essential", LexisNexis

President Obama 's critics argue that his plan to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan starting in July 2011 signals a fatal lack of resolve, inviting the Taliban to wait out a feckless America, or else has no credibility. In fact, the deadline is crucial to the strategy. Yes, there are many reasons to be skeptical of the prospects for the new plan, from the hopeless corruption in Kabul to the difficulties of state-building. But a clearly communicated timeline increases the odds of success. The July 2011 date should be understood as an inflection point, not as the end of the American military mission. There's no "mission accomplished" here. The American commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue. The pace and location of withdrawals will be dictated by conditions on the ground and, indeed, the date itself was carefully chosen based on the military's best calculations of improved security and political conditions. It was not drawn from a hat. The deadline is essential politically because it will provide the necessary urgency for Afghans to make the institutional reforms that will ensure their own survival. An open-ended commitment creates a terrible moral hazard in which Afghan leaders, assuming American troops will always be there to protect them, may make risky or counterproductive decisions. A limited, conditional commitment creates the leverage needed to generate the institutional transformation necessary to cement any gains made by the military. Just as in the Iraq debate, hawks who insist on an open-ended commitment to "victory" misunderstand the strategic incentives created by an unconditional military promise. Contrary to prevailing myths of the Iraq surge, Iraqi politicians began to make serious moves toward overcoming their political and sectarian divides only in mid-2008, when it became likely that an Obama electoral victory would lead to an end of the unconditional American commitment. President Obama's deadline will not compromise the military mission. The surge of troops is meant to blunt the momentum of the Taliban, establish security and provide space for the spread of governance and legitimacy. Should the Taliban choose to retreat and wait out the American mission, this would be a blessing, not a curse. It would allow America to establish control more easily and help build effective local and national governments. The greater problem for the Obama administration will be to make the commitment to the drawdown credible. Many expect that the military will come back in a year asking for more troops and time. The blizzard of conflicting messages coming from Washington this week did little to diminish the expectation. This is troubling, because the political logic of the deadline works only if Afghans on both sides believe in it. Skeptics among the public and in Congress can provide an essential service by carefully monitoring progress and supporting the strategy while making it clear that there will be no tolerance for future escalations or open-ended commitments.

## AT: Readiness Disadvantage

### **A counterterrorism strategy with fewer troops would still demonstrate US strength**

**Fred Kaplan, Slate's "War Stories" columnist, 3/24/2009,**

“CT or COIN?”, <http://slate.com/id/2214515>

A "targeted" CT campaign, its advocates say, would at least demonstrate the West's resolve in the war on terrorism and keep al-Qaida jihadists contained. It's a type of fighting that we know how to do, and its effects are measurable. One might also argue (I don't know if anyone on the inside is doing so) that it could serve as a holding action—a way of keeping Afghanistan from plunging deeper into chaos—while we focus more intently on diplomatic measures to stabilize neighboring Pakistan. If Pakistan blows up, curing Afghanistan of its problems will be irrelevant and, in any case, impossible.

### **Continuing the current Afghanistan strategy makes the US look weak**

**Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, November/December 2009,**

“Should the United States Withdraw from Afghanistan?”,

[http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy\\_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html](http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v31n6/cpr31n6-3.html)

Second, whether we withdraw or whether we stay, al Qaeda can twist our choice into a victory. If we withdraw, we appear weak — even though America is responsible for almost half of the world's military spending, can project its power to the most inaccessible corners of the globe, and wields one of the planet's largest nuclear arsenals. But America also looks weak if it remains in the region too long. The military will appear bogged down, the strategy aimless, and, despite our best efforts, military operations will continue to kill Afghan civilians, eroding support for our presence among the population

## AT: START Disadvantage

### **Democrats in Congress are strongly opposed to the War in Afghanistan**

**Adam Nagourney and Carl Hulse, writers for the New York Times, 12/3/2009**

“Obama’s Afghanistan Decision Is Straining Ties With Democrats”,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/us/politics/04dems.html>)

President Obama’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan over the objections of fellow Democrats on Capitol Hill is straining a relationship already struggling under the weight of an administration agenda that some Democratic lawmakers fear is placing them in a politically vulnerable position. The result has been a subtle shift in which Democrats in Congress are becoming less deferential to the White House, making clear that Mr. Obama will not always be able to count on them to fall into line and highlighting how Mr. Obama’s expansive ambitions are running up against political realities. The troop buildup is stirring unease among Democrats at a time when they have been struggling to navigate crosscurrents of pressure from different constituencies. Democrats now face the prospect of enacting a health care bill that Republicans are using to paint them as fiscally irresponsible and intent on extending the government’s reach deeper into the economy and personal health decisions.

### **Polls show the public is against the war**

**Jennifer Agiesta and Jon Cohen, Washington Post Staff Writers 8/20/2009,**

“Public Opinion in U.S. Turns Against Afghan War”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/19/AR2009081903066.html>

A majority of Americans now see the war in Afghanistan as not worth fighting, and just a quarter say more U.S. troops should be sent to the country, according to a new Washington Post-ABC News poll. Most have confidence in the ability of the United States to meet its primary goals of defeating the Taliban, facilitating economic development, and molding an honest and effective Afghan government, but few say Thursday’s elections there are likely to produce such a government. When it comes to the baseline question, 42 percent of Americans say the United States is winning in Afghanistan; about as many, 36 percent, say it is losing. The new poll comes amid widespread speculation that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, will request more troops for his stepped-up effort to remove the Taliban from Afghan towns and villages. That position gets the backing of 24 percent of those polled, while nearly twice as many, 45 percent, want to decrease the number of military forces there. (Most of the remainder want to keep the level about the same.) In January, before President Obama authorized sending an additional 17,000 troops to the country, public sentiment tilted more strongly toward a troop increase. Should Obama embrace his generals’ call for even more forces, he would risk alienating some of his staunchest supporters. Although 60 percent of Americans approve of how Obama has handled the situation in Afghanistan, his ratings among liberals have slipped, and majorities of liberals and Democrats alike now, for the first time, solidly oppose the war and are calling for a reduction in troop levels. Overall, seven in 10 Democrats say the war has not been worth its costs, and fewer than one in five support an increase in troop levels.



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# Afghanistan – Neg

## Afghanistan Negative

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## Answers To: Inherency

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[ ] **Obama has committed to withdrawal in 2011, he is even breaking with the military to ensure it**

**Sean Lengell, writer for the Washington Times, 6/20/2010,**

"White House: Afghanistan withdrawal deadline firm",

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/20/white-house-afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline-firm/>]

The Obama administration has reaffirmed its promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan by July 2011, distancing itself from recent Pentagon comments that the move could take longer. "There's a firm date," said White House Chief of State Rahm Emanuel on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday. "The July [2011] date, as stated by the president, that's not moving, that's not changing. Everybody agreed on that date." Mr. Emanuel's remarks were in contrast to comments by Gen. David H. Petraeus, who told a congressional committee last week that any withdrawal would be "based on conditions" and that "July 2011 is not the date where we race for the exits."

## Answers To: Inherency

[\_\_] **Withdrawal will happen in 2011, all the top officials conducting the war agree**

**The Times of India 6/22/2010,**

“US troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan is on track for next July”, the Times of India, June 22, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World-US/US-troops-withdrawal-from-Afghanistan-is-on-track-for-next-July/articleshow/6076602.cms>

The Obama administration reaffirmed that it will begin pulling US troops out of Afghanistan next summer, despite reservations among top generals that absolute deadlines are a mistake. President Barack Obama's chief of staff said on Sunday that an announced plan to begin bringing forces home in July 2011 still holds. “That's not changing. Everybody agreed on that date,” Rahm Emanuel said, adding by name the top three officials overseeing the policy girding the war: Gen David Petraeus, defense secretary Robert Gates and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Adm Mike Mullen.

## Answers To: Harms - Regional War and Pakistan Instability Advantage

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[ ] **The US strategy in Afghanistan is working and the country will soon be stabilized**

**MICHAEL O'HANLON, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at the Brookings institute, 12/14/2009**

“In Afghanistan, The Odds Are With Us,” Brookings, December 14th,

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1214\\_afghanistan\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1214_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx)

Second, elements of the Afghan security forces are improving fast. This is most true for the army. With NATO's International Security Assistance Force focused intently now on proper training and mentoring, the building of Afghan security forces that can protect their own people should accelerate. Third, life in Afghanistan has actually improved somewhat compared with the recent past. Yes, the progress is uneven, and the poor remain very badly off. But overall the economy, education, healthcare and similar indicators are moving more in the right direction than the wrong one. Material progress has contributed to a reservoir of goodwill among the Afghan people toward those in authority. President Karzai, the United States, and NATO all still enjoyed at least 60 percent support from the population as of summer 2009 — far better than the United States has enjoyed in Iraq. This popularity number is fragile, and uneven among different groups, but we do have some advantages in how the Afghan public views the situation nonetheless. Fourth, NATO in general and the United States in particular know how to carry out counterinsurgency missions better than ever before. Troops are experienced in the art of counterinsurgency and knowledgeable about Afghanistan. We also have excellent commanders, starting with Central Command Combatant Cmdr. Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. McChrystal, who directs both the NATO forces and the separate, U.S.-led counterterrorism force carrying out Operation Enduring Freedom there. Commanders at much lower levels of authority, the ones who execute the strategy day in and day out, are also seasoned and quite smart in the ways of this type of warfare. The importance of good leadership in counterinsurgency is very significant, and our strengths in this area are a major asset. Fifth, enough troops are now on the way. Until now, on the ground, troop shortages prevented combined Afghan and NATO forces from securing many districts, towns and villages. Worse, it left troops stalemated in dangerous situations over extended periods of time because they did not have the capacity to seize land and sustain control. It left NATO forces relying too heavily on air strikes with all their potential to cause accidental deaths of innocents (a policy that McChrystal has changed; air strikes are generally allowed now only if NATO troops are in direct peril). And it left Afghan citizens who cooperate with NATO and their government vulnerable to reprisal. Only in 2009 did these realities finally begin to change; only in 2010 will we achieve reasonable overall force rations. To predict success outright would be to go too far. But I honestly believe that, setting our sights at a reasonable level, the odds are with us in this important mission.

## Answers To: Harms - Regional War and Pakistan Instability Advantage

**[ ] Withdrawal from Afghanistan will embolden the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan because they will see it as a signal of U.S. defeat**

**Lisa Curtis and James Phillips - Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, and Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, 10/5/5/2009,**

“Shortsighted U.S. Policies on Afghanistan to Bring Long-Term Problems”

<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/shortsighted-us-policies-on-afghanistan-to-bring-long-term-problems>

There have been several positive developments in Pakistan over the last six months, such as the Pakistan military's thrust into the Swat Valley to evict pro-Taliban elements and significant improvement in U.S.-Pakistani joint operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that led to the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud in August. Moreover, the Pakistani military is reportedly preparing for an offensive in South Waziristan, where al-Qaeda and other extremists have been deeply entrenched for the last few years. But this recent success in Pakistan should not mislead U.S. policymakers into thinking that the U.S. can turn its attention away from Afghanistan. In fact, now is the time to demonstrate military resolve in Afghanistan so that al-Qaeda and its affiliates will be squeezed on both sides of the border. If the U.S. scales back the mission in Afghanistan at a time when the Taliban views itself as winning the war there, it is possible that the recent gains in Pakistan will be squandered. Anti-extremist constituencies in Pakistan that are fighting for their lives and the future of Pakistan are begging the U.S. to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, with full knowledge that a U.S. retreat would embolden extremists region-wide. Washington should listen to these voices.

**[ ] US troops are necessary to prevent the government of Afghanistan from being overthrown**

**James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND National Security Research Division, B.S. in international affairs, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, '08**

“Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War”, Rand Corporation,

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND\\_CT276.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT276.pdf)

Yet if Pakistan is the central front in the war on terror, it is not one susceptible to a military response. We are not going to bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan. An increase in US military manpower and money for Afghanistan may be needed to contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government from being overthrown. But the US and NATO troops are likely to be required indefinitely as long as the Taliban and the other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise funds and organize their operations in Pakistan. Afghanistan has never been a self sufficient state, and it probably never will be. It is simply too poor to be able to provide security and effective governance to its large and dispersed population. So unless the Pakistani government can be persuaded to abandon its relationship with extremist elements within its society, halt its support for terrorism, provide its youth an educational alternative to fundamentalist madrasas, extend effective governance into its border provinces, and curtail their use by insurgent movements, the United States and its allies are going to be forced to patrol Afghanistan's Southeast Frontier indefinitely, just as Great Britain was compelled to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign along the other side of that same frontier throughout the 19th century.

## Answers To: Harms - Regional War and Pakistan Instability Advantage

**[ ] Terrorism is at its lowest level since 2004. This proves that the counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan is effective**

### **American Security Project, 4/29/2010**

“New ASP Report Shows Declining Levels of Islamist Terrorism since July 2009,” 4/29, <http://www.americansecurityproject.org/content/media/press-releases/2010/new-asp-report-shows-declining-levels-of-islamist-terrorism-since-july-2009/>)

Today, the American Security Project released the mid-year update to their annual “Are We Winning?” Report, which showed a marked decrease in Islamist terrorism in the last two quarters of 2009 outside of the on-going conflict theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan. Even though Islamist terrorist incidents still remain at historically high levels, the decrease at the end of 2009 was the largest since 2004, when National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) started tracking Islamist terrorist incidents. The report, authored by ASP Senior Fellow Bernard Finel and Researcher Germain Difo measures America’s progress in the fight against terrorism according to metrics that are designed to be both reproducible and objective. According to the report, much of the decline in Islamic terrorist incidents is due to decreasing terror incidents in Pakistan. Though there have been several high profile attacks in Pakistan, Islamist terrorism in that country is down 60% from the first six months of 2009. This decline is likely due to increased military pressure by the Pakistani military on radicals within that country. In addition, the report found that Al Qaeda is increasingly marginal to the broader radical Islamist movement, and remains under significant pressure due to drone strikes and other forms of military pressure. This continues to demonstrate the tactical effectiveness of military counter-terrorism activities, though according to Senior Fellow and report author Bernard Finel, “it is unlikely that military pressure alone will provide a long-term solution to the terrorism challenge. We should be cautiously optimistic about the ability of military efforts in areas such as Pakistan and Afghanistan to dislodge some terrorist groups and keep them on the run. But there is still a significant chance that terror groups may rebound.”

**[ ] Defeat in Afghanistan will make it a base for terrorists to launch attacks against the United States.**

### **Kim R. Holmes, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 6/23/10,**

“Why Victory in Afghanistan is Crucial”, <http://blog.heritage.org/?p=36887>, DA: 7-19-10, AL)

And let’s make something completely clear: the stakes are high. A defeat such as this would be a tremendous tragedy for our nation. The sacrifice of our men and women in uniform have would have been in vain. And the financial and geopolitical investments this nation made in establishing a stable regime capable of keeping out terrorists would be deemed a complete waste. What is even worse, defeat will inevitably return to power a Taliban regime that will make Afghanistan a safe haven for terrorists, just as it was prior to the attacks of September 11. We neglected Afghanistan in the 1990s and paid dearly for it in lives in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. Winning in Afghanistan is directly related to preventing another “9/11,” and it truly is the central front in the war on terrorists. Winning in Afghanistan means ensuring a stable nation that can govern and defend itself, and where the Taliban and other terrorists cannot thrive, continuing to pose a threat to the United States. To achieve victory — a word the President has admitted being averse to — he needs to get away from inflexible artificial timelines that are divorced from conditions on the ground. We don’t need Afghanistan to become our next Vietnam. History never repeats itself exactly, and, yes, there are differences both in circumstances and even outcomes. But if we fail in Afghanistan, this nation will pay a terrible price. We will not only see the threat of terrorism to our shores grow, but could even see the regime in nuclear-armed Pakistan fall either into terrorist hands or a military in league with them. And that is a danger far, far greater than what we now face on the battlefields of Afghanistan.

## Answers To: Harms - Regional War and Pakistan Instability Advantage

**[\_\_] Afghans don't hate the American occupation. Polls show that the majority still favor the US military presence**

**Michael O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Director of Research and Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at Brookings and President of Aid Afghanistan for Education, 3/14/2010**

"Five Myths About Afghanistan," Brookings,

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0314\\_afghanistan\\_myths\\_ohanlon.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0314_afghanistan_myths_ohanlon.aspx))

The war in Afghanistan is in its ninth year, and even officials supportive of the U.S. presence there acknowledge the challenges that remain. "People still need to understand there is some very hard fighting and very hard days ahead," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said during his trip to Afghanistan this week. But the conflict is not hopeless, nor it is eternal. If we want to develop realistic expectations about the war -- how it might unfold from here and when it could begin to wind down -- it would help to dispel some of the popular mythologies that have emerged about the Afghans, the enemy we're fighting and the U.S. commitment. 1. Afghans always hate and defeat their invaders. The Afghans drove the British Empire out of their country in the 19th century and did the same to the Soviet Union in the 20th century. They do fight fiercely; many American troops who have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years have asserted that the Afghans are stronger natural fighters. Yet, the people of Afghanistan do not despise foreigners. Despite downward trends in recent years, Afghans are far more accepting of an international presence in their country than are Iraqis, for example, who typically gave the U.S. presence approval ratings of 15 to 30 percent in the early years of the war in that country. Average U.S. favorability ratings in recent polls in Afghanistan are around 50 percent, and according to polls from ABC, the BBC and the International Republican Institute, about two-thirds of Afghans recognize that they still need foreign help. And before we mythologize the Afghan insurgency, it is worth remembering some history. In the 1980s, the United States, Saudi Arabia and others gave enormous financial and military assistance to the Afghan resistance movement that eventually forced the Soviets out. That group grew to about 250,000 in strength in the mid-1980s. But today, the Taliban and other resistance groups receive substantial help only from some elements in Pakistan -- and diminishing help at that -- and collectively, they number about 25,000 fighters. Finally, though U.S.-backed Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, today's international presence there does not amount to an invasion. Foreign forces are present at the invitation of the host government, which two-thirds of Afghans consider legitimate, if somewhat corrupt.

## Answers To: Harms - Regional War and Pakistan Instability Advantage

[\_\_] **Pakistan is stable and its nuclear weapons are secure. Pakistan has implemented advanced security measures to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists**

**Imran Gardezi Minister for Press at the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.,  
July/August 2010**

“Pakistan’s Stabilizing Arsenal”, Published in Foreign Affairs,

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66476/imran-gardezi/pakistans-stabilizing-arsenal>

Contrary to Allison's claims, international regulatory authorities have acknowledged the efficacy of Pakistan's comprehensive command-and-control structure, which has made the country's nuclear assets impervious to any threat, internal or external. Over the past decade, the Pakistani government has instituted many advanced security mechanisms, from tightened physical safety to technical controls on the nuclear weapons themselves. After the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan was discredited for his illicit dealings, Pakistan introduced a multilayered, foolproof system of internal monitoring. The presence of militants on Pakistani soil, particularly on its western border, might raise alarms about nuclear safety. But even the most cursory knowledge of how nuclear states maintain their arsenals would make alarmists understand that extremists could not possibly come to possess a nuclear weapon, nor could nonstate actors acquire such a device or the requisite delivery system. Moreover, the Pakistani army has recently carried out successful operations in Malakand, the Swat Valley, and Waziristan, putting the most feared extremists on the run and destroying their safe havens. Pakistan stands committed to nonproliferation and disarmament and has taken effective measures to meet its international obligations. The government's wide-ranging regulatory instruments prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to any state -- including, contrary to Allison's implication, Saudi Arabia. In addition, Pakistan continues to cooperate voluntarily with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding its civil nuclear program.

## Answers To: Harms - Global War Advantage

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**[ ] Afghanistan has no real strategic value. Wars over it will not escalate and abandoning it does not pose a threat to the United States**

**Bernard Finel, Atlantic Council contributing editor and a senior fellow at the American Security Project, 4/27/09**

“Afghanistan is Irrelevant” [http://www.acus.org/new\\_atlanticist/afghanistan-irrelevant](http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/afghanistan-irrelevant)

It is now a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that the decision to “abandon” Afghanistan after the Cold War was a tragic mistake. In the oft-told story, our “abandonment” led to civil war, state collapse, the rise of the Taliban, and inevitably terrorist attacks on American soil. This narrative is now reinforced by dire warnings about the risks to Pakistan from instability in Afghanistan. Taken all together, critics of the Afghan commitment now find themselves facing a nearly unshakable consensus in continuing and deepen our involvement in Afghanistan. The problem with the consensus is that virtually every part of it is wrong. Abandonment did not cause the collapse of the state. Failed states are not always a threat to U.S. national security. And Pakistan’s problems have little to do with the situation across the border. First, the collapse of the Afghan state after the Soviet withdrawal had little to do with Western abandonment. Afghanistan has always been beset by powerful centrifugal forces. The country is poor, the terrain rough, the population divided into several ethnic groups. Because of this, the country has rarely been unified even nominally and has never really had a strong central government. The dominant historical political system in Afghan is warlordism. This is not a consequence of Western involvement or lack thereof. It is a function of geography, economics, and demography. Second, there is no straight-line between state failure and threats to the United States. Indeed, the problem with Afghanistan was not that it failed but rather that it “unfailed” and became ruled by the Taliban. Congo/Zaire is a failed state. Somalia is a failed state. There are many parts of the globe that are essentially ungoverned. Clearly criminality, human rights abuses, and other global ills flourish in these spaces. But the notion that any and all ungoverned space represents a core national security threat to the United States is simply unsustainable.

## Answers To: Harms - Global War Advantage

**[ ] Central Asian war will be prevented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which manages security threats**

**Ruslan Maksutov, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, August 2006**

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective”,

<http://www.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/Ruslan.SCO.pdf/download>

As a starting point, it is fair to say that all Central Asian countries—as well as China and Russia—are interested in security cooperation within a multilateral framework, such as the SCO provides. For Central Asia this issue ranks in importance with that of economic development, given the explosive environment created locally by a mixture of external and internal threats. Central Asia is encircled by four of the world’s eight known nuclear weapon states (China, India, Russia and Pakistan), of which Pakistan has a poor nuclear non-proliferation profile and Afghanistan is a haven for terrorism and extremism. Socio-economic degradation in Central Asian states adds to the reasons for concern and makes obvious the interdependence between progress in security and in development. Some scholars argue that currently concealed tendencies evolving in various states of Central Asia—such as the wide-ranging social discontent with oppressive regimes in the region, and the growing risks of state collapse and economic decline—all conducive to the quick growth of radical religious movements, could have far-reaching implications for regional stability once they come more into the light. 41 At first sight, the instruments established by the SCO to fulfill its declared security- building objectives seem to match the needs that Central Asian states have defined against this background. While the existence of the SCO further reduces the already remote threat of conventional interstate war in the region, 42 it allows for a major and direct focus on the non-state, non-traditional and transnational threats that now loom so large by comparison.

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The SCO is a regional security organization in Central Asia consisting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is designed to prevent conflicts from escalating in the Central Asia

**[ ] A war in the Middle East would not draw in more powerful countries, it would be contained**  
**Gamal Elgoraish, Phd Candidate at the University of Kent, 1986,**

“NUCLEARIZATION AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST”, PP. 409-410

In conclusion, it seems that the risks of nuclear war in a nuclear Middle East are essentially at three levels. The first level is concerned with the risks related in particular to the Middle East and other similar regions of the world. The second level of risks focuses on the possible responses of the major nuclear powers to nuclearization of the Middle East states. The third level is related to the risks of Superpower involvement in a Middle East nuclear conflict escalating to nuclear confrontation. Some of the risks at the first level are less worrisome than others such as a low level of rationality, weak conceptualization of use of weapons, accidental and catalytic war and nuclear terrorism. However, the risks of the vulnerability of command and control centers and weapons, difficulty of controlling escalation, miscalculation and pre-emptive and preventive strikes would remain major sources of concern. The possible responses of the major nuclear powers to the nuclearization of the Middle Eastern states are more likely to emerge in the form of strong protests, pressures and threats than in direct military intervention. The risks of a Middle East nuclear conflict escalating to a Superpower nuclear confrontation is a very real and serious risk but it would not necessarily lead to nuclear war between the two Superpowers. A nuclear exchange in the Middle East is more likely to be a regional tragedy and a very unpleasant contingency rather than a global holocaust. However, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be a serious danger to regional and global security of unprecedented magnitude. We just do not know the rules of the nuclear game between local powers and between parts of a regional system, or between other regional systems and the global system.

## Answers To: Harms - Global War Advantage

[ ] A Central Asian war wouldn't escalate. There are no great power interests in Central Asia anymore

**Richard Weitz, senior fellow and associate director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute, Summer 2006.**

The Washington Quarterly, Accessible Via LexisNexis

Central Asian security affairs have become much more complex than during the original nineteenth-century great game between czarist Russia and the United Kingdom. At that time, these two governments could largely dominate local affairs, but today a variety of influential actors are involved in the region. The early 1990s witnessed a vigorous competition between Turkey and Iran for influence in Central Asia. More recently, India and Pakistan have pursued a mixture of cooperative and competitive policies in the region that have influenced and been affected by their broader relationship. The now independent Central Asian countries also invariably affect the region's international relations as they seek to maneuver among the major powers without compromising their newfound autonomy. Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exaggerated. The contest for influence in the region does not directly challenge the vital national interests of China, Russia, or the United States, the most important extraregional countries in Central Asian security affairs. Unless restrained, however, competitive pressures risk impeding opportunities for beneficial cooperation among these countries. The three external great powers have incentives to compete for local allies, energy resources, and military advantage, but they also share substantial interests, especially in reducing terrorism and drug trafficking. If properly aligned, the major multilateral security organizations active in Central Asia could provide opportunities for cooperative diplomacy in a region where bilateral ties traditionally have predominated.

## Answers To: Solvency

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[ ] **The plan cannot solve because the Afghan government is corrupt and not seen as legitimate**

**Peter W. Galbraith, former UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan, 5/17/2010,**

"The opposition's opening remarks," in the Economist Debates: Afghanistan, May 17,  
<http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/516>

America is pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and, as General Stanley McChrystal observes, the centre of gravity in counterinsurgency is the people. Although American forces can outfight the poorly equipped Taliban (when they can be found), America and its allies cannot defeat the insurgency without the support of the Afghan people. Thus the essential element of American strategy is an Afghan government that enjoys the loyalty of enough Afghans to turn the population against the insurgents. Such a government does not exist. President Hamid Karzai has been in office since 2002, when he was installed with the support of the Bush administration following the fall of the Taliban. In eight years, he has run a government so ineffective that Afghans deride him as being no more than the mayor of Kabul and so corrupt that his country ranks 179 on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, just ahead of last-placed Somalia, which has no government at all. To make matters worse, Mr Karzai is now in office as a result of an election that he himself admits was massively fraudulent. In 2009, the Karzai-appointed Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC) rigged the elections so that Mr Karzai ended up with at least 1m phony votes, or one-third of his total votes. (After a separate, independently appointed, Electoral Complaints Commission eventually rejected enough Karzai votes to force a second round, the IEC adopted procedures to produce an even more fraud-prone second round and the runner up, Abdullah Abdullah, chose not to participate.) Many Afghans do not see Mr Karzai as a democratically elected leader. Thus, in addition to being corrupt and ineffective, the government that is the keystone of American strategy also suffers from a legitimacy deficit.

## Answers To: Solvency

**[\_\_] Past occupations of Afghanistan prove that a small occupation force will not be successful**

**Peter Bergen, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, 8/19/09**

“How Realistic is Walt’s Realism?” 8/19,

[http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/19/how\\_realistic\\_is\\_walt\\_s\\_realism](http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/19/how_realistic_is_walt_s_realism)

The implication of Walt's objection to the ramped-up Obama strategy in Afghanistan is that the U.S. should either do less in Afghanistan, or even just get out altogether. But America has already gone down this road. Twice. In 1989 the U.S. closed its embassy in Kabul and then effectively zeroed out aid to one of the poorest countries in the world; meanwhile Afghanistan was racked by a civil war, which spawned the Taliban who then gave safe haven to al Qaeda. Then in the winter of 2001 the Bush administration overthrew the Taliban, and because of its aversion to nation-building rebuilt the country on the cheap and quickly got distracted by the war in Iraq. Into the resulting vacuum stepped a resurgent Taliban. This time the movement of religious warriors was much more closely aligned with al Qaeda. So the U.S. has already tried the Do Nothing approach and the Do It Light approach in Afghanistan, the results of which are well known. The Obama administration is now attempting a Do It Seriously approach, which has a real chance of success.

**[\_\_] US military strategy is irrelevant. Conflict will spread from Pakistan regardless of what happens in Afghanistan.**

**Robert Fox, defense correspondent for the Evening Standard, 11/7/07,**

[http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/robert\\_fox/2007/11/the\\_talib\\_bomb.html](http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/robert_fox/2007/11/the_talib_bomb.html)

Since the crisis earlier this year, following the siege of the Red Mosque and the sacking of the chief justice, known Taliban organizations have been successful in proselytizing and recruiting in Punjab. The respected commentator Ahmed Rashid, author of the definitive Taliban and Jihad studies of Islamist movements in south-central Asia, considers this the major ingredient in the sense of incipient civil war in his country. And Benazir Bhutto, and whatever coalition of political forces she cobbles together, will be able to do little about it. Against the worsening tensions from the Euphrates to the Hindu Kush and into the Subcontinent, the posture of the US and NATO alliance seems depressingly incongruous, irrelevant even. The policies appear increasingly incompetent, the tactics on the ground increasingly inept. The activities of the British forces trying to defeat the Taliban, destroy dependence on the opium trade, and stabilize Helmand and its neighborhood, can have little effect on the spread of the battle to the north, and the Taliban resurgence to the south in Pakistan.

## Answers To: Solvency

[\_\_] **The Afghan military force is not ready to take over. Troops must remain in order to fight the insurgency**

**Frederick W. Kagan, Professor of Military History at West Point, 5/7/2009**

“Planning Victory in Afghanistan”, <http://www.aei.org/article/100020>, DA:07/19/’10,

The Afghan National Army consists of perhaps 70,000 troops (on paper). This number will rise gradually to 134,000--itself an arbitrary sum, based on assumptions about what the fifth-poorest country in the world can afford to pay for an army that is certainly too small to establish and maintain security. The Afghan National Police are ineffective when not actively part of the problem. Afghanistan is significantly larger than Iraq, its terrain is far more daunting, and its population is greater. The Iraqi Security Forces that defeated the insurgency (with our help) in 2007 and 2008 numbered over 500,000 by the end. There is simply no way that Afghan Security Forces can defeat the insurgents on their own, with or without large numbers of coalition advisers. Breaking the insurgency will have to be a real team effort. Coalition units must partner with Afghan army units to clear critical areas, and then work with local leaders to develop local security solutions that smaller numbers of residual U.S. and Afghan troops can support while other areas are cleared.

## Answers To: Solvency

**[\_\_] A smaller force would not be effective. We would not be able to separate the Taliban from the broader population and attack them.**

**Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Defense of the United States, 11/11/09,**  
 “No time to ease up in Afghanistan ,” [http://www.guluna.com/no-time-to-ease-up-in-afghanistan\\_3963.html](http://www.guluna.com/no-time-to-ease-up-in-afghanistan_3963.html)

Some believe that we can tolerate a re-Talibanization of Afghanistan and blunt future attacks simply by engaging in "counterterrorism-lite" that is focused just on eliminating al-Qaeda operatives on the ground. But three fallacies underlie this position. Myth No. 1: Since current al-Qaeda safe havens are largely in Pakistan, we just need to continue our efforts there, rather than worrying about a sideshow in Afghanistan. But as the Obama administration recognized after its first comprehensive strategy review in the spring, Afghanistan and Pakistan are part of a single "Af-Pak" theater of conflict. Both countries are bookends for the Pashtun frontier areas that span the region between the two. When we applied military pressure in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, terrorists simply moved into Pakistan. Relieving that pressure in Afghanistan would undercut the Pakistani counterterrorism offensive by creating an escape route for al-Qaeda and the Taliban to move back into Afghanistan. Only continued pressure on both sides of the frontier will degrade the freedom of movement by these terrorists. Myth No. 2: Since our core enemy is al-Qaeda, we can separate it from the Taliban and other extremist groups, and restrict our focus to al-Qaeda alone. The distinction among these groups is not as clear as some believe. Recent reporting has confirmed that al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and other groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangavi plan and work in concert, especially in carrying out recent attacks in Pakistan. A dense web of relationships has arisen among a number of these groups. While some Taliban might be peeled away from cooperation with al-Qaeda, the latter will continue to be a source of training, operational and ideological support for many extremists in the tribal regions. Indeed, al-Qaeda's founding purpose and strategy was to serve not only as a stand-alone organization, but also as a financial and operational support base for like-minded groups. Myth No. 3: We can withdraw from securing Afghanistan because we will be able to kill terrorist leaders in training compounds by using drones or special forces teams operating with surgical precision. A re-Talibanized Afghanistan would present a different landscape from the one we face now. Al-Qaeda and other groups would not be confined to discrete compounds or camps. They would likely follow the precedent of Hamas, and embed themselves in the dwellings, schools, hospitals and other structures of the civilian population. Trying to kill or capture terrorists operating within the population would be messy, with a high civilian casualty rate. Not only would that inflame anti-American attitudes, but U.S. military officials would soon find themselves accused of the same international law violations that have been lodged against the Israelis who sought to eliminate Hamas operatives in Gaza.

## Answers To: Solvency

### [\_\_] Iraq shows that we need a large force to fight the insurgency

**Frederick W. Kagan, Professor of Military History at West Point, 5/7/2009**

“Planning Victory in Afghanistan”, <http://www.aei.org/article/100020>, DA:07/19/’10,

Perhaps the most important lesson of Iraq that is transportable to Afghanistan is this: It is impossible to conduct effective counterterrorism operations (i.e., targeting terrorist networks with precise attacks on key leadership nodes) in a fragile state without conducting effective counterinsurgency operations (i.e., protecting the population and using economic and political programs to build support for the government and resistance to insurgents and terrorists). We will never have a better scenario in which to test the limitations of the counterterrorism model than we had in Iraq in 2006. U.S. Special Forces teams had complete freedom to act against al-Qaeda in Iraq, supported by around 150,000 regular U.S. troops, Iraqi military and police forces of several hundred thousand, and liberal airpower. We killed scores of key terrorist leaders, including the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, in June 2006. But terrorist strength, violence, and control only increased over the course of that year. It was not until units already on the ground applied a new approach--a counterinsurgency approach--and received reinforcements that we were able to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (even without killing its new leader).

### [\_\_] Withdrawal from Afghanistan would cause the government to collapse, destabilize Pakistan, and revive Al-Qaeda

**General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), President and CEO of the Institute for 21st Century Energy, United States Chamber of Commerce, and Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Vice Chairman, Hills & Company, 1/30/2008**

“Afghanistan Study Group Report”, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/2067441/Afghan-Study-Group-final>

The U.S. and international coalition forces are at a critical moment. Afghanistan strategy and policy are currently under review in several national capitals and at NATO headquarters. The Study Group believes two possible courses of action would have dire consequences – either withdrawing forces from Afghanistan or adopting a minimal approach. If international forces are pulled from Afghanistan, the fragile Afghan government would likely fall apart, again becoming a failed state while the Taliban and other warlords would gain control of various areas and eventually fight each other. Development efforts and accomplishments heretofore would be rolled back as they cannot be maintained in insecure areas. Not only would failure to stabilize Afghanistan pave the way for a revival of an al-Qaeda safe haven in that country, it would also likely have a blowback effect in Pakistan, where local Taliban and other extremist groups would be inspired to step up their own efforts to destabilize the Pakistani regime, with the hope of one day installing fundamentalist, theocratic rule.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

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# South Korea Aff

## South Korea Affirmative

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## Explanation:

The term “United States Forces Korea” refers to the entire military troop presence stationed in South Korea, including the ground, air and naval divisions. The total force level is approximately 37,500 troops.

In 1978, the U.S. and South Korea formed the Combined Forces Command (CFC), based in Seoul, and with a U.S. general in charge. A few years ago, the U.S. agreed to transfer its wartime command authority to South Korea. The planned date for completion of the OPCON military transfer is April 2012, less than two years away. If the CFC command is indeed transferred to South Korea, two separate military commands will be created. South Korean military forces, now under the command in wartime of the U.S. commander of the joint command, will then be under the wartime command of the ROK military.

This transition has been highly controversial because of how the timing relates to possible instability and leadership changes in North Korea. Leaders in both the United States and South Korea are calling for the reversal of that agreement and some evidence indicates it may be put on hold for an indefinite time. This is based on the fear that the transfer would convey a sign of weakness and lack of resolve by the United States to defend South Korea against North Korea.

Many American military officials foresee a changing role for the ground forces in South Korea. President Obama and U.S. commanders have spoken in 2009 of the possibility that remaining U.S. ground combat units in South Korea would be deployed to Afghanistan or other active theatres of combat. This would mean the U.S. defense role in South Korea would primarily be an air and sea role.

This affirmative argues that, counter to what the United States believes, its troop presence along the border between North and South Korea is much of what is creating the conflict between the two countries. It argues that tensions are high now, and will increase to the point of war in the near future. The affirmative would withdraw the 28,500 troops from the Korean Peninsula, arguing that this would promote stability by encouraging negotiations between the two countries and forcing China to become involved with the peace process.

## Glossary:

ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Pyongyang: Capital of North Korea

Seoul: Capital of South Korea

Demilitarized Zone: Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

FYI: PRC = People's Republic of China (China)

Offshore Balancing = Idea that the US should take a more passive role in international affairs, letting powerful countries manage their own regions.

Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not currently have them.

## South Korea IAC [1/8]

### **Contention 1: Inherency**

**The US Currently has 28000 troops acting as a buffer between North Korea and South Korea, and no troop reductions are planned in the status quo**

**Viola Gienger, Writer for Bloomberg news, 10/21/2009,**

<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arz7hYEpZMZY>

Defense Secretary Robert Gates pledged an “enduring” U.S. military presence in South Korea amid concerns the Asian nation isn’t ready to take control of their joint forces as planned within three years. In opening comments at the start of annual joint security talks in Seoul today, Gates and his South Korean counterpart, Defense Minister Kim Tae Young, vowed to strengthen their alliance to confront threats from North Korea. “The United States will continue to provide extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella to ensure” the security of South Korea, Gates said. “Key to that deterrent capability is our commitment to an enduring United States force presence on the Korean Peninsula as part of the combined defense posture.” The U.S. keeps about 28,500 troops in South Korea, down from about 37,000 five years ago, having agreed last year to amend a previous decision to reduce the level even more. Some former military officials have criticized an agreement by President Lee Myung Bak’s predecessor for the U.S. to hand over wartime operational control of joint forces by 2012.

**However, these troops do not serve a strategic function in preventing war. South Korea’s military is strong enough to take care of itself.**

**TED GALEN CARPENTER AND DOUGH BANDOW, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004,**

The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127)

Moreover, even if the security of the South was vital to the United States, Washington's treaty and troops are not necessary to achieve that end. Nearly a decade ago the Department of Defense declared that "our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years."<sup>29</sup> Although America's presence probably was central to the maintenance of peace 50 years ago, it is not so today. After all, the raison d'être for Washington's defense of the ROK, a weak South Korea vulnerable to communist aggression orchestrated by Beijing or Moscow, has disappeared. That America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism does not mean that it is necessary to do so •<sup>30</sup> As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conceded: "Without U.S. help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North."<sup>31</sup> An invasion that would be supported by no other nation, and certainly not by the DPRK's old allies, China and Russia.

FYI: ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

FYI: DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

## South Korea IAC [2/8]

### Contention 2: Harms

#### War is coming between North and South Korea, nuclear deterrence will fail

**Chong Wook Chung, Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanayang Technological University, 2010**

“The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,”

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us\\_policy\\_toward\\_the\\_korean\\_peninsula.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us_policy_toward_the_korean_peninsula.html))

After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North's apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

FYI: Pyongyang = Capital of North Korea

## South Korea IAC [3/8]

### **Continued North Korean provocations will draw the US into a nuclear conflict**

**Peter Hayes, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; 10/4/06**

“The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony”

<http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html>)

If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviors in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washington’s attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone. Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is, the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.

FYI: DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

FYI: Demilitarized Zone: Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

## South Korea IAC [4/8]

### **Nuclear War over North Korea causes millions of deaths, collapses the world economy, and destroys attempts at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons**

**Peter Hayes and Michael Green, - \*Victoria University AND \*\*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, 1/5/10**

“-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack<sup>1</sup>, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centers are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modeling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs<sup>2</sup> (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.<sup>3</sup> In Westberg's view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth's protective ozone.<sup>4</sup> These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships<sup>5</sup>, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

## South Korea IAC [5/8]

### **Attacking North Korea doesn't solve-it will result in Global Nuclear War**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 4/22/03**

“N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons'” [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=6020](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6020)]

A decade ago, many American policymakers and pundits blithely talked about military options for destroying the Yongbyon reactor and other North Korean nuclear facilities. Many people, apparently including President Bush, seem to be making the same calculations again. It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective. Officials in Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil and regional chaos. Even among the countries in the region most vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, there is no constituency for war. South Korea is particularly adamant. As President Roh Moo Hyun said, "For Washington, their prime interest lies in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction to restore the world order, but for us it's a matter of survival." Some advocates of military action predict that Pyongyang would not retaliate against a blow to its nuclear facilities. Others propose coupling such a military strike with the use or threat of tactical nuclear weapons against the North's conventional forces. But to attack and assume the North would not respond would be a wild gamble. A military strike might not get all of Pyongyang's nuclear assets, and hitting the reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or South Korea. Moreover, given the official U.S. policy of preemption, designation of the North as a member of the "axis of evil" and the Iraq war, Pyongyang might decide that even a limited military strike was the opening of a war for regime change. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. An account by a high-ranking defector, Cho Myung Chul, is particularly sobering. In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too defensive. Cho related the North Korean view as: "If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative." He estimates the chances of general war at 80% in response to even a limited strike on Yongbyon. Unfortunately, "everything" is a daunting force: In addition to a large army, the North possesses long-range artillery and rocket launchers, up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles. And it has developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons. Estimates as to the number of casualties run to more than 1 million. Also possible would be a limited retaliatory strike against the United States' Yongsan base in the center of Seoul. The Seoul-Inchon metropolis includes roughly half of South Korea's population, about 24 million people, and is the nation's industrial heartland. Pyongyang is thought to be able to fire up to 500,000 shells an hour into Seoul. Washington could hardly afford not to respond to an attack on Yongsan, yet retaliation would probably lead to general war. Such a scenario might threaten civilian control of the military in Seoul; the perception that South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh administration might create a decisive split between Seoul and Washington. Dealing with North Korea could prove to be one of the most vexing challenges for this administration. Military action does not offer a simple solution but rather portends a real war of horrific destructiveness.

FYI: Pyongyang = Capital of North Korea

**Plan: The United States federal government should withdraw its troop presence from South Korea.**

## South Korea IAC [6/8]

### Contention 3: Solvency

#### Removing U.S. troops attracts genuine Chinese support for Korean reunification

**Peter Van Nguyen, freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy Journal, 10/13/09**

“U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” UPI Asia, 10/13,

[http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us\\_bases\\_are\\_obstacle\\_to\\_korean\\_reunification/1193/](http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/)

The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat.

## South Korea IAC [7/8]

### **Chinese involvement would prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and ensure stability in East Asia**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,**

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11739](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739)]

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an "unfortunate incident." Beijing's ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation's commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today's badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North's impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North's ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan's sinking. Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

## South Korea IAC [8/8]

### **Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea reverses North Korean nuclearization**

**Doug Bandow, senior policy fellow at Cato, 8/9/09,**

“Bipolar Pyongyang ”, 8/9/09 [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=10523](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10523)]

Secretary Clinton should invite the DPRK to send an envoy to Washington. (Enough supplicants have gone to Pyongyang.) The agenda would be to develop the parameters for any bilateral talks. The administration should indicate that it is willing to discuss most any issue, but genuine negotiations could be conducted only in a multilateral context—if not the six-party talks per se, then in an ongoing, parallel framework. The reason is simple: the North's nuclear program, accentuated by Pyongyang's predictable brinkmanship, is the principal barrier to improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States, as well as North Korea's neighbors. In response, Washington should indicate that it is prepared to work with the other parties to develop a comprehensive program to promote stability, security and prosperity for the Korean peninsula. The solution must be both regional and consensual. Washington should indicate that it has no intention of imposing a solution on other nations. During this period the administration should work with Seoul and the new Japanese government to craft a package that includes: a peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, phased U.S.-troop withdrawal, mutual diplomatic recognition, an end of sanctions, membership in international organizations, and bilateral and multilateral aid. In return, the North would agree to forgo nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, fully dismantle its existing nuclear facilities, relinquish all nuclear materials and accept intrusive inspections. The need for the latter is even more evident after Pyongyang's claim to be in the final stages of uranium enrichment. If true, that gives the lie to the regime's lengthy denial that it possessed such a capability. In return for bountiful benefits from engagement, the DPRK must agree to a process that ensures no more unpleasant surprises for its neighbors and America. Washington, South Korea and Tokyo should simultaneously work together to encourage more intensive Chinese involvement. With increasing pessimism in Beijing that North Korea will agree to give up its nuclear potential, the allies should suggest that the People's Republic of China closely coordinate its policy with theirs for one last serious attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis through negotiation. In essence, Pyongyang's three antagonists would provide the carrots while its ally would wield the stick. If the DPRK chose to obstruct and obfuscate, it would demonstrate that it does not desire a diplomatic solution. In that case, Beijing should support—and, more importantly, enforce—an enhanced sanctions regime. China also should consider using whatever influence it has within the North to encourage more responsible behavior and/or better leadership. To ease the PRC's concerns over the prospect of inadvertently sparking a North Korean implosion, the United States, South Korea and Japan should emphasize that the situation today is dangerously unstable, despite the fact that Pyongyang is in its manic phase. Should the result of Chinese pressure be social collapse, the three allies would contribute financially. Moreover, both Washington and Seoul should promise that there would be no American military presence in a reunified Korea.

## South Korea Military Modernization Add on

### **Add on Advantage: South Korean Military modernization**

**South Korea is currently free riding off of US deterrence and troops in the region, spending far below what they would be otherwise. It must take the lead to help the US deter rising Asian countries**

**BRUCE BENNETT, Senior Policy Analyst – RAND Corporation, 1/29/2010**

“S. Korea’s Military Capability ‘Inadequate’”, Chosun Ilbo,

[http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2010/01/29/2010012900705.html](http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/01/29/2010012900705.html))

An American academic says South Korea's military capabilities are inadequate to handle a North Korean invasion or other North Korean military action or regime collapse there. In an article entitled "Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks," Bruce Bennett, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, said South Korea could face a crisis if it fails to enhance its military capabilities through modernization of equipment and personnel capable of using and maintaining it. He cited South Korea's outdated weapons, inadequate military budget, and reduced conscription period as the rationale for his claim. Many major South Korean weapon systems "are very old, such as M48 tanks and F-5 aircraft originally designed and produced three decades or more ago," he said. By contrast, "the U.S. military spends some 16 times as much as the [South Korean] military on equipment acquisition each year despite the U.S. forces having only twice as many personnel. U.S. military research and development spending is some 50 times" South Korean spending each year. He said that the South Korean military budget "has been too small to acquire key military capabilities. Thus few [South Korean] soldiers have GPS to identify their own or adversary locations with accuracy, making precision battlefield attacks difficult and increasing the potential for friendly fire. But in civilian life, many soldiers have GPS in their cars." He pointed out that South Korea and the United States have worked together for almost 60 years "to deter and defeat North Korean military threats. But while the United States remains ready to assist" South Korea, Seoul's security is ultimately Seoul's responsibility and it "must take the lead." South Korea's military budget is inadequate for "assuring the security of the Korean people from North Korea's catastrophic threats," he added.

### **US withdrawal would force South Korean military advancement**

**JJ Suh, Director of the Korea Studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 5/17/10**

“Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race”, Foreign Policy in Focus,

[http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied\\_to\\_race\\_the\\_us-korea\\_alliance\\_and\\_arms\\_race](http://www.fpif.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race))

Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul’s defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul. This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance: The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.

## South Korea Military Modernization Add on

### South Korean deterrence stops Chinese, Japanese, and Russian aggression

**DOUG BANDOW, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 1996,**

Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, p. 63-64)

None of those arguments suggests that any vital American interests are at stake. Thus, the most obvious reason to threaten to go to war does not apply to Korea. Rather, America's second most important and costly commitment (after Europe) is rooted in the more nebulous concept of regional "stability." But the "stability" argument fails to distinguish between U.S. influence in East Asia and a defense commitment to the ROK. The latter is not necessary for the former. First, the Mutual Defense Treaty yields America little benefit. As noted earlier, while a commitment to defend Seoul from North Korea helps stabilize the peninsula, the benefits of doing so accrue mostly to the ROK and to a lesser degree to neighboring nations. The advantages to America, based on proximity, if nothing else, are much more modest. Second, a militarily stronger South Korea, the probable consequence of a U.S. withdrawal, would promote regional stability almost as much as could the U.S. presence, by deterring aggression by not only Pyongyang but also by China, Japan, or Russia. (Those nations will always be able to outdo even a united Korea militarily, but the latter could make the prospect of war too expensive for any of them to seriously contemplate.) At the same time, it is hard to imagine even a more powerful Korea being in a position to threaten any of its major neighbors.

### East Asian aggression leads to nuclear war

**Jonathon Landy, National Security and International Correspondent, Knight Rider, 3/10/2000**

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stake could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

## Inherency: Troops Will Remain in South Korea

**North Korean security concerns mean there will be no troop reductions in the future**

**Lee Jong-Heon, United Press International Correspondent, 2/4/10, UPI,**

[http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul\\_seeks\\_extended\\_us\\_protection/2951](http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul_seeks_extended_us_protection/2951).

But the U.S. military said on Thursday that it has no immediate plan to redeploy troops from South Korea. In a statement, the command of the U.S. Forces Korea said a redeployment of its troops, even if necessary, would only be possible in the late 2010s after close consultations with South Korea. "The defense of the ROK (South Korea) remains the core mission of U.S. forces in Korea now and in the future, and there will be no reduction of U.S. forces in Korea tied to wartime operational control transition on April 17, 2012," it said. In return for longer U.S. military protection, South Korea has vowed to use an inter-Korean summit it is pushing to hold this year to persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons. "Denuclearization of the peninsula must be the most important agenda item if an inter-Korean summit takes place," a Foreign Ministry official said. "A summit should be arranged as a way to address international concerns about the North's nuclear weapons," he said. In an apparent bid to coordinate summit agenda items with White House officials, Kim Tae-hyo, secretary to President Lee for national s

## Inherency: South Korea Preventing US Withdrawal

### **New unstable situation prompts delay in U.S. withdrawal**

**Jay Solomon, Staff Writer, May 31, 2010.**

(Wall Street Journal (Online). New York, N.Y.: Lexis-Nexis)

The North's alleged attack March 26 on the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, however, has shaken up Seoul's strategic thinking, according to South Korean and U.S. officials. A major concern here now is that Pyongyang's development of nuclear technologies has provided leader Kim Jong Il with a deterrent against the more-advanced militaries of the U.S. and South Korea. This, in turn, could allow Pyongyang to stage more-aggressive conventional attacks on the South, with the belief that Seoul won't retaliate for fear of an escalation. This fear seems to have been borne out in recent days as Mr. Lee's government has shown a reluctance to take some new steps to challenge Pyongyang over the Cheonan incident. Seoul, for example, stepped back from an initial pledge to use loudspeakers to blast pro-South Korean propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas after the North threatened to attack the broadcasting infrastructure. Still, many leading defense thinkers in Seoul said Pyongyang's growing nuclear technologies are "game changers" that now require South Korea to significantly upgrade its own capabilities. In addition to developing longer-range missiles, many are calling for the purchases of advanced new strike-fighters and antiballistic-missile batteries. They also are calling for the Pentagon to remain in charge of the joint-military command in South Korea beyond 2012, given the lethal effectiveness displayed by North Korea's mini-submarine fleet during the Cheonan attack.

FYIL Demilitarized Zone= Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

### **South Korea is delaying military command transfer due to unpreparedness**

**Jay Solomon, Staff Writer, May 31, 2010.**

(Wall Street Journal (Online). New York, N.Y.: Lexis-Nexis)

South Korean defense strategists already are publicly pressing Mr. Lee to delay the planned 2012 transfer of operational control of the combined U.S.-South Korean fighting force to Seoul from Washington, arguing South Korea isn't prepared yet to oversee American forces. The agreement between Washington and Seoul has a clause that allows South Korea's president to formally request a suspension of the transfer. The U.S. currently deploys 29,000 troops in South Korea, and the South Korean military deploys 600,000.

## Harms: Korean War Coming Now – Recent incidents

### **The risk of Korean war is high – current disputes could escalate**

**Simon Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, 5/24/10,**  
 The Guardian, " China faces tough choices over Korea ",  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-korea>)

The risk of renewed, all-out warfare on the Korean peninsula is rated low by most western and Chinese analysts. But the chances of escalating armed clashes, planned or otherwise, have risen significantly following South Korea's decision to punish the North for the March sinking of its naval corvette, the Cheonan. And once shooting starts, it can be hard to stop. Today's South Korean announcement that it is planning joint anti-submarine exercises with the US provides one obvious possible flashpoint. Seoul says a North Korean torpedo destroyed the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. If its vengeful navy were to encounter another of Kim Jong-il's submarines, mayhem may ensue. President Lee Myung-bak's move to resume psy-ops (psychological warfare operations) along the demilitarized zone, including broadcast propaganda messages targeted at North Korean troops, has already led Pyongyang to threaten to shoot up the border. And if the South makes good its vow to intercept North Korean commercial shipping, more trouble is likely. Both sides have much to lose if violence ratchets up. "This latest violence is as unlikely as previous incidents to lead to renewal of general fighting," said author Arthur Cyr in the China Post. "The Korean war was extraordinarily costly, and neither side has ever tried to renew such hostilities. North Korea now has at least a primitive nuclear weapon, but any use would result in instant devastating retaliation." The US, with 29,000 troops based in the South, may quickly be drawn into any new skirmishing. Barack Obama has directed the US military to be ready "to deter future aggression" and is demanding the North admit responsibility and apologies. But cash-strapped Washington has no appetite, and scant capacity, for more war, with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq unfinished. Much the same goes for Japan, which is backing South Korea at the UN security council.

## Harms: Korean War Coming Now – Recent Incidents

**Recent incidents between North and South Korea prove that the risk of war is high**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, 4/6/10**

“An Unstable Rogue”, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>)

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior. Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. Now we are no longer sure. Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

FYI: PRC = People’s Republic of China (China)

## Harms: Korean War Coming Now – North Korean Provocations

### **North Korea still wants to reunify Korea - this will lead to war**

**Colin Robinson and Stephen H. Baker \*CDI Research Analyst \*\*Senior Fellow at the Center for Defense Information (Colin and Stephen H., May 2003,**  
 “Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences,” <http://www.cdi.org/north-korea/north-korea-crisis.pdf>)

However, the embattled state hung on. Despite a collapsing economy, widespread famine, and cooling relations with its previous major supporters – the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation – North Korea not only survived but also managed to bolster its conventional forces and, according to North Korean officials, covertly build a small nuclear arsenal. Its still avowed aim of reunifying the Peninsula under communist rule, and the massive military force it has built to be able to do so, present a continuing threat of war in North East Asia.

### **North Korea will engage in additional provocations**

**Bruce Klingner, - Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, “It Was A North Korean Torpedo”, 5/20/2010**  
<http://blog.heritage.org/2010/05/20/it-was-a-north-korean-torpedo/>)

As if the Cheonan attack was not bad enough, Seoul will be nervously waiting for the other shoe to drop. It can be expected that North Korea will react strongly to any international efforts to punish it for the Cheonan attack. It is also likely that the Cheonan sinking is not a singular event but rather the beginning of a North Korean campaign to raise tensions. Pyongyang could even be looking for a strong international response to the Cheonan sinking in order to justify additional belligerent behavior. If that is the case, then North Korea will engage in additional provocative behavior, particularly in the run-up to Seoul’s hosting of the G-20 summit in November.

### **Future North Korean provocations are inevitable**

**Michael Auslin, - director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute. (Michael, “Asia’s Troubled Waters,” *Wall Street Journal*, 5/21/10**  
[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957904575253292263660122.html?mod=google\\_news\\_wsj](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957904575253292263660122.html?mod=google_news_wsj)

Naval clashes between North and South have been a regular feature of the Korean standoff for the past decades. But the unprovoked sinking of the Cheonan is a major escalation in the North’s actions that may well portend even larger clashes—especially if Kim Jong Il feels his navy has escaped scot-free in the murder of dozens of South Korean sailors.

## Harms: Impacts to Korean war

### A Korean conflict would cause nuclear war and extinction

**Chol, Director Center for Korean American Peace, 2002 10/24/02,**  
[http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A\\_Chol.html](http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html))

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." Continues...The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

### A Korean war would result in the use of chemical and biological weapons

**Park Tong-Whan, KORUS Institute, 2004,**

From Collective Defense to Security Co-Management: Thoughts About the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, "The United States and South Korea: Reinvigorating the Partnership," [www.keia.com/2-Publications/2-3-Monograph/Monograph2004/Monograph2004.pdf](http://www.keia.com/2-Publications/2-3-Monograph/Monograph2004/Monograph2004.pdf),

But Pyongyang's qualitative deficiency in conventional forces is more than made up by its unconventional forces. It is known to have a strong chemical and biological warfare capability along with perhaps a few crude nuclear devices. <sup>2</sup> Moreover, North Korea has more than 100,000 special forces—the world's largest special forces—trained to stage a guerrilla war behind the lines. North Korea reportedly maintains a large contingent of spies and sympathizers in the South. In a war, the asymmetry in military capability between the two sides might play out this way: Pyongyang ignites internal turmoil in South Korea with its "sleeper" agents, and the special forces infiltrate by air and through tunnels. As the guerrilla-style agitation builds, Seoul will find it extremely difficult to suppress the turmoil. South Korea's only option will be a full-scale retaliation against the North; this will escalate into an all-out war. Although the ROK-U.S. combined forces will expect to win eventually, the two Koreas will suffer unbearable damage, including the prospect of extinction for the North Korean regime. Faced with this imminent danger, the Pyongyang regime will resort to WMD, including atomic bombs. Pyongyang's use of nuclear weapons will force the United States to respond in kind, resulting in devastation beyond imagination.

## Harms: Impacts to Korean War

### **The resulting proliferation from the war will result in nuclear war**

**Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Senior Member of the National Security Council Staff, Summer 2002,**

Survival, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions", Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s, with most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

### **US-North-South Korean nuclear war would be the bloodiest war since Vietnam.**

**Scott Stossel, graduate of Harvard Law and Atlantic magazine editor August 2005,**

[http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod\\_images/pdfs/KayDavid.NorthKoreaTheWarGame.07.05.pdf](http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/KayDavid.NorthKoreaTheWarGame.07.05.pdf)

The North Korean situation is also ripe for war-game treatment, because of the extraordinarily difficult military and diplomatic challenges it presents. Iran, considered an urgent national-security priority, is thought to be three to five years away from possessing even a single nuclear device. North Korea is widely believed to have as many as ten already, and to be producing more every year. (It is also the first developing nation thought to be capable of striking the continental United States with a long-range ballistic missile.) And whereas Iraq did not, after all, have weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is believed to have large stockpiles of chemical weapons (mustard gas, sarin, VX nerve agent) and biological weapons (anthrax, botulism, cholera, hemorrhagic fever, plague, smallpox, typhoid, yellow fever). An actual war on the Korean peninsula would almost certainly be the bloodiest America has fought since Vietnam—possibly since World War II. In recent years Pentagon experts have estimated that the first ninety days of such a conflict might produce 300,000 to 500,000 South Korean and American military casualties, along with hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. The damage to South Korea alone would rock the global economy.

## Harms: South Korean Spending Low Now

**South Korea is free-riding – current U.S. defense provisions cause underinvestment in conventional forces**

**TED GALEN CARPENTER AND DOUGH BANDOW, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127)**

Thus, America's military presence and the subsequent "mutual" defense treaty invited ROK free-riding at the start, given the disparity in power of the two signatories. Such behavior was not only expected but arguably justified. By underinvesting in the military and focusing on economic development, Seoul set the stage for the eventual financial miracle that has transformed South Korea into a major international economic power. But once that transformation was under way, it was time to increase the ROK's defense burden and decrease America's responsibility. That never happened. Shocked outrage greeted President Jimmy Carter's proposal to remove most U.S. troops, and that proposal eventually died. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reaffirmed the one-way U.S. commitment. Year after year of record economic growth did nothing to change American policy under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Only pressure from the war on terrorism has prompted President George W. Bush to reconfigure, and perhaps finally reduce, Washington's force presence. South Korea is one of America's most obvious security free-riders. The ROK vastly outstrips its northern antagonist, possessing about 40 times the GDP, enjoying a vast technological edge, and sporting a large economic presence around the globe. The South also has twice the population of the DPRK, is friendly with every major international and regional power, in contrast to the erratic North, and long ago won the diplomatic contest throughout the Third World. However, argues Peter Huessy of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting firm, "the ROK's population, GDP and per capita income are all irrelevant to its defense."<sup>2</sup> That is true only in the sense of the South's military capabilities today. It says nothing about its potential defense capabilities. Moreover, simply citing the North's quantitative lead, 1.1 million to 686,000 armed services personnel, for instance (as defenders of the U.S. commitment to South Korea typically do), does not say much about actual combat capabilities either.' In any case, the existing personnel and materiel imbalance is not inevitable, some immutable aspect of geography on the Korean peninsula. Rather, it results from past ROK free-riding. Seoul's failure to invest heavily in defense today to close the gap reflects current free-riding. The South can do so only because it relies on the U.S. presence as a supplemental deterrent to North Korean aggression. That the relationship is beneficial to the ROK is obvious. That it is in America's interest is not.

## Harms: South Korean Spending Low Now

**Without US defense, South Korea's defense budget would increase several fold**

**SELIG S. HARRISON, Senior Scholar – Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program – Center for International Policy, 4/11/06**

“South Korea-U.S. Alliance Under the Roh Government”, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0628Harrison.html>)

Without its U.S. subsidy, Seoul would have to double or triple its military budget if it wanted to replace the conventional forces now deployed for its defense by the United States - not to mention the much higher outlays that independent nuclear forces would require. In addition to the direct costs of its forces in Korea, averaging \$2 billion per year, the United States spends more than \$40 billion annually to maintain the overall U.S. defense posture in East Asia and the western Pacific on which its capability to intervene in Korea depends. So long as Seoul regards this U.S. economic cushion as an entitlement, it will be under no compulsion to decide whether to move toward the confederation envisaged in the June, 2000, summit, as a prelude to eventual reunification. A significant portion of the South Korean defense budget goes to a vast military-industrial complex. There are more than 80 defense contractors in the South producing some 350 categories of defense equipment in nearly 150 factories. This powerful interest group, allied with leaders of the armed forces, opposes reduced defense expenditures. To be sure, there are certain aspects of the U.S. military presence that are particularly crucial to the defense of the South: sophisticated command and control and intelligence capabilities in particular. Seoul would be wise to upgrade these capabilities to prepare for an eventual U.S. withdrawal, even at a high cost. Some spending on them is already underway and is justified. But that is very different from a broad-based, across-the-board expansion of the armed forces designed to replace the overall U.S. presence.

## Harms: Withdrawal Forces Modernization

### Reliance on US prevents South Korean military modernization which is key to deterring Pyongyang

**Ronald Mangum, Professor who is a retired U.S. Army Brigadier General, Spring 2004,** “Joint Force Training: Key to ROK Military Transformation”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 16(1), Spring, [http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/06\\_ronald\\_s\\_mangum.pdf](http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/06_ronald_s_mangum.pdf))

Even though adopting joint training and doctrine will enhance ROK military capabilities, there are two limiting factors which may have to be overcome before military transformation can proceed . The first limiting factor is the cost of transformation. The ROK currently has a well-equipped medium-heavy infantry-centric force, but the ROK alliance with the United States has permitted the ROK government to rely on U.S. military capability instead of acquiring its own comparable weapons systems.<sup>4</sup> The failure to acquire new weapons has restricted the capability of ROK forces of all services to a level at which many believe that the ROK will have difficulty repelling a concerted attack by North Korea without U.S. support.<sup>5</sup> If you take away the U.S. military capabilities that are committed to the defense of South Korea, it becomes difficult to assess the relative strength of the South Korean army against its North Korean neighbors. While the ROK Army is large—over 650,000 soldiers—its large size may belie its capability. Some writers have suggested, for example, that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division alone, currently stationed around the Uijeonbu area north of the South Korean capital of Seoul, surpasses the firepower of 3-4 ROK divisions, exceeding a ROK corps in strength.<sup>6</sup> In addition, U.S. capabilities of high performance fighter aircraft, precision-guided munitions and sophisticated communications simply don't exist in the ROK inventory. This lack of firepower is what leads analysts to determine that without U.S. military assistance, the ROK military would not be able to stop a North Korean military attack. Furthermore, this cost estimate does not address the cost required to repair existing military infrastructure—barracks, for example—to bring quality of life for ROK soldiers in line with modern standards. A recent article decried the Spartan condition of ROK army barracks that are more than 40 years old and in which battalion-sized units of 400 often use a bathroom suited for 40 soldiers. Reliance on U.S. military support for its defense needs has also permitted the ROK government to ignore upgrades in basic weaponry. Most ROK tanks were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and spare parts are no longer being produced. Many ROK helicopters have been in service for more than 40 years—long beyond their expected useful life. So even if the ROK were to continue to rely on the U.S. military presence, it must bear the cost to upgrade quality of life for its soldiers and its weapons systems.

## Harms: Withdrawal Causes Chinese Involvement

**The plan solves - withdrawing troops will immediately spur Chinese action on North Korea to prevent South Korean**

**Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 11/11/06**

“Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. Korea,” Chicago Sun Times,  
[http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=6772](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6772))

Instead of putting a leash on Japan and South Korea, U.S. officials should inform Pyongyang -- and Beijing -- that if the North insists on wielding nuclear weapons, Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about whether to acquire strategic deterrents. The mere possibility that South Korea and Japan might do so would come as an unpleasant surprise to both North Korea and China. The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. That would be inappropriate. It is sufficient if Washington informs those governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States needs to let Seoul and Tokyo know that we intend to withdraw our military forces from South Korea and Japan. In an environment with a nuclear-armed North Korea, those forward-deployed forces are not military assets; they are nuclear hostages. Faced with a dangerous, nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U.S. military commitment to the region, Japan or South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go down that path, the attitude in South Korea is different. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own. The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome. But offsetting the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. Moreover, the real danger arising from proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons, not when stable, democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense. If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors, whom it could not so easily intimidate, it might have to abandon its current provocative course. Indeed, Pyongyang might face the prospect of confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could hope to do. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. Even if it does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. . . . If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmares." Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach, the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance, it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that scenario.

## Harms: Chinese Involvement Solves War

**Increasing Chinese involvement in North Korea will create a peaceful solution – it's the only way to avoid war or North Korean collapse**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,**

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11739](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739)]

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the *Cheonan* incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an “unfortunate incident.” Beijing’s ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today’s badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North’s impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North’s ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan’s sinking. Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

**China is vital to solving North Korean conflict**

**Simon Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, 5/24/10,**

The Guardian, " China faces tough choices over Korea ",

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-korea>)

The unpalatable truth is Washington has failed utterly to resolve the North Korean conundrum over a period of decades. Neither carrot nor stick has worked, while the problem has grown steadily worse. If any one country has sufficient leverage to prevent escalation of the current crisis and open the path to a solution, it is China, not the US. Beijing is the North's only serious ally. It is its biggest trading partner, provides food and fuel, and recently gained Kim's agreement to expanded co-operation in talks in Beijing. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, recognizes this fact. In Beijing for this week's US-China strategic dialogue, Clinton is urgently pressing Chinese leaders to rein in their rogue neighbor. "The North Koreans will be more easily dissuaded from further attacks if they don't get cover from China," Michael Green of the Centre for International Studies told the New York Times. "It is absolutely critical to Korea and the US that China send that signal."

## Solvency: Troop Withdrawal Stabilizes Korean Peninsula

### **U.S. withdrawal would stabilize the peninsula**

**Doug Bandow , senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 12/16/91,  
“Defusing the Korean Bomb” , [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=1539](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1539)]**

Moreover, Washington should indicate its readiness to phase its forces out of the South, a move that Pyongyang has persistently demanded.[27] In fact, a troop pullout is long overdue, given Seoul's ability to provide for its own defense. The ROK's advantages over North Korea are objectively overwhelming: 11 times the GNP, the fastest economic growth rate in Asia, a dramatic technological lead, unencumbered access to international credit markets, and twice the population.[28] The South is fully capable of overtaking the DPRK militarily if it chooses, and it is more likely to do so if it can no longer rely on American assistance. Indeed, the Nixon administration's limited troop withdrawals in the early 1970s spurred the higher South Korean defense outlays that are now carrying the ROK past Pyongyang militarily. If the North really desires peace, as it claims, it could match an American withdrawal by accepting international inspection of its nuclear facilities, pulling its forces back from their advanced positions along the DMZ, and demobilizing some units. Then, no major South Korean defense hikes would be necessary. Instead, the two Koreas could negotiate a gradual reduction in both nations' forces complemented by further increases in cooperation and trade (building on the modest increases of the past year) followed perhaps by eventual reunification. But the American troops should be withdrawn regardless of North Korea's response, given the South's evident ability to create a military capable of deterring the DPRK. The carrot for the North is that concrete actions on its part-- particularly compliance with the NPT, which would demonstrate a genuine commitment to détente--would both speed up the U.S. withdrawal and forestall a South Korean military buildup. Although the ultimate goal of American disengagement would not be in doubt, the timing of that disengagement would reflect conditions on the peninsula.

### **The U.S. should remove troops in order to make North Korea more likely to negotiate over its nuclear weapons**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 10/4/99  
“Hugs for Pyongyang” , [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=4998](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4998)]**

Over the long term Washington should disentangle itself from Northeast Asia. The United States should step back, leaving Seoul and Tokyo to take the lead in dealing with the North. More important, Washington should develop a phased withdrawal program for its troops, and terminate the defense treaty when the pullout is complete. The ROK should then challenge the North to respond positively by demobilizing some army units and withdrawing some advanced forces from the Demilitarized Zone. The South's private message should be more blunt: negotiate for serious arms reduction, or face a crushing arms race (including missile development) which North Korea cannot win. And the ROK and Japan should expand security cooperation that, despite some recent positive steps, remains minimal. Pyongyang's expressed willingness to back off its planned missile test offers only a temporary respite in a continuing game of international chicken. The United States should begin shifting responsibility for security in Northeast Asia onto its allies, who benefit the most from stability. The Cold War is over; it is time to terminate America's obsolete Cold War deployment in Korea.

## Solvency: Offshore Balancing Stabilizes Korean Peninsula

**After withdrawing troops, the US would pursue a strategy of offshore balancing that would more effectively end the dispute between North and South Korea**

**Christopher Layne, professor of government at Texas A & M University, 2006**

The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 189)

An offshore balancing grand strategy must be implemented carefully. Because of the terrorist threat, the recommended changes in U.S. strategy toward the Gulf and Middle East should be put in place swiftly. On the other hand, because of the complexities and long-term strategic implications of an American shift to an offshore balancing strategy, U.S. military power should be retracted from Europe and East Asia gradually, and in consultation with the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans. An orderly, phased U.S. withdrawal will give the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans time to adjust to America's new grand strategy. As part of the change in grand strategy, the United States should be prepared to assist the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans in building up their independent military capabilities through arms sales and technology transfers. Also, although the United States will not maintain an ongoing forward military presence in Eurasia, it should seek to maintain close military contacts with the Europeans and the Japanese-and develop them with India and Russia-and conduct regular joint exercises. Because future geopolitical conditions might necessitate the reinsertion of U.S. military power into Eurasia, the United States should maintain a network of basing rights that can be used for this purpose should it become necessary. Finally, the adoption of offshore balancing is bound to result in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan, Germany (either as a national nuclear force or as part of an EU nuclear force), and possibly Korea. The United States should relax its nonproliferation policy and help these states, and both India and Pakistan (which already have nuclear weapons), acquire the technology to build survivable forces, and to maintain secure command and control over their nuclear arsenals. Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states-notably China-rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

FYI: Offshore Balancing = Idea that the US should take a more passive role in international affairs, letting powerful countries manage their own regions.

## Answers To: Troop Presence Prevents War

**American troops on the Korean Peninsula do not serve a strategic function in preventing war. South Korea's military is strong enough to take care of itself.**

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,**

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 [http://www.cato.org/pub\\_display.php?pub\\_id=11739](http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739)]

That's the short-term. Two longer-term issues require attention, however the current controversy is resolved. First, the United States and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. America must avoid another war at most any cost. Given the South's level of development, it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington's veto. Nor does it make any sense for the United States to risk being drawn into a war as a result of acts between other nations. These bilateral differences are only likely to grow, especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious. Then South Korea could find itself risking involvement in Washington's war. Also involved is the ROK's self-respect. In two years the U.S. plans on devolving operational control of the combined forces to South Korea. Yet some South Koreans fear their nation won't be ready to lead its own defense. That Washington took military command in underdeveloped, impoverished South Korea in 1950 is understandable. To argue that America must continue doing so in 2010 is bizarre.

**US troops serve no purpose in promoting Asian stability outside of the Korean Peninsula**

**Doug Bandow, 8 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President**

**Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, 11/11/2008**

“Seoul Searching”, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218>)

Other advocates of the alliance make the “dual use” argument, that American forces stationed on the Korean peninsula are useful for purposes other than defending South Korea. But an army division and assorted other forces have little useful role in promoting regional stability, whatever that means in practice (invading Burma or preventing the dissolution of Indonesia?). And minimal ROK support for other U.S. objectives, such as providing a small troop contingent to a safe sector of Iraq (which Seoul plans on withdrawing by year's end), is not worth today's one-sided alliance.

FYI: ROK = Republic of Korea (South Korea)

## AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

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[ ] **South Korea will not build nuclear weapons. The public is against it**

**Kiho Yi, Director of the Nautilus Institute of Seoul and Professor at Hanshin U, 6/5/2009**

**“The North Korean nuclear test: The South Korean reaction,”**

<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-the-south-korean-reaction>

But back to the domestic response in South Korea. Like the South Korean public, other than the two hours immediately following the test, the South Korean stock market remained pretty much unaffected by Pyongyang's actions last week. The country's most important investors seemed to dismiss the idea of a war between the North and South as unlikely, despite the North's rhetoric. As for Seoul's intellectual elite, they have made many political statements this week, but none of them involve North Korea. Instead, these statements involve Lee Myung-bak, as many professors at the country's major universities want him to apologize for prosecuting Roh and to support the basic rights of expression that make the South a democracy. A few statements from domestic civil society organizations did request that North Korea stop its nuclear program, but that was about it in terms of public outcry. Politically, the response has been more heated. Some members of the South Korean Parliament have seriously raised the idea of Seoul pursuing its own nuclear capability. Others want to discuss what options the South Korean government should take if the country's leaders decide the U.S. nuclear umbrella isn't enough to keep Seoul safe. But again, the South Korean people seem opposed to such actions. According to a recent poll done by Mono Research, 67 percent of everyday South Koreans said that Seoul needs to find a peaceful way in which to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis; only 25 percent answered that South Korea should take a strong stand against North Korean military provocations. So I am hopeful that such popular support for peace will lead to a practical process of denuclearization and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.

## AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

[ ] **There are many obstacles to South Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon**

**JONATHAN D. POLLACK AND MITCHELL B. REISS, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies – Naval War College, and Director – Reves Center for International Studies, 2004**  
 “The Nuclear Tipping Point”, Ed. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, p. 259-260)

Despite this impressive engineering base and technological infrastructure, it would be no easy matter for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Previous estimates of the time needed to complete a weapons program severely underestimated the technical barriers.<sup>9</sup> The extreme secrecy required for a covert program would also be far harder to maintain in the current democratic environment than what prevailed during the era of military dictatorship. The greatest obstacle would be obtaining the required fissile materials, either weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium. South Korea does not possess the indigenous capability to produce either type of bomb-grade material, although research breakthroughs (notably, in pilot production of high-speed centrifuges for isotope separation) have been reported in South Korean publications. Although South Korea could attempt larger-scale manufacture of the sophisticated equipment required for fissile material production, the ultimate success of such a home-grown effort would be far from assured and would entail a sustained, massive commitment of financial and manpower resources. A more likely route, therefore, would be for Seoul to import reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology from abroad. The political and institutional barriers to such transfers, however, are quite daunting. In recent decades, the leading nuclear industrial countries have informally banded together in a Nuclear Suppliers Group to control international trade in this area. The transfer of sensitive technologies is monitored closely, and any request by a South Korean firm or end user for reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology would trigger alarm bells abroad, especially in Washington. If South Korea sought to repeat an earlier attempt at a nuclear option, it is far more likely that Seoul would explore a clandestine route to avoid detection, trying to exploit the network of black market suppliers. The ROK would still need to invest years of effort, at great risk of exposure by foreign suppliers or by its increasingly rambunctious mass media, before it could acquire the infrastructure needed to produce the material for a bomb. Even then, it would require additional time before it could develop workable, deliverable nuclear weapons. During the period between a political decision to undertake a nuclear weapons program and actually obtaining a nuclear arsenal, the ROK would also encounter acute political and security vulnerabilities. A decision could provoke a U.S. withdrawal of political and military support, and South Korea would likely confront the vocal opposition of various nearby powers, including both China and Japan. Seoul would be without its staunchest ally, one armed with unmatched conventional and nuclear forces, and at the same time, the ROK might still be confronted by a hostile and aggressive DPRK.

AT: Readiness Disadvantage

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**South Korea can deter without the U.S.**

**TED GALEN CARPENTER AND DOUG BANDO**, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004  
The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127

Moreover, even if the security of the South was vital to the United States, Washington's treaty and troops are not necessary to achieve that end. Nearly a decade ago the Department of Defense declared that "our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years."<sup>29</sup> Although America's presence probably was central to the maintenance of peace 50 years ago, it is not so today. After all, the *raison d'être* for Washington's defense of the ROK, a weak South Korea vulnerable to communist aggression orchestrated by Beijing or Moscow, has disappeared. That America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism does not mean that it is necessary to do so •<sup>30</sup> As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conceded: "Without U.S. help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North."<sup>31</sup> An invasion that would be supported by no other nation, and certainly not by the DPRK's old allies, China and Russia.

## AT: Readiness Disadvantage

**[\_\_] Withdrawal does not hurt readiness and encourages South Korea to compensate for diminished US presence in the region**

**JOHN P. CUMMINGS, Colonel, United States Army, 5/3/2004**

“Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

In the foreseeable future the United States will continue to view the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula as a vital national security interest and integral to sustaining global commerce. Withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea will not degrade the military readiness of the alliance defense. On the contrary, it will eliminate one of the major sources of growing anti-Americanism among the South Korean population. Moreover, United States can utilize ground forces that are re-deployed from the peninsula in the Global War on terrorism, and save the associated costs of forward based troops. For South Korea, with strong United States support, to take the lead in the defense of their nation is an idea whose time has come. In conclusion, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would be a win-win alternative. We gain economic and military resources while maintaining our objectives in northeast Asia and garnering positive public opinion, and South Koreans step out of our shadow and join the first rank of nations as a fully functioning democratic nation in charge of its own national defense.

**[\_\_] Withdrawal increases readiness because it frees up troops to be used in other areas**

**JOHN P. CUMMINGS, Colonel, United States Army, 5/3/2004**

“Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Neither Richard Halloran’s diplomatic options nor the blatantly militant pre-emption options should be entertained. There is a more viable option: a unilateral withdraw of United States ground forces from South Korea. The current administration’s commitment to the global war on terrorism, with subsequent military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused considerable strain on the United States Military’s finite resources. Service components, scrambling to meet the increased operational tempo of the current environment, have yet to realize the implications on retention and sustaining a quality force. Withdrawal of forces from South Korea would enable the United States to realize an infrastructure cost savings while continuing to meet the guidance in the National Security Strategy and regional policy objectives that are inherent in forward basing of troops. It will also make available more forces for the administration’s global war on terrorism. Additionally, the removal of American forces from South Korea would alleviate political unrest associated with the increasing anti-American sentiment among South Koreans.

## AT: START Disadvantage

**Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, 5/7/2003**

“Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Cato Policy Analysis, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474.pdf>)

For years it was hard to find a single American analyst, let alone policymaker, who did not recoil in horror at the suggestion that American forces be brought home from Korea. Defenders of the commitment rushed to the barricades in the midst of Kim Daejung’s visit to Pyongyang. For instance, Robert Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations warned against the “loose talk about the future of the U.S.–South Korean alliance and the U.S. military presence in Korea.”<sup>81</sup> Even after Roh’s election, U.S. Department of Defense consultant Richard Weitz advocates a continued U.S. presence for the purpose of “rapidly halting any North Korean invasion,” as if South Korea’s 700,000-man military didn’t exist.<sup>82</sup> Former secretary of defense William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter, and Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, leading figures in the Clinton administration, offer the cliché of America’s and South Korea’s troops standing “shoulder to shoulder to deter North Korean aggression.”<sup>83</sup> Left unanswered is the question of why American shoulders are necessary in the first place. Some analysts would move to strengthen and expand the U.S. commitment to South Korea. Ralph Cossa, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Pacific Forum, wants a force buildup.<sup>84</sup> So does the Heritage Foundation.<sup>85</sup> The Weekly Standard’s Bill Kristol wants efforts aimed at “shoring up the defense capabilities of South Korea.”<sup>86</sup> The Bush administration seems to be taking those recommendations to heart: in early February 2003 Washington announced that it was supplementing its forces in Asia in response to a request from Adm. Thomas Fargo, Pacific commander of U.S. forces.<sup>87</sup> But now a growing number of commentators, including some resolute hawks, are saying that the United States need not remain in Korea, and certainly not if our forces are unwanted.<sup>88</sup> The message has hit home even at the Pentagon. More broadly, notes Scott Snyder, the Asia Foundation’s representative in Korea, “In Washington, within the U.S. government and Congress, there is a distinct, anti-Korean backlash.”<sup>89</sup>

## AT: START Disadvantage

**Woosang Kim and Tae-Hyo Kim, Professors of Political Science – Yonsei University, Spring 2004**

“A Candle in the Wind: Korean Perceptions of ROK-U.S. Security Relations”, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, XVI(1), Spring, p. 114-115)

Another concern is a possible anti-Korean backlash in the United States in these days of swift and vivid communication. Pictures of anti- American demonstrations in South Korea appeared in the newspapers and on the television screens of American homes. Events in Korea can have an immediate reaction in the U.S. Congress and public. We may even begin to see arguments from isolationist advocates for breaking the U.S. alliance with the ROK and bringing U.S. troops home.<sup>2 3</sup> The principal policy implication is quite clear. Unless policymakers in Seoul and Washington do something about the anti-American sentiment in Korea well in advance, the two countries may lose the best security option available to them. In public relations management, they should emphasize the vitality of the continued alliance between the United States and Korea and the necessity of U.S. troops’ remaining in Korea even after unification. Given that the U.S. Forces in Korea may gradually be adjusted to reflect the changing security environment in Northeast Asia and that there remains a salient rationale for ROK-U.S. security cooperation given neighboring great powers, the ongoing Korea-U.S. alliance will certainly remain a win-win strategic option for both countries: for Korea, its comprehensive alliance with the United States would maximize its security at least cost; while for the United States, it would maintain a forward base in one of the most crucial strategic regions in East Asia with reasonable burden-sharing on the part of Korea . The Korean government should stress to its people that condemning the problems originating from the ROK-U.S. alliance does not necessarily imply the logic of denying the existence of the alliance. That is, while appreciating the positive role that public pressure makes in improving the Korean say in running the ROK-U.S. alliance, possible misunderstanding or conflict of interests with the United States should not damage the 50-year-long partnership and friendship between the two countries. For public opinion not to become “single frame,” the flow of information and communication on national foreign policy issues between the government and the public should be more transparent and dynamic. In particular, the government needs to establish close and regular communication channels with major opinion leaders, including journalists, intellectuals, and NGO leaders, in order to deliver accurate information and share a grand vision of national policy t o w a rd the United States. American society also faces similar challenges in public relations . As a society becomes more democratic and plural, public opinion on f o reign relations tends to become more diverse (sometimes largely indifferent) and uncertain. Just as in Korea, there may be a divergence between the attitudes of the public and those of political leaders in response to economic and security related questions. Even if leaders in Washington DC appreciate the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula both now and after unification, American citizens may demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. U.S. policymakers should attempt to conduct active security dialogue with the mass media and the public to prevent anti-Korean feeling fro m spilling over into American society.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

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# South Korea Neg

## South Korea Negative

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Answers To: Inherency

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[ ] **Status Quo Policy is decreasing troops to increase hegemony**

**Andrew Yeo, Department of Politics at Catholic University of America, 5/18/2010,**  
“U.S. Military base realignment in South Korea”, Peace Review

By July 2004, Seoul and Washington proposed a new vision for the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. After ten rounds of negotiations under the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), U.S. and South Korean officials confirmed several developments concerning the future of USFK and the U.S.–ROK alliance. These included the withdrawal of 12,500 U.S. troops by December 2008 from South Korea, the relocation of USFK headquarters from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and the consolidation of the Second Infantry Division to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area. USFK also presented an ambitious plan to reduce the number of U.S. facilities in South Korea from approximately ninety-five in 2001 to ten by 2012, with a major strategic hub centered in Pyeongtaek. The shift to Pyeongtaek highlighted the Pentagon’s emphasis on rapid deployment and mobility. Unlike Seoul, which lacked a port or major airfield, Camp Humphreys is located near the coast, and is close to a major air base in nearby Osan.

## Answers To: Inherency

**[\_\_] The US just completed a withdrawal of troops on the Korean Peninsula and may be planning more**

**Lee Jong-Heon, United Press International Correspondent, 2/4/10,**

UPI, [http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul\\_seeks\\_extended\\_us\\_protection/2951](http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul_seeks_extended_us_protection/2951).

The United States had maintained nearly 40,000 troops in South Korea, alongside the South's 670,000 troops, facing off against the North's 1.2 million-strong armed forces. But it recently reduced the number to 28,500 and is planning to redeploy the frontline U.S. ground forces to south of Seoul, in one of the biggest realignments of U.S. forces in this country since the Korean War. Earlier this week, the U.S. Department of Defense said in the newest edition of its Quadrennial Defense Review that Washington would further cut troops in the South, saying U.S. troops in Seoul could possibly be relocated abroad under the concept of "strategic flexibility."

**[\_\_] The US will be moving troops in South Korea to other operations**

**Kim Young-jin, staff reporter for the Korea Times, 7/23/2010,**

“US Troops in Korea to be deployed to other areas”

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/113\\_70033.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/113_70033.html)

The United States will deploy some of its troops stationed in Korea to other conflict regions in the coming years as part of its strategic deployment stance, the top U.S. military officer said this week in Seoul. "Part of the discussion we are having with the Republic of Korea, with the leadership, and what we will be able to do in the next several years is support for deployments, literally, off the peninsula," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an audience of U.S. soldiers at Camp Red Cloud, north of Seoul, Tuesday. "But we're not there yet. We haven't got to that point in time." Mullen was in town to attend the "2+2" meeting of foreign and defense ministers of the two allies Wednesday, held as a show of solidarity after North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship earlier this year, killing 46 sailors.

## Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

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[ ] **There is no risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. Deterrence is stable.**

**William Perry, Former Secretary of State, 10/12/1999,**

“Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle”, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/perryrpt.html>)

In the course of the review, the policy team conferred with U.S. military leaders and allies, and concluded that, as in 1994, U.S. forces and alliances in the region are strong and ready. Indeed, since 1994, the U.S. has strengthened both its own forces and its plans and procedures for combining forces with allies. We are confident that allied forces could and would successfully defend ROK territory. We believe the DPRK's military leaders know this and thus are deterred from launching an attack. However, in sharp contrast to the Desert Storm campaign in Kuwait and Iraq, war on the Korean Peninsula would take place in densely populated areas. Considering the million-man DPRK army arrayed near the DMZ, the intensity of combat in another war on the Peninsula would be unparalleled in U.S. experience since the Korean War of 1950-53. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of persons - U.S., ROK, and DPRK - military and civilian - would perish, and millions of refugees would be created. While the U.S. and ROK of course have no intention of provoking war, there are those in the DPRK who believe the opposite is true. But even they must know that the prospect of such a destructive war is a powerful deterrent to precipitous U.S. or allied action. Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms. While always subject to miscalculation by the isolated North Korean government, there is no military calculus that would suggest to the North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict. This relative stability, if it is not disturbed, can provide the time and conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent peace on the Peninsula, ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to the peaceful reunification of the Korean people. This is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.

## Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

**[\_\_] The best way to prevent war with Korea is not through appeasement but through containment. Military power and hard bargaining are a more effective policy**

**COLIN DUECK, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado, Spring 2006, "Strategies for Managing Rogue States", Orbis, 50(2), Spring**

The problem with engagement is that it seriously underestimates the Kim regime's malevolence. It is rather naive to expect that any package of economic, diplomatic, and strategic inducements will necessarily alter the fundamentally hostile and authoritarian nature of the Kim regime by, for example, integrating that regime into regional patterns of economic interdependence. Kim will see any attempted integration as a potential threat to his rule. Nor can negotiations be conducted under the assumption that they will automatically result in softening or satiating the North's foreign policy goals. All prior experience indicates that Pyongyang will wring whatever concessions it can from this process, without abandoning its revisionist ambitions. It is absurd to suggest that Kim "feels" insecure primarily because of the policies of the Bush administration. Both his insecurity and his clandestine nuclear weapons program predate President Bush. The United States certainly caused alarm in Pyongyang with talk of regime change, but the root cause of this crisis is with North Korea, not George W. Bush. For practical reasons, however, direct rollback is not a plausible alternative. To begin with, any preventive U.S. military strike against North Korea and its weapons sites would probably result in a horrific conflict that would make Iraq look tame. The United States would ultimately win this war, but only at immense cost. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians would be killed. So would thousands more American troops. South Korea would be devastated. There would be no coalition support for such a preventive war under current circumstances. Nor are there any guarantees that North Korea's weapons sites would actually be destroyed and its nuclear weapons unused. This prospect should warn us not only against a preventive strike, but indeed against any actions that might hasten war. A stated American policy of regime change or indirect rollback against Pyongyang risks this very possibility. Insofar as Washington appears to indicate that its primary goal is overthrowing the Kim regime, the fewer incentives Pyongyang will have to abstain from lashing out in a dangerous policy course involving very high risk, coercive diplomacy, and even full-scale preventive war.<sup>35</sup> The baseline American strategy in relation to North Korea must therefore be neither rollback nor integration through engagement, but containment, supplemented by some careful, hard bargaining. A successful strategy of containment requires absolute clarity about the deadly consequences for Kim and his government should he choose to act aggressively. It also requires having military capabilities on the spot to make that threat credible. Fortunately, the United States and South Korea have those capabilities. The North can therefore be deterred, so long as U.S. defensive commitments are unambiguous. Kim cares little for the lives of his people, but he does value his own power and survival. For this very reason, even in relation to a leader like Kim, containment can work, as it has in the past.<sup>36</sup>

## Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

[\_\_] **North Korea would be defeated quickly in a war and the conflict would not escalate**

**Carlton Meyer, Former marine corps officer and editor of G2 Military, 2003,**  
“The Mythical North Korean Threat” , <http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm>)

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

## Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

**[\_\_] Risk of war is very low – it’s empirically proven for the past 57 years. There have been issues that were more provocative than the recent warship sinking and none of those escalated.**

**Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, McClatchy Newspapers, 5/26/2010**

**“KOREA WAR UNLIKELY, EXPERTS SAY; TENSIONS ARE LIKELY TO RISE, BUT CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED FOLLOWING PAST PROVOCATIONS”**,

North Korea's decision Tuesday to sever all ties with South Korea and threaten military action in disputed waters following the torpedoing of a South Korean warship confronts President Barack Obama with another international crisis that his administration doesn't want or need. Although the isolated, communist North's behavior is notoriously unpredictable and sometimes seems irrational, all-out war between it and the democratic, capitalist South still seems unlikely, analysts said, given the stakes. Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean peninsula, where some 28,500 U.S. troops provide a tripwire for U.S. military intervention if the North attacks, are likely to rise in coming days. North Korea would likely lose any conflict with the South, but not before inflicting massive damage on South Korea's capital, Seoul, a 30-minute drive south of the demilitarized zone that has divided the two Koreas since 1953. U.S. intelligence officials estimate that some 11,000 North Korean artillery pieces are in sheltered positions within range of Seoul and probably could destroy much of the city before they could be knocked out. "The tensions certainly have increased," but there is no sign that North Korea is mobilizing its 1.2 million-strong military, said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity to speak more freely. "They have masses [of troops] down on the DMZ [demilitarized zone], but they do a normal shift or rotation," he said. South Korean officials said they were bracing for fresh provocations from the North, especially at sea. On Monday, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak blamed North Korea for the March 26 sinking of the corvette Cheonan, which killed 46 of its crew, and said he was curbing trade with North Korea and banning its ships from transiting South Korean waters. "That could get sort of ugly if [North Korean vessels] don't stop, and chances are they won't," said Art Brown, formerly the top U.S. intelligence analyst for East Asia. "It's unlikely they will do nothing. I tend to think they're not going to try Korean War, version two." Still, Mr. Brown and other former top U.S. officials said serious clashes between the Koreas during the past 57 years haven't led to warfare -- and sometimes have provided opportunities for rapprochement. "It's not inevitable that it will escalate," said Mitchell Reiss, who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton administration. Mr. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the Cheonan sinking was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean Cabinet members visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence, the Blue House.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

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[ ] **South Korea is modernizing its military now which means the plan is not necessary**

**Stephen G Wood, Lieutenant General in the US Army, Fall 2008**

“The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula”

The alliance’s capability and will to defend the Republic of Korea from North Korean aggression has never been stronger. Well known to the reader are the advancements in US military capability over the last two decades. Less well known is the fact that the republic of Korea has placed tremendous emphasis on modernization and military competence. The republic of Korea is now the 13th largest economy in the world, spending approximately \$24.3 billion—about 2. percent of its gross domestic product—on defense each year. Its military comprises 77,000 active duty personnel, equipped with the most modern military technology. For instance, nearly 40 percent of the ROK Air Force’s (ROKAF) 500 fighters are F-1 K and F-1 aircraft.<sup>4</sup> However, the bedrock of the ROK military is its ground forces, with 41,000 active duty personnel and an additional 2.9 million trained soldiers in reserve. The leadership of the ROK army is also top notch, as proven during exercise vignettes in which the CFC commander cedes control to his ROK counterpart. Consequently, from an alliance perspective, the ROK military is capable of leading the ground campaign. Thus, under the CFC transformation plan, the US military’s contribution to the alliance will become more air and naval-centric in the future.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

**[ ] South Korea can't afford to modernize its military, and it is unpopular in the government because it is associated with troop withdrawal from the United States**

**Kyodo News International 7/19/10**

U.S. troop cutback in S. Korea may change E. Asian security situation.”

href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SCOPE%3A+U.S.+troop+cutback+in+S.+Korea+may+change+E.+Asian+security...-a0118113726"

At that time, the Roh administration was in trouble because of his supporters' minority in parliament. Its anti-U.S. stance was also under fire from the opposition camp," a government source said. The confidential U.S. proposal surfaced on May 17 this year when the United States told South Korea that it will transfer some troops to Iraq, giving rise to speculation that the anti-U.S. stance of Roh, who once proposed a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, led to the U.S. troop cut plan. Roh denied intentional concealment of the U.S. proposal, saying, "Independent defense and the alliance (with Washington) are not contradictory but are to be mutually supplemented." But it is not clear how the government will secure financial resources for independent defense. There are many young members taking a firm stance against the United States in Roh's Uri Party, which swept to power in a general election in April, according to party sources. Meanwhile, a Japanese government official said, "The U.S. troops stationed in South Korea are those mainly belonging to the Army, a type of military deployment during the Cold War, but those stationed in Japan are chiefly Navy and Air Force personnel, a type of deployment in the 'post-Cold War' era." "There will be no major impact from the U.S. global military transformation," said the official. But a Foreign Ministry source said the troop cut in Germany and the stronger military presence in Turkey show the U.S. military's stance of giving priority to the Middle East and Central Asia.

## Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

### [\_\_] South Korean Military Modernization leads to a Northeast Asian arms race and competition between other countries in Asia

**Salim Osman, Indonesia Correspondent for the Straits Times, 9/18/09** ( “Naval build-up in North-east Asia; Analysts advise caution amid higher defense spending”

A naval arms race that could have catastrophic consequences is developing in Asia-Pacific waters, a military expert warned at a conference here yesterday. The naval build-up in North-east Asia has exceeded basic modernization with the addition of new capabilities such as submarines, destroyers, large amphibious ships and long range missiles, experts said. Professor Desmond Ball of the Australian National University warned that the build-up could lead to a calamity if it becomes a full-fledged arms race. 'There's no arms control regime in Asia that might constrain these acquisitions,' he said. He and other experts spoke at a conference on New Challenges To Asia Pacific Security organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Prof Ball said that, since 2000, nearly all countries in the region badly hit by the 1997 financial crisis had increased their defense spending again. In South Korea, for instance, it rose 6.2 per cent in 2001 and then to 9.9 per cent by 2007. 'This has resulted, in rough terms, in doubling its defense capability since around 2000 beyond the level considered adequate for modernization in the 1990s,' he said. He believes that China now spends more on defense than any country in the world except the United States. China has bought large numbers of frigates and destroyers from Russia and plans to acquire aircraft carriers as well. Analyst Sam Bateman of the University of Wollongong in Australia said: 'China is usually seen as the trigger for a naval arms race, potentially shifting the military balance in Asia, although China strongly denies the claims.' Its naval force expansion may explain the acquisition of new missile destroyers by South Korea and Japan, he said in an article distributed at the conference. 'While most navies, including the Chinese navy, stress that their capabilities are being developed for defensive purposes, it is often difficult to differentiate offensive from defensive capabilities,' he said. Chinese analyst Zhang Junshe of the Naval Research Institute said that his country was merely making modest improvements to its maritime defense capability and that its navy 'was still lagging behind other countries'. The head of external programs at NTU's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, he warned: 'The consequence of the navy's build-up is the increasing probability of accidents and incidents at sea.'

## Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

### [\_\_] South Korean military modernization will cause a rupture in the partnership between the US and South Korea

**Japan Times 9/19/06**

“A positive U.S.-ROK summit”, Accessible on LexisNexis

While Japan has focused on the modernization of its alliance with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been seeking a new equilibrium in its relationship with Washington, too. The maturing of South Korea's economy and political system, and the coming to power of a new generation have shifted the center of gravity in that bilateral relationship. Both sides are working to find a new balance; it has been a sometimes messy process but dire predictions of the end of the alliance are not destined to come true. Both Washington and Seoul realize that the mutual interests that provided a foundation for their alliance a half century ago remain. They both desire security and stability on the Korean Peninsula; they worry about the North Korean threat and South Korea's room for maneuver as "a shrimp among whales." And, perhaps most significant, they recognize that the U.S. is an honest broker - and the government best suited to that role among all the contenders. But changes in both countries and in the region require a modernization of their alliance. At their summit last week, U.S. President George W. Bush met South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and proved that predictions of the death of the alliance were exaggerated. Yet it is also important that the two governments acknowledge the problems that they confront and deal with them honestly: Papering over the cracks in the U.S.-ROK alliance will provide only the briefest of respites. Mr. Roh was elected president in 2002, seizing upon anti-American sentiment to storm to victory. Fears of a rupture in the alliance with the U.S. have since not abated, even though Mr. Roh has reiterated his commitment to the alliance and backed the U.S. on key foreign-policy issues, even dispatching troops to Iraq. Yet Mr. Roh has also made plain his readiness to disagree with Washington on key issues, the most important of which is relations with North Korea. To Mr. Roh, and many of his party, the greatest threat from Pyongyang emanates not from strength but from weakness. Their concern is not invasion, but collapse. This puts the Roh administration at odds with Mr. Bush, who has characterized the regime in North Korea as "evil." The U.S. has confronted North Korea about its nuclear-weapons program, its human-rights practices and its other alleged illegal activities. The U.S. prefers a diplomatic solution to the problems that the world has with Pyongyang, but it has taken a hard line to compel the North to hew to international standards. Seoul prefers engagement, fearing isolation could prompt the North to lash out or to collapse. Either scenario is grim for South Korea. There have been fears that this divergence would drive a permanent wedge into the U.S.-ROK alliance. But North Korea's recent brinkmanship - missile tests in July and the prospect of a nuclear test - have helped bring Seoul and Washington closer together. At their summit last weekend, Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh restated their commitment to the stalled six-party talks on the North's nuclear program. They spend more time emphasizing their agreements now rather than their differences. The problem is that the potential differences are profound. In addition to the North Korea question, the two governments have also begun negotiations on a free-trade agreement and the two militaries are working out the transition to South Korean control of military forces in the event of war.

## Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

(\_\_\_\_) U.S./ South Korea Partnership key

**KIM 3** (Seung-Hwan Kim, Professor of International Affairs – Myongji University, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” Washington Quarterly, Winter, [http://www.thewashingtonquarterly.com/03winter/docs/03winter\\_kim.pdf](http://www.thewashingtonquarterly.com/03winter/docs/03winter_kim.pdf))

The future of the U.S.-Korean alliance is too important for Washington and Seoul to overlook this current trend of rising anti-Americanism and the potential rise of anti-Koreanism, as they directly threaten the special U.S.- ROK symbiotic relationship. The alliance with the United States is critical for South Korea to preserve stability on the peninsula and in the region. In addition, Korean instability that could arise in the absence of a U.S. security commitment would complicate Korean efforts to sustain current and expected levels of foreign investments throughout the country, thus threatening continued economic progress. Regional stability is also critical for South Korea because it conducts more than two-thirds of its trade in the Asia-Pacific region, with the volume of current South Korean trade through Asian naval transport routes exceeding 40 percent of its total trade. Even after unification, South Korea’s alliance with the United States will continue to be important to protect the peninsula from once again becoming the political, if not the military, battleground where the major Asian powers have historically sought regional hegemony. The alliance with South Korea is also critical for the United States to maintain its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific region. The partnership helps prevent the eruption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, which could otherwise draw China into a reenactment of the Korean War. It helps preserve a stable balance of power in the region by hedging against the rise of an aggressive regional power and regional rivalries, and it helps protect U.S. economic interests. More than one-third of total U.S. trade is conducted with the Asia-Pacific region, and millions of U.S. jobs would be at stake if continued regional growth and development were jeopardized.

## Answers To: Solvency

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### [ ] **North Korea will never give up its nuclear program**

**Stephanie Palla, Global Security Newswire, 2/25/2010,**

Experts Pessimistic on North Korea's Willingness to Give Up Nukes

[http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\\_20100225\\_7481.php](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100225_7481.php).

The fundamental question underlining the years-long process of the six-party talks was the possibility North Korea could be persuaded to eliminate its nuclear program if given the right incentives. Pyongyang, though, has continually cited the need for nuclear weapons in the face of "external threats," and numerous U.S. pledges of its nonhostile intentions have not quelled that mistrust. This standoff is evidence that no U.S. assurances or incentives would curb North Korean doubts and persuade it to take meaningful steps toward denuclearization, according to Cha. "It is very difficult for me to see this particular regime ever denuclearizing because even if you got rid of every potential external threat to North Korea -- even if you surrounded North Korea with five Costa Ricas -- this regime would still feel insecure," he said. "It's the nature of the regime; its inability to fulfill at least their version of the socialist contract with their people. This is the primary insecurity to the regime."

## Answers To: Solvency

**[\_\_] China will not pressure North Korea because it fears the collapse of Kim Jong-II's regime**

**Jayshree Bajoria, Staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/21/2009,**

[http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth\\_korea\\_relationship.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html)

China is North Korea's most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and fuel. China has helped sustain Kim Jong-II's regime and opposed harsh international economic sanctions in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled influx of refugees across its 800-mile border with North Korea. After Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, experts say that China has reconsidered the nature of its alliance to include both pressure and inducements. North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009 further complicated its relationship with China, which has played a central role in the Six-Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. CFR's Scott Snyder and See-won Byun of the Asia Foundation argue the nuclear tests highlight the tensions (PDF) between China's "emerging role as a global actor with increasing international responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares longstanding historical and ideological ties." Beijing continues to have more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation, say some analysts. The economic leverage in particular, some point out, has only grown as a result of North Korea's declining relations with South Korea and the international community. But most experts agree that Beijing is unlikely to exercise its leverage given its concerns regarding regional stability and the uncertainty surrounding regime succession in North Korea.

**[\_\_] U.S. military presence in Asia is necessary to keep peace in the region and deter conflicts**

**Michael Auslin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 3/17/10,**

“U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, <http://www.aei.org/speech/100130>)

It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

## Answers To: Solvency

**[\_\_] History proves that attempts at withdrawing troops causes panic in South Korea, forcing the United States to stay**

**Jingwung Kim, writer at Asian Affairs, 2004**

“Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172590>

The U.S. military presence had been a taboo subject for Koreans. As late as the 1970s, anyone who suggested withdrawal of U.S. forces might have faced instant arrest and been charged with supporting North Korea in violation of the strict National Security Law. During this time, debates in America concerning the withdrawal of troops disappointed many South Koreans and made them feel uneasy about their nation's security. The American decision to withdraw the Seventh U.S. Army Division in 1970, which decreased the number of the USFK from approximately 60,000 to 40,000, was regarded as a breach of faith among many Koreans. When the Carter administration announced its plan to withdraw the Second U.S. Army Division from South Korea in 1977, most Koreans expressed fears that this action would prompt North Korea to invade and asked Americans not to support the withdrawal. Carter's withdrawal plan caused a major political crisis, even public panic, in South Korea. The United States was forced to drop the idea.

**[\_\_] North Korea won't feel secure even after troop withdrawal because of US nuclear weapons**

**PATRICK MORGAN, Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California, Irvine, 6/21/ 2009**

“Considerations Bearing on a Possible Retraction of the American Nuclear Umbrella Over the ROK”

There are other complications. One would be that US extended deterrence for the ROK can not readily be eliminated. The US will continue to be devoted to democracy and human rights, and thus to the health and well being of the world's democracies, particularly large and important ones like Japan and the ROK. It will also remain committed to nuclear nonproliferation. Practicing deterrence with these in mind will directly or indirectly involve the possibility of nuclear retaliation unless the US adopts complete nuclear disarmament. If so, how credible can a renunciation of the American nuclear umbrella over South Korea really be, particularly to a government like North Korea's which is so deeply mistrustful of US intentions. In the same way, how can a regional nuclear umbrella be eliminated when it rests on a massively global nuclear capability? As noted, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from the peninsula in 1991 but North Korea still worries about a nuclear attack. The US does not need to keep nuclear weapons in East Asia to deliver highly accurate nuclear attacks anywhere in the region, from thousands of miles away. And many of the nuclear weapons the US withdrew from its navy were stored and could readily be reinstalled. The US also has many other stockpiled nuclear weapons for planes, cruise missiles, etc. Analysts have long noted that pledges of nonuse or no first use of nuclear weapons can not be taken seriously because they are unlikely to be honored if the face of a grave attack. Why should a US pledge to not retaliate with nuclear weapons for, say, a nuclear attack on Japan or the ROK, be taken as inviolate? The only reliable way to eliminate American extended nuclear deterrence is to eliminate American nuclear weapons. But that would make the proposed tradeoff even more sensitive and provocative.

## Answers To: Solvency

### **Recent North Korean aggression will prevent peace talks even after the departure of US troops**

#### **BBC, 4/20/2010**

“South Korea says nuclear talks not possible if North linked to ship sinking”, 4/20/10,

SEOUL, April 20 (Yonhap) - The resumption of multilateral denuclearization talks on North Korea will face a setback if the communist nation is found to have been involved in the recent sinking of a South Korean warship, South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan [Yu Myo'ng-hwan] said Tuesday. "I believe the resumption of the six-party talks will not be possible for some time if we find evidence that clearly shows North Korea's involvement," the minister told a press briefing. The 1,200-ton warship Cheonan sank near the tense border with North Korea in the Yellow Sea on the night of March 26. Suspicions of Pyongyang's involvement grew after investigators said upon examining a part of the broken vessel that an external blast likely caused the sinking. The disaster, said to be one of the worst in South Korea's naval history, occurred as members of the six-party talks were trying to reopen negotiations on denuclearizing the North. "It is hard to say how exactly the two will be linked, but I believe it will be difficult to resume the six-party talks, at least until the Cheonan incident is resolved to a certain extent," the minister said. "If North Korea is found to have been involved, it will naturally be difficult to hold the six-party talks," he added. Thirty-eight sailors were confirmed dead from the sunken warship, with eight still missing. North Korea's military on Saturday denied involvement in the incident, accusing Seoul of laying false blame to evade its own responsibility. US officials, including Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, have noted an inevitable suspension of efforts to resume the nuclear talks until the countries find out exactly what or who caused the sinking of the Cheonan. Minister Yu said the resumption of the nuclear negotiations, last held in December 2008, will likely be further delayed until the North pays its due penalties should it be found guilty. "If North Korea is clearly found to have been involved, I think it will not be easy to hold the six-party talks for some time because we must make North Korea pay a price for its actions," he told the briefing.



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# Allied Prolif DA- Neg

## Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

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## Explanation

The disadvantage argues that the affirmative plan would lead other countries to seek nuclear weapons. The uniqueness claims that the United States is able to reassure its allies because of its extended deterrence – its ability to prevent aggressor countries from attacking its allies. The disadvantage argues that the main reason that American allies feel so safe even though many of them, such as South Korea and Turkey, directly border potentially dangerous enemy countries, is because the United States directly stations troops and other military equipment in those countries. These forces serve as a “trip-wire”, meaning that if an aggressor state were to attack a US ally, that they would have to target American forces, thus starting a war with the United States. This setup both prevents war and makes American allies feel safe.

However, the plan withdraws these forces from the countries in the resolution. The link argues that these countries would no longer feel secure absent the trip-wire of U.S. forces, even though they may still be U.S. allies and the U.S. may still claim to be looking out for them. The disadvantage argues that these countries would be motivated to seek nuclear weapons in order to take their safety into their own hands, because nuclear weapons are a relatively cheap and very powerful means to prevent war. After all, no country has ever attacked a country it believed to have fully functioning nuclear weapons.

The impact argues that this proliferation would greatly increase the risk of war. The spread of nuclear weapons makes them more vulnerable to theft from terrorists. It also makes it more likely that some leader might finally decide to use one, thus initiating a nuclear war. While some argue that nuclear weapons might bring peace, thinking that the weapons are so destructive that using them is unthinkable, the disadvantage thinks that more nuclear weapons creates too many safety issues and makes it likely that one will eventually be used.

## Glossary

**Proliferation:** The spread of nuclear weapons to more countries that previously did not possess them.

**TNW:** Tactical Nuclear Weapons. TNWs are nuclear weapons that are smaller and are dropped from bombing planes, like the ones used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as opposed to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS) which are akin to rockets or missiles. Many are concerned that because TNWs are relatively small and mobile, that they are vulnerable to theft by terrorists.

**ROK:** Republic of Korea (South Korea)

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO was created at the beginning of the Cold War to help deter the Soviet Union. The members of NATO made an agreement that an attack on any single member of NATO would be met by all the other NATO members attacking the aggressor. The US nuclear weapons in Turkey are part of the guarantee the United States made with the other NATO members that it would come to their aid in the event of an attack.

**“Conventional” Forces or Capabilities:** Military capabilities that are not nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence:** Attempting to prevent a country from taking an action by threatening consequences that make the action not worth it. For example, the United States attempts to deter China from invading Taiwan by stationing its navy in between the two countries, meaning that the invasion would also force a war with the United States, something that China is not willing to do.

**Nuclear Umbrella:** (Nuclear Guarantee). The US nuclear umbrella refers to countries that the US has guaranteed to protect with its nuclear weapons. If a country under the US nuclear umbrella of possessing the US nuclear guarantee were attacked with nuclear weapons, the United States would respond with its own weapons for them.

**DOD:** Department of Defense.

**NPT:** Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is signed by the vast majority of the countries in the world. Those that are members that do not have nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire them, while those that do have nuclear weapons are committed to eliminate them. Many are concerned that proliferation would cause no one to abide by the NPT, which would cause proliferation to happen much more quickly.

## Allied Proliferation DA INC Shell [1/2]

### **A. Uniqueness. Forward deployment of U.S. troops in other countries is reassuring allies, but perception of our commitment to their defense is wavering.**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**  
 “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear “Wannabes”,  
[http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 7-8)

In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer a given, and divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing with would-be proliferators and legacy challenges.

### **B. Link. The US presence in these other countries is key to extended deterrence – it signals commitment and credibility to that country’s defense. Withdrawal will destroy that perception**

**Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Prof. – Naval Postgraduate School, 1997**  
 text taken from “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”, 22:1, Summer 1997, p. 108)

Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state's territory. Thus during the Cold War, the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the United States and bolstered extended deterrence's credibility. The defender's deployment of forces is one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended deterrence success, because it is a visible signal that the defender "means business."<sup>62</sup>

## Allied Proliferation DA INC Shell [2/2]

### **C. Impact. US physical presence and credibility of deterrence key to preventing proliferation – the US nuclear guarantee is not enough on its own**

#### **Kathleen J McInnis, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues, Summer 2005**

Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East published in the Washington Quarterly

2005 pg. 180, [http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer\\_mcinnis.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf))

Taking into consideration the potential for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to proliferate, could the United States assure Cairo and Riyadh, dissuading them from building their own nuclear weapons, by extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Assurance gained through a reasonably sound extended deterrence policy relies on two primary factors: capability and credibility. Although the United States arguably possesses the physical capability to deter the Iranian regime on behalf of Gulf/Near Eastern states, whether it has sufficient political credibility needed to assure its regional allies is not clear. Without this credibility, states in the region may yet be tempted to acquire their own nuclear guarantee. What does it mean to be credible? Essentially, allies must be confident that the United States would defend them and their interests in the event of an act of aggression. This involves an unambiguous obligation, created through physical presence and underpinned by political commitment, to the survival of these states and their regimes. Yet, as Cold War experience taught, establishing credibility can be difficult. France, for example, ultimately decided that U.S. security assurances were insufficient and decided to acquire its own nuclear deterrent.

### **The resulting proliferation from loss of guarantees would result in nuclear wars**

#### **Victor Utgoff, former Senior Member of the National Security Council, Summer 2002,**

Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2k2, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s, with most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

## Overview

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## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now

**The US currently maintains Cold War era deterrence with an integrated web of nuclear and conventional deterrents. This strategy reassures allies in Europe and East Asia**

**James Russell , Co-Dir. – Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, 1/5/2010**

“Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, [http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\\_id=3297](http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297))

The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to American security strategy.[19] During the Cold War, the United States’ commitment to defend Europe became operationalized through a series of extended deterrent commitments that included the basing of nuclear weapons in Europe that could have been used in the event of a Soviet attack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a “seamless” web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Soviet invasion.[20] More recently, United States clearly still believes that the concept has great relevance in Northeast Asia. In response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests during the last several years, senior U.S. officials quickly and routinely fan out to South Korea and Japan to “assure” them of America’s commitment to their security.[21] A main target of these efforts is to forestall the possibility that either South Korea or Japan will reconsider decisions not to develop nuclear weapons. Japan in particular has a robust nuclear infrastructure and is now widely considered to be a “latent” nuclear power that could develop a weapon reasonably quickly. As is the case in Northeast Asia, the United States today routinely acts as if extended deterrence and security assurances together constitute active, ongoing and useful tools in managing its regional security relationships in the Gulf. Secretary Clinton’s recent remarks only represent the latest evidence that this is the case. In May 2006, for example, the Bush Administration embarked on a much ballyhooed “Gulf Security Dialogue” that sought to re-invigorate U.S. security relationships with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was presented as part of a consultative process to focus attention on building regional self defense capabilities; consulting on regional security issues like the Iran nuclear program and fallout of Iran’s struggle against Sunni extremists; the U.S. invasion of Iraq; counter-proliferation; counter-terrorism and internal security; and critical infrastructure protection.[22] The dialogue came as the Bush Administration proposed billions of dollars in new arms sales to Israel and its Gulf partners that included precision guided munitions such as the Joint Defense Attack Munition and the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now

**American deterrence is currently maintained by forward deployed conventional forces**

**James Russell , Co-Dir. – Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, 1/5/2010**

“Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, [http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\\_id=3297](http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297))

The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states with tangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security. The military footprint today in the Gulf is no “trip-wire” force, but is engaged in tangible military operations, such as the multi-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama.

Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to regional instability. Starting with Operation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the Gulf States from external threats. Following Operation Desert Storm, the United States kept sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations’ cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and absorbed the monetary costs of toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by the Iraq regime if needed. Given this history it is difficult to see how any state could doubt the credibility of the United States’ commitments to use its conventional forces as an instrument of regional defense. This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the Gulf—unlike Northeast Asia—the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrella—headlines or no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over America’s forward deployed Gulf presence, it’s hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clinton’s recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now - Obama

**Obama has restored alliances which is Boosting American international credibility.**

**Michael D. Shear, writer for the Washington Post, 5/23/2010**

“Envisioning a new era of diplomacy”

President Obama on Saturday offered a glimpse of a new national security doctrine that distances his administration from George W. Bush's policy of preemptive war, emphasizing global institutions and America's role in promoting democratic values. In a commencement speech to the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president outlined his departure from what Bush had called a "distinctly American internationalism." Instead, Obama pledged to shape a new "international order" based on diplomacy and engagement. Obama has spoken frequently about creating new alliances, and of attempts to repair the U.S. image abroad after nearly a decade in which Bush's approach was viewed with suspicion in many quarters. Unlike Bush, who traveled to West Point in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to announce his American-centered approach to security, Obama on Saturday emphasized his belief in the power of those alliances. "Yes, we are clear-eyed about the shortfalls of our international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation," he said. "We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice -- so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities, and face consequences when they don't." In his speech -- the ninth wartime commencement in a row -- the commander in chief, who is leading two foreign wars, expressed his faith in cooperation to confront economic, military and environmental crises. "The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times," he said in prepared remarks. "Countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a changing climate and sustaining global growth; helping countries feed themselves and care for their sick; preventing conflict and healing its wounds."

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now – But on the Brink

**The US is currently on the brink of maintaining its deterrent in the eyes of its allies**

**James Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009**

“Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, p. ix)

Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when America’s and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations. It is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence (strong political and economic relations, conventional air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism of those weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, but it should be accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and bilateral security cooperation.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now – But on the Brink

**The US maintains extended deterrence right now, but our forward presence is key to maintaining it.**

**Satake Tomohiko, PhD Candidate in IR – Australian National U., Nautilus Institute Austral Peace and Security Network, 5/21/09**

“Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Between Non-Nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence”

<http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2009/japans-nuclear-policy/>)

On the other hand, Japan has still preferred to be under the US nuclear umbrella, rather than become an independent power. An internal report of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), which secretly studied the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament in 1995, suggested that Japan should not go nuclear because of the enormous political and economic costs that would be caused by the opposition of other countries including the United States. It concluded that ‘the best way is to rely on the US nuclear deterrence capabilities’. [9] In April 1996, Tokyo reconfirmed the US-Japan alliance by concluding the ‘US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security’. The Joint Declaration clearly defined Japan’s greater alliance roles on both regional and global fields, by stressing that the US-Japan alliance is not only for the security of Japan and the Far East, but also for Asia-Pacific security in general. Because of this, many observers pointed out that the Joint Declaration ‘redefined’ the alliance, by expanding the alliance scope from a narrow focus on Japan and the Far East to the broader Asia-Pacific. Yet Japanese policymakers denied this kind of view, by stressing that the Joint Declaration did not ‘redefine’ the alliance, but simply ‘reconfirmed’ it. For them, the most important achievement of the Joint Declaration was not that the alliance expanded its scope, but that the US promised to keep providing extended deterrence to the region even in the post-Cold War era. Yet US extended deterrence cannot be gained without certain costs. These costs not only mean traditional ‘defense burden-sharing’ such as a significant amount of host nation support to US troops stationing in Japan. In exchange for the continuous US military commitment in the region, Japan became increasingly involved in US regional and global security objectives. After September 11, Japan contributed to US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, by dispatching the SDF for the first time during war-time operations. While Tokyo clearly recognized the importance of terrorism and WMD issues, the central concern of Japanese policy elites were not those global problems, but how to keep the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan perceives a growing threat from North Korea and China. In fact, Japan’s military contributions to both the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction effort in Iraq were never significant compared to other allies. Likewise, Japan has joined the US Missile Defense (MD) program and contributed to its Research & Development (R&D). Although Japan joined the MD system primarily for its own defense, Tokyo also recognized that Japan’s entry to the MD system would supplement the US global defense posture against the attack of terrorist or rogue states. By providing moderate but symbolic contributions to US global operations, Japan attempted to maintain a US credible nuclear extended deterrence in the Asia Pacific region, which is indispensable for Japanese security.

## Links: Physical Presence Key To Credibility

### **Physical presence necessary for extended deterrence; the Cold War proves this**

**Kathleen J McInnis, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues, Summer 2005**

Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East published in the Washington Quarterly  
2005 pg. 180, [http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer\\_mcinnis.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf))

When it comes to the nuts and bolts of an extended deterrence strategy, the concept begins to lose its coherence. Extended deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a submarine capability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq. It is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably felt both by allies and adversaries. In the Middle East, building a sufficiently compelling case would be difficult to accomplish. Cold War examples provide compelling insight into the problem. During that era, the starting point for the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent in Europe and Asia was the forward deployment of ground troops, which signaled to enemy regimes that an attack on allied nations would also be an attack on the United States. Perhaps more importantly, the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia reinforced these ground troops by creating a “use it or lose it” threat of escalation. Essentially, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, nuclear weapons would either be used or lost to an invading force. Through these policies and force deployments, a credible threat of escalation was created. Adversaries could easily envision a conventional conflict leading to nuclear war.

### **US military presence is proof of commitment to other countries and many nations are supportive of it**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**

International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The US military presence in Europe has historically been viewed as an essential proof of Washington’s commitment to the security of the NATO allies, signifying the certainty of direct US involvement in meeting any aggression against the alliance. This deterrence role remains pertinent, although the United States has substantially reduced its conventional military force levels in Europe since the early 1990s. It is noteworthy in this regard that new allies in Eastern and Central Europe have expressed a willingness to host US and NATO facilities. One of the main reasons given by Czech and Polish supporters of the deployment of US missile defense system elements has been to gain the presence of US troops on their soil. Whatever happens with the missile defense plans under the new US administration, these countries remain interested in hosting US or NATO facilities. Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, declared in November 2008 that, although Poland joined the alliance in 1999, it had so far received only a promise of a NATO conference centre. ‘Everyone agrees’, he added, ‘that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.’<sup>36</sup>

## Links: Physical Presence Key to Credibility

**Japan and South Korea show that countries would openly question our commitment to their safety without a physical presence.**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**  
“Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes",  
[http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 7-8)

No such formula was put into place in Asia, which in any case lacked a multilateral framework comparable to that of NATO. Instead, for Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee was explicitly tied to the bilateral U.S. security relationships that were developed with each country and were made manifest in the forward deployment of American forces. As in NATO, these were regarded by their host governments as “trip-wire forces” necessary to ensure the steadfast nature of the U.S. commitment to come to their defense in a crisis, even one where nuclear escalation was possible.<sup>5</sup> In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.

## Links: Physical Presence Key to Credibility

**US forward presence is a key symbol. It demonstrates to allies we will maintain security commitments.**

**James Thompson et Al, Senior Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analysis, 2002**

Paper P-3707, "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DOD", July, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>

As indicated in the QDR, DOD clearly intends presence activities to promote at least three of these major goals. With regard to the assurance goal, the QDR specifies, for example, that the department believes the presence of US forces overseas to be one of the most profound symbols of the US commitment to its allies and friends, and says that DOD will honor its obligations and be a reliable security partner. [p. 11] With regard to deterrence of threats and coercion, the QDR argues for a multifaceted approach, one that places particular "emphasis upon peacetime forward presence in critical areas of the world, coupled with global intelligence, strike, and information assets in order to deter aggression with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater." [p. 12] As for countering coercion (defeating any adversary), the QDR says that "US forces must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends." [p. 13] The document also cites a number of related objectives that DOD intends to promote and achieve through presence activities that it labels security cooperation, saying [they] "will serve as an important means for linking DOD's strategic direction with those of its allies and friends.... A particular aim of DOD's security cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of preconflict options to available counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on US terms."

\*QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review, a study published by the DOD

**Forward troop presence is key to alliance credibility.**

**Jimmie Jackson, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Military, 1995**

"AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR US PACIFIC COMMAND COURSE V ESSAY", <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA440529&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

A key feature of US forces over the past 45 years has been their worldwide forward deployment. The bulk of these forces deployed to Europe totaling approximately 323,000 in the late 1980s. (4:18) The US also stationed forces in Korea and Japan and have smaller contingents in a number of locations, such as Panama, Turkey, and Iceland. Forward deployment replaces forward presence where the US has reduced the size of the military force. Forward presence continues to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability(11"7)but with fewer military forces. The forward presence of these forces sends explicit signals about the firmness of US commitment in a region.~ (10:4-2)

## Specific Links: Turkey

### **Removing Tactical Nuclear Weapons causes proliferation in all of our allies by undermining the credibility of all US deterrent commitments**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**  
International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe. Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defenses and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

### **Turkey is heavily dependent on Tactical Nuclear Weapons for security, they would proliferate after the plan**

**Dr. Oliver Thraner, Senior Fellow – German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 12/10/2008,**

“Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, but Not Yet”,

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zgp&proj=znp>

Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATO’s nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.

## Specific Links: Turkey

### **Turkey feels threatened in the Middle East, they would proliferate without American nuclear weapons**

#### **NUCLEAR THREAT INSTITUTE, 2009**

“Turkey Profile,” [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/turkey/index.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html), Updated June 09)

Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member in good standing of all of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use. Turkey is also active in proliferation prevention efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[1] While Turkey is situated in a notoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it has relied for its security on the nuclear and conventional deterrence provided by U.S./NATO security guarantees for more than half a century. Turkey's dedication to the nonproliferation regime is further solidified by its commitment to the European Union accession process, as prospects for Turkish EU membership would be gravely diminished should Turkey choose to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.[3] Thanks in part to decades of U.S. military aid and cooperation, Turkey has robust conventional defense capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles. Ankara is also working to procure advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities. Nuclear Turkey signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subject to extensive IAEA compliance monitoring through both its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankara has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. Although Turkey's interest in nuclear technology dates to at least 1956, when the government founded the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), Ankara's nuclear capabilities never moved beyond the research and development stages. Thus while Turkey conducts sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle research—primarily at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNRTC) and the Istanbul Technical University—it does not possess nuclear power reactors or industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.[6] Ankara possesses only two small research reactors, the TRIGA Mark II 250-KWt reactor and the TR-2 5MWt reactor—the former operates on 20% U-235 fuel, while the latter possesses a mixed HEU/LEU core that will soon be fully converted to run on LEU.[7] While past decades have witnessed numerous attempts by the government to acquire power reactors, all failed for a variety of political, diplomatic, and economic reasons.[8] However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP-led government is aggressively pursuing nuclear energy. While the government's announcement in 2006 that it would install 5,000MW nuclear energy by 2015 (3 reactors) has encountered numerous feasibility problems—and may not yield even one reactor by that date—the AKP remains unwaveringly politically committed to the endeavor.[9] After a troubled tender process in 2008, the government began assessing the sole bid for construction of the first nuclear plant. The offer from Russian-led consortium Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik is still under consideration.[10]

## Specific Links: Afghanistan

### **Afghanistan pullout would collapse US alliance credibility because of the signal of defeat**

#### **Wall Street Journal, 10/1/09**

“U.S. Credibility and Pakistan; What Islamabad thinks of a U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan”  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html>

Critics of the war in Afghanistan—inside and out of the Obama Administration—argue that we would be better off ensuring that nuclear-armed Pakistan will help us fight al Qaeda. As President Obama rethinks his Afghan strategy with his advisers in the coming days, he ought to listen to what the Pakistanis themselves think about that argument. In an interview at the Journal's offices this week in New York, Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi minced no words about the impact of a U.S. withdrawal before the Taliban is defeated. "This will be disastrous," he said. "You will lose credibility. . . . Who is going to trust you again?" As for Washington's latest public bout of ambivalence about the war, he added that "the fact that this is being debated—whether to stay or not stay—what sort of signal is that sending?" Mr. Qureshi also sounded incredulous that the U.S. might walk away from a struggle in which it has already invested so much: "If you go in, why are you going out without getting the job done? Why did you send so many billion of dollars and lose so many lives? And why did we ally with you?" All fair questions, and all so far unanswered by the Obama Administration. As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the immediate effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad.

## Specific Links: Afghanistan

**Afghanistan is the lynchpin of credibility of US ally commitments.**

**Beverly Crawford, Associate Director – Institute of European Studies, 2009**

“Isolated again...America’s War”, 12-2, <http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2009/12/02/isolated-again%E2%80%A6-america%E2%80%A6-america%E2%80%99s-war/>)

Obama threw down a clear and unequivocal challenge to Europe last night, and in the coming weeks he will try to obtain a pledge for yet more NATO troops. “What’s at stake,” he said, “is... a test of NATO’s credibility.” What he meant was that if the alliance is not up to the challenge of Afghanistan then its very raison d’être is in question. In fact, however, it’s Obama’s—and America’s—credibility among the allies that’s at stake. And last night’s address did not instill confidence. They see as disgraceful and delusional Obama’s statement that: “although it was marred by fraud, [the recent] election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and constitution.” Huh? Did the 2000 presidential election in the U.S. lower the bar for what constitutes “democracy” and pave the way for a statement like this? Perhaps European leaders will cough up a few more troops and spill the blood of more young men and women just to keep peace with their long-time ally and Cold War protector, the United States. But the resources the allies are willing to devote do not match the stakes that Obama has raised. Europeans spend \$520 a year per capita on the military, a third less than Americans. And a NATO graph that tracks European military spending shows that in every country but Greece, 2010 budget projections suggest a sharp drop. Britain’s military budget, the biggest along with France’s, could drop 10 percent in five years. And with regard to Afghanistan, it is clear that these cutbacks coincide with a quickly dissipating political will. If Afghanistan is truly the “graveyard of Empires,” as it seems to be, Europeans are saying, “been there, done that.” This war will continue to drain America’s strength and distort America’s thinking about its global role. The United States will again be a lone warrior.

## Specific Links: South Korea

**Withdrawing from South Korea would cause them to nuclearize.**

**Nicholas Eberstadt et al – Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at American Enterprise Institute, 10/06/2007**

“Toward an America-Free Korea ,” <http://www.aei.org/article/26924>

A Nuclear Crisis--in South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent self-defense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chilling--especially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing.

**Forward deployed forces are a key direct signal of US commitment to South Korea.**

**Keith Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, Professor at Graduate Defense and Strategic Studies, 2010**

“U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia”,

<http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-Deter-for%20print.pdf>, p. 11-13)

Forward deployment of forces, then, is one of the principal ways in which the United States assures the South Koreans of its commitment to their defense. Forward deployed forces are the embodiment of that commitment and the mechanism by which the United States would become engaged in any new Korean war. In certain circumstances, the direct engagement of American conventional forces in such a conflict could increase the prospect of U.S. nuclear use. This connection reinforces the nuclear guarantee to Seoul. For these purposes, the presence of some not-insignificant U.S. ground force in South Korea is more important than the specific number of troops or their disposition. While U.S. nuclear weapons in the past were forward deployed in South Korea, a nuclear presence on the peninsula has not been essential to the nuclear guarantee.

## Specific Links: South Korea

**Withdrawing from South Korea would be like leaving them to be run over. Withdrawal means that South Korea will pursue nuclear weapons**

**Todd Hendricks, Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, US Navy, 2005**

“Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignment”, Department of Joint Military Operations requirement paper, 2-14, Naval War College)

The ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments. A significant factor to remember is that the Korean War has not officially ended. Even though there has been an “armed truce” which has been in place for over 50 years, withdrawing U.S. troops would be tantamount to leaving an ally on the battlefield to be run over by the enemy. “By deploying USFK in a forward area as a ‘tripwire’<sup>12</sup> in order to defend and retaliate against the North Korean attack, the United States has successfully deterred North Korea’s attack.”<sup>13</sup> Although this is an extreme picture of the U.S.-ROK alliance situation, it still deserves some consideration. “Abrogation of the U.S. security treaty with South Korea and abandonment of that long-standing ally...could seriously degrade the importance of military power as a U.S. foreign policy implement, undercut U.S. interests in national credibility, and perhaps encourage aggression against other U.S. friends around the world. Civil war on the Korean Peninsula probably would erupt. The Republic of Korea and Japan might feel needs to develop their own nuclear weapons.”<sup>14</sup> The deterrence of North Korea and the defense of South Korea is firmly grounded in the presence of USFK military forces, for “...it is impossible to talk about the [U.S.-ROK] alliance without focusing on USFK.”<sup>1</sup>

## Specific Links: Japan

### **Troops are the best guarantee that nuclear threats mean something to Japan**

**Joseph Nye, Professor of IR at the Kennedy school of Government at Harvard, 7/14/2009**

Korea Times, "Will US-Japan Alliance Survive",

[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/07/137\\_48423.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/07/137_48423.html))

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

### **The Japanese government has publicly stated that their safety depends on American troops**

**Joseph Nye and Satoshi Ogawa, professor of IR at Harvard, and a Correspondent for the Yomiuri Shimbun, 9/2/09**

"TRANSFER OF POWER; DPJ win 'to boost soft power'", 9-2, L/N

Q: Some experts are concerned about the DPJ's view of extended deterrence [deterrence provided through the threat of a nuclear response to an attack on an ally]. It's unclear. How do you see it? A: Well, I think as the DPJ ministers take over their portfolios and start looking carefully at the situation, first there'll be talks between Americans and the new Japanese government about details of extended deterrence, but I think the new ministers will find that extended deterrence is very important for Japan and that the credibility of extended deterrence depends very much upon the forward presence of American troops.

\*DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan

## Specific Links: Japan

### **Troop presence has symbolic significance for Japan, removal would cause Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons**

**James Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009**

“Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, p. xi-xii)

Symbols have always been important to the U.S.-Japan alliance and to the concept of deterrence, whether the symbol is the nuclear umbrella, basing a U.S. aircraft carrier in Japan, or forward deploying a hundred thousand U.S. military personnel in East Asia (including a sizable contingent of Marines in Okinawa). Some of these symbols remain intact, but others are changing and seem less visible. High-ranking U.S. officials have disparaged the future viability of technology supporting the nuclear umbrella during the RRW debate, and the number of forward-deployed U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan is declining. The Pentagon talks more about stability operations and counterinsurgency as core missions for the military, while it lists “detering conflict” as only the fourth of five objectives in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Some Japanese defense planners fear that Washington is distracted by conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia, viewing everything through a prism of hunkered-down homeland defense. The reality is quite different, and an interesting dichotomy has developed whereby an American visitor to Tokyo can hear worry about a U.S. pullback, and the same week in Beijing listen to concern about America’s build-up in the region! Objectively speaking, overall the United States is increasing its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, not pulling back. This mild build-up is actually one of the many objectives of its global repositioning of forces in response to a perceived shifting of “the global community’s ‘center of gravity’ [toward] the Asia-Pacific region.” The build-up is hard to quantify, however, as it relies mostly on less visible measures such as upgrading equipment, more frequent and longer rotational deployments (of F-22s, B-2s, SSGNs, among other assets), access agreements with partners in the region to broaden deployment flexibility in times of crisis, and similar incremental moves. Taken together, all of these improvements suggest that external balancing vis-à-vis North Korea and China has actually been achieved to some degree, even if those in Japan who worry about America’s security commitments do not realize it. Part of the reason for this is that as old symbols of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, given the flexibility of use. The problem is that the relationship of these new assets to specific deterrence scenarios involving the alliance has not been explored adequately.

## Impact: Proliferation

### **Decline in extended deterrence causes global proliferation.**

**Jeffrey Record, Professor of Strategy and International Security – U.S. Air Force’s Air War College, 7/8/2004**

Cato Policy Analysis #519, 7-8, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation”, 7-8, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf>)

The success of the NPT has been reinforced by U.S. defense commitments that reassure allies that they can forswear nuclear weapons without endangering their security. To the extent that insecurity is a motive for acquiring nuclear weapons, a U.S. defense guarantee reduces that insecurity to tolerable levels as long as the guarantee remains credible. This reassurance has been especially critical for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Germany, all of which have had the capacity to “go nuclear” and would have had the incentive to do so absent the extension of credible nuclear deterrence by the United States. As Michael Tkacik at Stephen F. Austin State University observes: “There are many reasons to believe nuclear proliferation would have been far greater without U.S. possession of large, usable forces. Allies and enemies alike would have been driven to acquire such weapons: enemies, because such weapons would then matter; allies, to protect themselves.”<sup>21</sup>

### **Nuclear proliferation results in nuclear war**

**Theodore Taylor, former deputy director of Defense Nuclear Agency, 2001**

“Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in “Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking”, <http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html>)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

## Impact: Proliferation

### **Credible guarantees deter proliferation by allies.**

**Korea Times, 10/18/2009**

“Obama’s Nuclear Agenda”

At some point, he must open discussions with countries like China, France, and Britain to understand better the conditions for transparency and verification that would be necessary for a clearer path toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. At the same time, Obama cannot allow these long-term issues to divert his attention from crucial short-term issues. So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states.

### **Weak US alliances lead to proliferation as proven by the Gulf states and Turkey.**

**Peter R. Lavoy and Robin Walker, Director of the center for contemporary conflict and senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 7/28/06**

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016

[http://www.nps.edu/ccc/conferences/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06\\_rpt.html](http://www.nps.edu/ccc/conferences/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.html)

Lewis Dunn, a former U.S. nonproliferation official, argued that alarmist predictions of nuclear proliferation have been wrong over the last 40 years mainly because the United States allowed nuclear capable states, including Japan and most of Europe, to become security free riders during the Cold War, eliminating their need for nuclear weapons. Now the question is how strong and lasting the U.S. alliances will prove to be. If they are strong enough, they can keep Turkey out of the “nuclear club.” If they prove too weak to prevent Iran from arming itself, the rest of the Gulf states could very well follow.

## Impact: Nuclear Terrorism

### **Proliferation causes terrorists to get nuclear weapons, resulting in a nuclear 9/11**

**Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, November/December 2007**  
National Interest, "Symposium: Apocalypse When?"

READERS OF Mueller's judgment that policies aimed at preventing proliferation have been "obsessive" and "counterproductive" should be aware of his criteria for what constitutes an "overreaction." In *Overblown*, he argues that America's reaction to Pearl Harbor was exaggerated. America's overreaction led it to declare war on Japan, when a policy of "military containment and harassment" would have been sufficient to pressure Japan to withdraw from its empire. Mueller's claim that the quest to control proliferation has been "substantively counterproductive" misunderstands the impact successful policy has had in preventing what would have been catastrophic outcomes. Mueller takes to task President John Kennedy's 1962 prediction that if states acquired nuclear weapons at the rate they achieved the technical ability to build bombs, there could be twenty nuclear powers by 1975. He argues the claim was exaggerated simply because it did not happen. But the purpose of Kennedy's warning was to awaken the world to the unacceptable dangers of unconstrained nuclear proliferation. The United States and other nations' refusal to accept those consequences motivated an international initiative to create the non-proliferation regime, the centerpiece of which is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thanks to this regime, 183 nations, including scores that have the technical capability to build nuclear arsenals, have renounced nuclear weapons. Four decades later, there are only eight and a half nuclear-weapons states, not twenty or forty. (North Korea is the only self-declared but unrecognized nuclear state.) The gravest challenges to the non-proliferation regime today are North Korea and Iran. If each succeeds in becoming a nuclear-weapons state, we are likely to witness the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime and a cascade of proliferation. As Henry Kissinger recently said, "there is no greater challenge to the global nuclear order today than the impending proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing likelihood that terrorists may conduct a nuclear 9/11."

### **Nuclear terrorist attack causes extinction**

**Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/2004**  
Al-Ahram Online. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm> |

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

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**[ ] Nuclear peace theories are flawed. Deterrence failure is likely because of incomplete intelligence and irrationality in regional crisis.**

**Stephen Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn. State, 2007**

Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld)

There is no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, there is some experience during and after the Cold War to suggest that states might become more careful, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and, most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces themselves. Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated: especially by students of history and political science. The “rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety. States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. A U.S. model of deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis. The strategic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated. Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia’s policy of providing air defense missiles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia’s own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable. U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strategic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9–11. Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for policy makers to mull over. One of the major risks of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is the possibility that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning.

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

### **Nuclear proliferation escalates regional conflicts and pulls great powers into greater war**

**Harald Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor of international relations at Frankfurt University, Spring 2008,**

“The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, The Washington Quarterly, 31:2, [http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\\_muller.pdf](http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_muller.pdf)

A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Regional conflicts could escalate to the nuclear level. The optimistic expectation of a universal law according to which nuclear deterrence prevents all wars<sup>15</sup> rests on scant historical evidence and is dangerously naive. Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place. Moreover, the more states that possess nuclear weapons and related facilities, the more points of access are available to terrorists.

### **Assuming “rationality” will prevent a nuclear war is laughable, there will be mistakes**

**Stephen Cimbala, Professor of Political Science at Penn State, September 2002,**

‘Nuclear proliferation and great power security’, Defense Studies, 2:3, 77-102

The collapse of bipolarity after Cold War diminishes the link between basic and extended deterrence: one can make fewer reliable predictions about states' behaviors on the basis of 'system' variables. The significance of this theoretical construct for the practical problem of nonproliferation is illustrated by then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's comment that future terrorists or rogue regimes 'may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.'<sup>44</sup> Deterrence theory a la the Cold War, based on realist premises that assume risk averse and cost- benefit sensitive leaders, may no longer hold tenable for leaders armed with weapons of mass destruction and motivated by 'irrational' or 'illogical' objectives by at least US standards. As Keith B. Payne has explained: Assuming that deterrence will 'work' because the opponent will behave sensibly is bound to be the basis for a future surprise. I do not know whether our expectations of a generically sensible opponent will next be dashed by a so-called rogue state, such as North Korea, or by another challenger. That they will be dashed, however, is near certain. As we move into the second nuclear age and confront opponents with whom we are relatively unfamiliar, assumptions of a generically sensible foe almost certainly will ensure surprises.<sup>45</sup>

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

### **Nuclear proliferation would be fast and destabilizing, causing accidental launch and nuclear terrorism**

**Nathan E. Busch, assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University, 10/8/2004,**

“No End in Sight: The continuing menace of nuclear proliferation”, p. 301-2

This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWS have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will tend to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism.

### **The spread of technology means that nuclear proliferation would be extremely fast and poorly managed**

**Michael J Mazarr, Adjunct professor in security studies at Georgetown and former Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, 2002,**

“Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals”, P. 272-3

A second feature of the future world system seems likely to be its inherent instability in the form of a potential for wildfire-like proliferation. To date, proliferation has appeared as a process of piecemeal accumulation of weapons capacities, weaponry, and weapons states, subject possibly to delay, derailment, and sometimes reversal. But, as more states have the means at their disposal to build high-leverage strategic weapons based on what is available to them in the civilian economy, proliferation becomes a process that might unfold with great speed, as some group of states, whether within a region or across the international system, move suddenly to create hedges against an uncertain future. Those hedges might include new military research and development programs spun off from civilian NBC activities, more lavish funding for such programs and a push for greater sophistication and weaponization readiness, the construction of “bombs in the basement,” the assembly of the full accoutrement of effective military systems, or actual deployment, whether secret or open. The gaps between different states, would, of course, create advantages for those farthest along in the process of competitive hedging, and the perception of those gaps could be a significant source of instability. If it were to occur, wildfire-like proliferation would likely be visible and unsettling internationally. But it might also be nearly invisible, and thus doubly pernicious, by suggesting the existence of a stable world moving toward deeper cooperation when in fact world order is weakening and the risk of war is growing.



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# Allied Prolif DA Aff

## Allied Proliferation DA Affirmative

### Uniqueness Answers

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### Impact Answers

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## Non-Unique

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[ ] **US allies do not feel reassured in the status quo because of the foreign policy of Barack Obama**

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

Since January 20, 2009, American credibility has taken a back seat to the Obama administration’s quest for international popularity. During his trips to the Middle East and Asia last year, President Obama seemed more interested in bolstering his approval ratings abroad than advancing American interests. Last week it was reported that the Obama administration downgraded the priority placed on intelligence collection for China in an effort to increase cooperation with Beijing. This move was made despite the fact that Chinese cyberattacks against the U.S. are on the rise and the leadership in Beijing remains reticent about its massive military modernization program. Unfortunately, U.S. national security is more dependent on the credibility of American power—and the words and policies of its commander-in-chief—than international popularity. In foreign affairs, credibility matters. Hollow threats and naïve policies embolden our adversaries while broken commitments lead our friends and allies to question our resolve. During the first year in power, the Obama administration has damaged American credibility with its mishandling of American national security policy.

## Non-Unique

### [ ] Defense budget cuts mean that allies are not reassured in the status quo

**Andrew Shearer, director of studies and a senior research fellow at Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2/4/2010,**

“Will America Defend Its Asian Allies?” Wall Street Journal,

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704259304575044354072896096.html>

An even bigger question, though, is whether the U.S. will be able to afford the force outlined in the report: one capable of conducting stabilization operations when necessary and continuing to keep the peace in Asia into the future. Asian governments are nervous that this time around America's decline is real, and they are hedging in response. Both Australia and South Korea are building up their naval forces, for instance. It is no bad thing for U.S. allies to contribute more to international security, but a fundamental loss of confidence in the durability of American military dominance in Asia would be profoundly destabilizing. The report will only reassure U.S. allies if they are convinced Washington will deliver on the capabilities it promises and can project power, deter aggression and come to their aid. With little evident appetite in the White House or Congress to rein in rampant domestic spending, pressures on the defense budget will only increase. Asian governments will have little option but to divert resources to acquire more sophisticated weapons. That's not good news for anyone, including America.

### [ ] The new nuclear strategy decided by Obama will reduce the credibility of our deterrence

**Daniel Goure, PhD, States News Service, 4/5/2010,**

“New Obama Nuclear Strategy Undermines Extended Deterrence”,

<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/new-obama-nuclear-strategy-undermines-extended-deterrence?a=1&c=1171>

Reports have surfaced that sometime this week President Obama will declare that the United States is changing the nuclear strategy that has maintained the security of the Free World for half a century. The essence of the U.S. strategy was the willingness of every administration since Eisenhower to place, first, its military, but ultimately, the American people in harms way. America's willingness to sacrifice our own in the defense of friends and allies was the glue that held together the alliances in Europe and Asia. Also, this commitment is what made our deterrent of non-nuclear threats credible in an era when we did not enjoy conventional superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The United States was willing to escalate, to use nuclear weapons first. The key to the success of the U.S. deterrence strategy was the creation of a series of deterrence thresholds like rungs on a ladder. The idea was that at each step up the ladder the adversary was left with only two choices, either accept defeat or escalate to the next level of conflict with the attendant risk of still greater destruction. Ultimately, deterrence against a nuclear-armed adversary required that he be placed in the position of making the next to last decision, the one to unleash general strategic nuclear war. The adversary knew that by unleashing a large-scale strike against U.S. cities that this country would have no choice but to retaliate in kind. Hence, it was better not to start a fight with the United States which the adversary might win at one rung on the escalatory ladder but which it would inevitably lose as the United States raised the ante. Now, if these reports are correct, President Obama will dismantle the successful strategy of the past fifty years. The president is reported to be planning to announce that under the new strategy U.S. nuclear weapons use would only come in response to nuclear use by an adversary. The U.S. will also withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States will no longer deter non-nuclear attacks by the threat to escalate nor will it rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter attacks involving other types of weapons of mass destruction.

## Non-Unique

[\_\_] **The US response to the conflict in Georgia damaged its credibility with its allies**

**Stephen Blank, Professor of Russian National security Studies – Strategic Studies Institute of US Army War College, 2009**

Mediterranean Quarterly, “America and the Russian-Georgian War”, 20:4, p. 36,  
<http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/20/4/32.pdf>

NATO’s and the EU’s viability as security providers, the indivisibility of European security, and the vision of a truly integrated continent are at stake here. By the same token, the credibility of American security guarantees has been dealt a serious blow. Since Russia clearly states that America’s European presence is unnatural and that European solidarity is “silly” and a complicating factor for Russia, that solidarity becomes all the more critical if European security is to be preserved.<sup>14</sup> A disunited Europe bifurcated by blocs where Russia has a free hand to do as it pleases undermines all the work of past generations for a peaceful, whole, and free Europe.

[\_\_] **Recent decisions by Obama are causing allies to question their security relationship with the US**

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they’ve been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It’s not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

## Non-Unique

**[\_\_] The US has reduced its military presence in countries drastically since the end of the Cold War. Empirically, crises in confidence in American deterrence do not result in countries seeking nuclear weapons**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**  
International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.<sup>37</sup> According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

No Link

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[ ] **US troops are not sufficient to ensure allies of our commitment to their deterrence**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**

“Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", [http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 8)

Consequently, reassuring and discouraging a nuclear cascade of allies, or former allies, has emerged as a crucial element of deterrence planning, and, in the absence of consensus about the nature of the threats that we are facing, that reassurance function has become more complex and subject to more varied interpretations than it was in the past. In the wake of Iraq and in the midst of the Afghanistan war, as the United States endeavors to “reset” its forces and transform its overseas (military) “footprint,” the forward deployment of U.S. troops may not be sufficient in itself to convince American allies that our commitment to extended deterrence remains credible, especially in the case of political differences over preferred ways for dealing with emerging threats and legacy challenges. This, in turn, may lead some U.S. allies or coalition partners to conclude that their interests would better be served by pursuing their own nuclear options. As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment. Moreover, it is not adequate for deterring nuclear attack. The U.S. deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.<sup>6</sup>

## No Link

### [\_\_] **The US does not have enough troops stationed abroad to make its allies reassured**

**Christopher Layne, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 1997**

“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing”, *International Security*, Summer 1997, vol. 22, no. 1 //

Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state's territory. Thus during the Cold War, the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the United States and bolstered extended deterrence's credibility. The defender's deployment of forces is one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended deterrence success, because it is a visible signal that the defender "means business."[62] In contrast, in the early twenty-first century in many places where the United States may seek to implement extended deterrence, the strategy's effectiveness will be undercut because the United States will not have a permanent, sizeable military presence in the target state (Korea is a notable exception). For example, it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the credibility of security guarantees (should they, in fact, be given) to states like Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Taiwan each of which is threatened potentially by a nuclear rival--by deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, assuming NATO expansion goes forward, Washington has taken an ambivalent stance with respect to whether the United States will deploy troops or tactical nuclear weapons or both in Poland (which, because of its proximity to Russia, would be an expanded NATO's most vulnerable member state). At currently projected force levels, moreover, the American presence in Europe and East Asia probably will be too small to make extended deterrence credible in the early twenty-first century; a challenger, with good reason, may question whether the United States has either the capability or the intent to honor its deterrent commitments. U.S. forward-deployed forces could constitute the worst kind of trip wire--one that invites challenges rather than deterring them.

## No Internal Link

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[ ] **No internal link, the spread of nuclear weapons depends on many other factors besides US security guarantees**

**Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, 7/2/2009**

“Japan, TLAM/N, and Extended Deterrence,” FAS Strategic Security,  
<http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php>

These reports, authored by agencies and individuals that are or have been deeply involved in the nuclear business (and many of which “ran the Cold War”), argue for a reaffirmation – even strengthening – of extended deterrence as a “good” and enduring mission for nuclear weapons to prevent proliferation in the 21st Century. They argue that since the U.S. nuclear umbrella is extended to some 30 countries (one report even says 30-plus countries; I can only count 30) it prevents them from acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. Yet for the overwhelming majority of those countries, the function of the extended deterrent is not about nonproliferation but about the ultimate security guarantee. The number of those countries that could potentially be expected to develop nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella disappeared is very small, perhaps a couple, and whether they would actually do so depends on a wide spectrum of factors, most of which have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Yet the reports paint the role of nuclear weapons as alpha omega.

## No Internal Link

[\_\_] **The U.S. has many ways of maintaining deterrence besides direct military presence**

**Karen Ruth Adams, Associate Prof. IR at the University of Montana, 2005**

“New Great Powers: Who Will They Be, and How Will They Rise?”,  
<http://www.cas.umt.edu/polsci/faculty/adams/greatpower.pdf>, p. 11)

Extended deterrence can be substantiated in many ways – through the deployment of expatriates such as diplomats, advisors, or troops, for example, or through the cultivation of extensive political, economic, or cultural ties. Determining how this is most efficiently and effectively done in the nuclear, information age will be the key to identifying how second-tier states become great powers, as well as which ones are furthest along that path.<sup>41</sup> Despite the variety of options, there is a tendency in the US to focus on troop deployments, especially large ones. This is why policy makers see “command of the commons” as so vital. It is also why they discount the possibility that the US will have “peer competitors” in the near future. Yet, occasionally, officials acknowledge the logic of deterrence. For example, although during the Cold War, massive US deployments in the Korean DMZ were thought necessary to deter North Korea from attacking the South, today (when those troops are being redeployed to Iraq and within South Korea), Pentagon officials acknowledge that trip-wire forces of 5,000 are just as effective as deployments of 500,000.<sup>42</sup>

## No Internal Link

**[\_\_] Credibility with our allies is a nebulous concept, we cannot tell when it is lost or gained. It does not make sense to maintain military commitments just for the sake of credibility**

**Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy at Johns Hopkins, 2007**  
Daily Yomiuri, "Credibility of U.S. commitment a moot question",

With the Democrats taking both houses of Congress in November and growing public pressure to withdraw American forces from Iraq, the question of U.S. credibility has been raised once again in a central issue in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in part to show terrorists and potential nuclear proliferators that the United States would not tolerate their behavior, but would rather reach out and attack them preemptively. As a result of the military quagmire in Iraq, however, Washington has brought about just the opposite result: there are more anti-American terrorists in the Middle East now than at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and rogue state proliferators like Iran and North Korea have been persuaded to accelerate rather than stop their programs. One of the main arguments against a rapid U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is that it would signal a dramatic American loss of will, that will only encourage future terrorists and states contemplating nuclear weapons to push ahead, confident that the United States will not or cannot respond.

The issue of credibility is particularly important for U.S. allies like Japan, that depend on the United States for their security. Japan accepted a "peace" Constitution, limited the size of its armed forces, and abjured nuclear weapons on the grounds that the United States would come to its defense, including making use of nuclear weapons if Japan faced nuclear attack. With the rise of China and the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by North Korea, the question of U.S. credibility has become one of great urgency.

In the past, Americans have paid a great price to maintain the credibility of their alliance commitments and military deterrent. Then U.S. President Harry Truman felt he had to respond vigorously to the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel in June 1950 because failure to do so would encourage communist aggression all over the world; the result was the Korean War that killed nearly 50,000 Americans. The United States intervened in Vietnam out of fear of a "domino effect"; if one country were allowed to fall to communism, others would rapidly follow suit. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon prolonged the Vietnam War for another five years after the initial decision to draw down forces in 1970 on the grounds that the United States needed to preserve a "decent interval" between its withdrawal and any potential collapse of South Vietnam, for the sole purpose of maintaining the appearance that the United States was not abandoning its commitments. But while strategists assume that credibility is critical, it is not clear on the basis of historical experience how quickly it is lost, or how difficult it is to reestablish. Rapid retreat in the face of setbacks clearly set bad precedents that encourage future aggression. Osama bin Laden, for example, is reported to have pointed to the American retreat from Somalia in 1994 after the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers as one reason he believed that the United States could be driven out of the Middle East. On the other hand, credibility once lost can be regained. Then U.S. President Ronald Reagan withdrew American forces quickly from Lebanon in 1983 after the bombing of the marine barracks, and yet despite that he convinced the Soviet leadership that they would not be able to maintain a long-term military competition with the United States. He did this by confronting Soviet allies in Central America and Afghanistan, as well as through the military buildup that took place during the 1980s. Kissinger's fears that the Soviet Union and other communist powers would take advantage of perceived American weakness after the retreat from Vietnam turned out to be greatly overblown. When the last helicopter left Saigon in 1975, no one anticipated that China would soon embark on a major shift toward a market economy, that the rest of Southeast Asia would experience an economic miracle that would leave Vietnam in the dust, and that the Soviet empire would implode 16 years later. It oftentimes does not make sense to maintain a costly military commitment simply for the sake of credibility, if the engagement cannot ultimately be won, and if the costs of staying are so high that one cannot use one's forces to meet other commitments. Tactical retreats are periodically necessary if one is to avoid strategic defeat. This is the choice that the United States potentially faces today as it considers its options in Iraq.

## No Impact

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**[ ] No impact to proliferation. It will happen slowly and in a controlled environment. Negative predictions about proliferation have been consistently proven wrong and rely on an overly pessimistic view of the world**

**William Potter and Guakhar Mukhatzhanova, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Research Associate at the James Martin Center for International Security, 2008**

“Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay”, 33:1, Summer, Project Muse)

To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their forecasts, however, were almost without exception wildly off the mark. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projections about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the research by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books' publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.<sup>48</sup> The Four Myths of Nuclear Proliferation Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the "tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general 'roguishness' of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions" (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.<sup>49</sup> Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that "the 'domino theory' of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear."<sup>50</sup> As he points out, the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, assumes an over-simplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken.<sup>51</sup> Leaders' nuclear preferences, he maintains, "are not highly contingent on what other states decide," and, therefore, "proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states" (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces "an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self-assertive [End Page 161] ones," and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208–209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisionmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a "ticket to international status"; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208–216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.

## Impact Turn

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**[ ] Allied proliferation in Europe and Asia will increase stability, not decrease it. Their deterrents will be more credible than the US guarantee**

**Christopher Layne, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2006,**

“The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present”, pg. 171-172

There is nothing the United States can do that will fully reassure its allies that Washington will protect them. Recognizing this, America’s allies—especially in East Asia—have every incentive to do exactly what U.S. strategy is supposed to prevent them from doing: re-nationalize and emerge as autonomous poles of power—which will unravel the entire fabric of America’s hegemonic grand strategy.<sup>4</sup> Instead of vainly attempting to stem the tide of onrushing multipolarity, as an offshore balancer the United States would implement an orderly devolution of security responsibilities—including managed proliferation of nuclear weapons—to the potential great powers (and regional ones like South Korea) that heretofore have sheltered under America’s extended deterrence umbrella.<sup>42</sup> Given that managed proliferation would involve politically stable states that are capable of building secure, second-strike retaliatory forces, it would not be destabilizing. On the contrary, because the deterrence provided by national deterrent forces is more credible than extended deterrence provided by a distant protector, Eurasia probably would be more stable—not less—if, acting as an offshore balancer, the United States went forward with strategic devolution. In any event, given the nature of the evolving Eurasian security environment, for the United States it would be better and safer to let other states defend them- selves.

## Impact Turn

**[\_\_] The spread of nuclear weapons creates peace, not conflict. Because of their destructive power, nations will not start wars.**

**Kenneth Waltz, Professor of IR at Columbia, 1981,**

“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>)

Fourth, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that wars could not occur because they would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Germans founded a state by fighting three short wars, in the last of which France lost Alsace. Lorraine. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s dictum, broadly interpreted, becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons have reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One may expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal. Fifth, nuclear weapons can be used for defense as well as for deterrence. Some have argued that an apparently impregnable nuclear defense can be mounted. The Maginot Line has given defense a bad name. It nevertheless remains true that the incidence of wars decreases as the perceived difficulty of winning them increases. No one attacks a defense believed to be impregnable. Nuclear weapons may make it possible to approach the defensive ideal. If so, the spread of nuclear weapons will further help to maintain peace. Sixth, new nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have pro-liferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the centre but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.

## Impact Turn

### [ ] Proliferation makes aggression less likely because of the power of the weapons

**Erik Gartzke, and Dong Joon Jo, Professor of Political Science – UC San Diego and Professor of International Relations – University of Seoul, South Korea, 2009,**  
 “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 53  
 No 2

Even if only some of the substantial increase in lethality from “going nuclear” can be converted into political leverage, nuclear-capable nations are bound to increase their influence in international affairs. Greater influence amounts to getting what states want without having to use force. To the degree that nuclear capabilities lead to bargains that approximate the outcomes states expect from fighting, aggression becomes less appealing, and the anxieties of opponents are reduced. Diplomacy serves as a tool for smoothing the bumpy road of world politics. The decision to proliferate is also endogenous to conflict. Nations are not assigned nuclear weapons at random but select into nuclear status despite high costs, long delays in development, and international opprobrium. Countries with significant security problems or responsibilities and substantial governmental resources are more prone to seek nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007). These same nations fight more often, not because they possess a nuclear arsenal but because the causes of conflict also prompt states to proliferate. Nations with few enemies, modest resources, limited technology, or little dissatisfaction about world affairs are unlikely to pursue nuclear capabilities and also are less inclined to fight. Thus, nominal nuclear status probably overstates the empirical effect of proliferation in propagating interstate disputes.

### [ ] Nuclear weapons escalate the risks involved with war and makes nuclear war less likely

**Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, Assistant Prof of Political Science at SUNY Albany, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory, 2007**  
 Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior\*”, 44:2,

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.<sup>4</sup> While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

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# Readiness DA- Neg

## Readiness Disadvantage

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## Explanation

In the status quo, America stands alone with the position of a very powerful, credible superpower. This status is often referred to as “primacy” or “hegemony.” America uses its unique standing to build up its influence throughout the world. Presumably, the result is stability, peace and prosperity in the world.

Primacy has traditionally been closely connected with military policies, as the deployment of armed forces is one of the main ways a nation exercises “hard power.” Hard power stands in contrast to “soft power” which refers to the ability of nations to influence others with cultural or moral standing. Both hard power and soft power have roles in establishing leadership.

Primacy is not easy to maintain. Several nations around the world, such as China, Russia and India hope to challenge American worldwide hegemony. There are also smaller nations, such as Iran, Venezuela and North that confront the United States in regional affairs. President Obama is struggling to preserve America’s leadership in a very difficult time, and so far he has achieved this goal.

A nation’s credibility in the world is evaluated several ways. Do they stand up when they are challenged, or do they run from a fight? Do they keep their promises with their allies? Do they stay consistent and predictable, or do their policies lurch from one to another? Nations, including the United States, are constantly being watched. This is particularly the case when a nation has a relatively new leader.

**SUMMARY OF THE PRIMACY DISADVANTAGE:** In the status quo, America will maintain its primacy in world affairs. President Obama has upheld American commitments, stayed true to our allies, and not radically shifted policies from the end of the Bush Administration.

The affirmative plan undermines America’s standing in the world by suddenly reversing its military troop deployment policy. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States would be seen as running from a fight. In South Korea and Japan, it would be seen as going back on a commitment to the security of those two countries in the face of challengers in Asia such as North Korea and China. In Turkey, it would hurt our perceptions in the Middle East and prevent us from being able to undertake combat operations there because Turkey is a key base. It would also send a signal to Russia, as the missiles there were placed during the Cold War to deter it.

The consequences of the loss of American primacy would be dire. The United States plays an important role in preventing conflicts around the world, and also stopping the conflicts that do exist from escalating to large-scale war. We do this through the credibility of our use of force. Without that credibility, immense conflicts in several global hot spots would become much more likely.

## Glossary

**Hegemony:** Being the most powerful state in the world. The United States is usually considered the “Hegemon” in world politics. It means that the United States has the strongest military and the most influence in order to get what it wants.

**Unipolar:** When there is one “pole” in the international system. Refers to a world setup where there is one very powerful state and many other weaker states. A synonym for hegemony.

**Multipolar:** When there are many “poles” in the international system. Refers to a world where there are many powerful countries, and no one dominant one.

**Apolar:** Refers to an international system without any stabilizing influence. An apolar system would be in disarray and very unstable.

**Primacy:** Synonym for hegemony.

**Geopolitics:** Interactions between countries. Synonym for world politics.

**Retrench:** To make a reduction. A United States retrenchment would involve reducing how much it involves itself in the business of other countries, by withdrawing its bases, refusing to negotiate, or mediate a diplomatic dispute, or refusing to give international aid for example.

**GDP/GNP:** Gross Domestic Product / Gross National Product. A measure of how big a country’s economy is. A large, strong, economy is considered important to maintain hegemony.

**Hard Power:** The military power of a country.

**Soft Power:** The ability of a country to obtain what it wants through attraction and persuasion. It is power that does not have a military element. For example, some argue that the election of Barack Obama increased the United States’ soft power with other countries because he is a very popular President abroad and people are more inclined to want to work with him.

**Power projection:** The ability of a country to apply its power, whether it is military, economic, or otherwise, in faraway locations. For example, US bases in Turkey allow it to project power in the Middle East because it can resupply its forces from those bases.

**Readiness:** Being prepared to fight a war or undertake military action.

**Resolve:** Being perceived as committed and resolute to a particular position. The disadvantage argues that the U.S. needs to be seen as having resolve, that if it undertakes an action or that if a country attempts to challenge the United States in some area, that it would be willing and able to make the other country pay. Having resolve is a key aspect of maintaining deterrence.

## Glossary

**Embolden:** enticing someone to act more boldly or recklessly. The disadvantage argues that withdrawing the US' military presence might embolden countries to take actions that would upset the United States. For example, a withdrawal of troops from South Korea might embolden North Korea to attack.

**Predominant:** The most dominant. Another synonym for hegemony

**Balancing:** The practice of a country or a group of countries increasing their power so they can match another country. For example, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union balanced each other by building stronger militaries and more nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence:** Attempting to prevent a country from taking an action by threatening consequences that make the action not worth it. For example, the United States attempts to deter China from invading Taiwan by stationing its navy in between the two countries, meaning that the invasion would also force a war with the United States, something that China is not willing to do.

## Readiness DA INC Shell [1/2]

### **A. Uniqueness. Obama is going to maintain hegemony in the status quo, and overseas military presence is a key part of his strategy**

**Greg Scoblete, The Compass, Real Clear World January 23, 2010**

[[http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/01/obama\\_hearts\\_hegemony.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/01/obama_hearts_hegemony.html)]

You know they're wrong because President Obama - despite what his neoconservative critics assert and his progressive boosters hope - is not interested in dismantling this definition of American primacy. Sure, his rhetoric might pay greater lip service to a multi-polar world, but his actions to date are not indicative of someone about to seriously roll back America's dominant position in the world. Consider: he will not pull U.S. troops from their forward deployments in Europe, South Korea or Japan (indeed his administration is locking horns with Japan to keep a basing arrangement in place). He is not vowing to pull the U.S. out of its mutual defense treaties with partners such as Taiwan or Japan, or withdraw the U.S. from NATO, which entrenches U.S. power in Europe. He is strengthening America's military presence in the Gulf to contain Iran. He increased the Pentagon's budget. These are the engines of American primacy, in the military realm at least, and none of them are on the chopping block.

### **B. Link. Military withdrawal destroys U.S. foreign policy credibility---that undermines the foundation of hegemony**

**Hakan Tunc, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008,**

“Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” *Orbis*, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actor's past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a country's reputation involves resolve.<sup>5</sup> Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.<sup>6</sup> According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to “a cult of reputation” among foreign policy makers, which he defines as “a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead one's adversaries or allies to underestimate one's resolve in the next crisis.”<sup>7</sup> Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a country's reputation and thus “embolden” the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to their cause.<sup>8</sup> Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and resolve.<sup>9</sup> According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less supportive. This logic has had two general consequences for America's use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mere perception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force against every adversary.<sup>10</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some.<sup>11</sup>

## Readiness DA INC Shell [2/2]

### **C. Impact. Loss of Hegemony causes war between the most powerful countries as countries begin to take risks and challenge the United States**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

## Overview

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## Uniqueness: US Is the Hegemon Now

**The United States is still the global leader but other nations are trying to challenge us**

**Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007**

[Policy Review No. 144, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136>]

The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still “unipolar,” with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.

**US leadership is strong now**

**John G. Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, 9-5, 2005**

(Weary Titan or Poorly Led Superpower. <http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/9/5/135627/8001>)

Britain was not at the peak of its power in 1905 – that came much, much earlier. But America today surely is. Let us ponder America’s strategic position. It is about 4 percent of world population but 30 percent of world production and 40 percent of consumption. Its GNP is 11 trillion dollars – more than twice the size of the next largest national economy, and its real per capita income is substantially higher than any other major country. Its language is the language of world commerce and the dollar is the world’s currency. Clyde Prestowitz reports that the U.S. has 423 of the leading 1000 global companies and its stock markets account for 44 percent of the value of all stocks around the world. America has the top universities and research centers. It spends more on research and development than the next five countries together. It has no peer competitor. It spends almost half the world expenditures on military capacities – and does so as a percent of GNP (3 percent) substantially below Cold War levels (as much as 7 percent). If America is overstretched, it is not because of declining material capabilities. Some argue that American power is likely to actually increase during the coming century, not decline. John Mearsheimer made this provocative argument at the recent American Political Science Association, arguing that China’s ascent will be cut short because of a declining and aging population. My point doesn’t rely on this argument. I simply maintain that the U.S. is not threatened by rising powers in 2005 as Britain was in 1905 – the U.S. is utterly more powerful in relative terms and its rivals further behind. Indeed, if world politics today were a poker game, the United States would be holding the best cards – by far. Everyone around the table would know this and – if they could – they would swap their cards for America’s. Moreover, the hand the U.S. holds is probably better than any player has had in centuries. It is certainly the best cards the U.S. has held in a hundred years.

## Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable

**The new Obama national security strategy means we are looking to maintain sustainable U.S. power**

**Los Angeles Times, 6/6/10,**

“Obama's National Security Strategy,” online:

<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus-20100606,0,1433841.column>

Now he has, in the recently released National Security Strategy, a lengthy essay required by Congress. The short version — to save you from reading 52 pages of numbing generalities — is this: We still want to do a little bit of everything, but after almost a decade of war, we're overstretched and need to concentrate first on fixing the domestic economy. When it comes to problems overseas, we'll do what we can as long as it doesn't cost too much. Unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, President Obama's foreign policy isn't about pursuing one or two overriding goals — in Bush's case, defeating terrorism and spreading democracy. Instead, it's about what economists might call "sustainability," making sure we don't take on wars or other commitments that we can't afford. In an earlier generation, Walter Lippmann called this "solvency." It was essential, Lippmann believed, to bring "into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power."

**The US will be powerful for a long time to come because of its large defense budget, strong education system, and strong economy**

**Sankar Sen, Professor of Marketing at NYU, 4/5/2005**

American Power: How Long Will It Last? The Statesman.

The US today bestrides the globe like a Colossus. Today's international system, says Robert Kagan, "is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony". American military power is now far stronger than that of any other nation. The USA today accounts for 40 to 50 per cent of global defense spending. In every sphere of warfare US now has clear preponderance over other powers. No other power has the capacity to move large forces around the globe and support its troops with precision firepower and unsurpassed amount of information and intelligence. Military resources as a result of the \$ 400 billion military budget are formidable. The defense research establishment of the US receives more money than the entire defense budget of its largest European ally. No other power has B2 bombers, the satellite constellations, the aircraft carriers or the long range unmanned aircraft like that of the US Navy and Air Force. Sources of strength But no power can sustain itself by military strength alone; it must possess other sources of strength. Another pillar of American strength is its economy. It is indeed the world's largest and most vibrant. In 2000 the US economy was equal in size to that of the next four national economies (Japan, France, Germany, Great Britain) combined. However, the economic gap is smaller than the military gap when the US economy is compared to that of the European Union. Nevertheless, the American dominance remains remarkable. There are other sources of strength. The US today is the third most populous country. Unlike other developed countries it has a birth rate which is near the replacement rate. It has a stable political system and in the realm of knowledge and ideas, it has, as Joseph Nye of Harvard University calls it, "a clear lead over others". American universities dominate in the field of higher education and American culture, both high-brow or low-brow, music, food, work styles and manners. The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility and openness that find expression in American education and culture contribute to American power. It has been aptly said that American soft power looms larger than its economy and military assets

## Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable

### Overseas base deployments are sustainable

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed \$500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over \$100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes.

### The US has the will and the means to be the strongest military power for years to come

**Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and adjunct professor of history at Georgetown University, June and July 2002**

"Power and Weakness," Policy Review, No. 113

Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its GDP on defense today. Were Americans to increase that to 4 percent — meaning a defense budget in excess of \$500 billion per year — it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7 percent of its GDP on defense), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War — except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace. The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a “postmodern” utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the world.

## Generic Link: Withdrawal Hurts Readiness

### **Base realignment creates strategic imbalances in the Armed Forces and trades off with training and education – this crushes readiness**

#### **John Shimkus, Republican Representative in the House, 2006**

“Changes in US Forward Deployment and its Effects on Europe”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Annual Session, (<http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=999>)

19. The Commission also disputed the costs of the redeployment plan. They estimated that the costs could total \$20 billion, but noted that the Department of Defense had only budgeted \$4 billion for the redeployment process. This total is much larger than previous estimates because the Commission was including what they saw as the additional strategic mobility costs. The Global Posture Review envisions a force based primarily in the United States and relies on airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned supplies to transport and provision forces sent to a crisis area. This would require additional assets. Current plans for airlift, sealift and pre-positioned supplies, the Commission argues, do not take into account the additional burden imposed by the redeployment of more military personnel back to the United States. 20. Another more general critique is that the realignment will take years to complete, but there is no guarantee that the strategic environment will be the same and demand the same kind of basing structure. Few would have predicted, for example, the strategic need for basing rights in Central Asia in the years immediately before 2001. It is possible that the US will face other unforeseen challenges in the future, and that the realignment will not be appropriate for those contingencies. At the same time, the disruption that accompanies a realignment of this magnitude could have some effect on the readiness of the armed forces. The time and effort spent in moving equipment and establishing new facilities can impact on the amount of time available for training and education. In short, some critics of the realignment argue that the process can weaken the ability of the US military to confront current security challenges while offering no guarantee that it will be better suited to confronting tomorrow's challenges.

## Generic Link: Withdrawal Hurts Resolve

### **Withdrawal is a sign of weakness**

**Bradley Thayer, Assoc Prof., Missouri State Univ., The National Interest 2006**

[In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Nov/Dec 2006 Issue 86]

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

### **Reduced military presence will increase threats from competitors**

**Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, April 2, 2010**

[<http://www.aei.org/article/101869>]

The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe. And, as we hollow out our capabilities, China will be fielding ever more accurate anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, and stealthy submarines; Russia will continue to expand its influence over its "near abroad" while modernizing its nuclear arsenal; and Iran will develop nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race or preemptive attacks in the Middle East. Under such conditions, global trade flows will be stressed, the free flow of capital will be constrained, and foreign governments will expand their regulatory and confiscatory powers against their domestic economies in order to fund their own military expansions. For the past six decades, global stability was assured in large part by an expensive US commitment to maintain credible forces abroad, forge tight alliances with key strategic countries, and devote a significant, though not onerous, part of national treasure to sustaining a military second to none. Rarely in history has a country shouldered such burdens for so long, but the succeeding decades of growth and avoidance of systemic war proved the wisdom of the course.

## Specific Link: Japan Affirmative

### **Forward presence in Japan deters aggression and signals resolve**

**Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center 8/26/09**

“How to Save the US-Japan Alliance” [<http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/K/Bruce-Klingner>]

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world. Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

### **Forward presence in Japan signifies resolve, commitment to our allies, and deterrence**

**Gary S. Kinne, Colonel of US army, 5/3/04**

“U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT  
May 3, 2004

[<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423691>]

Forward deployed U.S. military forces on the Korean peninsula, backed up by additional forces in Japan, have long been the bastions of our current containment policy. Their presence signifies resolve, commitment to our allies, and deterrence. Although not the only element of power used to coerce North Korea, this remains the most persuasive and visible tool used to moderate potential aggression. Forward presence enables the U.S. to rapidly respond to crises while promoting regional stability. The primary disadvantage of this strategy is the requirement to maintain a dedicated military presence in the region. These forces are thus unavailable to respond to other worldwide contingencies.

## Specific Link: Japan Affirmative

### **Japanese bases are key Lilly pads to sustain military readiness**

**Yoshio Shimoji, M.S. from Georgetown, 5/3/10**

“The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective”, Asia-Pacific Journal, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354>)

Obviously, the U.S. Marines or the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, to be more specific, are stationed in Okinawa not to defend Japan as ballyhooed but simply to hone their assault skills in preparation for combat elsewhere. It's a cozy and easy place to train, with Tokyo providing prodigious financial aid, which Washington demands in the name of “host nation support.” I liken it to turf dues exacted by an organized crime syndicate, which offers protection from rival gangs. In 2003, for example, Japan's direct "host nation support" amounted to \$3,228.43 million or \$4,411.34 million if indirect support is added. Compare these figures with Germany's and Korea's support. Germany's direct host nation support in the same year was \$28.7 million (1/112th that of Japan) and indirect support \$1,535.22 million. Korea's direct host nation support in that same year was \$486.31 million (about 1/7th that of Japan) and indirect support \$356.5 million [4]. For ten years from 2001 through 2010, Japan shouldered an average annual sum of \$2,274 million for host nation support [5], which incidentally is known as "sympathy budget" as if Japan were voluntarily doling out money out of compassion for those U.S. service members who are deployed in this far-away country. The amount Japan has financed to support USF Japan operations since the system started in 1978 totals an astounding \$30 billion. That the Marines are based in Okinawa not to defend Japan but mainly to strengthen U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and beyond is widely recognized, as the following quotation from GlobalSecurity.org suggests: “The Regiment (3rd Battalion 6th Marines) continues to support the defense of the Nation by maintaining forces in readiness in support of contingency operations and unit deployments to the Mediterranean, Pacific rim and around the globe.”(Italics mine) Pundit Kevin Rafferty is more direct saying, "some of the bases (in Japan) are staging-posts for deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere [6]." When Marine contingents were compelled to move out of Gifu and Yamanashi Prefectures in mainland Japan in the face of mounting anti-U.S. base demonstrations and moved to Okinawa in the 1950's, a number of Pentagon strategists are reported to have cast doubt on the wisdom of such a shift. The U.S. Army was the major element in the U.S. Forces in Okinawa during the occupation period which ended in 1972 with reversion. Apparently, the Army recognized the limited value of being stationed in Okinawa and so withdrew, leaving behind only a few hundred troops. The Marines grabbed this chance to expand their role and function, taking over everything from the departing Army. They are not, however, deterrents against outside "threats" as they boast.

## Specific Link: South Korea Affirmative

### **Military presence in South Korea is critical to maintain readiness and prevent North Korean Aggression**

#### **Vancouverite, News Service, 5/24/2010**

“U.S. orders military readiness over North Korea aggression”,

<http://www.vancouverite.com/2010/05/24/u-s-orders-military-readiness-over-north-korea-aggression/>

BEIJING – U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has reiterated strong support for South Korea’s defense as President Obama ordered the U.S. military to be in a state of readiness. “The Republic of Korea can continue to count on the full support of the United States, as President Obama made clear when he spoke to President Lee last week,” said Clinton during a press briefing. “First, we endorse President Lee’s call on North Korea to come forward with the facts regarding this act of aggression and, above all, stop its belligerence and threatening behavior,” she said as tension continued to mount over the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel with the loss of 46 lives. “Second, our support for South Korea’s defense is unequivocal, and President Obama has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Korean counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression,” she said, reinforcing a statement made by Obama. ” As part of our ongoing dialogue, we will explore further enhancements to our joint posture on the Peninsula. Third, we support President Lee’s call to bring this issue to the United Nations Security Council,” she said. ” I will be working with Ambassador Rice and our Korean counterparts, as well as Japan, China, and other UN Security Council member states to reach agreement on a way forward in the Council.”

### **U.S. troops in South Korea are key to U.S. credibility throughout Asia**

#### **Alon Levkowitz, Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, 2008**

“The seventh withdrawal: has the US forces' journey back home from Korea begun?,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 131-148

The forces had several functions, bilateral and regional: 1. Deterring North Korea and preventing a new Korean War – The US assumption immediately after the war and for the majority of the years since it ended, was that South Korea could not deter North Korea by itself and it needed the assistance of the US forces.<sup>1</sup> 2. Demonstrating US commitment to Korea – The presence of US forces in Korea, especially by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as a ‘tripwire’ force that will ensure US involvement if any conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula, symbolized the highest US commitment to Korea's security. It also has an important psychological implication in assuring South Korean citizens that the Korean War will not reoccur (Hamm, 2004). 3. Supporting the Korean economy – The US forces (and the alliance) and the security ‘umbrella’ (conventional and nuclear) allowed South Korea to rebuild its economy after the Second World War and the Korean War and continue with its economic development ever since. It also gave political backup to South Korea's initiatives throughout the years to ease tensions in the Korean Peninsula (Cho, 1982; Hart-Landsberg, 1998). 4. Regional tasks – From a regional, strategic point of view, the importance of the US forces is threefold: preventing any changes in the balance of power in the region (Cumings, 1983; Clark, 1992); acting as a regional pacifier by allowing the US to respond very quickly and prevent a conflict from escalating in case a conflict arises outside or within the Korean Peninsula; and signaling US commitment not only to Korea but also to Japan and other Asian US allies in the region (Lee, 1978, pp. 107–108, 1982, p. 102).

## Specific Link: South Korea Affirmative

**US presence in South Korea is key to deterring China and North Korea, and keeping the region stable. Even the perception that the US is retrenching will cause war**

**Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow at AEI 5/1/2009**

Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,"  
<http://www.aei.org/article/100445>)

In fulfilling its security duties in the region, the U.S. military is providing one of the principle public goods of East Asia. To be sure, America's regional allies want Washington to participate in Asia's many diplomatic conferences and contribute to regional economic integration. But to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, one of the first American statesman to recognize the Pacific's importance, as much as Asians want the U.S. to "speak softly," they also want it to carry a "big stick." They welcome the U.S. for its unique ability to ensure a stable balance of power in a region marked by a rising global power, China, and a weak but dangerous nuclear nation, North Korea. All regional allies know that China has not become a postmodern, European-style power that eschews military force. To the contrary, China has become quite fond of its newfound military muscle. Beijing proudly displayed that might last week in Qingdao, as China celebrated the 60th anniversary of her growing navy. Neither has the conventional threat North Korea poses to its southern neighbor and Japan disappeared. Tokyo watches in dismay as Pyongyang inches ever closer to acquiring the means to deliver its nuclear weapons. But it is the transformation of Chinese military power that is causing the most Asian heartburn. China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China--mercifully--but there is already a military competition. Take China's submarine fleet for example. Since 1995 China placed into service 38 new submarines--a rate of 2.9 per year. In contrast, during the same period of time the U.S. has reduced its submarine force by about 25 boats. The Chinese have not only noticed the imbalance, they are counting on a continued decline in America's Pacific naval power. China's Rear Admiral Yang Yi gloated that "China already exceeds the United States in [submarine production] five times over . . . 18 [U.S. submarines--the amount resident in the Pacific] against 75 or more Chinese submarines is obviously not encouraging [from a U.S. perspective]." The Chinese admiral is spot on. U.S. boats are superior, though the quality gap is closing. And in this vast region, numbers matter. The rise of the Chinese submarine fleet and symmetrical decline in American subs is reflective of a broader trend. China is well on its way to having the greatest number of fighter planes, surface ships, missiles and submarines in the region. U.S. Secretary Gates rightly wants the military to concentrate on the "wars we are in." But we cannot do so at the expense of the military competition we are in. China military strength is not some futuristic abstraction. Indeed, we might think of China as a power-of-tomorrow, but our Asian allies see the daily realities of rising Chinese power. Beijing has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies and friends, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and India. The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea or China. Rather, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region. It has a strong interest in avoiding even the perception of American retrenchment. That would be a recipe for a spiraling arms race among the region's great powers. It is no accident that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, all capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, have not yet taken that road. They have been confident in the American security umbrella. If current trends continue, are we sure those states would not reconsider the wisdom of that policy?

## Specific Link: Turkey Affirmative

### **Presence in Turkey is key to overall hard power because of its strategic location**

**Hüseyin Bağcı and Saban Kardas, Middle East Technical University, 5/12/03,**  
“Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited,” Prepared for the  
CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112>

In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.<sup>[43]</sup> As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighborhood... All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."

## Specific Link: Turkey Affirmative

**The US presence in Turkey, especially at the Incirlik base, is key to power projection and overall hegemony**

**Henri Barkey, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, specialist in Turkish politics, 2003**

“The United States and Turkey.” Allies in Need, pp 209-211.

U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since 1990. The cold war’s straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the cold war was based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies’ interests and on globally expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention has shifted to mid-level powers such as Iran and Iraq with ambitions to acquire nonconventional weaponry and the means to deliver them. This policy vision lacks the simplicity of containment, but it has impacted Turkey significantly. Turkey’s proximity to many regions in flux or in conflict together with Ankara’s long-standing adherence to the NATO alliance helped Washington interpret this country’s geostrategic importance. Simply put, Turkey is important for the United States for four reasons. First, it serves as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power, as the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated. Saddam Hussein’s resilience in the aftermath of the war has made Ankara essential to staving the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes routinely patrol the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein’s forces away from Kurdish-controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey’s cooperation. Second, Turkey is also different and valuable because it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously. Its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms that are deployable, and it is committed to maintaining its spending on defense given its location in a ‘bad neighborhood.’ Third, Turkey is a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist’ regimes like Iran intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey’s strong links to the United States, NATO, and the West in general are in direct opposition to some of Iran’s regional preferences, if not designs. Hence, even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey’s reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s have changed the strategic setting in the Middle East—although much exaggerated by Arab countries—which helped Washington perceive Ankara as a more balanced regional player. Finally, for Washington, Turkey represents an alternative and successful example for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as the only Muslim NATO member and EU candidate. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey has had a vibrant, albeit flawed, democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization—well ahead of Latin America and, save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East.

## Specific Link: Afghanistan Affirmative

### **Afghanistan withdrawal sends a global signal of U.S. weakness and inspires power competition**

**Michael Weinstein, 11/12/2004**

Power and Interest News Report, p.

[http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_printable&report\\_id=235&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=235&language_id=1)

The persistence of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has hampered rebuilding efforts in both countries and blocked their emergence as credible democracies, diverts U.S. resources and attention from other interests and -- as long as progress is slow or nonexistent -- sends the message that Washington remains vulnerable. The recent election of Hamid Karzai to Afghanistan's presidency has not changed that country's political situation; power outside Kabul remains in the hands of warlords, the drug trade remains the major support of the country's economy, and the Taliban insurgency continues. In Iraq, Washington counts on elections in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly to provide legitimacy for the state-building process, but at present that goal seems unlikely to be achieved. Washington for the foreseeable future will be tied down managing the consequences of its earlier interventions. If Washington decides to retreat -- more likely from Iraq than from Afghanistan -- its loss of power will be confirmed, encouraging other powers to test its resolve elsewhere. Only in the unlikely case that Washington manages to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term will other powers think twice about probing U.S. vulnerabilities.

## Specific Link: Afghanistan Affirmative

**Presence in Afghanistan is critical to ensure US interests and military readiness because it provides training for 21<sup>st</sup> century styles of warfare**

**Lawrence Korb et. al., Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, He is also a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, 12/10 2008**

“Building a Military for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, Center for American Progress, December 10<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military\\_priorities.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military_priorities.html))

Embrace a new vision for the U.S. military. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the changing threat environment for the United States. It is increasingly likely that, in this post-9/11 world, U.S. troops will more frequently be assigned to non-traditional warfare tasks, including both kinetic and non-kinetic counterinsurgency operations, rather than full-scale conventional wars with near-peer competitors. While proficiency in conventional warfare cannot be allowed to lapse, the next administration should consider the type of conflicts most likely to be encountered when allocating limited funding to procurement, training, force expansion, and other budgetary requests. For the next four years, allow the defense budget to keep pace with inflation. As previously noted, today’s defense baseline budget is higher than it has been in real dollars since the end of the World War II. This sum, if used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. The substantial increase in defense spending during the Reagan administration, which saw DOD’s base budget increase by some 53 percent over five years, was followed by a sustained period of budget cuts of about 35 percent between 1985 and 1998. In contrast, the dramatic rise in base defense spending during the Korean War—DOD’s budget nearly quadrupled between 1950 and 1954—was followed by a long period of sustained but modest growth in DOD’s budget at an annual real increase of about 1.5 percent between 1954 and 1980. The latter precedent represents the better model to emulate. However, economic constraints and the almost unprecedented size of the current budget suggest that even small increases in the baseline budget can and should be avoided in the next administration’s first term. Include supplemental war funding in a consolidated budget. Long-term U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan require that an American military presence will be maintained in those countries for the foreseeable future, most of the cost of which should be paid for through supplemental appropriations. However, the services have taken advantage of these ostensibly “emergency” war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects. DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY 2010-13 defense budget priorities.

## AT: No Spillover Between Events

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[ ] US Weakness in one area is perceived by other countries

**Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999,**

“Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay>

In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia. Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another.

**Great-power adversaries like China perceive regional withdrawals as a signal of low resolve**

**Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999,**

“Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay>

Low points in American determination and leadership, such as the North Korean negotiations, did not go unnoticed. U.S. reactions encouraged Iraq's recalcitrance in its dealings with U.N. arms inspectors, accounted for North Korea's later face-off with Washington over demands to open its underground facilities to inspection (while demanding \$500 million to discontinue missile exports), and bolstered Serbia's reluctance, in the face of U.S.-led NATO efforts, to halt the bloodshed first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. A high-ranking Chinese military officer, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff, reportedly declared in 1995, in response to an American's unofficial warnings that Washington might react militarily to a Beijing attack on Taiwan, "No, you won't. We've watched you in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and you don't have the will."<sup>15</sup>

## Impact: Readiness Solves War

### **Readiness is critical to prevent rivals from lashing out and prevent war**

**Jack Spencer, Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, 9/15/2000**

“The Facts About Military Readiness”, Heritage Foundation, September 15<sup>th</sup>,  
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>)

America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,<sup>3</sup> concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."<sup>4</sup> According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.<sup>5</sup> Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>6</sup> Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

### **Lack of readiness invites aggression from enemies. This is especially true for the United States**

**Jack Spencer, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security at the Davis Institute at Heritage Foundation, 4-1, 2001**

(Don't Shortchange Defense. [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM734.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM734.cfm) |

Readiness is the ability of a military unit, such as an Army division, to accomplish its assigned mission. Any country that neglects to maintain a high state of readiness invites aggression from potential adversaries who assume that it is not prepared to defend its interests. A high state of readiness deters potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace. Today, potential adversaries threaten U.S. national interests in every region of the world. Yet in recent years, the readiness of the U.S. armed forces has declined. Logistics, spare parts, training programs, and morale, all of which contribute to readiness, deteriorated as forces and budgets decreased and non-combat operations increased. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Department of Defense funds about 80 percent of the cost of non-combat missions like peacekeeping in Kosovo with money from its operations and maintenance accounts--funds that should be used instead to purchase the supplies upon which readiness depends.

## Impact: Resolve is Key to Hegemony

**Resolve and credibility are key to hegemony. Weakness invites revisionist powers to challenge U.S. dominance**

**Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004**

“Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror,” online:

[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html)

The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.<sup>12</sup> The loss of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and irresolution, which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies. Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation and the observer, but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goal with sufficient resolve. By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist powers.<sup>13</sup> Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with “appeasement,” which is of course a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

**Resolve is key to prevent other countries from being aggressive**

**Bernard Chapin and Victor Davis Hanson –interviewer, and the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 12/7/09,**

“Change, weakness, disaster,” online: <http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/>

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

## Impact: Hegemony Solves War

**American dominance prevents war between the most powerful countries in the world. American troop presence in other regions is critical to this.**

**Stephen M. Walt, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Spring, 2002**

(American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls. Naval War College Review.

[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_2\\_55/ai\\_88174226](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_55/ai_88174226) |

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try. (8) The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave. (9) Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

## Impact: Hegemony Solves War

**The end of unipolarity results in multiple nuclear wars, systemic global conflict, and the magnification of all impacts.**

**Niall Ferguson, Professor of History at the School of Business at New York University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, September-October, 2004**  
A World Without Power. Foreign Policy, Lexis

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

## Impact: Conflict With China

### **A demonstration of resolve is essential to prevent China from invading Taiwan**

**Thomas Christensen, professor of politics at Princeton University, Spring, 2001**

“Posing problems without catching up.” International Security, EBSCO.)

On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a fairly impressive layered air defense system to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriot technology, China has purchased and is seeking to purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of this Russian technology might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAM systems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm.

### **A war between the US and China over Taiwan would result in nuclear weapon use**

**Straits Times 20000**

[6/25, “Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” lexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.



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# Readiness DA Aff

## Readiness DA Affirmative

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## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

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**[ ] Hegemony is already coming to a close. The Bush administration was the death knell of American power**

**Peter Goodspeed, National Post, 12/23/2009**

<http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2379362#ixzz0ajFLkxVK>

Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, estimates between 2000 and 2008 the U.S. share of the world's GDP fell by 32%, while that of China rose by 144%. "America is in unprecedented decline," he says. "The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell of American hegemony." The United States has experienced the most significant decline of any state, except the Soviet Union, since the mid-19th century, says Prof. Pape, adding: "Something fundamental has changed." While the U.S. intelligence report predicted a gradual growth in the influence of countries like Brazil, Russia, India and China, they are already starting to assert themselves on the world stage. In September, the Group of Eight leading economic countries agreed to share responsibility for the world economy with the G-20, shifting power to what is known as the BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China) which already has about 43% of the world's population and nearly a third of its GDP.

## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

**[ ] American power is declining. Many combinations of weaker countries can stand up to the United States**

**Robert A. Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University Chicago, 1/22/2009,**  
 "Empire Falls," in National Interest, January 22,  
<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484>

Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.

**[ ] Hegemony will decline in the coming years**

**Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M, Summer 2009**

“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1

According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.<sup>19</sup>

## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

[\_\_] **American decline is inevitable. It will lose power just like all other empires in history.**

**Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the George HW Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, 2009**

“America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25

Although there are some nuanced differences among offshore balancing’s proponents, they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. First, offshore balancers recognize that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing efforts of the other major powers in the international system. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried and failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Hitler (and, some would argue, under Kaiser Wilhelm II). Failure is the fate of hegemon. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive, and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power, the security of the others is threatened. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.<sup>4</sup> Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.<sup>5</sup> And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

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[ ] **Obama isn't showing resolve now, he refuses to act boldly on the international stage**

**Charles Krauthammer, Pulitzer prize winning columnist in international affairs, 5/21/10**

“Obama's many retreats signal U.S. weakness,” Washington Post,

<http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/may/21/charles-krauthammer-obamas-many-retreats-signal/?print=1>]

That picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-that-Uncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy. It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appease Iran, as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exerting sway over Eastern Europe, over Ukraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britain over the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia. And in Latin America, they see not just U.S. passivity as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his anti-American "Bolivarian" coalition while deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S. support in Honduras for a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country. This is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum. Nor is this retreat by inadvertence. This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

[\_\_] **North Korea and Iran prove that America has no resolve in the status quo**

**Dick Morris, American political author and commentator, 06/23/09,**

“Obama’s weakness issue”

<http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/dick-morris/47099-obamas-weakness-issue>

So now, as North Korea defies international sanctions and sends arms to Myanmar and Iran slaughters its citizens in the streets, President Obama looks helpless and hapless. He comes across as not having a clue how to handle the crises. And as North Korea prepares to launch a missile on a Hail Mary pass aimed at Hawaii, the Democrats slash 19 missile interceptors from the Defense Department budget. The transparent appeasement of Iran’s government — and its obvious lack of reciprocation — makes Obama look ridiculous. Long after the mullahs have suppressed what limited democracy they once allowed, Obama’s image problems will persist. While Americans generally applaud Obama’s outreach to the Muslims of the world and think highly of his Cairo speech, they are very dissatisfied with his inadequate efforts to stop Iran from developing — and North Korea from using — nuclear weapons. Clearly, his policies toward these two nations are a weak spot in his reputation. His failure to stand up to either aggressor is of a piece with his virtual surrender in the war on terror. Documented in our new book, Catastrophe, we show how he has disarmed the United States and simply elected to stop battling terrorists, freeing them from Guantánamo as he empowers them with every manner of constitutional protection. Obviously, the Iranian democracy demonstrators will not fare any better than their Chinese brethren did in Tiananmen Square. But the damage their brutal suppression will do to the Iranian government is going to be huge. The ayatollahs of Tehran have always sold themselves to the world’s Islamic faithful as the ultimate theocracy, marrying traditional Muslim values with the needs of modern governance. But now, in the wake of the bloodshed, they are revealed as nothing more than military dictators. All the romance is gone, just as it faded in wake of the tanks in Budapest and Prague. All that remains is power. China, of course, fared better after Tiananmen because of its economic miracle. But Iran has no such future on its horizon. The loss of prestige in the Arab world and the end of the pretense of government with popular support will cost Iran dearly. In the meantime, Obama’s pathetic performance vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea cannot but send a message to all of America’s enemies that the president of the United States does not believe in using power — that he is a wimp and they can get away with whatever they want. A dangerous reputation indeed.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

[ ] Obama's actions are already emboldening our enemies

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration's lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they've been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It's not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

## No Link

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**[ ] Single-country withdrawals don't link---forward-basing is increasing quickly across the globe**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

The world's failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed \$500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over \$100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. <sup>15</sup>

## No Link

[\_\_] Psychology and bias show that leaders do not perceive signs of resolve. Other countries will come up with an excuse to justify the US behavior.

**Michael Dennis and Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI's Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007**

“Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

What about the flip side of the question: does it follow that standing firm generates reputations of resolve in such an adversary? Mercer points out the tendency for critics to argue how past retreats explain future challenges but rarely consider how past victories fail to deter future challenges.<sup>56</sup> While staying in a conflict may deny opponents confirmatory evidence, this is not always the case. Further, does staying change beliefs or lead to reputations of resolution that will convince militant Islamists to give up the fight? We show that evidence of standing firm does not buy much reputational leverage with militant Islamists, who minimize or deny the firmness in the first place. The reason reputations for resolve do not form in the minds of those with motivated biases against a powerful enemy are the cognitive dissonance it would produce to the general paper tiger image. Biased expectations ensure that expected and actual responses are discounted so that successes and strength are explained away while irresolution is confirmed. Richard Ned Lebow finds in his study of crisis decision-making that desperate leaders insulate themselves and rationalize and interpret events to maintain expectations of success, so that “when goals flew in the face of reality they were not deterred but distorted reality to suit their needs.”<sup>57</sup> Richard Betts cites a “wishfully selective perception” among observers who conclude from U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia as indicative of the United States as a “paper tiger,” while discounting “decisive exercises of power” in Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan.<sup>58</sup>

## No Internal Link

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[ ] **Credibility is specific to every situation, there's no spillover**

**Michael Dennis and Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI's Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007**  
 "Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation," Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

A third critic of rational deterrence is Daryl Press, whose current calculus theory asserts that "credibility does not hinge on establishing a history of resolute actions"—only interests and power matter.<sup>24</sup> Press insists that credibility rests with situational power and interests rather than past actions.<sup>25</sup> By this view, a withdrawal from Iraq would not affect Islamist perceptions of U.S. resolve in the future. Credibility is case-specific to unique situations, thus making reputations irrelevant. Press suggests that statesmen merely assess interests and power in each specific instance to calculate whether an adversary's threat is credible: if they are strong and have strong interests at stake, the threat is credible regardless of past actions; scant power and interests yield dubious credibility regardless of past actions taken to bolster a reputation for resolve.<sup>26</sup>

[ ] **Studies show lack of resolve in one case doesn't spill over to a broad perception of weakness**

**Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004,**  
 "Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror," online:  
[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html)

The few studies that have examined the empirical evidence seem to agree with Mercer. Huth and Russett found few instances when a setback in one arena influenced state behavior in the second.<sup>30</sup> In the most convincing study, Hopf examined over 500 articles and 300 leadership speeches made by Soviet policymakers throughout the 1970s, and found that their public pronouncements did not show evidence of a belief that U.S. setbacks in the Third World signaled a lack of resolution. "The most dominant inference Soviet leaders made after Vietnam," concluded Hopf, "was not about falling regional dominoes or bandwagoning American allies, but about the prospects of détente with the United States and Western Europe."<sup>31</sup> Soviet behavior did not change despite the perception of incompetence that many Americans feared would inspire increased belligerence.<sup>32</sup> Despite the loss in Vietnam, no regional dominoes fell. In fact, there is no evidence of an increase in Soviet "adventurism" compared to the fifties and sixties, when U.S. credibility was high.<sup>33</sup> Mercer's conclusions about reputation seem to have been borne out.

## Link Turn

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**[ ] Even if withdrawing hurts hegemony, the alternative is much worse. The US looks immobile and unwilling to assess its policies**

**Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2009**

“Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, online:

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf>

Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ultimately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.<sup>26</sup> But what we’ve invested in the Afghanistan mission could all fall apart whether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 years from now. In fact, if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiers from having died in vain, pursuing a losing strategy would not vindicate their sacrifice. And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, much less hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is a losing strategy. Regardless, some people invoke memories of America’s ignominious withdrawals from Vietnam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster support for an open-ended commitment. President Bush in 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam emboldened today’s terrorists by compromising U.S. credibility. “Here at home,” he said, “some can argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carried no price to American credibility, but the terrorists see things differently.”<sup>27</sup> Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute agrees with that reasoning, writing that “the 1983 withdrawal from Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia a decade later emboldened Islamists who saw the United States as a paper tiger.”<sup>28</sup> When opinion leaders in Washington talk about “lessons learned” from Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else’s domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost.<sup>29</sup> But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we’ll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam: After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of 7 If leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for staying—prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.<sup>30</sup> For decades, the fear of America losing the world’s respect after withdrawing from a conflict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy.

## No Impact

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**[ ] American military presence does not create peace overseas. The negative overstates the importance of forward deployment**

**Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sapolsky, Department of Political Science at MIT, International Security, "America's Strategic Choices" v21 n4, 1997, p. 30-32**

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.[70] These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model.

## No Impact

[ ] **As long as tangible power exists the US will remain the hegemony**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:  
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

By the same token, foreign policy failures do not necessarily undermine predominance. Some have suggested that failure in Iraq would mean the end of predominance and unipolarity. But a superpower can lose a war — in Vietnam or in Iraq — without ceasing to be a superpower if the fundamental international conditions continue to support its predominance. So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance as it has consistently for six decades, and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as the Chinese describe it: one superpower and many great powers.

[ ] **There’s no such thing as credibility or resolve, other countries always make conservative assumptions about opponents’ intentions**

**Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005,**

“Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that reputation cannot form in conflicts because of the anarchical nature of international politics. Because of its simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer's. Anarchy remains the defining feature of international politics, so states operate within an environment of uncertainty. Anarchy produces "a strong sense of peril and doom"<sup>62</sup> and "a conservative tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worst plausible cause terms."<sup>63</sup> States have to consistently assume the worst possible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.<sup>64</sup> This "worst-case mentality" has major implications for reputation under anarchy on at least two fronts.<sup>65</sup> Foremost, because a state's security ultimately depends on self-help, the worst-case mentality means that a state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be irresolute. Essentially, this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and reputation becomes impossible to develop under anarchy. A state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its adversaries by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict, because its adversaries will always assume the state to be resolute (the baseline image) in the next conflict. By the same token, a state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its allies by their backing down or standing firm in a conflict, for its allies will always assume the state to be irresolute in the next conflict. A state is assigned its baseline image by its adversaries and allies at the beginning of a crisis, and no past behavior can change that image ex ante.<sup>66</sup>

## Impact Turn

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**[ ] A strategy of offshore balancing, where the United States withdraws troops from overseas would make the world more stable and keep the US out of potential conflicts**

**Stephen Walt, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 3/10/2005**  
(In the National Interest; A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy. Boston Review. Lexis)

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America's traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of "maintaining stability," and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends--to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder--but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened--as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan--and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America's favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America's power to advance its core interests.

## Impact Turn

### [ ] Hegemony draws us into wars, instead of keeping areas stable

**Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M, 2006**

The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 169)

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non-great power war on the Korean Peninsula-even if nuclear weapons were not involved-would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

### [ ] Reducing overseas military presence will prevent overstretch and conflicts with other countries

**Chalmers Johnson, retired professor of Asian Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 7/30/2009**

[<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175101>]

However ambitious President Barack Obama's domestic plans, one unacknowledged issue has the potential to destroy any reform efforts he might launch. Think of it as the 800-pound gorilla in the American living room: our longstanding reliance on imperialism and militarism in our relations with other countries and the vast, potentially ruinous global empire of bases that goes with it. The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment and the profligate use of it in missions for which it is hopelessly inappropriate will, sooner rather than later, condemn the United States to a devastating trio of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war, and insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the former Soviet Union. According to the 2008 official Pentagon inventory of our military bases around the world, our empire consists of 865 facilities in more than 40 countries and overseas U.S. territories. We deploy over 190,000 troops in 46 countries and territories. In just one such country, Japan, at the end of March 2008, we still had 99,295 people connected to U.S. military forces living and working there -- 49,364 members of our armed services, 45,753 dependent family members, and 4,178 civilian employees. Some 13,975 of these were crowded into the small island of Okinawa, the largest concentration of foreign troops anywhere in Japan. These massive concentrations of American military power outside the United States are not needed for our defense. They are, if anything, a prime contributor to our numerous conflicts with other countries. They are also unimaginably expensive. According to Anita Dancs, an analyst for the website Foreign Policy in Focus, the United States spends approximately \$250 billion each year maintaining its global military presence. The sole purpose of this is to give us hegemony -- that is, control or dominance -- over as many nations on the planet as possible.

## Impact Turn

[\_\_] Security competition between countries as a result of US withdrawal would be good for the US. Other countries would focus on each other and the US would become more powerful

**Christopher Layne, associate professor of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 1997,**  
International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 118-119

An offshore balancing strategy would be grounded on the assumption that relative economic power matters. Domestic economic revitalization and a neomercantilist international economic policy would be integral components of the strategy. The strategy, however, also would seek to maximize U.S. relative power by capitalizing on its geostrategically privileged position. If the United States adopted an offshore balancing strategy, security competitions almost certainly would occur in East Asia and Europe. The United States would be the primary beneficiary of these rivalries between (among) the other great powers in the emerging multipolar system. Noninsular states' constant worry about possible threats from nearby neighbors is a factor that historically has increased the relative power position of insular states.<sup>87</sup> Offshore balancing thus would be a more sophisticated power-maximizing strategy than preponderance: the United States would be able to enhance its relative power without having to confront rivals directly. Great powers that stand on the sidelines while their peers engage in security competitions and conflict invariably gain in relative power.<sup>88</sup>

Multipolarity challenges strategists because a state can be threatened by more than a single adversary. It is often unclear which of potential multiple rivals poses the most salient threat, whether measured in terms of capabilities, intentions, or time. In East Asia, where China and Japan are emerging great powers, the United States confronts this dilemma of multiple rivals. Offshore balancing is the classic grand strategic response of an insular great power facing two (or more) potential peer competitors in the same region. As an offshore balancer, the United States would increase its relative power against both China and Japan by letting them compete and balance against, and contain, each other.<sup>8</sup>