



# BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE

Transforming School Culture Through Debate

## 2010-2011 JV Packet Tournament Three

- Allied Prolif DA
- Allied Prolif DA Aff
- Readiness DA
- Readiness DA Aff

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reduce its military and/or police presence in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

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# Allied Prolif DA-Neg

## Allied Proliferation Disadvantage

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## Explanation

The disadvantage argues that the affirmative plan would lead other countries to seek nuclear weapons. The uniqueness claims that the United States is able to reassure its allies because of its extended deterrence – its ability to prevent aggressor countries from attacking its allies. The disadvantage argues that the main reason that American allies feel so safe even though many of them, such as South Korea and Turkey, directly border potentially dangerous enemy countries, is because the United States directly stations troops and other military equipment in those countries. These forces serve as a “trip-wire”, meaning that if an aggressor state were to attack a US ally, that they would have to target American forces, thus starting a war with the United States. This setup both prevents war and makes American allies feel safe.

However, the plan withdraws these forces from the countries in the resolution. The link argues that these countries would no longer feel secure absent the trip-wire of U.S. forces, even though they may still be U.S. allies and the U.S. may still claim to be looking out for them. The disadvantage argues that these countries would be motivated to seek nuclear weapons in order to take their safety into their own hands, because nuclear weapons are a relatively cheap and very powerful means to prevent war. After all, no country has ever attacked a country it believed to have fully functioning nuclear weapons.

The impact argues that this proliferation would greatly increase the risk of war. The spread of nuclear weapons makes them more vulnerable to theft from terrorists. It also makes it more likely that some leader might finally decide to use one, thus initiating a nuclear war. While some argue that nuclear weapons might bring peace, thinking that the weapons are so destructive that using them is unthinkable, the disadvantage thinks that more nuclear weapons creates too many safety issues and makes it likely that one will eventually be used.

## Glossary

**Proliferation:** The spread of nuclear weapons to more countries that previously did not possess them.

**TNW:** Tactical Nuclear Weapons. TNWs are nuclear weapons that are smaller and are dropped from bombing planes, like the ones used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as opposed to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS) which are akin to rockets or missiles. Many are concerned that because TNWs are relatively small and mobile, that they are vulnerable to theft by terrorists.

**ROK:** Republic of Korea (South Korea)

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO was created at the beginning of the Cold War to help deter the Soviet Union. The members of NATO made an agreement that an attack on any single member of NATO would be met by all the other NATO members attacking the aggressor. The US nuclear weapons in Turkey are part of the guarantee the United States made with the other NATO members that it would come to their aid in the event of an attack.

**“Conventional” Forces or Capabilities”:** Military capabilities that are not nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence:** Attempting to prevent a country from taking an action by threatening consequences that make the action not worth it. For example, the United States attempts to deter China from invading Taiwan by stationing its navy in between the two countries, meaning that the invasion would also force a war with the United States, something that China is not willing to do.

**Nuclear Umbrella:** (Nuclear Guarantee). The US nuclear umbrella refers to countries that the US has guaranteed to protect with its nuclear weapons. If a country under the US nuclear umbrella of possessing the US nuclear guarantee were attacked with nuclear weapons, the United States would respond with its own weapons for them.

**DOD:** Department of Defense.

**NPT:** Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is signed by the vast majority of the countries in the world. Those that are members that do not have nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire them, while those that do have nuclear weapons are committed to eliminate them. Many are concerned that proliferation would cause no one to abide by the NPT, which would cause proliferation to happen much more quickly.

## Allied Proliferation DA INC Shell [1/2]

### **A. Uniqueness. Forward deployment of U.S. troops in other countries is reassuring allies, but perception of our commitment to their defense is wavering.**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**  
 “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes",  
[http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 7-8)

In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, that satisfaction and trust is no longer a given, and divergent threat perceptions have given rise to contending approaches to dealing with would-be proliferators and legacy challenges.

### **B. Link. The US presence in these other countries is key to extended deterrence – it signals commitment and credibility to that country’s defense. Withdrawal will destroy that perception**

**Christopher Layne, Visiting Associate Prof. – Naval Postgraduate School, 1997**  
 text taken from “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy”, 22:1, Summer 1997, p. 108)

Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state's territory. Thus during the Cold War, the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the United States and bolstered extended deterrence's credibility. The defender's deployment of forces is one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended deterrence success, because it is a visible signal that the defender "means business."<sup>62</sup>

## Allied Proliferation DA INC Shell [2/2]

### **C. Impact. US physical presence and credibility of deterrence key to preventing proliferation – the US nuclear guarantee is not enough on its own**

**Kathleen J McInnis, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues, Summer 2005**  
Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East published in the Washington Quarterly  
2005 pg. 180, [http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer\\_mcinnis.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf))

Taking into consideration the potential for Egypt and Saudi Arabia to proliferate, could the United States assure Cairo and Riyadh, dissuading them from building their own nuclear weapons, by extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella? Assurance gained through a reasonably sound extended deterrence policy relies on two primary factors: capability and credibility. Although the United States arguably possesses the physical capability to deter the Iranian regime on behalf of Gulf/Near Eastern states, whether it has sufficient political credibility needed to assure its regional allies is not clear. Without this credibility, states in the region may yet be tempted to acquire their own nuclear guarantee. What does it mean to be credible? Essentially, allies must be confident that the United States would defend them and their interests in the event of an act of aggression. This involves an unambiguous obligation, created through physical presence and underpinned by political commitment, to the survival of these states and their regimes. Yet, as Cold War experience taught, establishing credibility can be difficult. France, for example, ultimately decided that U.S. security assurances were insufficient and decided to acquire its own nuclear deterrent.

### **The resulting proliferation from loss of guarantees would result in nuclear wars**

**Victor Utgoff, former Senior Member of the National Security Council, Summer 2002,**  
Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defense and American Ambitions”, Vol. 44, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s, with most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

## Overview

1.

2.

3.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now

**The US currently maintains Cold War era deterrence with an integrated web of nuclear and conventional deterrents. This strategy reassures allies in Europe and East Asia**

**James Russell , Co-Dir. – Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, 1/5/2010**

“Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, [http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\\_id=3297](http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297))

The linked concepts of extended deterrence and security guarantees are nothing new to American security strategy.[19] During the Cold War, the United States’ commitment to defend Europe became operationalized through a series of extended deterrent commitments that included the basing of nuclear weapons in Europe that could have been used in the event of a Soviet attack. In Europe, the United States and its NATO allies eventually constructed a “seamless” web of conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Soviet invasion.[20] More recently, United States clearly still believes that the concept has great relevance in Northeast Asia. In response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests during the last several years, senior U.S. officials quickly and routinely fan out to South Korea and Japan to “assure” them of America’s commitment to their security.[21] A main target of these efforts is to forestall the possibility that either South Korea or Japan will reconsider decisions not to develop nuclear weapons. Japan in particular has a robust nuclear infrastructure and is now widely considered to be a “latent” nuclear power that could develop a weapon reasonably quickly. As is the case in Northeast Asia, the United States today routinely acts as if extended deterrence and security assurances together constitute active, ongoing and useful tools in managing its regional security relationships in the Gulf. Secretary Clinton’s recent remarks only represent the latest evidence that this is the case. In May 2006, for example, the Bush Administration embarked on a much ballyhooed “Gulf Security Dialogue” that sought to re-invigorate U.S. security relationships with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The initiative was presented as part of a consultative process to focus attention on building regional self defense capabilities; consulting on regional security issues like the Iran nuclear program and fallout of Iran’s struggle against Sunni extremists; the U.S. invasion of Iraq; counter-proliferation; counter-terrorism and internal security; and critical infrastructure protection.[22] The dialogue came as the Bush Administration proposed billions of dollars in new arms sales to Israel and its Gulf partners that included precision guided munitions such as the Joint Defense Attack Munition and the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now

### **American deterrence is currently maintained by forward deployed conventional forces**

**James Russell , Co-Dir. – Center for Contemporary Conflict at Naval Postgraduate School, Former Advisor to the Sec. Def. on Persian Gulf strategy, 1/5/2010**

“Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf”, [http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art\\_id=3297](http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297))

The build out of the U.S. military infrastructure points around the region provide the hosting states with tangible evidence of the credibility of the American military commitment to their security. The military footprint today in the Gulf is no “trip-wire” force, but is engaged in tangible military operations, such as the multi-national maritime security operations conducted in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea by the combined task force command operating out of the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama.

Since the British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to deploy its conventional forces to the region in response to regional instability. Starting with Operation Earnest Will in 1988, the United States slowly but inexorably inserted itself into the role played by the British for over a century as protecting the Gulf States from external threats. Following Operation Desert Storm, the United States kept sufficient forces in theater to enforce the United Nations’ cease fire resolutions on a recalcitrant Saddam. Last, but not least, it flowed significant forces and absorbed the monetary costs of toppling Saddam and providing a protective conventional force that can be readily called upon by the Iraq regime if needed. Given this history it is difficult to see how any state could doubt the credibility of the United States’ commitments to use its conventional forces as an instrument of regional defense. This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the Gulf—unlike Northeast Asia—the role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary. The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrella—headlines or no headlines. If a nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over America’s forward deployed Gulf presence, it’s hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clinton’s recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e., the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now - Obama

**Obama has restored alliances which is Boosting American international credibility.**

**Michael D. Shear, writer for the Washington Post, 5/23/2010**

“Envisioning a new era of diplomacy”

President Obama on Saturday offered a glimpse of a new national security doctrine that distances his administration from George W. Bush's policy of preemptive war, emphasizing global institutions and America's role in promoting democratic values. In a commencement speech to the graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the president outlined his departure from what Bush had called a "distinctly American internationalism." Instead, Obama pledged to shape a new "international order" based on diplomacy and engagement. Obama has spoken frequently about creating new alliances, and of attempts to repair the U.S. image abroad after nearly a decade in which Bush's approach was viewed with suspicion in many quarters. Unlike Bush, who traveled to West Point in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to announce his American-centered approach to security, Obama on Saturday emphasized his belief in the power of those alliances. "Yes, we are clear-eyed about the shortfalls of our international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation," he said. "We have succeeded by steering those currents in the direction of liberty and justice -- so nations thrive by meeting their responsibilities, and face consequences when they don't." In his speech -- the ninth wartime commencement in a row -- the commander in chief, who is leading two foreign wars, expressed his faith in cooperation to confront economic, military and environmental crises. "The international order we seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times," he said in prepared remarks. "Countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a changing climate and sustaining global growth; helping countries feed themselves and care for their sick; preventing conflict and healing its wounds."

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now – But on the Brink

**The US is currently on the brink of maintaining its deterrent in the eyes of its allies**

**James Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009**

“Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, p. ix)

Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under pressure because it is more complicated than before (thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), and this challenge comes at a time when America’s and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about how deterrence worked mattered little. Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for bigger and better conventional options or seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence tailored to fit different situations. It is time to bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete and common understanding about how deterrence functions in East Asia will also be necessary. The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is acceptable provided Washington works proactively with Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence (strong political and economic relations, conventional air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism of those weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, but it should be accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and bilateral security cooperation.

## Uniqueness: Allies Reassured Now – But on the Brink

**The US maintains extended deterrence right now, but our forward presence is key to maintaining it.**

**Satake Tomohiko, PhD Candidate in IR – Australian National U., Nautilus Institute Austral Peace and Security Network, 5/21/09**

“Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Between Non-Nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence”

<http://www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-forum/2009/japans-nuclear-policy/>

On the other hand, Japan has still preferred to be under the US nuclear umbrella, rather than become an independent power. An internal report of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), which secretly studied the possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament in 1995, suggested that Japan should not go nuclear because of the enormous political and economic costs that would be caused by the opposition of other countries including the United States. It concluded that ‘the best way is to rely on the US nuclear deterrence capabilities’. [9] In April 1996, Tokyo reconfirmed the US-Japan alliance by concluding the ‘US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security’. The Joint Declaration clearly defined Japan’s greater alliance roles on both regional and global fields, by stressing that the US-Japan alliance is not only for the security of Japan and the Far East, but also for Asia-Pacific security in general. Because of this, many observers pointed out that the Joint Declaration ‘redefined’ the alliance, by expanding the alliance scope from a narrow focus on Japan and the Far East to the broader Asia-Pacific. Yet Japanese policymakers denied this kind of view, by stressing that the Joint Declaration did not ‘redefine’ the alliance, but simply ‘reconfirmed’ it. For them, the most important achievement of the Joint Declaration was not that the alliance expanded its scope, but that the US promised to keep providing extended deterrence to the region even in the post-Cold War era. Yet US extended deterrence cannot be gained without certain costs. These costs not only mean traditional ‘defense burden-sharing’ such as a significant amount of host nation support to US troops stationing in Japan. In exchange for the continuous US military commitment in the region, Japan became increasingly involved in US regional and global security objectives. After September 11, Japan contributed to US-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, by dispatching the SDF for the first time during war-time operations. While Tokyo clearly recognized the importance of terrorism and WMD issues, the central concern of Japanese policy elites were not those global problems, but how to keep the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan perceives a growing threat from North Korea and China. In fact, Japan’s military contributions to both the war in Afghanistan and the reconstruction effort in Iraq were never significant compared to other allies. Likewise, Japan has joined the US Missile Defense (MD) program and contributed to its Research & Development (R&D). Although Japan joined the MD system primarily for its own defense, Tokyo also recognized that Japan’s entry to the MD system would supplement the US global defense posture against the attack of terrorist or rogue states. By providing moderate but symbolic contributions to US global operations, Japan attempted to maintain a US credible nuclear extended deterrence in the Asia Pacific region, which is indispensable for Japanese security.

## Links: Physical Presence Key To Credibility

### **Physical presence necessary for extended deterrence; the Cold War proves this**

**Kathleen J McInnis, Coordinator of the Project on Nuclear Issues, Summer 2005**  
Extended Deterrence: The US Credibility Gap in the Middle East published in the  
 Washington Quarterly  
 2005 pg. 180, [http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer\\_mcinnis.pdf](http://www.twq.com/05summer/docs/05summer_mcinnis.pdf))

When it comes to the nuts and bolts of an extended deterrence strategy, the concept begins to lose its coherence. Extended deterrence is not a hands-off strategy. It cannot be created from a distance through a submarine capability in the Persian Gulf or a troop deployment in another country such as Iraq. It is a real, tangible, physical commitment, to be palpably felt both by allies and adversaries. In the Middle East, building a sufficiently compelling case would be difficult to accomplish. Cold War examples provide compelling insight into the problem. During that era, the starting point for the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent in Europe and Asia was the forward deployment of ground troops, which signaled to enemy regimes that an attack on allied nations would also be an attack on the United States. Perhaps more importantly, the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia reinforced these ground troops by creating a “use it or lose it” threat of escalation. Essentially, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, nuclear weapons would either be used or lost to an invading force. Through these policies and force deployments, a credible threat of escalation was created. Adversaries could easily envision a conventional conflict leading to nuclear war.

### **US military presence is proof of commitment to other countries and many nations are supportive of it**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**  
 International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley  
 InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The US military presence in Europe has historically been viewed as an essential proof of Washington’s commitment to the security of the NATO allies, signifying the certainty of direct US involvement in meeting any aggression against the alliance. This deterrence role remains pertinent, although the United States has substantially reduced its conventional military force levels in Europe since the early 1990s. It is noteworthy in this regard that new allies in Eastern and Central Europe have expressed a willingness to host US and NATO facilities. One of the main reasons given by Czech and Polish supporters of the deployment of US missile defense system elements has been to gain the presence of US troops on their soil. Whatever happens with the missile defense plans under the new US administration, these countries remain interested in hosting US or NATO facilities. Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, declared in November 2008 that, although Poland joined the alliance in 1999, it had so far received only a promise of a NATO conference centre. ‘Everyone agrees’, he added, ‘that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.’<sup>36</sup>

## Links: Physical Presence Key to Credibility

**Japan and South Korea show that countries would openly question our commitment to their safety without a physical presence.**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**  
“Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes",  
[http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 7-8)

No such formula was put into place in Asia, which in any case lacked a multilateral framework comparable to that of NATO. Instead, for Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee was explicitly tied to the bilateral U.S. security relationships that were developed with each country and were made manifest in the forward deployment of American forces. As in NATO, these were regarded by their host governments as “trip-wire forces” necessary to ensure the steadfast nature of the U.S. commitment to come to their defense in a crisis, even one where nuclear escalation was possible.<sup>5</sup> In South Korea, the United States deployed as it still does a sizable contingent of U.S. Army and Air Force troops to deter a renewed North Korean attack and to signal U.S. resolve to escalate to whatever level might be necessary to repel such an attack, thereby underscoring America’s extended deterrent commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). In Japan, the United States Navy has home-ported one of its aircraft carriers at Yokosuka, while the Marines deployed forces on Okinawa, the Army at Camp Zama, and the Air Force at bases near Tokyo and Misawa, to reinforce the notion of extended deterrence. That said, the extended deterrence concept has not always seemed convincing to U.S. allies, and, were it not for the forward deployment of American troops, the willingness of the United States to put itself at risk to protect Allied interests would probably have been more widely questioned than it has been to date. Nonetheless, despite the fact that some U.S. allies, such as France and Israel, chose to go down the nuclear path themselves, most NATO nations, Japan, and even the ROK, despite putting into place the capacity for exercising a nuclear option should political and/or strategic circumstances change, have been satisfied that they shared with the United States a common threat perception and trusted that the United States would come to their defense if necessary.

## Links: Physical Presence Key to Credibility

**US forward presence is a key symbol. It demonstrates to allies we will maintain security commitments.**

**James Thompson et Al, Senior Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analysis, 2002**

Paper P-3707, "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DOD", July, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>

As indicated in the QDR, DOD clearly intends presence activities to promote at least three of these major goals. With regard to the assurance goal, the QDR specifies, for example, that the department believes the presence of US forces overseas to be one of the most profound symbols of the US commitment to its allies and friends, and says that DOD will honor its obligations and be a reliable security partner. [p. 11] With regard to deterrence of threats and coercion, the QDR argues for a multifaceted approach, one that places particular "emphasis upon peacetime forward presence in critical areas of the world, coupled with global intelligence, strike, and information assets in order to deter aggression with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater." [p. 12] As for countering coercion (defeating any adversary), the QDR says that "US forces must maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its allies, or friends." [p. 13] The document also cites a number of related objectives that DOD intends to promote and achieve through presence activities that it labels security cooperation, saying [they] "will serve as an important means for linking DOD's strategic direction with those of its allies and friends. . . . A particular aim of DOD's security cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the range of preconflict options to available counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on US terms."

\*QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review, a study published by the DOD

**Forward troop presence is key to alliance credibility.**

**Jimmie Jackson, Lieutenant Colonel in the US Military, 1995**

"AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR US PACIFIC COMMAND COURSE V ESSAY", <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA440529&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

A key feature of US forces over the past 45 years has been their worldwide forward deployment. The bulk of these forces deployed to Europe totaling approximately 323,000 in the late 1980s. (4:18) The US also stationed forces in Korea and Japan and have smaller contingents in a number of locations, such as Panama, Turkey, and Iceland. Forward deployment replaces forward presence where the US has reduced the size of the military force. Forward presence continues to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability(11"7)but with fewer military forces. The forward presence of these forces sends explicit signals about the firmness of US commitment in a region.~ (10:4-2)

## Specific Links: Turkey

### **Removing Tactical Nuclear Weapons causes proliferation in all of our allies by undermining the credibility of all US deterrent commitments**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**  
International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe. Such a withdrawal would be inconsistent with the objective of assuring US allies, and not only in Europe. There are connections between the US deterrence posture in Europe and US security partners and interests elsewhere. Australian and Japanese officials and experts are, for example, monitoring US decisions about extended deterrence globally; and they see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitment to their own security. A loss of confidence in the reliability of the protection provided by US extended deterrence could lead some US allies and security partners to consider seeking their own national nuclear forces or to invest more in potential hedging measures such as air and missile defenses and/or enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

### **Turkey is heavily dependent on Tactical Nuclear Weapons for security, they would proliferate after the plan**

**Dr. Oliver Thraner, Senior Fellow – German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 12/10/2008,**

“Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, but Not Yet”,

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>

Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation within the Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey could have further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security. Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalent response to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATO’s nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkey could seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.

## Specific Links: Turkey

### **Turkey feels threatened in the Middle East, they would proliferate without American nuclear weapons**

#### **Nuclear Threat Institute, 2009**

“Turkey Profile,” [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/turkey/index.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html), Updated June 09)

Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member in good standing of all of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use. Turkey is also active in proliferation prevention efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[1] While Turkey is situated in a notoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it has relied for its security on the nuclear and conventional deterrence provided by U.S./NATO security guarantees for more than half a century. Turkey's dedication to the nonproliferation regime is further solidified by its commitment to the European Union accession process, as prospects for Turkish EU membership would be gravely diminished should Turkey choose to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.[3] Thanks in part to decades of U.S. military aid and cooperation, Turkey has robust conventional defense capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles. Ankara is also working to procure advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities. Nuclear Turkey signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subject to extensive IAEA compliance monitoring through both its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankara has also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory at Incirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and the United States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to the near-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they provide tangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security. Although Turkey's interest in nuclear technology dates to at least 1956, when the government founded the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), Ankara's nuclear capabilities never moved beyond the research and development stages. Thus while Turkey conducts sophisticated nuclear fuel cycle research—primarily at the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre (CNRTC) and the Istanbul Technical University—it does not possess nuclear power reactors or industrial-scale enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.[6] Ankara possesses only two small research reactors, the TRIGA Mark II 250-KWt reactor and the TR-2 5MWt reactor—the former operates on 20% U-235 fuel, while the latter possesses a mixed HEU/LEU core that will soon be fully converted to run on LEU.[7] While past decades have witnessed numerous attempts by the government to acquire power reactors, all failed for a variety of political, diplomatic, and economic reasons.[8] However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP-led government is aggressively pursuing nuclear energy. While the government's announcement in 2006 that it would install 5,000MW nuclear energy by 2015 (3 reactors) has encountered numerous feasibility problems—and may not yield even one reactor by that date—the AKP remains unwaveringly politically committed to the endeavor.[9] After a troubled tender process in 2008, the government began assessing the sole bid for construction of the first nuclear plant. The offer from Russian-led consortium Atomstroyexport-Inter Rao-Park Teknik is still under consideration.[10]

## Specific Links: Afghanistan

### **Afghanistan pullout would collapse US alliance credibility because of the signal of defeat**

#### **Wall Street Journal, 10/1/09**

“U.S. Credibility and Pakistan; What Islamabad thinks of a U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan”

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704471504574443352072071822.html>

Critics of the war in Afghanistan—inside and out of the Obama Administration—argue that we would be better off ensuring that nuclear-armed Pakistan will help us fight al Qaeda. As President Obama rethinks his Afghan strategy with his advisers in the coming days, he ought to listen to what the Pakistanis themselves think about that argument. In an interview at the Journal's offices this week in New York, Pakistan Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi minced no words about the impact of a U.S. withdrawal before the Taliban is defeated. "This will be disastrous," he said. "You will lose credibility. . . . Who is going to trust you again?" As for Washington's latest public bout of ambivalence about the war, he added that "the fact that this is being debated—whether to stay or not stay—what sort of signal is that sending?" Mr. Qureshi also sounded incredulous that the U.S. might walk away from a struggle in which it has already invested so much: "If you go in, why are you going out without getting the job done? Why did you send so many billion of dollars and lose so many lives? And why did we ally with you?" All fair questions, and all so far unanswered by the Obama Administration. As for the consequences to Pakistan of an American withdrawal, the foreign minister noted that "we will be the immediate effectees of your policy." Among the effects he predicts are "more misery," "more suicide bombings," and a dramatic loss of confidence in the economy, presumably as investors fear that an emboldened Taliban, no longer pressed by coalition forces in Afghanistan, would soon turn its sights again on Islamabad.

## Specific Links: Afghanistan

**Afghanistan is the lynchpin of credibility of US ally commitments.**

**Beverly Crawford, Associate Director – Institute of European Studies, 2009**

“Isolated again... America’s War”, 12-2, <http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2009/12/02/isolated-again%E2%80%A6-america%E2%80%A6-america%E2%80%99s-war/>)

Obama threw down a clear and unequivocal challenge to Europe last night, and in the coming weeks he will try to obtain a pledge for yet more NATO troops. “What’s at stake,” he said, “is... a test of NATO’s credibility.” What he meant was that if the alliance is not up to the challenge of Afghanistan then its very raison d’être is in question. In fact, however, it’s Obama’s—and America’s—credibility among the allies that’s at stake. And last night’s address did not instill confidence. They see as disgraceful and delusional Obama’s statement that: “although it was marred by fraud, [the recent] election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan’s laws and constitution.” Huh? Did the 2000 presidential election in the U.S. lower the bar for what constitutes “democracy” and pave the way for a statement like this? Perhaps European leaders will cough up a few more troops and spill the blood of more young men and women just to keep peace with their long-time ally and Cold War protector, the United States. But the resources the allies are willing to devote do not match the stakes that Obama has raised. Europeans spend \$520 a year per capita on the military, a third less than Americans. And a NATO graph that tracks European military spending shows that in every country but Greece, 2010 budget projections suggest a sharp drop. Britain’s military budget, the biggest along with France’s, could drop 10 percent in five years. And with regard to Afghanistan, it is clear that these cutbacks coincide with a quickly dissipating political will. If Afghanistan is truly the “graveyard of Empires,” as it seems to be, Europeans are saying, “been there, done that.” This war will continue to drain America’s strength and distort America’s thinking about its global role. The United States will again be a lone warrior.

## Specific Links: South Korea

**Withdrawing from South Korea would cause them to nuclearize.**

**Nicholas Eberstadt et al – Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at American Enterprise Institute, 10/06/2007**

“Toward an America-Free Korea ,” <http://www.aei.org/article/26924>

A Nuclear Crisis--in South Korea. If forced to pursue a wholly independent self-defense in a hostile security environment, Seoul would face overwhelming pressures to develop its own nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the rapidity with which participants at the conference, American and Korean, progressive and conservative, arrived at this conclusion was chilling--especially given the likely implications for regional stability, further nuclear proliferation and South Korea's international standing.

**Forward deployed forces are a key direct signal of US commitment to South Korea.**

**Keith Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, Professor at Graduate Defense and Strategic Studies, 2010**

“U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia”,

<http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Current%20Publications/PDF/US%20Extend-Deter-for%20print.pdf>, p. 11-13)

Forward deployment of forces, then, is one of the principal ways in which the United States assures the South Koreans of its commitment to their defense. Forward deployed forces are the embodiment of that commitment and the mechanism by which the United States would become engaged in any new Korean war. In certain circumstances, the direct engagement of American conventional forces in such a conflict could increase the prospect of U.S. nuclear use. This connection reinforces the nuclear guarantee to Seoul. For these purposes, the presence of some not-insignificant U.S. ground force in South Korea is more important than the specific number of troops or their disposition. While U.S. nuclear weapons in the past were forward deployed in South Korea, a nuclear presence on the peninsula has not been essential to the nuclear guarantee.

## Specific Links: South Korea

**Withdrawing from South Korea would be like leaving them to be run over. Withdrawal means that South Korea will pursue nuclear weapons**

**Todd Hendricks, Lieutenant Commander, Civil Engineer Corps, US Navy, 2005**

“Adverse Effects of Prospective U.S. Forces Korea Troop Realignment”, Department of Joint Military Operations requirement paper, 2-14, Naval War College)

The ROK will consider the United States as having broken defense commitments. A significant factor to remember is that the Korean War has not officially ended. Even though there has been an “armed truce” which has been in place for over 50 years, withdrawing U.S. troops would be tantamount to leaving an ally on the battlefield to be run over by the enemy. “By deploying USFK in a forward area as a ‘tripwire’<sup>12</sup> in order to defend and retaliate against the North Korean attack, the United States has successfully deterred North Korea’s attack.”<sup>13</sup> Although this is an extreme picture of the U.S.-ROK alliance situation, it still deserves some consideration. “Abrogation of the U.S. security treaty with South Korea and abandonment of that long-standing ally...could seriously degrade the importance of military power as a U.S. foreign policy implement, undercut U.S. interests in national credibility, and perhaps encourage aggression against other U.S. friends around the world. Civil war on the Korean Peninsula probably would erupt. The Republic of Korea and Japan might feel needs to develop their own nuclear weapons.”<sup>14</sup> The deterrence of North Korea and the defense of South Korea is firmly grounded in the presence of USFK military forces, for “...it is impossible to talk about the [U.S.-ROK] alliance without focusing on USFK.”<sup>1</sup>

## Specific Links: Japan

### **Troops are the best guarantee that nuclear threats mean something to Japan**

**Joseph Nye, Professor of IR at the Kennedy school of Government at Harvard, 7/14/2009**

Korea Times, "Will US-Japan Alliance Survive",  
[http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/07/137\\_48423.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2009/07/137_48423.html)

Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the U.S. decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold War, the U.S. was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic missile defense.

### **The Japanese government has publicly stated that their safety depends on American troops**

**Joseph Nye and Satoshi Ogawa, professor of IR at Harvard, and a Correspondent for the Yomiuri Shimbun, 9/2/09**

"TRANSFER OF POWER; DPJ win 'to boost soft power'", 9-2, L/N

Q: Some experts are concerned about the DPJ's view of extended deterrence [deterrence provided through the threat of a nuclear response to an attack on an ally]. It's unclear. How do you see it? A: Well, I think as the DPJ ministers take over their portfolios and start looking carefully at the situation, first there'll be talks between Americans and the new Japanese government about details of extended deterrence, but I think the new ministers will find that extended deterrence is very important for Japan and that the credibility of extended deterrence depends very much upon the forward presence of American troops.

\*DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan

## Specific Links: Japan

### **Troop presence has symbolic significance for Japan, removal would cause Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons**

**James Schoff, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, March 2009**

“Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence”, March, <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>, p. xi-xii)

Symbols have always been important to the U.S.-Japan alliance and to the concept of deterrence, whether the symbol is the nuclear umbrella, basing a U.S. aircraft carrier in Japan, or forward deploying a hundred thousand U.S. military personnel in East Asia (including a sizable contingent of Marines in Okinawa). Some of these symbols remain intact, but others are changing and seem less visible. High-ranking U.S. officials have disparaged the future viability of technology supporting the nuclear umbrella during the RRW debate, and the number of forward-deployed U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan is declining. The Pentagon talks more about stability operations and counterinsurgency as core missions for the military, while it lists “detering conflict” as only the fourth of five objectives in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Some Japanese defense planners fear that Washington is distracted by conflict in the Middle East and Central Asia, viewing everything through a prism of hunkered-down homeland defense. The reality is quite different, and an interesting dichotomy has developed whereby an American visitor to Tokyo can hear worry about a U.S. pullback, and the same week in Beijing listen to concern about America’s build-up in the region! Objectively speaking, overall the United States is increasing its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, not pulling back. This mild build-up is actually one of the many objectives of its global repositioning of forces in response to a perceived shifting of “the global community’s ‘center of gravity’ [toward] the Asia-Pacific region.” The build-up is hard to quantify, however, as it relies mostly on less visible measures such as upgrading equipment, more frequent and longer rotational deployments (of F-22s, B-2s, SSGNs, among other assets), access agreements with partners in the region to broaden deployment flexibility in times of crisis, and similar incremental moves. Taken together, all of these improvements suggest that external balancing vis-à-vis North Korea and China has actually been achieved to some degree, even if those in Japan who worry about America’s security commitments do not realize it. Part of the reason for this is that as old symbols of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, given the flexibility of use. The problem is that the relationship of these new assets to specific deterrence scenarios involving the alliance has not been explored adequately.

## Impact: Proliferation

### **Decline in extended deterrence causes global proliferation.**

**Jeffrey Record, Professor of Strategy and International Security – U.S. Air Force’s Air War College, 7/8/2004**

Cato Policy Analysis #519, 7-8, “Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation”, 7-8, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf>)

The success of the NPT has been reinforced by U.S. defense commitments that reassure allies that they can foreswear nuclear weapons without endangering their security. To the extent that insecurity is a motive for acquiring nuclear weapons, a U.S. defense guarantee reduces that insecurity to tolerable levels as long as the guarantee remains credible. This reassurance has been especially critical for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Germany, all of which have had the capacity to “go nuclear” and would have had the incentive to do so absent the extension of credible nuclear deterrence by the United States. As Michael Tkacik at Stephen F. Austin State University observes: “There are many reasons to believe nuclear proliferation would have been far greater without U.S. possession of large, usable forces. Allies and enemies alike would have been driven to acquire such weapons: enemies, because such weapons would then matter; allies, to protect themselves.”<sup>21</sup>

### **Nuclear proliferation results in nuclear war**

**Theodore Taylor, former deputy director of Defense Nuclear Agency, 2001**

“Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, in “Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking”, <http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html>)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

## Impact: Proliferation

### **Credible guarantees deter proliferation by allies.**

**Korea Times, 10/18/2009**

“Obama’s Nuclear Agenda”

At some point, he must open discussions with countries like China, France, and Britain to understand better the conditions for transparency and verification that would be necessary for a clearer path toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. At the same time, Obama cannot allow these long-term issues to divert his attention from crucial short-term issues. So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states.

### **Weak US alliances lead to proliferation as proven by the Gulf states and Turkey.**

**Peter R. Lavoy and Robin Walker, Director of the center for contemporary conflict and senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 7/28/06**

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: 2016

[http://www.nps.edu/ccc/conferences/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06\\_rpt.html](http://www.nps.edu/ccc/conferences/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.html)

Lewis Dunn, a former U.S. nonproliferation official, argued that alarmist predictions of nuclear proliferation have been wrong over the last 40 years mainly because the United States allowed nuclear capable states, including Japan and most of Europe, to become security free riders during the Cold War, eliminating their need for nuclear weapons. Now the question is how strong and lasting the U.S. alliances will prove to be. If they are strong enough, they can keep Turkey out of the “nuclear club.” If they prove too weak to prevent Iran from arming itself, the rest of the Gulf states could very well follow.

## Impact: Nuclear Terrorism

### **Proliferation causes terrorists to get nuclear weapons, resulting in a nuclear 9/11**

**Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, November/December 2007**  
National Interest, "Symposium: Apocalypse When?"

READERS OF Mueller's judgment that policies aimed at preventing proliferation have been "obsessive" and "counterproductive" should be aware of his criteria for what constitutes an "overreaction." In *Overblown*, he argues that America's reaction to Pearl Harbor was exaggerated. America's overreaction led it to declare war on Japan, when a policy of "military containment and harassment" would have been sufficient to pressure Japan to withdraw from its empire. Mueller's claim that the quest to control proliferation has been "substantively counterproductive" misunderstands the impact successful policy has had in preventing what would have been catastrophic outcomes. Mueller takes to task President John Kennedy's 1962 prediction that if states acquired nuclear weapons at the rate they achieved the technical ability to build bombs, there could be twenty nuclear powers by 1975. He argues the claim was exaggerated simply because it did not happen. But the purpose of Kennedy's warning was to awaken the world to the unacceptable dangers of unconstrained nuclear proliferation. The United States and other nations' refusal to accept those consequences motivated an international initiative to create the non-proliferation regime, the centerpiece of which is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thanks to this regime, 183 nations, including scores that have the technical capability to build nuclear arsenals, have renounced nuclear weapons. Four decades later, there are only eight and a half nuclear-weapons states, not twenty or forty. (North Korea is the only self-declared but unrecognized nuclear state.) The gravest challenges to the non-proliferation regime today are North Korea and Iran. If each succeeds in becoming a nuclear-weapons state, we are likely to witness the unraveling of the non-proliferation regime and a cascade of proliferation. As Henry Kissinger recently said, "there is no greater challenge to the global nuclear order today than the impending proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasing likelihood that terrorists may conduct a nuclear 9/11."

### **Nuclear terrorist attack causes extinction**

**Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Egyptian Political Analyst, Al-Ahram Newspaper, 8/26/2004**  
Al-Ahram Online. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm> |

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilizations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

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**[ ] Nuclear peace theories are flawed. Deterrence failure is likely because of incomplete intelligence and irrationality in regional crisis.**

**Stephen Cimballa, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn. State, 2007**

Journal of Slavic Military Studies, "NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK", 20, InformaWorld)

There is no "magic number" of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, there is some experience during and after the Cold War to suggest that states might become more careful, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and, most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces themselves. Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated: especially by students of history and political science. The "rationalities" of states are not of the black box variety. States' world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. A U.S. model of deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis. The strategic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated. Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia's policy of providing air defense missiles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia's own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable. U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strategic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9-11. Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for policy makers to mull over. One of the major risks of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is the possibility that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will "use them or lose them" on the basis of faulty indications and warning.

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

### **Nuclear proliferation escalates regional conflicts and pulls great powers into greater war**

**Harald Muller, director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor of international relations at Frankfurt University, Spring 2008,**

“The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, The Washington Quarterly, 31:2, [http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring\\_muller.pdf](http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_muller.pdf)

A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Regional conflicts could escalate to the nuclear level. The optimistic expectation of a universal law according to which nuclear deterrence prevents all wars rests on scant historical evidence and is dangerously naive. Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place. Moreover, the more states that possess nuclear weapons and related facilities, the more points of access are available to terrorists.

### **Assuming “rationality” will prevent a nuclear war is laughable, there will be mistakes**

**Stephen Cimbala, Professor of Political Science at Penn State, September 2002,**

'Nuclear proliferation and great power security', Defense Studies, 2:3, 77-102

The collapse of bipolarity after Cold War diminishes the link between basic and extended deterrence: one can make fewer reliable predictions about states' behaviors on the basis of 'system' variables. The significance of this theoretical construct for the practical problem of nonproliferation is illustrated by then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's comment that future terrorists or rogue regimes 'may not buy into our deterrence theory. Indeed, they may be madder than MAD.'<sup>44</sup> Deterrence theory a la the Cold War, based on realist premises that assume risk averse and cost-benefit sensitive leaders, may no longer hold tenable for leaders armed with weapons of mass destruction and motivated by 'irrational' or 'illogical' objectives by at least US standards. As Keith B. Payne has explained: Assuming that deterrence will 'work' because the opponent will behave sensibly is bound to be the basis for a future surprise. I do not know whether our expectations of a generically sensible opponent will next be dashed by a so-called rogue state, such as North Korea, or by another challenger. That they will be dashed, however, is near certain. As we move into the second nuclear age and confront opponents with whom we are relatively unfamiliar, assumptions of a generically sensible foe almost certainly will ensure surprises.<sup>45</sup>

## Answers To: Proliferation Good

### **Nuclear proliferation would be fast and destabilizing, causing accidental launch and nuclear terrorism**

**Nathan E. Busch, assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University, 10/8/2004,**

“No End in Sight: The continuing menace of nuclear proliferation”, p. 301-2

This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWS have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will tend to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism.

### **The spread of technology means that nuclear proliferation would be extremely fast and poorly managed**

**Michael J Mazarr, Adjunct professor in security studies at Georgetown and former Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College, 2002,**

“Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World: The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals”, P. 272-3

A second feature of the future world system seems likely to be its **inherent instability in the form of a potential for wildfire-like proliferation**. To date, proliferation has appeared as a process of piecemeal accumulation of weapons capacities, weaponry, and weapons states, subject possibly to delay, derailment, and sometimes reversal. But, as more states have the means at their disposal to build high-leverage strategic weapons based on what is available to them in the civilian economy, proliferation becomes a process that might unfold with great speed, as some group of states, whether within a region or across the international system, move suddenly to create hedges against an uncertain future. Those hedges might include new military research and development programs spun off from civilian NBC activities, more lavish funding for such programs and a push for greater sophistication and weaponization readiness, the construction of “bombs in the basement,” the assembly of the full accoutrement of effective military systems, or actual deployment, whether secret or open. The gaps between different states, would, of course, create advantages for those farthest along in the process of competitive hedging, and the perception of those gaps could be a significant source of instability. If it were to occur, wildfire-like proliferation would likely be visible and unsettling internationally. But it might also be nearly invisible, and thus doubly pernicious, by suggesting the existence of a stable world moving toward deeper cooperation when in fact world order is weakening and the risk of war is growing.



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# Allied Prolif DA-Aff

## Allied Proliferation DA Affirmative

### Uniqueness Answers

Non-Unique .....1-4

### Link Answers

No Link..... 5-6

No Internal Link..... 7-9

### Impact Answers

No Impact..... 10

Impact Turn ..... 11-13

## Non-Unique

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[ ] **US allies do not feel reassured in the status quo because of the foreign policy of Barack Obama**

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

Since January 20, 2009, American credibility has taken a back seat to the Obama administration’s quest for international popularity. During his trips to the Middle East and Asia last year, President Obama seemed more interested in bolstering his approval ratings abroad than advancing American interests. Last week it was reported that the Obama administration downgraded the priority placed on intelligence collection for China in an effort to increase cooperation with Beijing. This move was made despite the fact that Chinese cyberattacks against the U.S. are on the rise and the leadership in Beijing remains reticent about its massive military modernization program. Unfortunately, U.S. national security is more dependent on the credibility of American power—and the words and policies of its commander-in-chief—than international popularity. In foreign affairs, credibility matters. Hollow threats and naïve policies embolden our adversaries while broken commitments lead our friends and allies to question our resolve. During the first year in power, the Obama administration has damaged American credibility with its mishandling of American national security policy.

## Non-Unique

### [ ] **Defense budget cuts mean that allies are not reassured in the status quo**

**Andrew Shearer, director of studies and a senior research fellow at Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2/4/2010,**

“Will America Defend Its Asian Allies?” Wall Street Journal,  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704259304575044354072896096.html>

An even bigger question, though, is whether the U.S. will be able to afford the force outlined in the report: one capable of conducting stabilization operations when necessary and continuing to keep the peace in Asia into the future. Asian governments are nervous that this time around America's decline is real, and they are hedging in response. Both Australia and South Korea are building up their naval forces, for instance. It is no bad thing for U.S. allies to contribute more to international security, but a fundamental loss of confidence in the durability of American military dominance in Asia would be profoundly destabilizing. The report will only reassure U.S. allies if they are convinced Washington will deliver on the capabilities it promises and can project power, deter aggression and come to their aid. With little evident appetite in the White House or Congress to rein in rampant domestic spending, pressures on the defense budget will only increase. Asian governments will have little option but to divert resources to acquire more sophisticated weapons. That's not good news for anyone, including America.

### [ ] **The new nuclear strategy decided by Obama will reduce the credibility of our deterrence**

**Daniel Goure, PhD, States News Service, 4/5/2010,**

“New Obama Nuclear Strategy Undermines Extended Deterrence”,  
<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/new-obama-nuclear-strategy-undermines-extended-deterrence?a=1&c=1171>

Reports have surfaced that sometime this week President Obama will declare that the United States is changing the nuclear strategy that has maintained the security of the Free World for half a century. The essence of the U.S. strategy was the willingness of every administration since Eisenhower to place, first, its military, but ultimately, the American people in harms way. America's willingness to sacrifice our own in the defense of friends and allies was the glue that held together the alliances in Europe and Asia. Also, this commitment is what made our deterrent of non-nuclear threats credible in an era when we did not enjoy conventional superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The United States was willing to escalate, to use nuclear weapons first. The key to the success of the U.S. deterrence strategy was the creation of a series of deterrence thresholds like rungs on a ladder. The idea was that at each step up the ladder the adversary was left with only two choices, either accept defeat or escalate to the next level of conflict with the attendant risk of still greater destruction. Ultimately, deterrence against a nuclear-armed adversary required that he be placed in the position of making the next to last decision, the one to unleash general strategic nuclear war. The adversary knew that by unleashing a large-scale strike against U.S. cities that this country would have no choice but to retaliate in kind. Hence, it was better not to start a fight with the United States which the adversary might win at one rung on the escalatory ladder but which it would inevitably lose as the United States raised the ante. Now, if these reports are correct, President Obama will dismantle the successful strategy of the past fifty years. The president is reported to be planning to announce that under the new strategy U.S. nuclear weapons use would only come in response to nuclear use by an adversary. The U.S. will also withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The United States will no longer deter non-nuclear attacks by the threat to escalate nor will it rely on its nuclear arsenal to deter attacks involving other types of weapons of mass destruction.

## Non-Unique

### [\_\_] The US response to the conflict in Georgia damaged its credibility with its allies

**Stephen Blank, Professor of Russian National security Studies – Strategic Studies Institute of US Army War College, 2009**

Mediterranean Quarterly, “America and the Russian-Georgian War”, 20:4, p. 36,  
<http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/20/4/32.pdf>

NATO’s and the EU’s viability as security providers, the indivisibility of European security, and the vision of a truly integrated continent are at stake here. By the same token, the credibility of American security guarantees has been dealt a serious blow. Since Russia clearly states that America’s European presence is unnatural and that European solidarity is “silly” and a complicating factor for Russia, that solidarity becomes all the more critical if European security is to be preserved.<sup>14</sup> A disunited Europe bifurcated by blocs where Russia has a free hand to do as it pleases undermines all the work of past generations for a peaceful, whole, and free Europe.

### [\_\_] Recent decisions by Obama are causing allies to question their security relationship with the US

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they’ve been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It’s not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

## Non-Unique

[\_\_] **The US has reduced its military presence in countries drastically since the end of the Cold War. Empirically, crises in confidence in American deterrence do not result in countries seeking nuclear weapons**

**David Yost, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School and PhD in IR, 2009,**  
International Affairs, “Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO”, 85:4, Wiley InterScience, p. 767-768, published 2009)

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.<sup>37</sup> According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

## No Link

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### [ ] **US troops are not sufficient to ensure allies of our commitment to their deterrence**

**Jacquelyn Davis et Al, VP – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis , February 2009,**

“Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Legacy Threats, and Dissuading Nuclear "Wannabes", [http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating\\_US\\_Deterrence\\_Concepts.pdf](http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf), p. 8)

Consequently, reassuring and discouraging a nuclear cascade of allies, or former allies, has emerged as a crucial element of deterrence planning, and, in the absence of consensus about the nature of the threats that we are facing, that reassurance function has become more complex and subject to more varied interpretations than it was in the past. In the wake of Iraq and in the midst of the Afghanistan war, as the United States endeavors to “reset” its forces and transform its overseas (military) “footprint,” the forward deployment of U.S. troops may not be sufficient in itself to convince American allies that our commitment to extended deterrence remains credible, especially in the case of political differences over preferred ways for dealing with emerging threats and legacy challenges. This, in turn, may lead some U.S. allies or coalition partners to conclude that their interests would better be served by pursuing their own nuclear options. As the Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, previously cited, points out: Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals. So long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment. Moreover, it is not adequate for deterring nuclear attack. The U.S. deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.<sup>6</sup>

## No Link

[ ] **The US does not have enough troops stationed abroad to make its allies reassured**

**Christopher Layne, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 1997**

“From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing”, *International Security*, Summer 1997, vol. 22, no. 1 //

Deterrence theory holds that extended deterrence is strengthened when the guarantor deploys its own military forces on the protected state's territory. Thus during the Cold War, the presence of large numbers of U.S. combat forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe underscored its importance to the United States and bolstered extended deterrence's credibility. The defender's deployment of forces is one of the most powerful factors in ensuring extended deterrence success, because it is a visible signal that the defender "means business."[62] In contrast, in the early twenty-first century in many places where the United States may seek to implement extended deterrence, the strategy's effectiveness will be undercut because the United States will not have a permanent, sizeable military presence in the target state (Korea is a notable exception). For example, it is unlikely that the United States would ever bolster the credibility of security guarantees (should they, in fact, be given) to states like Ukraine, the Baltics, or even Taiwan each of which is threatened potentially by a nuclear rival--by deploying ground forces as tokens of its resolve. Indeed, assuming NATO expansion goes forward, Washington has taken an ambivalent stance with respect to whether the United States will deploy troops or tactical nuclear weapons or both in Poland (which, because of its proximity to Russia, would be an expanded NATO's most vulnerable member state). At currently projected force levels, moreover, the American presence in Europe and East Asia probably will be too small to make extended deterrence credible in the early twenty-first century; a challenger, with good reason, may question whether the United States has either the capability or the intent to honor its deterrent commitments. U.S. forward-deployed forces could constitute the worst kind of trip wire--one that invites challenges rather than deterring them.

No Internal Link

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[ ] **No internal link, the spread of nuclear weapons depends on many other factors besides US security guarantees**

**Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, 7/2/2009**

“Japan, TLAM/N, and Extended Deterrence,” FAS Strategic Security,  
<http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php>

These reports, authored by agencies and individuals that are or have been deeply involved in the nuclear business (and many of which “ran the Cold War”), argue for a reaffirmation – even strengthening – of extended deterrence as a “good” and enduring mission for nuclear weapons to prevent proliferation in the 21st Century. They argue that since the U.S. nuclear umbrella is extended to some 30 countries (one report even says 30-plus countries; I can only count 30) it prevents them from acquiring nuclear weapons themselves. Yet for the overwhelming majority of those countries, the function of the extended deterrent is not about nonproliferation but about the ultimate security guarantee. The number of those countries that could potentially be expected to develop nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella disappeared is very small, perhaps a couple, and whether they would actually do so depends on a wide spectrum of factors, most of which have nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Yet the reports paint the role of nuclear weapons as alpha omega.

## No Internal Link

[ ] **The U.S. has many ways of maintaining deterrence besides direct military presence**

**Karen Ruth Adams, Associate Prof. IR at the University of Montana, 2005**

“New Great Powers: Who Will They Be, and How Will They Rise?”,  
<http://www.cas.umt.edu/polsci/faculty/adams/greatpower.pdf>, p. 11)

Extended deterrence can be substantiated in many ways – through the deployment of expatriates such as diplomats, advisors, or troops, for example, or through the cultivation of extensive political, economic, or cultural ties. Determining how this is most efficiently and effectively done in the nuclear, information age will be the key to identifying how second-tier states become great powers, as well as which ones are furthest along that path.<sup>41</sup> Despite the variety of options, there is a tendency in the US to focus on troop deployments, especially large ones. This is why policy makers see “command of the commons” as so vital. It is also why they discount the possibility that the US will have “peer competitors” in the near future. Yet, occasionally, officials acknowledge the logic of deterrence. For example, although during the Cold War, massive US deployments in the Korean DMZ were thought necessary to deter North Korea from attacking the South, today (when those troops are being redeployed to Iraq and within South Korea), Pentagon officials acknowledge that trip-wire forces of 5,000 are just as effective as deployments of 500,000.<sup>42</sup>

## No Internal Link

**[ ] Credibility with our allies is a nebulous concept, we cannot tell when it is lost or gained. It does not make sense to maintain military commitments just for the sake of credibility**

**Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy at Johns Hopkins, 2007**  
Daily Yomiuri, "Credibility of U.S. commitment a moot question",

With the Democrats taking both houses of Congress in November and growing public pressure to withdraw American forces from Iraq, the question of U.S. credibility has been raised once again in a central issue in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in part to show terrorists and potential nuclear proliferators that the United States would not tolerate their behavior, but would rather reach out and attack them preemptively. As a result of the military quagmire in Iraq, however, Washington has brought about just the opposite result: there are more anti-American terrorists in the Middle East now than at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and rogue state proliferators like Iran and North Korea have been persuaded to accelerate rather than stop their programs. One of the main arguments against a rapid U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is that it would signal a dramatic American loss of will, that will only encourage future terrorists and states contemplating nuclear weapons to push ahead, confident that the United States will not or cannot respond.

The issue of credibility is particularly important for U.S. allies like Japan, that depend on the United States for their security. Japan accepted a "peace" Constitution, limited the size of its armed forces, and abjured nuclear weapons on the grounds that the United States would come to its defense, including making use of nuclear weapons if Japan faced nuclear attack. With the rise of China and the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by North Korea, the question of U.S. credibility has become one of great urgency.

In the past, Americans have paid a great price to maintain the credibility of their alliance commitments and military deterrent. Then U.S. President Harry Truman felt he had to respond vigorously to the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel in June 1950 because failure to do so would encourage communist aggression all over the world; the result was the Korean War that killed nearly 50,000 Americans. The United States intervened in Vietnam out of fear of a "domino effect"; if one country were allowed to fall to communism, others would rapidly follow suit. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon prolonged the Vietnam War for another five years after the initial decision to draw down forces in 1970 on the grounds that the United States needed to preserve a "decent interval" between its withdrawal and any potential collapse of South Vietnam, for the sole purpose of maintaining the appearance that the United States was not abandoning its commitments. But while strategists assume that credibility is critical, it is not clear on the basis of historical experience how quickly it is lost, or how difficult it is to reestablish. Rapid retreat in the face of setbacks clearly set bad precedents that encourage future aggression. Osama bin Laden, for example, is reported to have pointed to the American retreat from Somalia in 1994 after the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers as one reason he believed that the United States could be driven out of the Middle East. On the other hand, credibility once lost can be regained. Then U.S. President Ronald Reagan withdrew American forces quickly from Lebanon in 1983 after the bombing of the marine barracks, and yet despite that he convinced the Soviet leadership that they would not be able to maintain a long-term military competition with the United States. He did this by confronting Soviet allies in Central America and Afghanistan, as well as through the military buildup that took place during the 1980s. Kissinger's fears that the Soviet Union and other communist powers would take advantage of perceived American weakness after the retreat from Vietnam turned out to be greatly overblown. When the last helicopter left Saigon in 1975, no one anticipated that China would soon embark on a major shift toward a market economy, that the rest of Southeast Asia would experience an economic miracle that would leave Vietnam in the dust, and that the Soviet empire would implode 16 years later. It oftentimes does not make sense to maintain a costly military commitment simply for the sake of credibility, if the engagement cannot ultimately be won, and if the costs of staying are so high that one cannot use one's forces to meet other commitments.

## No Impact

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[ ] **No impact to proliferation. It will happen slowly and in a controlled environment. Negative predictions about proliferation have been consistently proven wrong and rely on an overly pessimistic view of the world**

**William Potter and Guakhar Mukhatzhanova, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Research Associate at the James Martin Center for International Security, 2008**

“Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay”, 33:1, Summer, Project Muse)

To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their forecasts, however, were almost without exception wildly off the mark. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projections about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the research by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books' publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.<sup>48</sup> The Four Myths of Nuclear Proliferation Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the "tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general 'rogueishness' of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions" (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.<sup>49</sup> Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that "the 'domino theory' of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear."<sup>50</sup> As he points out, the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, assumes an over-simplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken.<sup>51</sup> Leaders' nuclear preferences, he maintains, "are not highly contingent on what other states decide," and, therefore, "proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states" (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces "an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self-assertive [End Page 161] ones," and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208–209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisionmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a "ticket to international status"; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208–216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.

## Impact Turn

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**[ ] Allied proliferation in Europe and Asia will increase stability, not decrease it. Their deterrents will be more credible than the US guarantee**

**Christopher Layne, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M, 2006,**

“The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present”, pg. 171-172

There is nothing the United States can do that will fully reassure its allies that Washington will protect them. Recognizing this, America’s allies—especially in East Asia—have every incentive to do exactly what U.S. strategy is supposed to prevent them from doing: re-nationalize and emerge as autonomous poles of power—which will unravel the entire fabric of America’s hegemonic grand strategy.<sup>4</sup> Instead of vainly attempting to stem the tide of onrushing multipolarity, as an offshore balancer the United States would implement an orderly devolution of security responsibilities—including managed proliferation of nuclear weapons—to the potential great powers (and regional ones like South Korea) that heretofore have sheltered under America’s extended deterrence umbrella.<sup>42</sup> Given that managed proliferation would involve politically stable states that are capable of building secure, second-strike retaliatory forces, it would not be destabilizing. On the contrary, because the deterrence provided by national deterrent forces is more credible than extended deterrence provided by a distant protector, Eurasia probably would be more stable—not less—if, acting as an offshore balancer, the United States went forward with strategic devolution. In any event, given the nature of the evolving Eurasian security environment, for the United States it would be better and safer to let other states defend them- selves.

## Impact Turn

**[ ] The spread of nuclear weapons creates peace, not conflict. Because of their destructive power, nations will not start wars.**

**Kenneth Waltz, Professor of IR at Columbia, 1981,**

“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” *Adelphi Papers*, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>)

Fourth, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angell argued that wars could not occur because they would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Germans founded a state by fighting three short wars, in the last of which France lost Alsace. Lorraine. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s dictum, broadly interpreted, becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons have reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One may expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear weapons make it possible to approach the deterrent ideal. Fifth, nuclear weapons can be used for defense as well as for deterrence. Some have argued that an apparently impregnable nuclear defense can be mounted. The Maginot Line has given defense a bad name. It nevertheless remains true that the incidence of wars decreases as the perceived difficulty of winning them increases. No one attacks a defense believed to be impregnable. Nuclear weapons may make it possible to approach the defensive ideal. If so, the spread of nuclear weapons will further help to maintain peace. Sixth, new nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the centre but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.

## Impact Turn

### [ ] Proliferation makes aggression less likely because of the power of the weapons

**Erik Gartzke, and Dong Joon Jo, Professor of Political Science – UC San Diego and Professor of International Relations – University of Seoul, South Korea, 2009,**

“Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol 53 No 2

Even if only some of the substantial increase in lethality from “going nuclear” can be converted into political leverage, nuclear-capable nations are bound to increase their influence in international affairs. Greater influence amounts to getting what states want without having to use force. To the degree that nuclear capabilities lead to bargains that approximate the outcomes states expect from fighting, aggression becomes less appealing, and the anxieties of opponents are reduced. Diplomacy serves as a tool for smoothing the bumpy road of world politics. The decision to proliferate is also endogenous to conflict. Nations are not assigned nuclear weapons at random but select into nuclear status despite high costs, long delays in development, and international opprobrium. Countries with significant security problems or responsibilities and substantial governmental resources are more prone to seek nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007). These same nations fight more often, not because they possess a nuclear arsenal but because the causes of conflict also prompt states to proliferate. Nations with few enemies, modest resources, limited technology, or little dissatisfaction about world affairs are unlikely to pursue nuclear capabilities and also are less inclined to fight. Thus, nominal nuclear status probably overstates the empirical effect of proliferation in propagating interstate disputes.

### [ ] Nuclear weapons escalate the risks involved with war and makes nuclear war less likely

**Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, Assistant Prof of Political Science at SUNY Albany, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory, 2007**

*Journal of Peace Research*, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior\*”, 44:2,

Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the ‘nuclear peace’.<sup>4</sup> While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6–7) ‘Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war’ (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita & Riker (1982) demonstrate formally that a world with almost universal membership in the nuclear club will be much less likely to experience nuclear war than a world with only a few members.



**BOSTON DEBATE LEAGUE**

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# Readiness DA-Neg

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## Explanation

In the status quo, America stands alone with the position of a very powerful, credible superpower. This status is often referred to as “primacy” or “hegemony.” America uses its unique standing to build up its influence throughout the world. Presumably, the result is stability, peace and prosperity in the world.

Primacy has traditionally been closely connected with military policies, as the deployment of armed forces is one of the main ways a nation exercises “hard power.” Hard power stands in contrast to “soft power” which refers to the ability of nations to influence others with cultural or moral standing. Both hard power and soft power have roles in establishing leadership.

Primacy is not easy to maintain. Several nations around the world, such as China, Russia and India hope to challenge American worldwide hegemony. There are also smaller nations, such as Iran, Venezuela and North that confront the United States in regional affairs. President Obama is struggling to preserve America’s leadership in a very difficult time, and so far he has achieved this goal.

A nation’s credibility in the world is evaluated several ways. Do they stand up when they are challenged, or do they run from a fight? Do they keep their promises with their allies? Do they stay consistent and predictable, or do their policies lurch from one to another? Nations, including the United States, are constantly being watched. This is particularly the case when a nation has a relatively new leader.

**SUMMARY OF THE PRIMACY DISADVANTAGE:** In the status quo, America will maintain its primacy in world affairs. President Obama has upheld American commitments, stayed true to our allies, and not radically shifted policies from the end of the Bush Administration.

The affirmative plan undermines America’s standing in the world by suddenly reversing its military troop deployment policy. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States would be seen as running from a fight. In South Korea and Japan, it would be seen as going back on a commitment to the security of those two countries in the face of challengers in Asia such as North Korea and China. In Turkey, it would hurt our perceptions in the Middle East and prevent us from being able to undertake combat operations there because Turkey is a key base. It would also send a signal to Russia, as the missiles there were placed during the Cold War to deter it.

The consequences of the loss of American primacy would be dire. The United States plays an important role in preventing conflicts around the world, and also stopping the conflicts that do exist from escalating to large-scale war. We do this through the credibility of our use of force. Without that credibility, immense conflicts in several global hot spots would become much more likely.

## Glossary

**Hegemony:** Being the most powerful state in the world. The United States is usually considered the “Hegemon” in world politics. It means that the United States has the strongest military and the most influence in order to get what it wants.

**Unipolar:** When there is one “pole” in the international system. Refers to a world setup where there is one very powerful state and many other weaker states. A synonym for hegemony.

**Multipolar:** When there are many “poles” in the international system. Refers to a world where there are many powerful countries, and no one dominant one.

**Apolar:** Refers to an international system without any stabilizing influence. An apolar system would be in disarray and very unstable.

**Primacy:** Synonym for hegemony.

**Geopolitics:** Interactions between countries. Synonym for world politics.

**Retrench:** To make a reduction. A United States retrenchment would involve reducing how much it involves itself in the business of other countries, by withdrawing its bases, refusing to negotiate, or mediate a diplomatic dispute, or refusing to give international aid for example.

**GDP/GNP:** Gross Domestic Product / Gross National Product. A measure of how big a country’s economy is. A large, strong, economy is considered important to maintain hegemony.

**Hard Power:** The military power of a country.

**Soft Power:** The ability of a country to obtain what it wants through attraction and persuasion. It is power that does not have a military element. For example, some argue that the election of Barack Obama increased the United States’ soft power with other countries because he is a very popular President abroad and people are more inclined to want to work with him.

**Power projection:** The ability of a country to apply its power, whether it is military, economic, or otherwise, in faraway locations. For example, US bases in Turkey allow it to project power in the Middle East because it can resupply its forces from those bases.

**Readiness:** Being prepared to fight a war or undertake military action.

**Resolve:** Being perceived as committed and resolute to a particular position. The disadvantage argues that the U.S. needs to be seen as having resolve, that if it undertakes an action or that if a country attempts to challenge the United States in some area, that it would be willing and able to make the other country pay. Having resolve is a key aspect of maintaining deterrence.

## Glossary (cont.)

**Embolden:** enticing someone to act more boldly or recklessly. The disadvantage argues that withdrawing the US' military presence might embolden countries to take actions that would upset the United States. For example, a withdrawal of troops from South Korea might embolden North Korea to attack.

**Predominant:** The most dominant. Another synonym for hegemony

**Balancing:** The practice of a country or a group of countries increasing their power so they can match another country. For example, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union balanced each other by building stronger militaries and more nuclear weapons.

**Deterrence:** Attempting to prevent a country from taking an action by threatening consequences that make the action not worth it. For example, the United States attempts to deter China from invading Taiwan by stationing its navy in between the two countries, meaning that the invasion would also force a war with the United States, something that China is not willing to do.

## Readiness DA INC Shell [1/2]

### **A. Uniqueness. Obama is going to maintain hegemony in the status quo, and overseas military presence is a key part of his strategy**

**Greg Scoblete, The Compass, Real Clear World January 23, 2010**

[[http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/01/obama\\_hearts\\_hegemony.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2010/01/obama_hearts_hegemony.html)]

You know they're wrong because President Obama - despite what his neoconservative critics assert and his progressive boosters hope - is not interested in dismantling this definition of American primacy. Sure, his rhetoric might pay greater lip service to a multi-polar world, but his actions to date are not indicative of someone about to seriously roll back America's dominant position in the world. Consider: he will not pull U.S. troops from their forward deployments in Europe, South Korea or Japan (indeed his administration is locking horns with Japan to keep a basing arrangement in place). He is not vowing to pull the U.S. out of its mutual defense treaties with partners such as Taiwan or Japan, or withdraw the U.S. from NATO, which entrenches U.S. power in Europe. He is strengthening America's military presence in the Gulf to contain Iran. He increased the Pentagon's budget. These are the engines of American primacy, in the military realm at least, and none of them are on the chopping block.

### **B. Link. Military withdrawal destroys U.S. foreign policy credibility---that undermines the foundation of hegemony**

**Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008,**

“Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” *Orbis*, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actor's past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a country's reputation involves resolve.<sup>5</sup> Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.<sup>6</sup> According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to “a cult of reputation” among foreign policy makers, which he defines as “a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead one's adversaries or allies to underestimate one's resolve in the next crisis.”<sup>7</sup> Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a country's reputation and thus “embolden” the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to their cause.<sup>8</sup> Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and resolve.<sup>9</sup> According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less supportive. This logic has had two general consequences for America's use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mere perception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force against every adversary.<sup>10</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some.<sup>11</sup>

## Readiness DA INC Shell [2/2]

### **C. Impact. Loss of Hegemony causes war between the most powerful countries as countries begin to take risks and challenge the United States**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

## Overview

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## Uniqueness: US Is the Hegemon Now

**The United States is still the global leader but other nations are trying to challenge us**

**Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007**

[Policy Review No. 144, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136>]

The world has not been transformed, however. Nations remain as strong as ever, and so too the nationalist ambitions, the passions, and the competition among nations that have shaped history. The world is still “unipolar,” with the United States remaining the only superpower. But international competition among great powers has returned, with the United States, Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Iran, and others vying for regional predominance. Struggles for honor and status and influence in the world have once again become key features of the international scene. Ideologically, it is a time not of convergence but of divergence. The competition between liberalism and absolutism has reemerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up, as in the past, along ideological lines. Finally, there is the fault line between modernity and tradition, the violent struggle of Islamic fundamentalists against the modern powers and the secular cultures that, in their view, have penetrated and polluted their Islamic world.

**US leadership is strong now**

**John G. Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton, 9-5, 2005**

(Weary Titan or Poorly Led Superpower. <http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/9/5/135627/8001>)

Britain was not at the peak of its power in 1905 – that came much, much earlier. But America today surely is. Let us ponder America’s strategic position. It is about 4 percent of world population but 30 percent of world production and 40 percent of consumption. Its GNP is 11 trillion dollars – more than twice the size of the next largest national economy, and its real per capita income is substantially higher than any other major country. Its language in the language of world commerce and the dollar is the world’s currency. Clyde Prestowitz reports that the U.S. has 423 of the leading 1000 global companies and its stock markets account for 44 percent of the value of all stocks around the world. America has the top universities and research centers. It spends more on research and development than the next five countries together. It has no peer competitor. It spends almost half the world expenditures on military capacities – and does so as a percent of GNP (3 percent) substantially below Cold War levels (as much as 7 percent). If America is overstretched, it is not because of declining material capabilities. Some argue that American power is likely to actually increase during the coming century, not decline. John Mearsheimer made this provocative argument at the recent American Political Science Association, arguing that China’s ascent will be cut short because of a declining and aging population. My point doesn’t rely on this argument. I simply maintain that the U.S. is not threatened by rising powers in 2005 as Britain was in 1905 – the U.S. is utterly more powerful in relative terms and its rivals further behind. Indeed, if world politics today were a poker game, the United States would be holding the best cards – by far. Everyone around the table would know this and – if they could – they would swap their cards for America’s. Moreover, the hand the U.S. holds is probably better than any player has had in centuries. It is certainly the best cards the U.S. has held in a hundred years.

## Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable

**The new Obama national security strategy means we are looking to maintain sustainable U.S. power**

**Los Angeles Times, 6/6/10,**

“Obama's National Security Strategy,” online:

<http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus-20100606,0,1433841.column>

Now he has, in the recently released National Security Strategy, a lengthy essay required by Congress. The short version — to save you from reading 52 pages of numbing generalities — is this: We still want to do a little bit of everything, but after almost a decade of war, we're overstretched and need to concentrate first on fixing the domestic economy. When it comes to problems overseas, we'll do what we can as long as it doesn't cost too much. Unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, President Obama's foreign policy isn't about pursuing one or two overriding goals — in Bush's case, defeating terrorism and spreading democracy. Instead, it's about what economists might call "sustainability," making sure we don't take on wars or other commitments that we can't afford. In an earlier generation, Walter Lippmann called this "solvency." It was essential, Lippmann believed, to bring "into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation's commitments and the nation's power."

**The US will be powerful for a long time to come because of its large defense budget, strong education system, and strong economy**

**Sankar Sen, Professor of Marketing at NYU, 4/5/2005**

American Power: How Long Will It Last? The Statesman.

The US today bestrides the globe like a Colossus. Today's international system, says Robert Kagan, "is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony". American military power is now far stronger than that of any other nation. The USA today accounts for 40 to 50 per cent of global defense spending. In every sphere of warfare US now has clear preponderance over other powers. No other power has the capacity to move large forces around the globe and support its troops with precision firepower and unsurpassed amount of information and intelligence. Military resources as a result of the \$ 400 billion military budget are formidable. The defense research establishment of the US receives more money than the entire defense budget of its largest European ally. No other power has B2 bombers, the satellite constellations, the aircraft carriers or the long range unmanned aircraft like that of the US Navy and Air Force. Sources of strength But no power can sustain itself by military strength alone; it must possess other sources of strength. Another pillar of American strength is its economy. It is indeed the world's largest and most vibrant. In 2000 the US economy was equal in size to that of the next four national economies (Japan, France, Germany, Great Britain) combined. However, the economic gap is smaller than the military gap when the US economy is compared to that of the European Union. Nevertheless, the American dominance remains remarkable. There are other sources of strength. The US today is the third most populous country. Unlike other developed countries it has a birth rate which is near the replacement rate. It has a stable political system and in the realm of knowledge and ideas, it has, as Joseph Nye of Harvard University calls it, "a clear lead over others". American universities dominate in the field of higher education and American culture, both high-brow or low-brow, music, food, work styles and manners. The values of democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility and openness that find expression in American education and culture contribute to American power. It has been aptly said that American soft power looms larger than its economy and military assets

## Uniqueness: Hegemony Sustainable

### Overseas base deployments are sustainable

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:  
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed \$500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over \$100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes.

### The US has the will and the means to be the strongest military power for years to come

**Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and adjunct professor of history at Georgetown University, June and July 2002**

"Power and Weakness," Policy Review, No. 113

Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3 percent of its GDP on defense today. Were Americans to increase that to 4 percent — meaning a defense budget in excess of \$500 billion per year — it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defense throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial overstretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7 percent of its GDP on defense), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the Cold War — except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace. The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a “postmodern” utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the world.

## Generic Link: Withdrawal Hurts Readiness

### **Base realignment creates strategic imbalances in the Armed Forces and trades off with training and education – this crushes readiness**

#### **John Shimkus, Republican Representative in the House, 2006**

“Changes in US Forward Deployment and its Effects on Europe”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Annual Session, (<http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=999>)

19. The Commission also disputed the costs of the redeployment plan. They estimated that the costs could total \$20 billion, but noted that the Department of Defense had only budgeted \$4 billion for the redeployment process. This total is much larger than previous estimates because the Commission was including what they saw as the additional strategic mobility costs. The Global Posture Review envisions a force based primarily in the United States and relies on airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned supplies to transport and provision forces sent to a crisis area. This would require additional assets. Current plans for airlift, sealift and pre-positioned supplies, the Commission argues, do not take into account the additional burden imposed by the redeployment of more military personnel back to the United States. 20. Another more general critique is that the realignment will take years to complete, but there is no guarantee that the strategic environment will be the same and demand the same kind of basing structure. Few would have predicted, for example, the strategic need for basing rights in Central Asia in the years immediately before 2001. It is possible that the US will face other unforeseen challenges in the future, and that the realignment will not be appropriate for those contingencies. At the same time, the disruption that accompanies a realignment of this magnitude could have some effect on the readiness of the armed forces. The time and effort spent in moving equipment and establishing new facilities can impact on the amount of time available for training and education. In short, some critics of the realignment argue that the process can weaken the ability of the US military to confront current security challenges while offering no guarantee that it will be better suited to confronting tomorrow's challenges.

## Generic Link: Withdrawal Hurts Resolve

### **Withdrawal is a sign of weakness**

**Bradley Thayer, Assoc Prof., Missouri State Univ., The National Interest 2006**

[In Defense of Primacy, National Interest, Nov/Dec 2006 Issue 86]

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

### **Reduced military presence will increase threats from competitors**

**Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, April 2, 2010**

[<http://www.aei.org/article/101869>]

The upshot of these three trends will likely be a series of decisions to slowly, but irrevocably reduce America's overseas global military presence and limit our capacity to uphold peace and intervene around the globe. And, as we hollow out our capabilities, China will be fielding ever more accurate anti-ship ballistic missiles, advanced fighter aircraft, and stealthy submarines; Russia will continue to expand its influence over its "near abroad" while modernizing its nuclear arsenal; and Iran will develop nuclear weapons, leading to an arms race or preemptive attacks in the Middle East. Under such conditions, global trade flows will be stressed, the free flow of capital will be constrained, and foreign governments will expand their regulatory and confiscatory powers against their domestic economies in order to fund their own military expansions. For the past six decades, global stability was assured in large part by an expensive US commitment to maintain credible forces abroad, forge tight alliances with key strategic countries, and devote a significant, though not onerous, part of national treasure to sustaining a military second to none. Rarely in history has a country shouldered such burdens for so long, but the succeeding decades of growth and avoidance of systemic war proved the wisdom of the course.

## Specific Link: Japan Affirmative

### **Forward presence in Japan deters aggression and signals resolve**

**Bruce Klinger, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center 8/26/09**

“How to Save the US-Japan Alliance” [<http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/K/Bruce-Klingner>]

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia, including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's principal missile defense partner in the world. Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

### **Forward presence in Japan signifies resolve, commitment to our allies, and deterrence**

**Gary S. Kinne, Colonel of US army, 5/3/04**

“U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT  
May 3, 2004

[<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA423691>]

Forward deployed U.S. military forces on the Korean peninsula, backed up by additional forces in Japan, have long been the bastions of our current containment policy. Their presence signifies resolve, commitment to our allies, and deterrence. Although not the only element of power used to coerce North Korea, this remains the most persuasive and visible tool used to moderate potential aggression. Forward presence enables the U.S. to rapidly respond to crises while promoting regional stability. The primary disadvantage of this strategy is the requirement to maintain a dedicated military presence in the region. These forces are thus unavailable to respond to other worldwide contingencies.

## Specific Link: Japan Affirmative

### Japanese bases are key Lilly pads to sustain military readiness

**Yoshio Shimoji, M.S. from Georgetown, 5/3/10**

“The Futenma Base and the U.S.-Japan Controversy: an Okinawan perspective”, Asia-Pacific Journal, May 3<sup>rd</sup>, <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yoshio-SHIMOJI/3354>)

Obviously, the U.S. Marines or the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, to be more specific, are stationed in Okinawa not to defend Japan as ballyhooed but simply to hone their assault skills in preparation for combat elsewhere. It's a cozy and easy place to train, with Tokyo providing prodigious financial aid, which Washington demands in the name of “host nation support.” I liken it to turf dues exacted by an organized crime syndicate, which offers protection from rival gangs. In 2003, for example, Japan's direct “host nation support” amounted to \$3,228.43 million or \$4,411.34 million if indirect support is added. Compare these figures with Germany's and Korea's support. Germany's direct host nation support in the same year was \$28.7 million (1/112th that of Japan) and indirect support \$1.535.22 million. Korea's direct host nation support in that same year was \$486.31 million (about 1/7th that of Japan) and indirect support \$356.5 million [4]. For ten years from 2001 through 2010, Japan shouldered an average annual sum of \$2,274 million for host nation support [5], which incidentally is known as “sympathy budget” as if Japan were voluntarily doling out money out of compassion for those U.S. service members who are deployed in this far-away country. The amount Japan has financed to support USF Japan operations since the system started in 1978 totals an astounding \$30 billion. That the Marines are based in Okinawa not to defend Japan but mainly to strengthen U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific and beyond is widely recognized, as the following quotation from GlobalSecurity.org suggests: “The Regiment (3rd Battalion 6th Marines) continues to support the defense of the Nation by maintaining forces in readiness in support of contingency operations and unit deployments to the Mediterranean, Pacific rim and around the globe.”(Italics mine) Pundit Kevin Rafferty is more direct saying, “some of the bases (in Japan) are staging-posts for deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere [6].” When Marine contingents were compelled to move out of Gifu and Yamanashi Prefectures in mainland Japan in the face of mounting anti-U.S. base demonstrations and moved to Okinawa in the 1950's, a number of Pentagon strategists are reported to have cast doubt on the wisdom of such a shift. The U.S. Army was the major element in the U.S. Forces in Okinawa during the occupation period which ended in 1972 with reversion. Apparently, the Army recognized the limited value of being stationed in Okinawa and so withdrew, leaving behind only a few hundred troops. The Marines grabbed this chance to expand their role and function, taking over everything from the departing Army. They are not, however, deterrents against outside “threats” as they boast.

## Specific Link: South Korea Affirmative

### **Military presence in South Korea is critical to maintain readiness and prevent North Korean Aggression**

#### **Vancouverite, News Service, 5/24/2010**

“U.S. orders military readiness over North Korea aggression”,

<http://www.vancouverite.com/2010/05/24/u-s-orders-military-readiness-over-north-korea-aggression/>

BEIJING – U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has reiterated strong support for South Korea’s defense as President Obama ordered the U.S. military to be in a state of readiness. “The Republic of Korea can continue to count on the full support of the United States, as President Obama made clear when he spoke to President Lee last week,” said Clinton during a press briefing. “First, we endorse President Lee’s call on North Korea to come forward with the facts regarding this act of aggression and, above all, stop its belligerence and threatening behavior,” she said as tension continued to mount over the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel with the loss of 46 lives. “Second, our support for South Korea’s defense is unequivocal, and President Obama has directed his military commanders to coordinate closely with their Korean counterparts to ensure readiness and to deter future aggression,” she said, reinforcing a statement made by Obama. ” As part of our ongoing dialogue, we will explore further enhancements to our joint posture on the Peninsula. Third, we support President Lee’s call to bring this issue to the United Nations Security Council,” she said. ” I will be working with Ambassador Rice and our Korean counterparts, as well as Japan, China, and other UN Security Council member states to reach agreement on a way forward in the Council.”

### **U.S. troops in South Korea are key to U.S. credibility throughout Asia**

#### **Alon Levkowitz, Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Haifa, 2008**

“The seventh withdrawal: has the US forces' journey back home from Korea begun?,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 131-148

The forces had several functions, bilateral and regional: 1. Deterring North Korea and preventing a new Korean War – The US assumption immediately after the war and for the majority of the years since it ended, was that South Korea could not deter North Korea by itself and it needed the assistance of the US forces. 2. Demonstrating US commitment to Korea – The presence of US forces in Korea, especially by the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), as a ‘tripwire’ force that will ensure US involvement if any conflict broke out on the Korean Peninsula, symbolized the highest US commitment to Korea's security. It also has an important psychological implication in assuring South Korean citizens that the Korean War will not reoccur (Hamm, 2004). 3. Supporting the Korean economy – The US forces (and the alliance) and the security ‘umbrella’ (conventional and nuclear) allowed South Korea to rebuild its economy after the Second World War and the Korean War and continue with its economic development ever since. It also gave political backup to South Korea's initiatives throughout the years to ease tensions in the Korean Peninsula (Cho, 1982; Hart-Landsberg, 1998). 4. Regional tasks – From a regional, strategic point of view, the importance of the US forces is threefold: preventing any changes in the balance of power in the region (Cumings, 1983; Clark, 1992); acting as a regional pacifier by allowing the US to respond very quickly and prevent a conflict from escalating in case a conflict arises outside or within the Korean Peninsula; and signaling US commitment not only to Korea but also to Japan and other Asian US allies in the region (Lee, 1978, pp. 107–108, 1982, p. 102).

## Specific Link: South Korea Affirmative

**US presence in South Korea is key to deterring China and North Korea, and keeping the region stable. Even the perception that the US is retrenching will cause war**

**Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow at AEI 5/1/2009**

Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Erosion of U.S. Power in Asia,"  
<http://www.aei.org/article/100445>)

In fulfilling its security duties in the region, the U.S. military is providing one of the principle public goods of East Asia. To be sure, America's regional allies want Washington to participate in Asia's many diplomatic conferences and contribute to regional economic integration. But to paraphrase Teddy Roosevelt, one of the first American statesman to recognize the Pacific's importance, as much as Asians want the U.S. to "speak softly," they also want it to carry a "big stick." They welcome the U.S. for its unique ability to ensure a stable balance of power in a region marked by a rising global power, China, and a weak but dangerous nuclear nation, North Korea. All regional allies know that China has not become a postmodern, European-style power that eschews military force. To the contrary, China has become quite fond of its newfound military muscle. Beijing proudly displayed that might last week in Qingdao, as China celebrated the 60th anniversary of her growing navy. Neither has the conventional threat North Korea poses to its southern neighbor and Japan disappeared. Tokyo watches in dismay as Pyongyang inches ever closer to acquiring the means to deliver its nuclear weapons. But it is the transformation of Chinese military power that is causing the most Asian heartburn. China has built up its military across the board. Its submarine fleet has grown faster than any other in the world, it now has a large and lethal arsenal of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, and it has announced plans to deploy aircraft carriers. Worrying about China is far from a case of what Defense Secretary Robert Gates calls "next war-itis." The U.S. isn't in a war with China--mercifully--but there is already a military competition. Take China's submarine fleet for example. Since 1995 China placed into service 38 new submarines--a rate of 2.9 per year. In contrast, during the same period of time the U.S. has reduced its submarine force by about 25 boats. The Chinese have not only noticed the imbalance, they are counting on a continued decline in America's Pacific naval power. China's Rear Admiral Yang Yi gloated that "China already exceeds the United States in [submarine production] five times over . . . 18 [U.S. submarines--the amount resident in the Pacific] against 75 or more Chinese submarines is obviously not encouraging [from a U.S. perspective]." The Chinese admiral is spot on. U.S. boats are superior, though the quality gap is closing. And in this vast region, numbers matter. The rise of the Chinese submarine fleet and symmetrical decline in American subs is reflective of a broader trend. China is well on its way to having the greatest number of fighter planes, surface ships, missiles and submarines in the region. U.S. Secretary Gates rightly wants the military to concentrate on the "wars we are in." But we cannot do so at the expense of the military competition we are in. China military strength is not some futuristic abstraction. Indeed, we might think of China as a power-of-tomorrow, but our Asian allies see the daily realities of rising Chinese power. Beijing has already changed the military balance in the Asia-Pacific region to the great consternation of America's key allies and friends, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and India.

The point is not that Washington is poised to go to war with North Korea or China. Rather, only by maintaining its role as Asia's security guarantor can the U.S. hope to secure an enduring peace in this dynamic region. It has a strong interest in avoiding even the perception of American retrenchment. That would be a recipe for a spiraling arms race among the region's great powers. It is no accident that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, all capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, have not yet taken that road. They have been confident in the American security umbrella. If current trends continue, are we sure those states would not reconsider the wisdom of that policy?

## Specific Link: Turkey Affirmative

### **Presence in Turkey is key to overall hard power because of its strategic location**

**Hüseyin Bağcı and Saban Kardaş, Middle East Technical University, 5/12/03,**  
“Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited,” Prepared for the  
CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, <http://www.eusec.org/bagci.htm#ftnref112>

In developing this relationship, Turkey's special ties with the region again appeared to be an important asset for U.S. policy. Turkey had a lot to offer: Not only did Turkey have strong political, cultural and economic connections to the region, but it had also accumulated a significant intelligence capability in the region. Moreover, the large experience Turkey accumulated in fighting terrorism would be made available in expanding the global war on terrorism to this region.<sup>[43]</sup> As a result, after the locus of interest shifted to a possible operation against Afghanistan, and then to assuring the collaboration of the countries in Central Asia, Turkish analysts soon discovered that Turkey's geo-strategic importance was once again on the rise. It was thought that, thanks to its geography's allowing easy access to the region, and its strong ties with the countries there, Turkey could play a pivotal role in the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, and reshaping the politics in Central Asia: "Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sort of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighborhood... All these features made Turkey a center that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers... In the new process, Turkey's importance has increased in American calculations. With a consistent policy, Turkey could capitalize on this to derive some practical benefits... Turkey has acquired a new opportunity to enhance its role in Central Asia."

## Specific Link: Turkey Affirmative

**The US presence in Turkey, especially at the Incirlik base, is key to power projection and overall hegemony**

**Henri Barkey, Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, specialist in Turkish politics, 2003**

“The United States and Turkey.” Allies in Need, pp 209-211.

U.S. interests and objectives in Turkey have steadily expanded since 1990. The cold war’s straightjacket has given way to many new considerations. The primary U.S. foreign policy vision after the cold war was based on preventing regional disputes from threatening its own and its allies’ interests and on globally expanding market reforms and democratic principles and practices. With no serious Russian threat to European security, U.S. attention has shifted to mid-level powers such as Iran and Iraq with ambitions to acquire nonconventional weaponry and the means to deliver them. This policy vision lacks the simplicity of containment, but it has impacted Turkey significantly. Turkey’s proximity to many regions in flux or in conflict together with Ankara’s long-standing adherence to the NATO alliance helped Washington interpret this country’s geostrategic importance. Simply put, Turkey is important for the United States for four reasons. First, it serves as a potential platform for the projection of U.S. power, as the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated. Saddam Hussein’s resilience in the aftermath of the war has made Ankara essential to staving the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime. From the Incirlik base in Turkey, U.S. and British airplanes routinely patrol the no-fly zone over northern Iraq in an effort to keep Saddam Hussein’s forces away from Kurdish-controlled parts of Iraq. It is difficult to see how the United States could have sustained its policy of sanctions, regime isolation, and protection of the Kurdish population without Turkey’s cooperation. Second, Turkey is also different and valuable because it is a NATO ally that takes security seriously. Its need for military modernization notwithstanding, Ankara has large numbers of troops under arms that are deployable, and it is committed to maintaining its spending on defense given its location in a ‘bad neighborhood.’ Third, Turkey is a bulwark standing in the way of revisionist’ regimes like Iran intent on changing the regional landscape. Turkey’s strong links to the United States, NATO, and the West in general are in direct opposition to some of Iran’s regional preferences, if not designs. Hence, even in the event of cordial relations with Ankara, no Iranian government can ignore Turkey’s reaction in its regional calculations. The improving relations between Turkey and Israel throughout the 1990s have changed the strategic setting in the Middle East—although much exaggerated by Arab countries—which helped Washington perceive Ankara as a more balanced regional player. Finally, for Washington, Turkey represents an alternative and successful example for many countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a model to be emulated as the only Muslim NATO member and EU candidate. In addition to its historical ties to the West, Turkey has had a vibrant, albeit flawed, democratic political system and in the 1980s embraced economic liberalization—well ahead of Latin America and, save for Israel, the only one in the Middle East.

## Specific Link: Afghanistan Affirmative

### **Afghanistan withdrawal sends a global signal of U.S. weakness and inspires power competition**

**Michael Weinstein, 11/12/2004**

Power and Interest News Report, p.

[http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\\_printable&report\\_id=235&language\\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=235&language_id=1)

The persistence of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has hampered rebuilding efforts in both countries and blocked their emergence as credible democracies, diverts U.S. resources and attention from other interests and -- as long as progress is slow or nonexistent -- sends the message that Washington remains vulnerable. The recent election of Hamid Karzai to Afghanistan's presidency has not changed that country's political situation: power outside Kabul remains in the hands of warlords, the drug trade remains the major support of the country's economy, and the Taliban insurgency continues. In Iraq, Washington counts on elections in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly to provide legitimacy for the state-building process, but at present that goal seems unlikely to be achieved. Washington for the foreseeable future will be tied down managing the consequences of its earlier interventions. If Washington decides to retreat -- more likely from Iraq than from Afghanistan -- its loss of power will be confirmed, encouraging other powers to test its resolve elsewhere. Only in the unlikely case that Washington manages to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term will other powers think twice about probing U.S. vulnerabilities.

## Specific Link: Afghanistan Affirmative

**Presence in Afghanistan is critical to ensure US interests and military readiness because it provides training for 21<sup>st</sup> century styles of warfare**

**Lawrence Korb et. al., Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, He is also a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, 12/10 2008**

“Building a Military for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, Center for American Progress, December 10<sup>th</sup>, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military\\_priorities.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/military_priorities.html))

Embrace a new vision for the U.S. military. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the changing threat environment for the United States. It is increasingly likely that, in this post-9/11 world, U.S. troops will more frequently be assigned to non-traditional warfare tasks, including both kinetic and non-kinetic counterinsurgency operations, rather than full-scale conventional wars with near-peer competitors. While proficiency in conventional warfare cannot be allowed to lapse, the next administration should consider the type of conflicts most likely to be encountered when allocating limited funding to procurement, training, force expansion, and other budgetary requests. For the next four years, allow the defense budget to keep pace with inflation. As previously noted, today’s defense baseline budget is higher than it has been in real dollars since the end of the World War II. This sum, if used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. The substantial increase in defense spending during the Reagan administration, which saw DOD’s base budget increase by some 53 percent over five years, was followed by a sustained period of budget cuts of about 35 percent between 1985 and 1998. In contrast, the dramatic rise in base defense spending during the Korean War—DOD’s budget nearly quadrupled between 1950 and 1954—was followed by a long period of sustained but modest growth in DOD’s budget at an annual real increase of about 1.5 percent between 1954 and 1980. The latter precedent represents the better model to emulate. However, economic constraints and the almost unprecedented size of the current budget suggest that even small increases in the baseline budget can and should be avoided in the next administration’s first term. Include supplemental war funding in a consolidated budget. Long-term U.S. interests in Iraq and Afghanistan require that an American military presence will be maintained in those countries for the foreseeable future, most of the cost of which should be paid for through supplemental appropriations. However, the services have taken advantage of these ostensibly “emergency” war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects. DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY 2010-13 defense budget priorities.

## AT: No Spillover Between Events

[ ]

[ ] US Weakness in one area is perceived by other countries

**Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999,**

“Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay>

In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia. Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another.

**Great-power adversaries like China perceive regional withdrawals as a signal of low resolve**

**Thomas H. Henriksen, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the U.S. Joint Special Operations University, February 1999,**

“Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, online: <http://www.hoover.org/publications/epp/2846256.html?show=essay>

Low points in American determination and leadership, such as the North Korean negotiations, did not go unnoticed. U.S. reactions encouraged Iraq's recalcitrance in its dealings with U.N. arms inspectors, accounted for North Korea's later face-off with Washington over demands to open its underground facilities to inspection (while demanding \$500 million to discontinue missile exports), and bolstered Serbia's reluctance, in the face of U.S.-led NATO efforts, to halt the bloodshed first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo. A high-ranking Chinese military officer, Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai, deputy chief of China's general staff, reportedly declared in 1995, in response to an American's unofficial warnings that Washington might react militarily to a Beijing attack on Taiwan, "No, you won't. We've watched you in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and you don't have the will."<sup>15</sup>

## Impact: Readiness Solves War

### **Readiness is critical to prevent rivals from lashing out and prevent war**

**Jack Spencer, Research Fellow at Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies,  
9/15/2000**

“The Facts About Military Readiness”, Heritage Foundation, September 15<sup>th</sup>,

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2000/09/BG1394-The-Facts-About-Military-Readiness>)

America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,<sup>3</sup> concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."<sup>4</sup> According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.<sup>5</sup> Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.<sup>6</sup> Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

### **Lack of readiness invites aggression from enemies. This is especially true for the United States**

**Jack Spencer, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security at the Davis Institute at Heritage Foundation, 4-1, 2001**

(Don't Shortchange Defense. [www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM734.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/EM734.cfm) |

Readiness is the ability of a military unit, such as an Army division, to accomplish its assigned mission. Any country that neglects to maintain a high state of readiness invites aggression from potential adversaries who assume that it is not prepared to defend its interests. A high state of readiness deters potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace. Today, potential adversaries threaten U.S. national interests in every region of the world. Yet in recent years, the readiness of the U.S. armed forces has declined. Logistics, spare parts, training programs, and morale, all of which contribute to readiness, deteriorated as forces and budgets decreased and non-combat operations increased. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Department of Defense funds about 80 percent of the cost of non-combat missions like peacekeeping in Kosovo with money from its operations and maintenance accounts--funds that should be used instead to purchase the supplies upon which readiness depends.

## Impact: Resolve is Key to Hegemony

**Resolve and credibility are key to hegemony. Weakness invites revisionist powers to challenge U.S. dominance**

**Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004**

“Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror,” online:

[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html)

The credibility of a state forms the basis of its reputation, which is little more than an impression of fundamental national character that serves as a guide for others trying to anticipate future actions.<sup>12</sup> The loss of credibility can lead to reputations for weakness, fecklessness, and irresolution, which, the thinking goes, emboldens enemies and discourages the loyalty of allies. Credibility can be damaged in many ways, depending on the situation and the observer, but perhaps the surest is to fail to rise to a challenge or to pursue a goal with sufficient resolve. By doing so, a state may earn a reputation for irresolution, which can encourage more aggressive actions by revisionist powers.<sup>13</sup> Threats made by a state without credibility may not be believed, inspiring the aggressor to press his advantage, which may lead to a challenge to an interest that is truly vital making a major war unavoidable. Thus the credibility imperative is also intimately related to the post-war American obsession with “appeasement,” which is of course a code word for a show of weakness that inadvertently encourages an aggressor.

**Resolve is key to prevent other countries from being aggressive**

**Bernard Chapin and Victor Davis Hanson –interviewer, and the Martin and Illie Anderson senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 12/7/09,**

“Change, weakness, disaster,” online: <http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/>

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemony, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

## Impact: Hegemony Solves War

**American dominance prevents war between the most powerful countries in the world. American troop presence in other regions is critical to this.**

**Stephen M. Walt, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Spring, 2002**

(American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls. Naval War College Review.

[http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0JIW/is\\_2\\_55/ai\\_88174226](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_55/ai_88174226) |

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try. (8) The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave. (9) Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

## Impact: Hegemony Solves War

**The end of unipolarity results in multiple nuclear wars, systemic global conflict, and the magnification of all impacts.**

**Niall Ferguson, Professor of History at the School of Business at New York University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, September-October, 2004**  
A World Without Power. Foreign Policy, Lexis

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

## Impact: Conflict With China

### **A demonstration of resolve is essential to prevent China from invading Taiwan**

**Thomas Christensen, professor of politics at Princeton University, Spring, 2001**

“Posing problems without catching up.” International Security, EBSCO.)

On the active defense side, it appears that China is attempting to import and to build indigenously a fairly impressive layered air defense system to counter cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. In addition to reported clandestine acquisition of Patriot technology, China has purchased and is seeking to purchase from Russia an undisclosed number of SA-10 (S-300) and SA-15 (TOR-1) SAM systems. Some of this Russian technology might be successfully integrated into China's own domestically produced SAM systems, such as the HQ-9. [66] China is also working to develop antistealth and antisatellite capabilities. Even if the Chinese programs have only limited effect against more technologically advanced foes, they may still pose a future security challenge to Taiwan and the United States. If Beijing elites believe that they are in a protracted war of wills over an issue that they care about much more than do the Americans, such as Taiwan, those elites might still be emboldened by the perceived capability--however limited--to increase costs to American and Taiwanese forces and to reduce costs to mainland assets in such a struggle. This problem is only exacerbated by any perceptions that Chinese elites might have about America's supposed limited willingness to fight such protracted wars and to suffer casualties. Implications and Prescriptions for U.S. Strategy If the analysis above is correct, preventing war across the Taiwan Strait and between the United States and China is much more difficult than a straightforward net assessment of relative military power in the region might suggest. To deter China from launching attacks against Taiwan and escalating crises and conflicts by attacking American assets in the region, the United States must do more than demonstrate an ability to prevail militarily in a conflict; it must also demonstrate American resolve and, perhaps, the ability to protect its forces not only from defeat but also from significant harm.

### **A war between the US and China over Taiwan would result in nuclear weapon use**

**Straits Times 20000**

[6/25, “Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” lexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and - horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.



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# Readiness DA-Aff

## Readiness DA Affirmative

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## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

[ ]

[ ]

[ ] **Hegemony is already coming to a close. The Bush administration was the death knell of American power**

**Peter Goodspeed, National Post, 12/23/2009**

<http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2379362#ixzz0ajFLkxVK>

Robert Pape, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, estimates between 2000 and 2008 the U.S. share of the world's GDP fell by 32%, while that of China rose by 144%. "America is in unprecedented decline," he says. "The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell of American hegemony." The United States has experienced the most significant decline of any state, except the Soviet Union, since the mid-19th century, says Prof. Pape, adding: "Something fundamental has changed." While the U.S. intelligence report predicted a gradual growth in the influence of countries like Brazil, Russia, India and China, they are already starting to assert themselves on the world stage. In September, the Group of Eight leading economic countries agreed to share responsibility for the world economy with the G-20, shifting power to what is known as the BRIC bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China) which already has about 43% of the world's population and nearly a third of its GDP.

## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

**[\_\_] American power is declining. Many combinations of weaker countries can stand up to the United States**

**Robert A. Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University Chicago, 1/22/2009,**  
 "Empire Falls," in National Interest, January 22,  
<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484>

Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.

**[\_\_] Hegemony will decline in the coming years**

**Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M, Summer 2009**

“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1

According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.<sup>19</sup>

## Non-Unique – Hegemony Declining

[ ] American decline is inevitable. It will lose power just like all other empires in history.

**Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the George HW Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, 2009**

“America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived,” in *Review of International Studies* (2009), 35, 5–25

Although there are some nuanced differences among offshore balancing’s proponents, they fundamentally agree on the strategy’s basic premises. First, offshore balancers recognize that one of the few ironclad rules in international politics is that when one great power becomes too powerful – when it bids to achieve hegemony – it is defeated by the counter-balancing efforts of the other major powers in the international system. The history of the modern international state system (which dates back to about 1500) is littered with the wreckage of great powers that tried and failed to achieve geopolitical primacy: the Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Hitler (and, some would argue, under Kaiser Wilhelm II). Failure is the fate of hegemon. The reason is simple: the basic motivation of all major states is to survive, and when one among them threatens to gain preponderant power, the security of the others is threatened. Some primacists believe that the US is immune to being counter-balanced because, as the only great power in a ‘unipolar’ system, it is so much more powerful than its nearest possible competitors.<sup>4</sup> Yet, recent studies by the CIA offer compelling evidence that by 2020 the era of America’s unipolar ascendancy will be drawing to a close as new poles of power in the international system approach the US share of world power.<sup>5</sup> And, of course, growing apprehensions about the military, as well as economic, implications of China’s rapid ascent are – at the very least – an implicit acknowledgment that the days of unchallenged US dominance in world affairs are numbered. Offshore balancers believe the US must adjust to incipient multipolarity because they understand that – unless the US is prepared to fight an unending series of preventive wars – new great powers inevitably will emerge in the next decade or two.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

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[ ] **Obama isn't showing resolve now, he refuses to act boldly on the international stage**

**Charles Krauthammer, Pulitzer prize winning columnist in international affairs, 5/21/10**

“Obama's many retreats signal U.S. weakness,” Washington Post,

<http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/may/21/charles-krauthammer-obamas-many-retreats-signal/?print=1>]

That picture -- a defiant, triumphant take-that-Uncle-Sam -- is a crushing verdict on the Obama foreign policy. It demonstrates how rising powers, traditional American allies, having watched this administration in action, have decided that there's no cost in lining up with America's enemies and no profit in lining up with a U.S. president given to apologies and appeasement. They've watched President Obama's humiliating attempts to appease Iran, as every rejected overture is met with abjectly renewed U.S. negotiating offers. American acquiescence reached such a point that the president was late, hesitant and flaccid in expressing even rhetorical support for democracy demonstrators who were being brutally suppressed and whose call for regime change offered the potential for the most significant U.S. strategic advance in the region in 30 years. They've watched America acquiesce to Russia's re-exerting sway over Eastern Europe, over Ukraine (pressured by Russia last month into extending for 25 years its lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol) and over Georgia (Russia's de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is no longer an issue under the Obama "reset" policy). They've watched our appeasement of Syria, Iran's agent in the Arab Levant -- sending our ambassador back to Syria even as it tightens its grip on Lebanon, supplies Hezbollah with Scuds, and intensifies its role as the pivot of the Iran-Hezbollah-Hamas alliance. The price for this ostentatious flouting of the U.S. and its interests? Ever more eager U.S. "engagement." They've observed the administration's gratuitous slap at Britain over the Falklands, its contemptuous treatment of Israel, its undercutting of the Czech Republic and Poland, and its indifference to Lebanon and Georgia. And in Latin America, they see not just U.S. passivity as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez organizes his anti-American "Bolivarian" coalition while deepening military and commercial ties with Iran and Russia. They saw active U.S. support in Honduras for a pro-Chavez would-be dictator seeking unconstitutional powers in defiance of the democratic institutions of that country. This is not just an America in decline. This is an America in retreat -- accepting, ratifying and declaring its decline, and inviting rising powers to fill the vacuum. Nor is this retreat by inadvertence. This is retreat by design and, indeed, on principle. It's the perfect fulfillment of Obama's adopted Third World narrative of American misdeeds, disrespect and domination from which he has come to redeem us and the world.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

[ ] **North Korea and Iran prove that America has no resolve in the status quo**

**Dick Morris, American political author and commentator, 06/23/09,**

“Obama’s weakness issue”

<http://thehill.com/opinion/columnists/dick-morris/47099-obamas-weakness-issue>

So now, as North Korea defies international sanctions and sends arms to Myanmar and Iran slaughters its citizens in the streets, President Obama looks helpless and hapless. He comes across as not having a clue how to handle the crises. And as North Korea prepares to launch a missile on a Hail Mary pass aimed at Hawaii, the Democrats slash 19 missile interceptors from the Defense Department budget. The transparent appeasement of Iran’s government — and its obvious lack of reciprocation — makes Obama look ridiculous. Long after the mullahs have suppressed what limited democracy they once allowed, Obama’s image problems will persist. While Americans generally applaud Obama’s outreach to the Muslims of the world and think highly of his Cairo speech, they are very dissatisfied with his inadequate efforts to stop Iran from developing — and North Korea from using — nuclear weapons. Clearly, his policies toward these two nations are a weak spot in his reputation. His failure to stand up to either aggressor is of a piece with his virtual surrender in the war on terror. Documented in our new book, *Catastrophe*, we show how he has disarmed the United States and simply elected to stop battling terrorists, freeing them from Guantánamo as he empowers them with every manner of constitutional protection. Obviously, the Iranian democracy demonstrators will not fare any better than their Chinese brethren did in Tiananmen Square. But the damage their brutal suppression will do to the Iranian government is going to be huge. The ayatollahs of Tehran have always sold themselves to the world’s Islamic faithful as the ultimate theocracy, marrying traditional Muslim values with the needs of modern governance. But now, in the wake of the bloodshed, they are revealed as nothing more than military dictators. All the romance is gone, just as it faded in wake of the tanks in Budapest and Prague. All that remains is power. China, of course, fared better after Tiananmen because of its economic miracle. But Iran has no such future on its horizon. The loss of prestige in the Arab world and the end of the pretense of government with popular support will cost Iran dearly. In the meantime, Obama’s pathetic performance vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea cannot but send a message to all of America’s enemies that the president of the United States does not believe in using power — that he is a wimp and they can get away with whatever they want. A dangerous reputation indeed.

## Non-Unique – No Resolve

**Obama’s actions are already emboldening our enemies**

**Tom Skypek, Defense Policy Analyst based in DC. He has written articles for the National Interest and Journal of International Security Affairs, 2/10/2010**

“How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security”  
<http://www.hopeisnotforeignpolicy.org/2010/02/02/how-the-obama-administrations-lack-of-credibility-is-weakening-u-s-national-security/>)

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they’ve been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It’s not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

## No Link

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**[ ] Single-country withdrawals don't link---forward-basing is increasing quickly across the globe**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

The world's failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed \$500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over \$100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

## No Link

[\_\_] Psychology and bias show that leaders do not perceive signs of resolve. Other countries will come up with an excuse to justify the US behavior.

**Michael Dennis and Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI's Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007**  
“Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

What about the flip side of the question: does it follow that standing firm generates reputations of resolve in such an adversary? Mercer points out the tendency for critics to argue how past retreats explain future challenges but rarely consider how past victories fail to deter future challenges.<sup>56</sup> While staying in a conflict may deny opponents confirmatory evidence, this is not always the case. Further, does staying change beliefs or lead to reputations of resolution that will convince militant Islamists to give up the fight? We show that evidence of standing firm does not buy much reputational leverage with militant Islamists, who minimize or deny the firmness in the first place. The reason reputations for resolve do not form in the minds of those with motivated biases against a powerful enemy are the cognitive dissonance it would produce to the general paper tiger image. Biased expectations ensure that expected and actual responses are discounted so that successes and strength are explained away while irresolution is confirmed. Richard Ned Lebow finds in his study of crisis decision-making that desperate leaders insulate themselves and rationalize and interpret events to maintain expectations of success, so that “when goals flew in the face of reality they were not deterred but distorted reality to suit their needs.”<sup>57</sup> Richard Betts cites a “wishfully selective perception” among observers who conclude from U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia as indicative of the United States as a “paper tiger,” while discounting “decisive exercises of power” in Panama, Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan.<sup>58</sup>

## No Internal Link

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[ ] **Credibility is specific to every situation, there's no spillover**

**Michael Dennis and Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI's Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007**

“Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

A third critic of rational deterrence is Daryl Press, whose current calculus theory asserts that “credibility does not hinge on establishing a history of resolute actions”—only interests and power matter.<sup>24</sup> Press insists that credibility rests with situational power and interests rather than past actions.<sup>25</sup> By this view, a withdrawal from Iraq would not affect Islamist perceptions of U.S. resolve in the future. Credibility is case-specific to unique situations, thus making reputations irrelevant. Press suggests that statesmen merely assess interests and power in each specific instance to calculate whether an adversary's threat is credible; if they are strong and have strong interests at stake, the threat is credible regardless of past actions; scant power and interests yield dubious credibility regardless of past actions taken to bolster a reputation for resolve.<sup>26</sup>

[ ] **Studies show lack of resolve in one case doesn't spill over to a broad perception of weakness**

**Christopher Fettweis, Professor at the U.S. Army War College, December 2004,**

“Resolute Eagle or Paper Tiger? Credibility, Reputation and the War on Terror,” online:

[http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67147_index.html)

The few studies that have examined the empirical evidence seem to agree with Mercer. Huth and Russett found few instances when a setback in one arena influenced state behavior in the second.<sup>30</sup> In the most convincing study, Hopf examined over 500 articles and 300 leadership speeches made by Soviet policymakers throughout the 1970s, and found that their public pronouncements did not show evidence of a belief that U.S. setbacks in the Third World signaled a lack of resolution. “The most dominant inference Soviet leaders made after Vietnam,” concluded Hopf, “was not about falling regional dominoes or bandwagoning American allies, but about the prospects of détente with the United States and Western Europe.”<sup>31</sup> Soviet behavior did not change despite the perception of incompetence that many Americans feared would inspire increased belligerence.<sup>32</sup> Despite the loss in Vietnam, no regional dominoes fell. In fact, there is no evidence of an increase in Soviet “adventurism” compared to the fifties and sixties, when U.S. credibility was high.<sup>33</sup> Mercer’s conclusions about reputation seem to have been borne out.

## Link Turn

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**[ ] Even if withdrawing hurts hegemony, the alternative is much worse. The US looks immobile and unwilling to assess its policies**

**Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter, Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, 2009**

“Escaping the ‘Graveyard of Empires’: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan, online:

<http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf>

Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ultimately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.<sup>26</sup> But what we’ve invested in the Afghanistan mission could all fall apart whether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 years from now. In fact, if leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiers from having died in vain, pursuing a losing strategy would not vindicate their sacrifice. And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, much less hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is a losing strategy. Regardless, some people invoke memories of America’s ignominious withdrawals from Vietnam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster support for an open-ended commitment. President Bush in 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnam emboldened today’s terrorists by compromising U.S. credibility. “Here at home,” he said, “some can argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carried no price to American credibility, but the terrorists see things differently.”<sup>27</sup> Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute agrees with that reasoning, writing that “the 1983 withdrawal from Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia a decade later emboldened Islamists who saw the United States as a paper tiger.”<sup>28</sup> When opinion leaders in Washington talk about “lessons learned” from Vietnam, Somalia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typically draw the wrong lesson: not that America should avoid intervening in someone else’s domestic dispute, but that America should never give up after having intervened, no matter what the cost.<sup>29</sup> But the longer we stay and the more money we spend, the more we’ll feel compelled to remain in the country to validate the investment. A similar self-imposed predicament plagued U.S. officials during the war in Vietnam: After 1968 it became increasingly clear that the survival of the [government of 7 If leaving would make America look weak, trying to stay indefinitely while accomplishing little would appear even worse. South Vietnam] was not worth the cost of securing it, but by then the United States had another rationale for staying— prestige and precedent setting. The United States said the [South Vietnamese government] would stand, and even those in the administration now long convinced of the hollowness of the domino argument could agree that a U.S. failure in South Vietnam might endanger vital US national interests elsewhere or in the future.<sup>30</sup> For decades, the fear of America losing the world’s respect after withdrawing from a conflict has been instrumental in selling the American public bad foreign policy.

## No Impact

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**[ ] American military presence does not create peace overseas. The negative overstates the importance of forward deployment**

**Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sapolsky, Department of Political Science at MIT, International Security, "America's Strategic Choices" v21 n4, 1997, p. 30-32**

Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.[70] These analysts fear that American military retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model.

## No Impact

[ ] **As long as tangible power exists the US will remain the hegemony**

**Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007,**

“End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online:

<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>

By the same token, foreign policy failures do not necessarily undermine predominance. Some have suggested that failure in Iraq would mean the end of predominance and unipolarity. But a superpower can lose a war — in Vietnam or in Iraq — without ceasing to be a superpower if the fundamental international conditions continue to support its predominance. So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance as it has consistently for six decades, and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain as the Chinese describe it: one superpower and many great powers.

[ ] **There’s no such thing as credibility or resolve, other countries always make conservative assumptions about opponents’ intentions**

**Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005,**

“Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that reputation cannot form in conflicts because of the anarchical nature of international politics. Because of its simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer's. Anarchy remains the defining feature of international politics, so states operate within an environment of uncertainty. Anarchy produces "a strong sense of peril and doom"<sup>62</sup> and "a conservative tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worst plausible cause terms."<sup>63</sup> States have to consistently assume the worst possible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.<sup>64</sup> This "worst-case mentality" has major implications for reputation under anarchy on at least two fronts.<sup>65</sup> Foremost, because a state's security ultimately depends on self-help, the worst-case mentality means that a state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be irresolute. Essentially, this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and reputation becomes impossible to develop under anarchy. A state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its adversaries by either backing down or standing firm in a conflict, because its adversaries will always assume the state to be resolute (the baseline image) in the next conflict. By the same token, a state cannot lose nor gain reputation among its allies by their backing down or standing firm in a conflict, for its allies will always assume the state to be irresolute in the next conflict. A state is assigned its baseline image by its adversaries and allies at the beginning of a crisis, and no past behavior can change that image ex ante.<sup>66</sup>

## Impact Turn

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**[ ] A strategy of offshore balancing, where the United States withdraws troops from overseas would make the world more stable and keep the US out of potential conflicts**

**Stephen Walt, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 3/10/2005**  
(In the National Interest; A New Grand Strategy for American Foreign Policy. Boston Review. Lexis)

The final option is offshore balancing, which has been America's traditional grand strategy. In this strategy, the United States deploys its power abroad only when there are direct threats to vital American interests. Offshore balancing assumes that only a few areas of the globe are of strategic importance to the United States (that is, worth fighting and dying for). Specifically, the vital areas are the regions where there are substantial concentrations of power and wealth or critical natural resources: Europe, industrialized Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing further recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor. To prevent rival great powers from doing this, offshore balancing prefers to rely primarily on local actors to uphold the regional balance of power. Under this strategy, the United States would intervene with its own forces only when regional powers are unable to uphold the balance of power on their own. Most importantly, offshore balancing is not isolationist. The United States would still be actively engaged around the world, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO and through close ties with specific regional allies. But it would no longer keep large numbers of troops overseas solely for the purpose of "maintaining stability," and it would not try to use American military power to impose democracy on other countries or disarm potential proliferators. Offshore balancing does not preclude using power for humanitarian ends--to halt or prevent genocide or mass murder--but the United States would do so only when it was confident it could prevent these horrors at an acceptable cost. (By limiting military commitments overseas, however, an offshore-balancing strategy would make it easier for the United States to intervene in cases of mass murder or genocide.) The United States would still be prepared to use force when it was directly threatened--as it was when the Taliban allowed al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan--and would be prepared to help other governments deal with terrorists that also threaten the United States. Over time, a strategy of offshore balancing would make it less likely that the United States would face the hatred of radicals like bin Laden, and would thus make it less likely that the United States would have to intervene in far-flung places where it is not welcome. Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more for us. Equally important, it takes advantage of America's favorable geopolitical position and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy and does not preclude using the full range of America's power to advance its core interests.

## Impact Turn

### [ ] Hegemony draws us into wars, instead of keeping areas stable

**Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M, 2006**

The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 169)

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example, a non-great power war on the Korean Peninsula-even if nuclear weapons were not involved-would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

### [ ] Reducing overseas military presence will prevent overstretch and conflicts with other countries

**Chalmers Johnson, retired professor of Asian Studies at the University of California, San Diego, 7/30/2009**

[<http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175101>]

However ambitious President Barack Obama's domestic plans, one unacknowledged issue has the potential to destroy any reform efforts he might launch. Think of it as the 800-pound gorilla in the American living room: our longstanding reliance on imperialism and militarism in our relations with other countries and the vast, potentially ruinous global empire of bases that goes with it. The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment and the profligate use of it in missions for which it is hopelessly inappropriate will, sooner rather than later, condemn the United States to a devastating trio of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war, and insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the former Soviet Union. According to the 2008 official Pentagon inventory of our military bases around the world, our empire consists of 865 facilities in more than 40 countries and overseas U.S. territories. We deploy over 190,000 troops in 46 countries and territories. In just one such country, Japan, at the end of March 2008, we still had 99,295 people connected to U.S. military forces living and working there -- 49,364 members of our armed services, 45,753 dependent family members, and 4,178 civilian employees. Some 13,975 of these were crowded into the small island of Okinawa, the largest concentration of foreign troops anywhere in Japan. These massive concentrations of American military power outside the United States are not needed for our defense. They are, if anything, a prime contributor to our numerous conflicts with other countries. They are also unimaginably expensive. According to Anita Dancs, an analyst for the website Foreign Policy in Focus, the United States spends approximately \$250 billion each year maintaining its global military presence. The sole purpose of this is to give us hegemony -- that is, control or dominance -- over as many nations on the planet as possible.

## Impact Turn

[\_\_] **Security competition between countries as a result of US withdrawal would be good for the US. Other countries would focus on each other and the US would become more powerful**

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An offshore balancing strategy would be grounded on the assumption that relative economic power matters. Domestic economic revitalization and a neomercantilist international economic policy would be integral components of the strategy. The strategy, however, also would seek to maximize U.S. relative power by capitalizing on its geostrategically privileged position. If the United States adopted an offshore balancing strategy, security competitions almost certainly would occur in East Asia and Europe. The United States would be the primary beneficiary of these rivalries between (among) the other great powers in the emerging multipolar system. Noninsular states' constant worry about possible threats from nearby neighbors is a factor that historically has increased the relative power position of insular states.<sup>87</sup> Offshore balancing thus would be a more sophisticated power-maximizing strategy than preponderance: the United States would be able to enhance its relative power without having to confront rivals directly. Great powers that stand on the sidelines while their peers engage in security competitions and conflict invariably gain in relative power.<sup>88</sup> Multipolarity challenges strategists because a state can be threatened by more than a single adversary. It is often unclear which of potential multiple rivals poses the most salient threat, whether measured in terms of capabilities, intentions, or time. In East Asia, where China and Japan are emerging great powers, the United States confronts this dilemma of multiple rivals. Offshore balancing is the classic grand strategic response of an insular great power facing two (or more) potential peer competitors in the same region. As an offshore balancer, the United States would increase its relative power against both China and Japan by letting them compete and balance against, and contain, each other.<sup>8</sup>