



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

2010-2011 Novice Packet Tournament Two

- South Korea Affirmative
- South Korea Negative

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

South Korea - Aff

South Korea Affirmative

Explanation:1
 Glossary:.....2

South Korea IAC 3-10

South Korea Military Modernization Add on..... 11-12

Inherency Extensions
 Inherency: Troops Will Remain in South Korea..... 13
 Inherency: South Korea Preventing US Withdrawal 14

Harms Extensions

Korean War Advantage
 Harms: Korean War Coming Now – Recent incidents.....15-16
 Harms: Korean War Coming Now – North Korean Provocations..... 17
 Harms: Impacts to Korean war18-19

Military Modernization Advantage
 Harms: South Korean Spending Low Now..... 20-21
 Harms: Withdrawal Forces Modernization..... 22
 Harms: Withdrawal Causes Chinese Involvement..... 23
 Harms: Chinese Involvement Solves War 24

Solvency Extensions
 Solvency: Troop Withdrawal Stabilizes Korean Peninsula 25
 Solvency: Offshore Balancing Stabilizes Korean Peninsula 26
 Answers To: Troop Presence Prevents War..... 27

Disadvantage Answers
 AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage28-29
 AT: Readiness Disadvantage..... 30-31
 AT: START Disadvantage..... 32-33

Explanation:

The term “United States Forces Korea” refers to the entire military troop presence stationed in South Korea, including the ground, air and naval divisions. The total force level is approximately 37,500 troops.

In 1978, the U.S. and South Korea formed the Combined Forces Command (CFC), based in Seoul, and with a U.S. general in charge. A few years ago, the U.S. agreed to transfer its wartime command authority to South Korea. The planned date for completion of the OPCON military transfer is April 2012, less than two years away. If the CFC command is indeed transferred to South Korea, two separate military commands will be created. South Korean military forces, now under the command in wartime of the U.S. commander of the joint command, will then be under the wartime command of the ROK military.

This transition has been highly controversial because of how the timing relates to possible instability and leadership changes in North Korea. Leaders in both the United States and South Korea are calling for the reversal of that agreement and some evidence indicates it may be put on hold for an indefinite time. This is based on the fear that the transfer would convey a sign of weakness and lack of resolve by the United States to defend South Korea against North Korea.

Many American military officials foresee a changing role for the ground forces in South Korea. President Obama and U.S. commanders have spoken in 2009 of the possibility that remaining U.S. ground combat units in South Korea would be deployed to Afghanistan or other active theatres of combat. This would mean the U.S. defense role in South Korea would primarily be an air and sea role.

This affirmative argues that, counter to what the United States believes, its troop presence along the border between North and South Korea is much of what is creating the conflict between the two countries. It argues that tensions are high now, and will increase to the point of war in the near future. The affirmative would withdraw the 28,500 troops from the Korean Peninsula, arguing that this would promote stability by encouraging negotiations between the two countries and forcing China to become involved with the peace process.

Glossary:

ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Pyongyang: Capital of North Korea

Seoul: Capital of South Korea

Demilitarized Zone: Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

FYI: PRC = People's Republic of China (China)

Offshore Balancing = Idea that the US should take a more passive role in international affairs, letting powerful countries manage their own regions.

Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not currently have them.

South Korea IAC [1/8]

Contention 1: Inherency

The US Currently has 28000 troops acting as a buffer between North Korea and South Korea, and no troop reductions are planned in the status quo

Viola Gienger, Writer for Bloomberg news, 10/21/2009,

<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arz7hYEpZMZY>

Defense Secretary Robert Gates pledged an “enduring” U.S. military presence in South Korea amid concerns the Asian nation isn’t ready to take control of their joint forces as planned within three years. In opening comments at the start of annual joint security talks in Seoul today, Gates and his South Korean counterpart, Defense Minister Kim Tae Young, vowed to strengthen their alliance to confront threats from North Korea. “The United States will continue to provide extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella to ensure” the security of South Korea, Gates said. “Key to that deterrent capability is our commitment to an enduring United States force presence on the Korean Peninsula as part of the combined defense posture.” The U.S. keeps about 28,500 troops in South Korea, down from about 37,000 five years ago, having agreed last year to amend a previous decision to reduce the level even more. Some former military officials have criticized an agreement by President Lee Myung Bak’s predecessor for the U.S. to hand over wartime operational control of joint forces by 2012.

However, these troops do not serve a strategic function in preventing war. South Korea’s military is strong enough to take care of itself.

Ted Galen Carpenter and Dough Bandow, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004,

The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127)

Moreover, even if the security of the South was vital to the United States, Washington's treaty and troops are not necessary to achieve that end. Nearly a decade ago the Department of Defense declared that "our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years."²⁹ Although America's presence probably was central to the maintenance of peace 50 years ago, it is not so today. After all, the raison d'être for Washington's defense of the ROK, a weak South Korea vulnerable to communist aggression orchestrated by Beijing or Moscow, has disappeared. That America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism does not mean that it is necessary to do so •³⁰ As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conceded: "Without U.S. help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North."³¹ An invasion that would be supported by no other nation, and certainly not by the DPRK's old allies, China and Russia.

FYI: ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

FYI: DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

South Korea IAC [2/8]

Contention 2: Harms

War is coming between North and South Korea, nuclear deterrence will fail

Chong Wook Chung, Visiting Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations (RSIS), Nanayang Technological University, 2010

“The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,”

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us_policy_toward_the_korean_peninsula.html)

After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North's apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation. Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons. The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbors. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.

FYI: Pyongyang = Capital of North Korea

South Korea IAC [3/8]

Continued North Korean provocations will draw the US into a nuclear conflict

Peter Hayes, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; 10/4/06

“The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony”

<http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html>)

If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviors in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washington’s attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat. Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone. Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is, the development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the United States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-use on both sides.

FYI: DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

FYI: Demilitarized Zone: Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

South Korea IAC [4/8]

Nuclear War over North Korea causes millions of deaths, collapses the world economy, and destroys attempts at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons

Peter Hayes and Michael Green, - *Victoria University AND **Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, 1/5/10

“-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack¹, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centers are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modeling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs² (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.³ In Westberg's view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth's protective ozone.⁴ These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships⁵, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

South Korea IAC [5/8]

Attacking North Korea doesn't solve-it will result in Global Nuclear War

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 4/22/03

“N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons'” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6020]

A decade ago, many American policymakers and pundits blithely talked about military options for destroying the Yongbyon reactor and other North Korean nuclear facilities. Many people, apparently including President Bush, seem to be making the same calculations again. It is not surprising that policymakers in Seoul, within easy reach of North Korean artillery and Scud missiles, have a different perspective. Officials in Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo also worry about radioactive fallout, missile attacks, refugee flows, economic turmoil and regional chaos. Even among the countries in the region most vulnerable to a North Korea with nuclear weapons, there is no constituency for war. South Korea is particularly adamant. As President Roh Moo Hyun said, "For Washington, their prime interest lies in getting rid of weapons of mass destruction to restore the world order, but for us it's a matter of survival." Some advocates of military action predict that Pyongyang would not retaliate against a blow to its nuclear facilities. Others propose coupling such a military strike with the use or threat of tactical nuclear weapons against the North's conventional forces. But to attack and assume the North would not respond would be a wild gamble. A military strike might not get all of Pyongyang's nuclear assets, and hitting the reprocessing facility and spent fuel rods could create radioactive fallout over China, Japan, Russia or South Korea. Moreover, given the official U.S. policy of preemption, designation of the North as a member of the "axis of evil" and the Iraq war, Pyongyang might decide that even a limited military strike was the opening of a war for regime change. In that case, it would make sense to roll the tanks. An account by a high-ranking defector, Cho Myung Chul, is particularly sobering. In analyzing Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, North Korean military officials concluded that Baghdad was too defensive. Cho related the North Korean view as: "If we're in a war, we'll use everything. And if there's a war, we should attack first, to take the initiative." He estimates the chances of general war at 80% in response to even a limited strike on Yongbyon. Unfortunately, "everything" is a daunting force: In addition to a large army, the North possesses long-range artillery and rocket launchers, up to 600 Scud missiles and additional longer-range No Dong missiles. And it has developed a significant number and range of chemical and perhaps biological weapons. Estimates as to the number of casualties run to more than 1 million. Also possible would be a limited retaliatory strike against the United States' Yongsan base in the center of Seoul. The Seoul-Inchon metropolis includes roughly half of South Korea's population, about 24 million people, and is the nation's industrial heartland. Pyongyang is thought to be able to fire up to 500,000 shells an hour into Seoul. Washington could hardly afford not to respond to an attack on Yongsan, yet retaliation would probably lead to general war. Such a scenario might threaten civilian control of the military in Seoul; the perception that South Koreans died because the U.S. acted against the wishes of the Roh administration might create a decisive split between Seoul and Washington. Dealing with North Korea could prove to be one of the most vexing challenges for this administration. Military action does not offer a simple solution but rather portends a real war of horrific destructiveness.

FYI: Pyongyang = Capital of North Korea

Plan: The United States federal government should withdraw its troop presence from South Korea.

South Korea IAC [6/8]

Contention 3: Solvency

Removing U.S. troops attracts genuine Chinese support for Korean reunification

Peter Van Nguyen, freelance writer based in Sydney, Australia. His articles have been published in OpEdnews, Asia Times Online and Foreign Policy Journal, 10/13/09

“U.S. bases are obstacle to Korean reunification,” UPI Asia, 10/13,

http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/13/us_bases_are_obstacle_to_korean_reunification/1193/

The United States believes that if the North collapsed, China would have to back reunification to demonstrate that it is a responsible player in regional cooperation. But in order to get the Chinese to endorse the plan, the United States would have to give up its strategic military bases in South Korea and order a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. Both Koreas have been constantly eyed by foreigners due to their geostrategic value in Northeast Asia. For China, Japan and the United States, the Koreas have provided a buffer zone for more than half a century since the end of the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is also seen as a predetermined battlefield if war breaks out between China, the United States and Japan. This would leave the warring states relatively untouched, as the three nations could avoid hitting each other’s territories, which would escalate the conflict and make it difficult for all parties to disengage for fear of losing face. But both Koreas would have to face the brunt of a full-scale war. For China, protecting North Korea means keeping the United States and its allies from encroaching on its border. China would rather maintain the status quo than accept a reunified Korea under South Korean administration. Therefore, China will do its best to stabilize North Korea and rebuild its political structure in line with Chinese interests. China might be forced to accept a reunified Korea if it wants to maintain an international image as a peace-promoting country. However, unless it gets some kind of security guarantee without losing the strategic balance in the region, there is little incentive for it to allow reunification to take place unchallenged. Since the end of the Korean War the United States has maintained a large military contingent in South Korea to deter an invasion attempt by the North. The U.S. military presence keeps China’s ambitions in check and in the bargain offers Japan some security, as the Japanese fear reprisals from the Chinese for atrocities committed during World War II. Besides, China’s growing economic and military clout has increased the necessity for a military presence in South Korea. However, U.S. military bases in South Korea could pose the greatest obstacle to a peaceful reunification of the Koreas. Even a unified Korea might not want the U.S. military, as reunification would make the objective of providing deterrence against the North redundant. A U.S. military base in a united Korea would only strain ties with China, as it would be difficult to explain why it was required if the North Korean threat no longer exists. Also, millions of North Koreans have a deeply embedded resentment against the United States and are highly suspicious of its geopolitical moves in the region. Many believe that the South Korean government is a puppet of the United States. Stationing troops in Korea after reunification would only reinforce this belief. This would create a deep rift within the Koreas and threaten to derail the reunification process. The complete withdrawal of all U.S. military bases and personnel from the Korean peninsula should follow after a timetable has been set, allowing the new Korea to handle its own security. The question is, will the United States pull out all its troops in order to allow the peaceful reunification of the Koreas? The United States has been dreading a scenario in which its military bases in South Korea could come under threat.

South Korea IAC [7/8]

Chinese involvement would prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and ensure stability in East Asia

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739]

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an "unfortunate incident." Beijing's ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation's commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today's badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North's impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North's ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan's sinking. Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

South Korea IAC [8/8]

Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea reverses North Korean nuclearization

Doug Bandow, senior policy fellow at Cato, 8/9/09,

“Bipolar Pyongyang ”, 8/9/09 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10523]

Secretary Clinton should invite the DPRK to send an envoy to Washington. (Enough supplicants have gone to Pyongyang.) The agenda would be to develop the parameters for any bilateral talks. The administration should indicate that it is willing to discuss most any issue, but genuine negotiations could be conducted only in a multilateral context—if not the six-party talks per se, then in an ongoing, parallel framework. The reason is simple: the North's nuclear program, accentuated by Pyongyang's predictable brinkmanship, is the principal barrier to improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States, as well as North Korea's neighbors. In response, Washington should indicate that it is prepared to work with the other parties to develop a comprehensive program to promote stability, security and prosperity for the Korean peninsula. The solution must be both regional and consensual. Washington should indicate that it has no intention of imposing a solution on other nations. During this period the administration should work with Seoul and the new Japanese government to craft a package that includes: a peace treaty, a nonaggression pact, phased U.S.-troop withdrawal, mutual diplomatic recognition, an end of sanctions, membership in international organizations, and bilateral and multilateral aid. In return, the North would agree to forgo nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, fully dismantle its existing nuclear facilities, relinquish all nuclear materials and accept intrusive inspections. The need for the latter is even more evident after Pyongyang's claim to be in the final stages of uranium enrichment. If true, that gives the lie to the regime's lengthy denial that it possessed such a capability. In return for bountiful benefits from engagement, the DPRK must agree to a process that ensures no more unpleasant surprises for its neighbors and America. Washington, South Korea and Tokyo should simultaneously work together to encourage more intensive Chinese involvement. With increasing pessimism in Beijing that North Korea will agree to give up its nuclear potential, the allies should suggest that the People's Republic of China closely coordinate its policy with theirs for one last serious attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis through negotiation. In essence, Pyongyang's three antagonists would provide the carrots while its ally would wield the stick. If the DPRK chose to obstruct and obfuscate, it would demonstrate that it does not desire a diplomatic solution. In that case, Beijing should support—and, more importantly, enforce—an enhanced sanctions regime. China also should consider using whatever influence it has within the North to encourage more responsible behavior and/or better leadership. To ease the PRC's concerns over the prospect of inadvertently sparking a North Korean implosion, the United States, South Korea and Japan should emphasize that the situation today is dangerously unstable, despite the fact that Pyongyang is in its manic phase. Should the result of Chinese pressure be social collapse, the three allies would contribute financially. Moreover, both Washington and Seoul should promise that there would be no American military presence in a reunified Korea.

South Korea Military Modernization Add on

Add on Advantage: South Korean Military modernization

South Korea is currently free riding off of US deterrence and troops in the region, spending far below what they would be otherwise. It must take the lead to help the US deter rising Asian countries

Bruce Bennett, Senior Policy Analyst – RAND Corporation, 1/29/2010

“S. Korea’s Military Capability ‘Inadequate’”, Chosun Ilbo,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/01/29/2010012900705.html)

An American academic says South Korea's military capabilities are inadequate to handle a North Korean invasion or other North Korean military action or regime collapse there. In an article entitled "Managing Catastrophic North Korea Risks," Bruce Bennett, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, said South Korea could face a crisis if it fails to enhance its military capabilities through modernization of equipment and personnel capable of using and maintaining it. He cited South Korea's outdated weapons, inadequate military budget, and reduced conscription period as the rationale for his claim. Many major South Korean weapon systems "are very old, such as M48 tanks and F-5 aircraft originally designed and produced three decades or more ago," he said. By contrast, "the U.S. military spends some 16 times as much as the [South Korean] military on equipment acquisition each year despite the U.S. forces having only twice as many personnel. U.S. military research and development spending is some 50 times" South Korean spending each year. He said that the South Korean military budget "has been too small to acquire key military capabilities. Thus few [South Korean] soldiers have GPS to identify their own or adversary locations with accuracy, making precision battlefield attacks difficult and increasing the potential for friendly fire. But in civilian life, many soldiers have GPS in their cars." He pointed out that South Korea and the United States have worked together for almost 60 years "to deter and defeat North Korean military threats. But while the United States remains ready to assist" South Korea, Seoul's security is ultimately Seoul's responsibility and it "must take the lead." South Korea's military budget is inadequate for "assuring the security of the Korean people from North Korea's catastrophic threats," he added.

US withdrawal would force South Korean military advancement

JJ Suh, Director of the Korea Studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 5/17/10

“Allied to Race? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Arms Race”, Foreign Policy in Focus,
http://www.fpi.org/articles/allied_to_race_the_us-korea_alliance_and_arms_race)

Using the second, more indirect measure is more complicated for it involves counterfactual estimates. One needs to estimate the marginal increase in Seoul’s defense expenditure if the alliance were terminated. This in turn involves assessing two kinds of costs. First, if the alliance were terminated and the American military withdrawn, Korea would first have to fill the void with its own forces at its own cost. Some 40,000 American soldiers would have to be replaced with Koreans, and all the facilities manned by Americans would have to be managed by Koreans. These extra personnel would have to be paid, and the operating costs of the facilities would have to be borne by Seoul. This is exactly the argument that the Ministry of National Defense made in its defense of the alliance: The U.S. Forces in Korea help us [Koreans] reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.

South Korea Military Modernization Add on

South Korean deterrence stops Chinese, Japanese, and Russian aggression

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 1996,

Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, p. 63-64)

None of those arguments suggests that any vital American interests are at stake. Thus, the most obvious reason to threaten to go to war does not apply to Korea. Rather, America's second most important and costly commitment (after Europe) is rooted in the more nebulous concept of regional "stability." But the "stability" argument fails to distinguish between U.S. influence in East Asia and a defense commitment to the ROK. The latter is not necessary for the former. First, the Mutual Defense Treaty yields America little benefit. As noted earlier, while a commitment to defend Seoul from North Korea helps stabilize the peninsula, the benefits of doing so accrue mostly to the ROK and to a lesser degree to neighboring nations. The advantages to America, based on proximity, if nothing else, are much more modest. Second, a militarily stronger South Korea, the probable consequence of a U.S. withdrawal, would promote regional stability almost as much as could the U.S. presence, by deterring aggression by not only Pyongyang but also by China, Japan, or Russia. (Those nations will always be able to outdo even a united Korea militarily, but the latter could make the prospect of war too expensive for any of them to seriously contemplate.) At the same time, it is hard to imagine even a more powerful Korea being in a position to threaten any of its major neighbors.

East Asian aggression leads to nuclear war

Jonathon Landy, National Security and International Correspondent, Knight Rider, 3/10/2000

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster. In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stake could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

Inherency: Troops Will Remain in South Korea

North Korean security concerns mean there will be no troop reductions in the future

Lee Jong-Heon, United Press International Correspondent, 2/4/10, UPI,

http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul_seeks_extended_us_protection/2951.

But the U.S. military said on Thursday that it has no immediate plan to redeploy troops from South Korea. In a statement, the command of the U.S. Forces Korea said a redeployment of its troops, even if necessary, would only be possible in the late 2010s after close consultations with South Korea. "The defense of the ROK (South Korea) remains the core mission of U.S. forces in Korea now and in the future, and there will be no reduction of U.S. forces in Korea tied to wartime operational control transition on April 17, 2012," it said. In return for longer U.S. military protection, South Korea has vowed to use an inter-Korean summit it is pushing to hold this year to persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons. "Denuclearization of the peninsula must be the most important agenda item if an inter-Korean summit takes place," a Foreign Ministry official said. "A summit should be arranged as a way to address international concerns about the North's nuclear weapons," he said. In an apparent bid to coordinate summit agenda items with White House officials, Kim Tae-hyo, secretary to President Lee for national s

Inherency: South Korea Preventing US Withdrawal

New unstable situation prompts delay in U.S. withdrawal

Jay Solomon, Staff Writer, May 31, 2010.

(Wall Street Journal (Online). New York, N.Y.: Lexis-Nexis)

The North's alleged attack March 26 on the South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, however, has shaken up Seoul's strategic thinking, according to South Korean and U.S. officials. A major concern here now is that Pyongyang's development of nuclear technologies has provided leader Kim Jong Il with a deterrent against the more-advanced militaries of the U.S. and South Korea. This, in turn, could allow Pyongyang to stage more-aggressive conventional attacks on the South, with the belief that Seoul won't retaliate for fear of an escalation. This fear seems to have been borne out in recent days as Mr. Lee's government has shown a reluctance to take some new steps to challenge Pyongyang over the Cheonan incident. Seoul, for example, stepped back from an initial pledge to use loudspeakers to blast pro-South Korean propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas after the North threatened to attack the broadcasting infrastructure. Still, many leading defense thinkers in Seoul said Pyongyang's growing nuclear technologies are "game changers" that now require South Korea to significantly upgrade its own capabilities. In addition to developing longer-range missiles, many are calling for the purchases of advanced new strike-fighters and antiballistic-missile batteries. They also are calling for the Pentagon to remain in charge of the joint-military command in South Korea beyond 2012, given the lethal effectiveness displayed by North Korea's mini-submarine fleet during the Cheonan attack.

FYIL Demilitarized Zone= Strip of land between North and South Korea that serves as a buffer to prevent war.

FYI: Cheonan = Incident where a South Korean ship (the Cheonan) sunk, the sinking believed to have been caused by a North Korean torpedo.

South Korea is delaying military command transfer due to unpreparedness

Jay Solomon, Staff Writer, May 31, 2010.

(Wall Street Journal (Online). New York, N.Y.: Lexis-Nexis)

South Korean defense strategists already are publicly pressing Mr. Lee to delay the planned 2012 transfer of operational control of the combined U.S.-South Korean fighting force to Seoul from Washington, arguing South Korea isn't prepared yet to oversee American forces. The agreement between Washington and Seoul has a clause that allows South Korea's president to formally request a suspension of the transfer. The U.S. currently deploys 29,000 troops in South Korea, and the South Korean military deploys 600,000.

Harms: Korean War Coming Now – Recent incidents

The risk of Korean war is high – current disputes could escalate

Simon Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, 5/24/10,
 The Guardian, " China faces tough choices over Korea ",
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-korea>)

The risk of renewed, all-out warfare on the Korean peninsula is rated low by most western and Chinese analysts. But the chances of escalating armed clashes, planned or otherwise, have risen significantly following South Korea's decision to punish the North for the March sinking of its naval corvette, the Cheonan. And once shooting starts, it can be hard to stop. Today's South Korean announcement that it is planning joint anti-submarine exercises with the US provides one obvious possible flashpoint. Seoul says a North Korean torpedo destroyed the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. If its vengeful navy were to encounter another of Kim Jong-il's submarines, mayhem may ensue. President Lee Myung-bak's move to resume psy-ops (psychological warfare operations) along the demilitarized zone, including broadcast propaganda messages targeted at North Korean troops, has already led Pyongyang to threaten to shoot up the border. And if the South makes good its vow to intercept North Korean commercial shipping, more trouble is likely. Both sides have much to lose if violence ratchets up. "This latest violence is as unlikely as previous incidents to lead to renewal of general fighting," said author Arthur Cyr in the China Post. "The Korean war was extraordinarily costly, and neither side has ever tried to renew such hostilities. North Korea now has at least a primitive nuclear weapon, but any use would result in instant devastating retaliation." The US, with 29,000 troops based in the South, may quickly be drawn into any new skirmishing. Barack Obama has directed the US military to be ready "to deter future aggression" and is demanding the North admit responsibility and apologies. But cash-strapped Washington has no appetite, and scant capacity, for more war, with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq unfinished. Much the same goes for Japan, which is backing South Korea at the UN security council.

Harms: Korean War Coming Now – Recent Incidents

Recent incidents between North and South Korea prove that the risk of war is high

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, 4/6/10

“An Unstable Rogue”, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144>)

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior. Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned direct attacks on South Korea and the United States. Now we are no longer sure. Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and spilling outward seems real. Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea. There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help. Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else? South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy, the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites. Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea. Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires. Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

FYI: PRC = People’s Republic of China (China)

Harms: Korean War Coming Now – North Korean Provocations

North Korea still wants to reunify Korea - this will lead to war

Colin Robinson and Stephen H. Baker *CDI Research Analyst **Senior Fellow at the Center for Defense Information (Colin and Stephen H., May 2003,
 “Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences,” <http://www.cdi.org/north-korea/north-korea-crisis.pdf>)

However, the embattled state hung on. Despite a collapsing economy, widespread famine, and cooling relations with its previous major supporters – the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation – North Korea not only survived but also managed to bolster its conventional forces and, according to North Korean officials, covertly build a small nuclear arsenal. Its still avowed aim of reunifying the Peninsula under communist rule, and the massive military force it has built to be able to do so, present a continuing threat of war in North East Asia.

North Korea will engage in additional provocations

Bruce Klingner, - Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, “It Was A North Korean Torpedo”, 5/20/2010
<http://blog.heritage.org/2010/05/20/it-was-a-north-korean-torpedo/>)

As if the Cheonan attack was not bad enough, Seoul will be nervously waiting for the other shoe to drop. It can be expected that North Korea will react strongly to any international efforts to punish it for the Cheonan attack. It is also likely that the Cheonan sinking is not a singular event but rather the beginning of a North Korean campaign to raise tensions. Pyongyang could even be looking for a strong international response to the Cheonan sinking in order to justify additional belligerent behavior. If that is the case, then North Korea will engage in additional provocative behavior, particularly in the run-up to Seoul’s hosting of the G-20 summit in November.

Future North Korean provocations are inevitable

Michael Auslin, - director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute. (Michael, “Asia’s Troubled Waters,” *Wall Street Journal*, 5/21/10
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957904575253292263660122.html?mod=google_news_wsj

Naval clashes between North and South have been a regular feature of the Korean standoff for the past decades. But the unprovoked sinking of the Cheonan is a major escalation in the North’s actions that may well portend even larger clashes—especially if Kim Jong Il feels his navy has escaped scot-free in the murder of dozens of South Korean sailors.

Harms: Impacts to Korean war

A Korean conflict would cause nuclear war and extinction

Chol, Director Center for Korean American Peace, 2002 10/24/02,
http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html)

Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." Continues...The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power.

A Korean war would result in the use of chemical and biological weapons

Park Tong-Whan, KORUS Institute, 2004,

From Collective Defense to Security Co-Management: Thoughts About the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, "The United States and South Korea: Reinvigorating the Partnership," www.keia.com/2-Publications/2-3-Monograph/Monograph2004/Monograph2004.pdf,

But Pyongyang's qualitative deficiency in conventional forces is more than made up by its unconventional forces. It is known to have a strong chemical and biological warfare capability along with perhaps a few crude nuclear devices. ² Moreover, North Korea has more than 100,000 special forces—the world's largest special forces—trained to stage a guerrilla war behind the lines. North Korea reportedly maintains a large contingent of spies and sympathizers in the South. In a war, the asymmetry in military capability between the two sides might play out this way: Pyongyang ignites internal turmoil in South Korea with its "sleeper" agents, and the special forces infiltrate by air and through tunnels. As the guerrilla-style agitation builds, Seoul will find it extremely difficult to suppress the turmoil. South Korea's only option will be a full-scale retaliation against the North; this will escalate into an all-out war. Although the ROK-U.S. combined forces will expect to win eventually, the two Koreas will suffer unbearable damage, including the prospect of extinction for the North Korean regime. Faced with this imminent danger, the Pyongyang regime will resort to WMD, including atomic bombs. Pyongyang's use of nuclear weapons will force the United States to respond in kind, resulting in devastation beyond imagination.

Harms: Impacts to Korean War

The resulting proliferation from the war will result in nuclear war

Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and former Senior Member of the National Security Council Staff, Summer 2002,

Survival, "Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions", Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s, with most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

US-North-South Korean nuclear war would be the bloodiest war since Vietnam.

Scott Stossel, graduate of Harvard Law and Atlantic magazine editor August 2005,

http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/KayDavid.NorthKoreaTheWarGame.07.05.pdf

The North Korean situation is also ripe for war-game treatment, because of the extraordinarily difficult military and diplomatic challenges it presents. Iran, considered an urgent national-security priority, is thought to be three to five years away from possessing even a single nuclear device. North Korea is widely believed to have as many as ten already, and to be producing more every year. (It is also the first developing nation thought to be capable of striking the continental United States with a long-range ballistic missile.) And whereas Iraq did not, after all, have weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is believed to have large stockpiles of chemical weapons (mustard gas, sarin, VX nerve agent) and biological weapons (anthrax, botulism, cholera, hemorrhagic fever, plague, smallpox, typhoid, yellow fever). An actual war on the Korean peninsula would almost certainly be the bloodiest America has fought since Vietnam—possibly since World War II. In recent years Pentagon experts have estimated that the first ninety days of such a conflict might produce 300,000 to 500,000 South Korean and American military casualties, along with hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. The damage to South Korea alone would rock the global economy.

Harms: South Korean Spending Low Now

South Korea is free-riding – current U.S. defense provisions cause underinvestment in conventional forces

Ted Galen Carpenter and Dough Bandow, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004,

The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127)

Thus, America's military presence and the subsequent "mutual" defense treaty invited ROK free-riding at the start, given the disparity in power of the two signatories. Such behavior was not only expected but arguably justified. By underinvesting in the military and focusing on economic development, Seoul set the stage for the eventual financial miracle that has transformed South Korea into a major international economic power. But once that transformation was under way, it was time to increase the ROK's defense burden and decrease America's responsibility. That never happened. Shocked outrage greeted President Jimmy Carter's proposal to remove most U.S. troops, and that proposal eventually died. Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, reaffirmed the one-way U.S. commitment. Year after year of record economic growth did nothing to change American policy under presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Only pressure from the war on terrorism has prompted President George W. Bush to reconfigure, and perhaps finally reduce, Washington's force presence. South Korea is one of America's most obvious security free-riders. The ROK vastly outstrips its northern antagonist, possessing about 40 times the GDP, enjoying a vast technological edge, and sporting a large economic presence around the globe. The South also has twice the population of the DPRK, is friendly with every major international and regional power, in contrast to the erratic North, and long ago won the diplomatic contest throughout the Third World. However, argues Peter Huessy of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting firm, "the ROK's population, GDP and per capita income are all irrelevant to its defense."² That is true only in the sense of the South's military capabilities today. It says nothing about its potential defense capabilities. Moreover, simply citing the North's quantitative lead, 1.1 million to 686,000 armed services personnel, for instance (as defenders of the U.S. commitment to South Korea typically do), does not say much about actual combat capabilities either.' In any case, the existing personnel and materiel imbalance is not inevitable, some immutable aspect of geography on the Korean peninsula. Rather, it results from past ROK free-riding. Seoul's failure to invest heavily in defense today to close the gap reflects current free-riding. The South can do so only because it relies on the U.S. presence as a supplemental deterrent to North Korean aggression. That the relationship is beneficial to the ROK is obvious. That it is in America's interest is not.

Harms: South Korean Spending Low Now

Without US defense, South Korea's defense budget would increase several fold

Selig S. Harrison, Senior Scholar – Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Director of the Asia Program – Center for International Policy, 4/11/06

“South Korea-U.S. Alliance Under the Roh Government”, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0628Harrison.html>)

Without its U.S. subsidy, Seoul would have to double or triple its military budget if it wanted to replace the conventional forces now deployed for its defense by the United States - not to mention the much higher outlays that independent nuclear forces would require. In addition to the direct costs of its forces in Korea, averaging \$2 billion per year, the United States spends more than \$40 billion annually to maintain the overall U.S. defense posture in East Asia and the western Pacific on which its capability to intervene in Korea depends. So long as Seoul regards this U.S. economic cushion as an entitlement, it will be under no compulsion to decide whether to move toward the confederation envisaged in the June, 2000, summit, as a prelude to eventual reunification. A significant portion of the South Korean defense budget goes to a vast military-industrial complex. There are more than 80 defense contractors in the South producing some 350 categories of defense equipment in nearly 150 factories. This powerful interest group, allied with leaders of the armed forces, opposes reduced defense expenditures. To be sure, there are certain aspects of the U.S. military presence that are particularly crucial to the defense of the South: sophisticated command and control and intelligence capabilities in particular. Seoul would be wise to upgrade these capabilities to prepare for an eventual U.S. withdrawal, even at a high cost. Some spending on them is already underway and is justified. But that is very different from a broad-based, across-the-board expansion of the armed forces designed to replace the overall U.S. presence.

Harms: Withdrawal Forces Modernization

Reliance on US prevents South Korean military modernization which is key to deterring Pyongyang

Ronald Mangum, Professor who is a retired U.S. Army Brigadier General, Spring 2004, “Joint Force Training: Key to ROK Military Transformation”, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 16(1), Spring, http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/06_ronald_s_mangum.pdf)

Even though adopting joint training and doctrine will enhance ROK military capabilities, there are two limiting factors which may have to be overcome before military transformation can proceed. The first limiting factor is the cost of transformation. The ROK currently has a well-equipped medium-heavy infantry-centric force, but the ROK alliance with the United States has permitted the ROK government to rely on U.S. military capability instead of acquiring its own comparable weapons systems.⁴ The failure to acquire new weapons has restricted the capability of ROK forces of all services to a level at which many believe that the ROK will have difficulty repelling a concerted attack by North Korea without U.S. support.⁵ If you take away the U.S. military capabilities that are committed to the defense of South Korea, it becomes difficult to assess the relative strength of the South Korean army against its North Korean neighbors. While the ROK Army is large—over 650,000 soldiers—its large size may belie its capability. Some writers have suggested, for example, that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division alone, currently stationed around the Uijeonbu area north of the South Korean capital of Seoul, surpasses the firepower of 3-4 ROK divisions, exceeding a ROK corps in strength.⁶ In addition, U.S. capabilities of high performance fighter aircraft, precision-guided munitions and sophisticated communications simply don't exist in the ROK inventory. This lack of firepower is what leads analysts to determine that without U.S. military assistance, the ROK military would not be able to stop a North Korean military attack. Furthermore, this cost estimate does not address the cost required to repair existing military infrastructure—barracks, for example—to bring quality of life for ROK soldiers in line with modern standards. A recent article decried the Spartan condition of ROK army barracks that are more than 40 years old and in which battalion-sized units of 400 often use a bathroom suited for 40 soldiers. Reliance on U.S. military support for its defense needs has also permitted the ROK government to ignore upgrades in basic weaponry. Most ROK tanks were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and spare parts are no longer being produced. Many ROK helicopters have been in service for more than 40 years— long beyond their expected useful life. So even if the ROK were to continue to rely on the U.S. military presence, it must bear the cost to upgrade quality of life for its soldiers and its weapons systems.

Harms: Withdrawal Causes Chinese Involvement

The plan solves - withdrawing troops will immediately spur Chinese action on North Korea to prevent South Korean

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, 11/11/06

“Nuclear Neighbors Might Thwart N. Korea,” Chicago Sun Times,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6772)

Instead of putting a leash on Japan and South Korea, U.S. officials should inform Pyongyang -- and Beijing -- that if the North insists on wielding nuclear weapons, Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about whether to acquire strategic deterrents. The mere possibility that South Korea and Japan might do so would come as an unpleasant surprise to both North Korea and China. The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. That would be inappropriate. It is sufficient if Washington informs those governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States needs to let Seoul and Tokyo know that we intend to withdraw our military forces from South Korea and Japan. In an environment with a nuclear-armed North Korea, those forward-deployed forces are not military assets; they are nuclear hostages. Faced with a dangerous, nuclear-capable neighbor and a more limited U.S. military commitment to the region, Japan or South Korea (or both) might well decide to build a nuclear deterrent. Although the Japanese public seems reluctant to go down that path, the attitude in South Korea is different. A public opinion poll taken shortly after Pyongyang's nuclear test showed that a majority of respondents believed South Korea should develop a deterrent of its own. The prospect of additional nuclear weapons proliferation in northeast Asia obviously is not an ideal outcome. But offsetting the North's looming illicit advantage may be the best of a bad set of options. Moreover, the real danger arising from proliferation is when repulsive rogue states such as North Korea get such weapons, not when stable, democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea do so in self-defense. If the North had to deal with nuclear neighbors, whom it could not so easily intimidate, it might have to abandon its current provocative course. Indeed, Pyongyang might face the prospect of confronting more prosperous adversaries that could easily build larger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenals than it could hope to do. Kim's regime might then conclude that keeping the region non-nuclear would be more productive. Even if it does not do so, a nuclear balance of power in the region would likely emerge instead of a North Korean nuclear monopoly. The prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan is also the one factor that might galvanize the Chinese to put serious diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions. Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer expresses that thesis starkly: "We should go to the Chinese and tell them plainly that if they do not join us in squeezing North Korea and thus stopping its march to go nuclear, we will endorse any Japanese attempt to create a nuclear deterrent of its own. . . . If our nightmare is a nuclear North Korea, China's is a nuclear Japan. It's time to share the nightmares." Even if one does not embrace Krauthammer's approach, the reality is that if the United States blocks the possible emergence of a northeast Asian nuclear balance, it will be stuck with the responsibility of shielding non-nuclear allies from a volatile, nuclear-armed North Korea. More proliferation may be a troubling outcome, but it beats that scenario.

Harms: Chinese Involvement Solves War

Increasing Chinese involvement in North Korea will create a peaceful solution – it's the only way to avoid war or North Korean collapse

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739]

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict. And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an “unfortunate incident.” Beijing’s ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But even if peace survives, today’s badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord, even without Chinese pressure. There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North’s impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North’s ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing pressure on the South and Japan to develop countervailing arsenals. Beijing should take the lead in forging a new, active policy designed to both denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North. In fact, a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation for the Cheonan’s sinking. Although few people expect the Koreans to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.

China is vital to solving North Korean conflict

Simon Tisdale, assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist, 5/24/10,

The Guardian, " China faces tough choices over Korea ",

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-korea>)

The unpalatable truth is Washington has failed utterly to resolve the North Korean conundrum over a period of decades. Neither carrot nor stick has worked, while the problem has grown steadily worse. If any one country has sufficient leverage to prevent escalation of the current crisis and open the path to a solution, it is China, not the US. Beijing is the North's only serious ally. It is its biggest trading partner, provides food and fuel, and recently gained Kim's agreement to expanded co-operation in talks in Beijing. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, recognizes this fact. In Beijing for this week's US-China strategic dialogue, Clinton is urgently pressing Chinese leaders to rein in their rogue neighbor. "The North Koreans will be more easily dissuaded from further attacks if they don't get cover from China," Michael Green of the Centre for International Studies told the New York Times. "It is absolutely critical to Korea and the US that China send that signal."

Solvency: Troop Withdrawal Stabilizes Korean Peninsula

U.S. withdrawal would stabilize the peninsula

**Doug Bandow , senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 12/16/91,
“Defusing the Korean Bomb” , http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1539]**

Moreover, Washington should indicate its readiness to phase its forces out of the South, a move that Pyongyang has persistently demanded.[27] In fact, a troop pullout is long overdue, given Seoul's ability to provide for its own defense. The ROK's advantages over North Korea are objectively overwhelming: 11 times the GNP, the fastest economic growth rate in Asia, a dramatic technological lead, unencumbered access to international credit markets, and twice the population.[28] The South is fully capable of overtaking the DPRK militarily if it chooses, and it is more likely to do so if it can no longer rely on American assistance. Indeed, the Nixon administration's limited troop withdrawals in the early 1970s spurred the higher South Korean defense outlays that are now carrying the ROK past Pyongyang militarily. If the North really desires peace, as it claims, it could match an American withdrawal by accepting international inspection of its nuclear facilities, pulling its forces back from their advanced positions along the DMZ, and demobilizing some units. Then, no major South Korean defense hikes would be necessary. Instead, the two Koreas could negotiate a gradual reduction in both nations' forces complemented by further increases in cooperation and trade (building on the modest increases of the past year) followed perhaps by eventual reunification. But the American troops should be withdrawn regardless of North Korea's response, given the South's evident ability to create a military capable of deterring the DPRK. The carrot for the North is that concrete actions on its part-- particularly compliance with the NPT, which would demonstrate a genuine commitment to détente--would both speed up the U.S. withdrawal and forestall a South Korean military buildup. Although the ultimate goal of American disengagement would not be in doubt, the timing of that disengagement would reflect conditions on the peninsula.

The U.S. should remove troops in order to make North Korea more likely to negotiate over its nuclear weapons

**Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 10/4/99
“Hugs for Pyongyang” , http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4998]**

Over the long term Washington should disentangle itself from Northeast Asia. The United States should step back, leaving Seoul and Tokyo to take the lead in dealing with the North. More important, Washington should develop a phased withdrawal program for its troops, and terminate the defense treaty when the pullout is complete. The ROK should then challenge the North to respond positively by demobilizing some army units and withdrawing some advanced forces from the Demilitarized Zone. The South's private message should be more blunt: negotiate for serious arms reduction, or face a crushing arms race (including missile development) which North Korea cannot win. And the ROK and Japan should expand security cooperation that, despite some recent positive steps, remains minimal. Pyongyang's expressed willingness to back off its planned missile test offers only a temporary respite in a continuing game of international chicken. The United States should begin shifting responsibility for security in Northeast Asia onto its allies, who benefit the most from stability. The Cold War is over; it is time to terminate America's obsolete Cold War deployment in Korea.

Solvency: Offshore Balancing Stabilizes Korean Peninsula

After withdrawing troops, the US would pursue a strategy of offshore balancing that would more effectively end the dispute between North and South Korea

Christopher Layne, professor of government at Texas A & M University, 2006

The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 189)

An offshore balancing grand strategy must be implemented carefully. Because of the terrorist threat, the recommended changes in U.S. strategy toward the Gulf and Middle East should be put in place swiftly. On the other hand, because of the complexities and long-term strategic implications of an American shift to an offshore balancing strategy, U.S. military power should be retracted from Europe and East Asia gradually, and in consultation with the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans. An orderly, phased U.S. withdrawal will give the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans time to adjust to America's new grand strategy. As part of the change in grand strategy, the United States should be prepared to assist the Europeans, Japanese, and Koreans in building up their independent military capabilities through arms sales and technology transfers. Also, although the United States will not maintain an ongoing forward military presence in Eurasia, it should seek to maintain close military contacts with the Europeans and the Japanese-and develop them with India and Russia-and conduct regular joint exercises. Because future geopolitical conditions might necessitate the reinsertion of U.S. military power into Eurasia, the United States should maintain a network of basing rights that can be used for this purpose should it become necessary. Finally, the adoption of offshore balancing is bound to result in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan, Germany (either as a national nuclear force or as part of an EU nuclear force), and possibly Korea. The United States should relax its nonproliferation policy and help these states, and both India and Pakistan (which already have nuclear weapons), acquire the technology to build survivable forces, and to maintain secure command and control over their nuclear arsenals. Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states-notably China-rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

FYI: Offshore Balancing = Idea that the US should take a more passive role in international affairs, letting powerful countries manage their own regions.

Answers To: Troop Presence Prevents War

American troops on the Korean Peninsula do not serve a strategic function in preventing war. South Korea's military is strong enough to take care of itself.

Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 5/3/10,

“Taming Pyongyang” ,5/3/10 http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11739]

That's the short-term. Two longer-term issues require attention, however the current controversy is resolved. First, the United States and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. America must avoid another war at most any cost. Given the South's level of development, it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington's veto. Nor does it make any sense for the United States to risk being drawn into a war as a result of acts between other nations. These bilateral differences are only likely to grow, especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious. Then South Korea could find itself risking involvement in Washington's war. Also involved is the ROK's self-respect. In two years the U.S. plans on devolving operational control of the combined forces to South Korea. Yet some South Koreans fear their nation won't be ready to lead its own defense. That Washington took military command in underdeveloped, impoverished South Korea in 1950 is understandable. To argue that America must continue doing so in 2010 is bizarre.

US troops serve no purpose in promoting Asian stability outside of the Korean Peninsula

Doug Bandow, 8 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire, 11/11/2008

“Seoul Searching”, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218>)

Other advocates of the alliance make the “dual use” argument, that American forces stationed on the Korean peninsula are useful for purposes other than defending South Korea. But an army division and assorted other forces have little useful role in promoting regional stability, whatever that means in practice (invading Burma or preventing the dissolution of Indonesia?). And minimal ROK support for other U.S. objectives, such as providing a small troop contingent to a safe sector of Iraq (which Seoul plans on withdrawing by year's end), is not worth today's one-sided alliance.

FYI: ROK = Republic of Korea (South Korea)

AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

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[] **South Korea will not build nuclear weapons. The public is against it**

Kiho Yi, Director of the Nautilus Institute of Seoul and Professor at Hanshin U, 6/5/2009
“The North Korean nuclear test: The South Korean reaction,”

<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-north-korean-nuclear-test-the-south-korean-reaction>

But back to the domestic response in South Korea. Like the South Korean public, other than the two hours immediately following the test, the South Korean stock market remained pretty much unaffected by Pyongyang's actions last week. The country's most important investors seemed to dismiss the idea of a war between the North and South as unlikely, despite the North's rhetoric. As for Seoul's intellectual elite, they have made many political statements this week, but none of them involve North Korea. Instead, these statements involve Lee Myung-bak, as many professors at the country's major universities want him to apologize for prosecuting Roh and to support the basic rights of expression that make the South a democracy. A few statements from domestic civil society organizations did request that North Korea stop its nuclear program, but that was about it in terms of public outcry. Politically, the response has been more heated. Some members of the South Korean Parliament have seriously raised the idea of Seoul pursuing its own nuclear capability. Others want to discuss what options the South Korean government should take if the country's leaders decide the U.S. nuclear umbrella isn't enough to keep Seoul safe. But again, the South Korean people seem opposed to such actions. According to a recent poll done by Mono Research, 67 percent of everyday South Koreans said that Seoul needs to find a peaceful way in which to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis; only 25 percent answered that South Korea should take a strong stand against North Korean military provocations. So I am hopeful that such popular support for peace will lead to a practical process of denuclearization and disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.

AT: Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

[] **There are many obstacles to South Korea acquiring a nuclear weapon**

Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies – Naval War College, and Director – Reves Center for International Studies, 2004

“The Nuclear Tipping Point”, Ed. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, p. 259-260)

Despite this impressive engineering base and technological infrastructure, it would be no easy matter for South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. Previous estimates of the time needed to complete a weapons program severely underestimated the technical barriers.⁹ The extreme secrecy required for a covert program would also be far harder to maintain in the current democratic environment than what prevailed during the era of military dictatorship. The greatest obstacle would be obtaining the required fissile materials, either weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium. South Korea does not possess the indigenous capability to produce either type of bomb-grade material, although research breakthroughs (notably, in pilot production of high-speed centrifuges for isotope separation) have been reported in South Korean publications. Although South Korea could attempt larger-scale manufacture of the sophisticated equipment required for fissile material production, the ultimate success of such a home-grown effort would be far from assured and would entail a sustained, massive commitment of financial and manpower resources. A more likely route, therefore, would be for Seoul to import reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology from abroad. The political and institutional barriers to such transfers, however, are quite daunting. In recent decades, the leading nuclear industrial countries have informally banded together in a Nuclear Suppliers Group to control international trade in this area. The transfer of sensitive technologies is monitored closely, and any request by a South Korean firm or end user for reprocessing or uranium enrichment technology would trigger alarm bells abroad, especially in Washington. If South Korea sought to repeat an earlier attempt at a nuclear option, it is far more likely that Seoul would explore a clandestine route to avoid detection, trying to exploit the network of black market suppliers. The ROK would still need to invest years of effort, at great risk of exposure by foreign suppliers or by its increasingly rambunctious mass media, before it could acquire the infrastructure needed to produce the material for a bomb. Even then, it would require additional time before it could develop workable, deliverable nuclear weapons. During the period between a political decision to undertake a nuclear weapons program and actually obtaining a nuclear arsenal, the ROK would also encounter acute political and security vulnerabilities. A decision could provoke a U.S. withdrawal of political and military support, and South Korea would likely confront the vocal opposition of various nearby powers, including both China and Japan. Seoul would be without its staunchest ally, one armed with unmatched conventional and nuclear forces, and at the same time, the ROK might still be confronted by a hostile and aggressive DPRK.

AT: Readiness Disadvantage

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South Korea can deter without the U.S.

Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bando, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, 2004

The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 127

Moreover, even if the security of the South was vital to the United States, Washington's treaty and troops are not necessary to achieve that end. Nearly a decade ago the Department of Defense declared that "our security relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to be central to the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, as it has been for over forty years."²⁹ Although America's presence probably was central to the maintenance of peace 50 years ago, it is not so today. After all, the *raison d'être* for Washington's defense of the ROK, a weak South Korea vulnerable to communist aggression orchestrated by Beijing or Moscow, has disappeared. That America's presence undoubtedly still helps deter the DPRK from military adventurism does not mean that it is necessary to do so •³⁰ As noted earlier, the South can stand on its own. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies conceded: "Without U.S. help, South Korea is capable today of defending itself against an invasion from the North."³¹ An invasion that would be supported by no other nation, and certainly not by the DPRK's old allies, China and Russia.

AT: Readiness Disadvantage

[__] Withdrawal does not hurt readiness and encourages South Korea to compensate for diminished US presence in the region

John P. Cummings, Colonel, United States Army, 5/3/2004

“Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

In the foreseeable future the United States will continue to view the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula as a vital national security interest and integral to sustaining global commerce. Withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea will not degrade the military readiness of the alliance defense. On the contrary, it will eliminate one of the major sources of growing anti-Americanism among the South Korean population. Moreover, United States can utilize ground forces that are re-deployed from the peninsula in the Global War on terrorism, and save the associated costs of forward based troops. For South Korea, with strong United States support, to take the lead in the defense of their nation is an idea whose time has come. In conclusion, withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea would be a win-win alternative. We gain economic and military resources while maintaining our objectives in northeast Asia and garnering positive public opinion, and South Koreans step out of our shadow and join the first rank of nations as a fully functioning democratic nation in charge of its own national defense.

[__] Withdrawal increases readiness because it frees up troops to be used in other areas

John P. Cummings, Colonel, United States Army, 5/3/2004

“Should the U.S. Continue to Maintain Forces in South Korea?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423298&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Neither Richard Halloran’s diplomatic options nor the blatantly militant pre-emption options should be entertained. There is a more viable option: a unilateral withdraw of United States ground forces from South Korea. The current administration’s commitment to the global war on terrorism, with subsequent military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, has caused considerable strain on the United States Military’s finite resources. Service components, scrambling to meet the increased operational tempo of the current environment, have yet to realize the implications on retention and sustaining a quality force. Withdrawal of forces from South Korea would enable the United States to realize an infrastructure cost savings while continuing to meet the guidance in the National Security Strategy and regional policy objectives that are inherent in forward basing of troops. It will also make available more forces for the administration’s global war on terrorism. Additionally, the removal of American forces from South Korea would alleviate political unrest associated with the increasing anti-American sentiment among South Koreans.

AT: START Disadvantage

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, 5/7/2003

“Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Cato Policy Analysis, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa474.pdf>)

For years it was hard to find a single American analyst, let alone policymaker, who did not recoil in horror at the suggestion that American forces be brought home from Korea. Defenders of the commitment rushed to the barricades in the midst of Kim Daejung’s visit to Pyongyang. For instance, Robert Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations warned against the “loose talk about the future of the U.S.–South Korean alliance and the U.S. military presence in Korea.”⁸¹ Even after Roh’s election, U.S. Department of Defense consultant Richard Weitz advocates a continued U.S. presence for the purpose of “rapidly halting any North Korean invasion,” as if South Korea’s 700,000-man military didn’t exist.⁸² Former secretary of defense William J. Perry, Ashton B. Carter, and Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, leading figures in the Clinton administration, offer the cliché of America’s and South Korea’s troops standing “shoulder to shoulder to deter North Korean aggression.”⁸³ Left unanswered is the question of why American shoulders are necessary in the first place. Some analysts would move to strengthen and expand the U.S. commitment to South Korea. Ralph Cossa, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Pacific Forum, wants a force buildup.⁸⁴ So does the Heritage Foundation.⁸⁵ The Weekly Standard’s Bill Kristol wants efforts aimed at “shoring up the defense capabilities of South Korea.”⁸⁶ The Bush administration seems to be taking those recommendations to heart: in early February 2003 Washington announced that it was supplementing its forces in Asia in response to a request from Adm. Thomas Fargo, Pacific commander of U.S. forces.⁸⁷ But now a growing number of commentators, including some resolute hawks, are saying that the United States need not remain in Korea, and certainly not if our forces are unwanted.⁸⁸ The message has hit home even at the Pentagon. More broadly, notes Scott Snyder, the Asia Foundation’s representative in Korea, “In Washington, within the U.S. government and Congress, there is a distinct, anti-Korean backlash.”⁸⁹

AT: START Disadvantage

Woosang Kim and Tae-Hyo Kim, Professors of Political Science – Yonsei University, Spring 2004

“A Candle in the Wind: Korean Perceptions of ROK-U.S. Security Relations”, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, XVI(1), Spring, p. 114-115)

Another concern is a possible anti-Korean backlash in the United States in these days of swift and vivid communication. Pictures of anti-American demonstrations in South Korea appeared in the newspapers and on the television screens of American homes. Events in Korea can have an immediate reaction in the U.S. Congress and public. We may even begin to see arguments from isolationist advocates for breaking the U.S. alliance with the ROK and bringing U.S. troops home.^{2 3} The principal policy implication is quite clear. Unless policymakers in Seoul and Washington do something about the anti-American sentiment in Korea well in advance, the two countries may lose the best security option available to them. In public relations management, they should emphasize the vitality of the continued alliance between the United States and Korea and the necessity of U.S. troops' remaining in Korea even after unification. Given that the U.S. Forces in Korea may gradually be adjusted to reflect the changing security environment in Northeast Asia and that there remains a salient rationale for ROK-U.S. security cooperation given neighboring great powers, the ongoing Korea-U.S. alliance will certainly remain a win-win strategic option for both countries: for Korea, its comprehensive alliance with the United States would maximize its security at least cost; while for the United States, it would maintain a forward base in one of the most crucial strategic regions in East Asia with reasonable burden-sharing on the part of Korea. The Korean government should stress to its people that condemning the problems originating from the ROK-U.S. alliance does not necessarily imply the logic of denying the existence of the alliance. That is, while appreciating the positive role that public pressure makes in improving the Korean way in running the ROK-U.S. alliance, possible misunderstanding or conflict of interests with the United States should not damage the 50-year-long partnership and friendship between the two countries. For public opinion not to become “single frame,” the flow of information and communication on national foreign policy issues between the government and the public should be more transparent and dynamic. In particular, the government needs to establish close and regular communication channels with major opinion leaders, including journalists, intellectuals, and NGO leaders, in order to deliver accurate information and share a grand vision of national policy toward the United States. American society also faces similar challenges in public relations. As a society becomes more democratic and plural, public opinion on foreign relations tends to become more diverse (sometimes largely indifferent) and uncertain. Just as in Korea, there may be a divergence between the attitudes of the public and those of political leaders in response to economic and security related questions. Even if leaders in Washington DC appreciate the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula both now and after unification, American citizens may demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. U.S. policymakers should attempt to conduct active security dialogue with the mass media and the public to prevent anti-Korean feeling from spilling over into American society.



BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

South Korea - Neg

South Korea Negative

Answers To: Inherency.....	1-2
Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage.....	3-6
Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage.....	7-11
Answers To: Solvency.....	12-15

Answers To: Inherency

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[] **Status Quo Policy is decreasing troops to increase hegemony**

Andrew Yeo, Department of Politics at Catholic University of America, 5/18/2010,
“U.S. Military base realignment in South Korea”, Peace Review

By July 2004, Seoul and Washington proposed a new vision for the U.S.–Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. After ten rounds of negotiations under the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), U.S. and South Korean officials confirmed several developments concerning the future of USFK and the U.S.–ROK alliance. These included the withdrawal of 12,500 U.S. troops by December 2008 from South Korea, the relocation of USFK headquarters from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, and the consolidation of the Second Infantry Division to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area. USFK also presented an ambitious plan to reduce the number of U.S. facilities in South Korea from approximately ninety-five in 2001 to ten by 2012, with a major strategic hub centered in Pyeongtaek. The shift to Pyeongtaek highlighted the Pentagon’s emphasis on rapid deployment and mobility. Unlike Seoul, which lacked a port or major airfield, Camp Humphreys is located near the coast, and is close to a major air base in nearby Osan.

Answers To: Inherency

[__] The US just completed a withdrawal of troops on the Korean Peninsula and may be planning more

Lee Jong-Heon, United Press International Correspondent, 2/4/10,
UPI, http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2010/02/04/seoul_seeks_extended_us_protection/2951.

The United States had maintained nearly 40,000 troops in South Korea, alongside the South's 670,000 troops, facing off against the North's 1.2 million-strong armed forces. But it recently reduced the number to 28,500 and is planning to redeploy the frontline U.S. ground forces to south of Seoul, in one of the biggest realignments of U.S. forces in this country since the Korean War. Earlier this week, the U.S. Department of Defense said in the newest edition of its Quadrennial Defense Review that Washington would further cut troops in the South, saying U.S. troops in Seoul could possibly be relocated abroad under the concept of "strategic flexibility."

[__] The US will be moving troops in South Korea to other operations

Kim Young-jin, staff reporter for the Korea Times, 7/23/2010,
"US Troops in Korea to be deployed to other areas"
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/07/113_70033.html

The United States will deploy some of its troops stationed in Korea to other conflict regions in the coming years as part of its strategic deployment stance, the top U.S. military officer said this week in Seoul. "Part of the discussion we are having with the Republic of Korea, with the leadership, and what we will be able to do in the next several years is support for deployments, literally, off the peninsula," Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an audience of U.S. soldiers at Camp Red Cloud, north of Seoul, Tuesday. "But we're not there yet. We haven't got to that point in time." Mullen was in town to attend the "2+2" meeting of foreign and defense ministers of the two allies Wednesday, held as a show of solidarity after North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship earlier this year, killing 46 sailors.

Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

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[] **There is no risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. Deterrence is stable.**

William Perry, Former Secretary of State, 10/12/1999,
“Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle”, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/book/perryrpt.html>)

In the course of the review, the policy team conferred with U.S. military leaders and allies, and concluded that, as in 1994, U.S. forces and alliances in the region are strong and ready. Indeed, since 1994, the U.S. has strengthened both its own forces and its plans and procedures for combining forces with allies. We are confident that allied forces could and would successfully defend ROK territory. We believe the DPRK's military leaders know this and thus are deterred from launching an attack. However, in sharp contrast to the Desert Storm campaign in Kuwait and Iraq, war on the Korean Peninsula would take place in densely populated areas. Considering the million-man DPRK army arrayed near the DMZ, the intensity of combat in another war on the Peninsula would be unparalleled in U.S. experience since the Korean War of 1950-53. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of persons - U.S., ROK, and DPRK - military and civilian - would perish, and millions of refugees would be created. While the U.S. and ROK of course have no intention of provoking war, there are those in the DPRK who believe the opposite is true. But even they must know that the prospect of such a destructive war is a powerful deterrent to precipitous U.S. or allied action. Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms. While always subject to miscalculation by the isolated North Korean government, there is no military calculus that would suggest to the North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict. This relative stability, if it is not disturbed, can provide the time and conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent peace on the Peninsula, ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to the peaceful reunification of the Korean people. This is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.

Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

[__] The best way to prevent war with Korea is not through appeasement but through containment. Military power and hard bargaining are a more effective policy

Colin Dueck, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado, Spring 2006, “Strategies for Managing Rogue States”, Orbis, 50(2), Spring

The problem with engagement is that it seriously underestimates the Kim regime’s malevolence. It is rather naive to expect that any package of economic, diplomatic, and strategic inducements will necessarily alter the fundamentally hostile and authoritarian nature of the Kim regime by, for example, integrating that regime into regional patterns of economic interdependence. Kim will see any attempted integration as a potential threat to his rule. Nor can negotiations be conducted under the assumption that they will automatically result in softening or satiating the North’s foreign policy goals. All prior experience indicates that Pyongyang will wring whatever concessions it can from this process, without abandoning its revisionist ambitions. It is absurd to suggest that Kim “feels” insecure primarily because of the policies of the Bush administration. Both his insecurity and his clandestine nuclear weapons program predate President Bush. The United States certainly caused alarm in Pyongyang with talk of regime change, but the root cause of this crisis is with North Korea, not George W. Bush. For practical reasons, however, direct rollback is not a plausible alternative. To begin with, any preventive U.S. military strike against North Korea and its weapons sites would probably result in a horrific conflict that would make Iraq look tame. The United States would ultimately win this war, but only at immense cost. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians would be killed. So would thousands more American troops. South Korea would be devastated. There would be no coalition support for such a preventive war under current circumstances. Nor are there any guarantees that North Korea’s weapons sites would actually be destroyed and its nuclear weapons unused. This prospect should warn us not only against a preventive strike, but indeed against any actions that might hasten war. A stated American policy of regime change or indirect rollback against Pyongyang risks this very possibility. Insofar as Washington appears to indicate that its primary goal is overthrowing the Kim regime, the fewer incentives Pyongyang will have to abstain from lashing out in a dangerous policy course involving very high risk, coercive diplomacy, and even full-scale preventive war.³⁵ The baseline American strategy in relation to North Korea must therefore be neither rollback nor integration through engagement, but containment, supplemented by some careful, hard bargaining. A successful strategy of containment requires absolute clarity about the deadly consequences for Kim and his government should he choose to act aggressively. It also requires having military capabilities on the spot to make that threat credible. Fortunately, the United States and South Korea have those capabilities. The North can therefore be deterred, so long as U.S. defensive commitments are unambiguous. Kim cares little for the lives of his people, but he does value his own power and survival. For this very reason, even in relation to a leader like Kim, containment can work, as it has in the past.³⁶

Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

[] **North Korea would be defeated quickly in a war and the conflict would not escalate**

Carlton Meyer, Former marine corps officer and editor of G2 Military, 2003,
“The Mythical North Korean Threat” , <http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm>)

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

Answers To: Harms - North Korean War Advantage

[] Risk of war is very low – it’s empirically proven for the past 57 years. There have been issues that were more provocative than the recent warship sinking and none of those escalated.

Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay, McClatchy Newspapers, 5/26/2010

“KOREA WAR UNLIKELY, EXPERTS SAY; TENSIONS ARE LIKELY TO RISE, BUT CONFLICTS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED FOLLOWING PAST PROVOCATIONS”,

North Korea's decision Tuesday to sever all ties with South Korea and threaten military action in disputed waters following the torpedoing of a South Korean warship confronts President Barack Obama with another international crisis that his administration doesn't want or need. Although the isolated, communist North's behavior is notoriously unpredictable and sometimes seems irrational, all-out war between it and the democratic, capitalist South still seems unlikely, analysts said, given the stakes. Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean peninsula, where some 28,500 U.S. troops provide a tripwire for U.S. military intervention if the North attacks, are likely to rise in coming days. North Korea would likely lose any conflict with the South, but not before inflicting massive damage on South Korea's capital, Seoul, a 30-minute drive south of the demilitarized zone that has divided the two Koreas since 1953. U.S. intelligence officials estimate that some 11,000 North Korean artillery pieces are in sheltered positions within range of Seoul and probably could destroy much of the city before they could be knocked out. "The tensions certainly have increased," but there is no sign that North Korea is mobilizing its 1.2 million-strong military, said a U.S. defense official, who requested anonymity to speak more freely. "They have masses [of troops] down on the DMZ [demilitarized zone], but they do a normal shift or rotation," he said. South Korean officials said they were bracing for fresh provocations from the North, especially at sea. On Monday, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak blamed North Korea for the March 26 sinking of the corvette Cheonan, which killed 46 of its crew, and said he was curbing trade with North Korea and banning its ships from transiting South Korean waters. "That could get sort of ugly if [North Korean vessels] don't stop, and chances are they won't," said Art Brown, formerly the top U.S. intelligence analyst for East Asia. "It's unlikely they will do nothing. I tend to think they're not going to try Korean War, version two." Still, Mr. Brown and other former top U.S. officials said serious clashes between the Koreas during the past 57 years haven't led to warfare -- and sometimes have provided opportunities for rapprochement. "It's not inevitable that it will escalate," said Mitchell Reiss, who negotiated with North Korea during the Clinton administration. Mr. Reiss said no war erupted after earlier North Korean acts that were more provocative than the Cheonan sinking was. Those included a 1983 bombing linked to North Korea that killed South Korean Cabinet members visiting Burma and a 1968 commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence, the Blue House.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

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[] **South Korea is modernizing its military now which means the plan is not necessary**

Stephen G Wood, Lieutenant General in the US Army, Fall 2008

“The Transformation of Air Forces on the Korean Peninsula”

The alliance’s capability and will to defend the Republic of Korea from North Korean aggression has never been stronger. Well known to the reader are the advancements in US military capability over the last two decades. Less well known is the fact that the republic of Korea has placed tremendous emphasis on modernization and military competence. The republic of Korea is now the 13th largest economy in the world, spending approximately \$24.3 billion—about 2. percent of its gross domestic product—on defense each year. Its military comprises 77,000 active duty personnel, equipped with the most modern military technology. For instance, nearly 40 percent of the ROK Air Force’s (ROKAF) 500 fighters are F-1 K and F-1 aircraft.⁴ However, the bedrock of the ROK military is its ground forces, with 41,000 active duty personnel and an additional 2.9 million trained soldiers in reserve. The leadership of the ROK army is also top notch, as proven during exercise vignettes in which the CFC commander cedes control to his ROK counterpart. Consequently, from an alliance perspective, the ROK military is capable of leading the ground campaign. Thus, under the CFC transformation plan, the US military’s contribution to the alliance will become more air and naval-centric in the future.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

[] South Korea can't afford to modernize its military, and it is unpopular in the government because it is associated with troop withdrawal from the United States

Kyodo News International 7/19/10

U.S. troop cutback in S. Korea may change E. Asian security situation."

href="http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SCOPE%3A+U.S.+troop+cutback+in+S.+Korea+may+change+E.+Asian+security...-a0118113726"

At that time, the Roh administration was in trouble because of his supporters' minority in parliament. Its anti-U.S. stance was also under fire from the opposition camp," a government source said. The confidential U.S. proposal surfaced on May 17 this year when the United States told South Korea that it will transfer some troops to Iraq, giving rise to speculation that the anti-U.S. stance of Roh, who once proposed a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, led to the U.S. troop cut plan. Roh denied intentional concealment of the U.S. proposal, saying, "Independent defense and the alliance (with Washington) are not contradictory but are to be mutually supplemented." But it is not clear how the government will secure financial resources for independent defense. There are many young members taking a firm stance against the United States in Roh's Uri Party, which swept to power in a general election in April, according to party sources. Meanwhile, a Japanese government official said, "The U.S. troops stationed in South Korea are those mainly belonging to the Army, a type of military deployment during the Cold War, but those stationed in Japan are chiefly Navy and Air Force personnel, a type of deployment in the 'post-Cold War' era." "There will be no major impact from the U.S. global military transformation," said the official. But a Foreign Ministry source said the troop cut in Germany and the stronger military presence in Turkey show the U.S. military's stance of giving priority to the Middle East and Central Asia.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

[__] South Korean Military Modernization leads to a Northeast Asian arms race and competition between other countries in Asia

Salim Osman, Indonesia Correspondent for the Straits Times, 9/18/09 (“Naval build-up in North-east Asia; Analysts advise caution amid higher defense spending”

A naval arms race that could have catastrophic consequences is developing in Asia-Pacific waters, a military expert warned at a conference here yesterday. The naval build-up in North-east Asia has exceeded basic modernization with the addition of new capabilities such as submarines, destroyers, large amphibious ships and long range missiles, experts said. Professor Desmond Ball of the Australian National University warned that the build-up could lead to a calamity if it becomes a full-fledged arms race. 'There's no arms control regime in Asia that might constrain these acquisitions,' he said. He and other experts spoke at a conference on New Challenges To Asia Pacific Security organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Prof Ball said that, since 2000, nearly all countries in the region badly hit by the 1997 financial crisis had increased their defense spending again. In South Korea, for instance, it rose 6.2 per cent in 2001 and then to 9.9 per cent by 2007. 'This has resulted, in rough terms, in doubling its defense capability since around 2000 beyond the level considered adequate for modernization in the 1990s,' he said. He believes that China now spends more on defense than any country in the world except the United States. China has bought large numbers of frigates and destroyers from Russia and plans to acquire aircraft carriers as well. Analyst Sam Bateman of the University of Wollongong in Australia said: 'China is usually seen as the trigger for a naval arms race, potentially shifting the military balance in Asia, although China strongly denies the claims.' Its naval force expansion may explain the acquisition of new missile destroyers by South Korea and Japan, he said in an article distributed at the conference. 'While most navies, including the Chinese navy, stress that their capabilities are being developed for defensive purposes, it is often difficult to differentiate offensive from defensive capabilities,' he said. Chinese analyst Zhang Junshe of the Naval Research Institute said that his country was merely making modest improvements to its maritime defense capability and that its navy 'was still lagging behind other countries'. The head of external programs at NTU's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, he warned: 'The consequence of the navy's build-up is the increasing probability of accidents and incidents at sea.'

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

[__] South Korean military modernization will cause a rupture in the partnership between the US and South Korea

Japan Times 9/19/06

“A positive U.S.-ROK summit”, Accessible on LexisNexis

While Japan has focused on the modernization of its alliance with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been seeking a new equilibrium in its relationship with Washington, too. The maturing of South Korea's economy and political system, and the coming to power of a new generation have shifted the center of gravity in that bilateral relationship. Both sides are working to find a new balance; it has been a sometimes messy process but dire predictions of the end of the alliance are not destined to come true. Both Washington and Seoul realize that the mutual interests that provided a foundation for their alliance a half century ago remain. They both desire security and stability on the Korean Peninsula; they worry about the North Korean threat and South Korea's room for maneuver as "a shrimp among whales." And, perhaps most significant, they recognize that the U.S. is an honest broker - and the government best suited to that role among all the contenders. But changes in both countries and in the region require a modernization of their alliance. At their summit last week, U.S. President George W. Bush met South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and proved that predictions of the death of the alliance were exaggerated. Yet it is also important that the two governments acknowledge the problems that they confront and deal with them honestly: Papering over the cracks in the U.S.-ROK alliance will provide only the briefest of respites. Mr. Roh was elected president in 2002, seizing upon anti-American sentiment to storm to victory. Fears of a rupture in the alliance with the U.S. have since not abated, even though Mr. Roh has reiterated his commitment to the alliance and backed the U.S. on key foreign-policy issues, even dispatching troops to Iraq. Yet Mr. Roh has also made plain his readiness to disagree with Washington on key issues, the most important of which is relations with North Korea. To Mr. Roh, and many of his party, the greatest threat from Pyongyang emanates not from strength but from weakness. Their concern is not invasion, but collapse. This puts the Roh administration at odds with Mr. Bush, who has characterized the regime in North Korea as "evil." The U.S. has confronted North Korea about its nuclear-weapons program, its human-rights practices and its other alleged illegal activities. The U.S. prefers a diplomatic solution to the problems that the world has with Pyongyang, but it has taken a hard line to compel the North to hew to international standards. Seoul prefers engagement, fearing isolation could prompt the North to lash out or to collapse. Either scenario is grim for South Korea. There have been fears that this divergence would drive a permanent wedge into the U.S.-ROK alliance. But North Korea's recent brinkmanship - missile tests in July and the prospect of a nuclear test - have helped bring Seoul and Washington closer together. At their summit last weekend, Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh restated their commitment to the stalled six-party talks on the North's nuclear program. They spend more time emphasizing their agreements now rather than their differences. The problem is that the potential differences are profound. In addition to the North Korea question, the two governments have also begun negotiations on a free-trade agreement and the two militaries are working out the transition to South Korean control of military forces in the event of war.

Answers To: Harms - South Korea Military Modernization Advantage

Strong U.S. / South Korea Alliance necessary for U.S. security interests

Kim 3 (Seung-Hwan Kim, Professor of International Affairs – Myongji University, “Anti-Americanism in Korea,” Washington Quarterly, Winter, http://www.thewashingtonquarterly.com/03winter/docs/03winter_kim.pdf)

The future of the U.S.-Korean alliance is too important for Washington and Seoul to overlook this current trend of rising anti-Americanism and the potential rise of anti-Koreanism, as they directly threaten the special U.S.- ROK symbiotic relationship. The alliance with the United States is critical for South Korea to preserve stability on the peninsula and in the region. In addition, Korean instability that could arise in the absence of a U.S. security commitment would complicate Korean efforts to sustain current and expected levels of foreign investments throughout the country, thus threatening continued economic progress. Regional stability is also critical for South Korea because it conducts more than two-thirds of its trade in the Asia-Pacific region, with the volume of current South Korean trade through Asian naval transport routes exceeding 40 percent of its total trade. Even after unification, South Korea’s alliance with the United States will continue to be important to protect the peninsula from once again becoming the political, if not the military, battleground where the major Asian powers have historically sought regional hegemony. The alliance with South Korea is also critical for the United States to maintain its leadership position in the Asia-Pacific region. The partnership helps prevent the eruption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, which could otherwise draw China into a reenactment of the Korean War. It helps preserve a stable balance of power in the region by hedging against the rise of an aggressive regional power and regional rivalries, and it helps protect U.S. economic interests. More than one-third of total U.S. trade is conducted with the Asia-Pacific region, and millions of U.S. jobs would be at stake if continued regional growth and development were jeopardized.

Answers To: Solvency

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[] **North Korea will never give up its nuclear program**

Stephanie Palla, Global Security Newswire, 2/25/2010,

Experts Pessimistic on North Korea's Willingness to Give Up Nukes

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100225_7481.php.

The fundamental question underlining the years-long process of the six-party talks was the possibility North Korea could be persuaded to eliminate its nuclear program if given the right incentives. Pyongyang, though, has continually cited the need for nuclear weapons in the face of "external threats," and numerous U.S. pledges of its nonhostile intentions have not quelled that mistrust. This standoff is evidence that no U.S. assurances or incentives would curb North Korean doubts and persuade it to take meaningful steps toward denuclearization, according to Cha. "It is very difficult for me to see this particular regime ever denuclearizing because even if you got rid of every potential external threat to North Korea -- even if you surrounded North Korea with five Costa Ricas -- this regime would still feel insecure," he said. "It's the nature of the regime; its inability to fulfill at least their version of the socialist contract with their people. This is the primary insecurity to the regime."

Answers To: Solvency

[] China will not pressure North Korea because it fears the collapse of Kim Jong-Il's regime

Jayshree Bajoria, Staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, 7/21/2009,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11097/chinanorth_korea_relationship.html

China is North Korea's most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and fuel. China has helped sustain Kim Jong-Il's regime and opposed harsh international economic sanctions in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and an uncontrolled influx of refugees across its 800-mile border with North Korea. After Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, experts say that China has reconsidered the nature of its alliance to include both pressure and inducements. North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009 further complicated its relationship with China, which has played a central role in the Six-Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. CFR's Scott Snyder and See-won Byun of the Asia Foundation argue the nuclear tests highlight the tensions (PDF) between China's "emerging role as a global actor with increasing international responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares longstanding historical and ideological ties." Beijing continues to have more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation, say some analysts. The economic leverage in particular, some point out, has only grown as a result of North Korea's declining relations with South Korea and the international community. But most experts agree that Beijing is unlikely to exercise its leverage given its concerns regarding regional stability and the uncertainty surrounding regime succession in North Korea.

[] U.S. military presence in Asia is necessary to keep peace in the region and deter conflicts

Michael Auslin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 3/17/10,
 "U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments," House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, <http://www.aei.org/speech/100130>)

It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

Answers To: Solvency

[__] History proves that attempts at withdrawing troops causes panic in South Korea, forcing the United States to stay

Jingwung Kim, writer at Asian Affairs, 2004

“Ambivalent Allies: Recent South Korean Perceptions of the United States Forces Korea

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172590>

The U.S. military presence had been a taboo subject for Koreans. As late as the 1970s, anyone who suggested withdrawal of U.S. forces might have faced instant arrest and been charged with supporting North Korea in violation of the strict National Security Law. During this time, debates in America concerning the withdrawal of troops disappointed many South Koreans and made them feel uneasy about their nation's security. The American decision to withdraw the Seventh U.S. Army Division in 1970, which decreased the number of the USFK from approximately 60,000 to 40,000, was regarded as a breach of faith among many Koreans. When the Carter administration announced its plan to withdraw the Second U.S. Army Division from South Korea in 1977, most Koreans expressed fears that this action would prompt North Korea to invade and asked Americans not to support the withdrawal. Carter's withdrawal plan caused a major political crisis, even public panic, in South Korea. The United States was forced to drop the idea.

[__] North Korea won't feel secure even after troop withdrawal because of US nuclear weapons

Patrick Morgan, Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California, Irvine, 6/21/2009

“Considerations Bearing on a Possible Retraction of the American Nuclear Umbrella Over the ROK”

There are other complications. One would be that US extended deterrence for the ROK can not readily be eliminated. The US will continue to be devoted to democracy and human rights, and thus to the health and well being of the world's democracies, particularly large and important ones like Japan and the ROK. It will also remain committed to nuclear nonproliferation. Practicing deterrence with these in mind will directly or indirectly involve the possibility of nuclear retaliation unless the US adopts complete nuclear disarmament. If so, how credible can a renunciation of the American nuclear umbrella over South Korea really be, particularly to a government like North Korea's which is so deeply mistrustful of US intentions. In the same way, how can a regional nuclear umbrella be eliminated when it rests on a massively global nuclear capability? As noted, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons from the peninsula in 1991 but North Korea still worries about a nuclear attack. The US does not need to keep nuclear weapons in East Asia to deliver highly accurate nuclear attacks anywhere in the region, from thousands of miles away. And many of the nuclear weapons the US withdrew from its navy were stored and could readily be reinstalled. The US also has many other stockpiled nuclear weapons for planes, cruise missiles, etc. Analysts have long noted that pledges of nonuse or no first use of nuclear weapons can not be taken seriously because they are unlikely to be honored if the face of a grave attack. Why should a US pledge to not retaliate with nuclear weapons for, say, a nuclear attack on Japan or the ROK, be taken as inviolate? The only reliable way to eliminate American extended nuclear deterrence is to eliminate American nuclear weapons. But that would make the proposed tradeoff even more sensitive and provocative.

Answers To: Solvency

Recent North Korean aggression will prevent peace talks even after the departure of US troops

BBC, 4/20/2010

“South Korea says nuclear talks not possible if North linked to ship sinking”, 4/20/10,

SEOUL, April 20 (Yonhap) - The resumption of multilateral denuclearization talks on North Korea will face a setback if the communist nation is found to have been involved in the recent sinking of a South Korean warship, South Korea's Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan [Yu Myo'ng-hwan] said Tuesday. "I believe the resumption of the six-party talks will not be possible for some time if we find evidence that clearly shows North Korea's involvement," the minister told a press briefing. The 1,200-ton warship Cheonan sank near the tense border with North Korea in the Yellow Sea on the night of March 26. Suspicions of Pyongyang's involvement grew after investigators said upon examining a part of the broken vessel that an external blast likely caused the sinking. The disaster, said to be one of the worst in South Korea's naval history, occurred as members of the six-party talks were trying to reopen negotiations on denuclearizing the North. "It is hard to say how exactly the two will be linked, but I believe it will be difficult to resume the six-party talks, at least until the Cheonan incident is resolved to a certain extent," the minister said. "If North Korea is found to have been involved, it will naturally be difficult to hold the six-party talks," he added. Thirty-eight sailors were confirmed dead from the sunken warship, with eight still missing. North Korea's military on Saturday denied involvement in the incident, accusing Seoul of laying false blame to evade its own responsibility. US officials, including Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, have noted an inevitable suspension of efforts to resume the nuclear talks until the countries find out exactly what or who caused the sinking of the Cheonan. Minister Yu said the resumption of the nuclear negotiations, last held in December 2008, will likely be further delayed until the North pays its due penalties should it be found guilty. "If North Korea is clearly found to have been involved, I think it will not be easy to hold the six-party talks for some time because we must make North Korea pay a price for its actions," he told the briefing.